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INTRODUCTION

A couple of decades ago, some scholars and critics had the idea of 
gathering people together in one spot, for a few days, to talk about 
a writer whom many people regard as either the greatest writer of 
the twentieth century, or the most influential, or both. With a touch 
of veneration (more on that later), they wanted for James Joyce what 
Simon Dedalus calls in Ulysses "a symposium all his own"—and, 
as he also puts it, the devil wouldn't stop them. 
They went to Dublin that first year, and for a long time the 
James Joyce Foundation, which sponsors and runs what came to be 
called the International James Joyce Symposia, kept to the tradition 
of holding them only in cities in which Joyce himself had lived for 
an extended period of time. Given Joyce's comparatively nomadic 
life, that would seem to provide a goodly number of choices. Even 
so, it obviously became unnecessarily or even pedantically limiting. 
So the tradition was broken; and when the invitation to hold 
a Symposium in Copenhaghen in 1986 was issued, it was eagerly 
accepted. Certainly the timing was right: for the conference, always 
held around Bloomsday, came within a few weeks, as well, of the 
fiftieth anniversary of Joyce's own visit to Copenhagen. 
There was also a more general appropriateness in the conference 
being held in the capital city of the Danes who founded the capital 
city of Ireland in the first place: for to Joyce, Ireland itself seemed 
a sort of offshoot of Scandinavia. As he wrote in "Ireland, Island 
of Saints and Sages" in 1907, the original Scandinavians did not 
leave Ireland, "but were gradually assimilated into the community, 
a fact we must keep in mind if we want to understand the curious 
character of the modern Irishman." 
At the very start of his literary career, Joyce made clear the 
importance to him of Scandinavian literature—and especially of 
Henrik Ibsen. His first notable publication was, after all, on "Ibsen's 
New Drama," When We Dead Awaken. But even before that he 
had written about Ibsen in his "epiphanies," in one of which Ibsen 
is called "the greatest man in the world." Later, in 1907, Stanislaus 
Joyce recorded in his diary that "Jim told me that he is going to 
expand his story 'Ulysses' into a short book and make a Dublin 
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'Peer Gynt' of it ." And in Finnegans Wake we have numerous 
"peers and gints, quaysirs and gallyliers, fresk letties from the say 
and stale headygabblers, gaingangers and dudder wagoners, pullars 
off societies and pushers on rothmere's homes." 
So Joyce's connection with what the "Ballad of Persse O'Reilly" 
calls "Scandiknavery" has long been acknowledged. For decades, 
scholars—especially, of course, Scandinavian scholars, displaying what 
the Wake more positively calls "domfine norsemanship"—have also 
chronicled the influence of Joyce on later Nordic writers. All that 
kept coming up, again and again, during the week-long gathering 
in the city the Wake calls "the cope of heaven." 
To have reached the milestone of a Tenth International James 
Joyce Symposium also means that we have passed through a succession 
of James Joyces along the way. As Fritz Senn implies in his provocative 
address "named" "Joyce the Verb," there are as many meanings to 
the word Joyce, the name Joyce, as there are to that strange word 
"Joycean." As a community of Joyceans (scholars and readers, teachers 
and students, translators and enthusiasts) have redefined themselves 
in various ways over the past two decades of coming together 
internationally, "coping" with Joyce has come to have a meaning 
beyond the wordplay that associates it with Copenhagen. 
Three distinct approaches have previously been apparent to 
many who have attended these Symposia and the many other Joyce 
conferences and seminars that have proliferated across the world 
during the 1970s and 1980s. "Venerating" Joyce has long been in 
evidence, and can still be noticed on occasion: it has made Joyce an 
insurmountable obstacle, a totem for adulation, which if it has not 
actually impeded interpretation has at least set the first and forming 
condition, that Joyce was a genius and in such full control of his 
material and techniques that his intentions could only be surmised. 
Veneration has met with skepticism by the younger generation of 
Joyceans, some of whom have even avoided the name Joycean for 
fear that it implies unquestioning adulation. In addition, recent 
theoretical assumptions that all authors lack the authority that resides 
either in the text or with the reader have made veneration—even of 
Joyce—uncomfortable. Nonetheless, all of those who approach the 
Joyce texts find themselves having to contend with the redoubtable 
presence of James Joyce. 
Joyceans have also had to face charges of "exploiting" Joyce, a 
concern recently brought forward (at the Symposia and in the media) 
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by Joyce's grandson, Stephen Joyce. The institutionalization of what 
has been called The Joyce Industry has been responsible for the vast 
amount of scholarship and criticism filling library shelves, the organ­
izational self-propagation through a series of periodicals—two or three 
seem always to be in circulation—and the self-identification of a 
Joycean community made most noticeable by the biannual Interna­
tional Symposia. Stephen Joyce has been particularly offended by 
the selling of blue-and-white neckties and other such paraphernalia 
at the Joyce Museum in Sandycove, a "commercialization" of James 
Joyce that after all was intended to help keep a small and unique 
museum in operation. That James Joyce was in danger of becoming 
a commodity in which speculative shares were being bought and sold 
has bothered Joyceans and others not immediately related to Joyce 
himself. Yet, since most Joyceans work in the academic marketplace— 
whose companies rarely appear in the Blue Chips board and where 
the stakes are usually embarrassingly low—the idea of Joycean aca­
demics getting rich on their investments is easily dismissed. But the 
idea of exploiting Joyce in less obvious ways, of living Joyce's life 
vicariously, has caused some degree of unease within the community. 
The mere specter of exploitation, however, has had the effect of 
reevaluating the scholar's relationship to the subject—and especially 
the motivations of those who have elected to involve themselves with 
so prominent a subject. 
Perhaps the most audacious approach to that subject over the 
years has been the intention of "mastering" Joyce, of viewing the 
texts as capable of yielding up their secrets to the overpowering 
ingenuity of highly skilled practitioners of the Joycean craft. This 
conquistadore attitude made itself apparent fairly early, long before 
the first of the Joyce Symposia brought a working community 
together. It has its touch of Faustian audacity, each alchemist working 
alone and almost in secret to find the touchstone that would open 
up the formidable door, each cryptographer intent on breaking the 
code. Rumors circulated that certain scholars had found the central 
motif of Finnegans Wake, that the "grand design" would soon be 
disclosed, that a central thesis would be expounded. Others guarded 
their findings jealously, hinting at what they now knew but refusing 
to be specific for fear of having their discoveries appropriated. The 
coming together of a Joycean grouping in regular attendance at the 
Symposia has done much to dissipate the incipient paranoia, although 
it has also occasionally contributed to the heady atmosphere in which 
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Joyceans felt all the more assured of the inevitability (or at least the 
possibility) of mastering Joyce. Concentrated assault, under a corps 
of generals, replaced more individualistic forays, and the pooling of 
knowledge made for a more democratic campaign. Joyce has withstood 
the onslaught and has no more been mastered than has Nature, and 
as with Nature, neither exploitation nor veneration has contributed 
to mastery, an unlocking of secrets. Instead, we have come to the 
realization that "coping" with Joyce remains viable and productive— 
and perhaps even valuable. 
Diversity and complexity, therefore, characterize the eighteen 
essays in this volume, representative of the numerous presentations 
and the prevalent ambiance of the Tenth International James Joyce 
Symposium. Describing them, much less classifying them, proves to 
be difficult, although arranging them in a reading order suggested 
itself very easily. The first five essays were major addresses at the 
Symposium, and, characteristic of such addresses, they all assume 
some sort of overview of the Joyce texts or of the Joycean perspective. 
The litany of these perspectives is almost in itself Joycean (or at least 
Shakespearean): historical, biographical, cultural, thematic, linguistic, 
textual, sexual—a plethora of Joyces (venerators would have said a 
"pantheon of Joyces")—with whom to cope. Thereafter, the chro­
nology of the Joyce texts determines the order, from Dubliners to 
Exiles and then very rapidly to Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. The 
aspects of diversity/complexity, however, make discreet classifications 
at times impossible, since it has become increasingly apparent that 
Joyce's texts interleaf with each other, depend on each other, 
complement each other, extend each other. Margot Norris's opening 
essay establishes the intricacy and significance of that intertextuality: 
she reads the Wake "through" the other Joyce works and reads it 
as an organic text with the generating powers of a flower, Joyce's 
designated heliotrope. The answer to the riddle of desire in the 
Wake's "mime," and the narrative structure of the riddle, reside in 
the thematic heliotrope that derives from Nausicaa and "The Dead," 
coloring each of the texts, turning toward each of the texts. 
The quest for Joyce takes Colbert Kearney to Cork and Robert 
Scholes to Italy, has Bernard Benstock investigating plaques, street 
signs, and tombstones, and Fritz Senn investigating Greek and Latin 
grammar. Kearney locates Joyce among the Joyces of Cork, the father, 
grandfather, great-grandfather, as well as the marriage to an O'Con­
nell, the building up of a Joycead that James Joyce contributed to 
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in the history of his fiction. If Kearney exhumes the ancestors, Scholes 
exhumes Joyce's contemporaries, those involved as Joyce was with 
European socialism, and the divergent paths youthful socialism took 
for Joyce and others at the beginning of the twentieth century, as 
well as the cross-currents of politics and aesthetics. Each identifies a 
complex Joyce within the diversification and complexity of human 
history. Benstock carries that reading of history into the human 
family, determining landmarks noted by Joyce as he read the runic 
indicators to the history of the race in the individual. And Senn 
sifts through Joyce's own runes, deciding on the Joycean process of 
naming, the use of active and passive voices and the finding of a 
mediating way, a middle voice, between the fixity of nouns and the 
activity of verbs. Senns concept of such mediation should in turn 
be read against Scholes's notation of Joyce's middle road between 
naturalism and aestheticism. As Norris reads the old stories as 
providing structures to make new ones, the other four authors of 
major addresses read the old stories of family and influences, linguistic 
and epigrammatic structures underlying Joyce's contributions. 
A discernible change in Joyce studies, reflected in this collection 
of essays, is not only the concentration on Ulysses and Finnegans 
Wake, but especially the concern with that latter text. What some 
have suspected for a long time has now become a widely accepted 
view: that ignoring the Wake when coping with Joyce seriously limits 
the range of Joycean perspectives. New theoretical approaches in 
particular have paid prominent attention to Finnegans Wake, a text 
that is at least as challenging as the complexities and diversities of 
critical theories. Perhaps the suspension of the awe with which Joyce 
has too often been surrounded, the veneration of genius that kept 
the Wake as a sacred book to be honored but not approached, as 
well as the suspension of the notion that it is a text that must be 
mastered and rendered up to explication, have opened Finnegans 
Wake for new considerations. And frequently one finds that a 
coupling of Ulysses and the Wake within the same essay makes for 
a kind of double reading, the "easier" text providing an entry into 
the more difficult one, the earlier text providing a quite different 
perspective on some obscure activity of the later text. 
Identifying the diverse/complex James Joyce in his various guises 
and in his various capacities highlights Coping with Joyce as a group 
of divergent essays. Historically, Joyce emerges as a product of his 
genetic world, an early movie-goer whose retina recorded the flickering 
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of screen images allowing for a translation of that new and awkward 
medium into the magical transformations and quick changes of the 
Circe chapter. Politically he presents himself as a victim of a colonial 
policy toward his native land that colors his socialist ideals and causes 
him to espouse Irish nationalism while rejecting the theocratic state 
it has engendered. Culturally he is viewed as a central figure of a 
male modernism with which he was uncomfortable, preferring to 
move outside the masculine vortex that proves to be politically 
reactionary as well, and the Joyce now identifiable as the "womanly 
man" also has claims as a feminist opposed to the masculine 
modernist hegemony. 
Correspondingly, Joyce has never lost his identity as the con­
summate artist, but new facets of his artistry have become apparent 
under recent examinations, especially with new materials of exami­
nation. Joyce as a creator of systems magnified the proportions of 
his ambitious range, and new credence is given to his role as rival 
to the god of creation, an anti-Babelist, for example, creating a 
"mediating" language rather than mediating between languages, 
repeating in the Wake the dispersal of linguistic controls that 
challenges "mastery." Often it is in his diachronic role, manipulating 
the words as well as the music under his specific signature, that the 
dualistic powers of creativity become established: condemned by his 
earliest and most severe critic as a "schoolmaster," he shows himself 
as a pedagogue of self-instruction, providing the means by which his 
readers teach themselves how to read the texts. As a worker in 
language, he can work the formal and fixed forms of speech in active 
relationship with colloquial and spontaneous modes of human ex­
pression. And as a writer credited with being the chronicler of 
everyday life in Ulysses, he simultaneously demonstrates his power 
as a mythmaker and esotericist, producing in Ulysses a perfectly 
heterogeneous text. 
The essays collected in this volume not only mark a certain 
moment in the history of "coping" with Joyce but raise some new 
questions about the terms of that coping. The resulting volume is 
symptomatic of Joycean concerns: 1) reading the effects of Joyce's 
presence and participation in a Modernism that is itself being reread 
and revised through various lenses—socialist, feminist, deconstruc­
tionist, psychoanalytic; 2) defining both the aesthetics and ideologies 
of Modernism in terms of Joyce; 3) reading Joyce's texts through 
each other, with new interest in organic metaphors of Joycean textual 
Introduction 
construction and with particular attention to the ways in which the 
individual works, taken together, form a textual fabric—overlapped, 
interwoven, seamed, signed by knots and marked by holes; 4) being 
aware of Joycean pedagogy, a study of all facets of the notion of 
the pedagogic, both within and outside of the texts proper; 5) 
creating (or recognizing) rhetorical and grammatical readings of Joyce's 
texts that focus on the ruptures in textual logic. What is evident in 
this collection, and was in evidence in Copenhagen as well, is that 
the Joyce "industry" is caught in a moment of self-evaluation, a 
heliotropic turn to questioning the contexts in which we have for so 
long situated Joyce's texts, with a backward glance reflected in both 
irony and nostalgia at a time when our mutual goal was easily 
defined but difficult to reach: that is, to "master" the Joycean 
oeuvre. We have conceded the game, but—in a kind of wily, 
polytropic gesture—refused to admit defeat. Like Leopold Bloom, 
and Odysseus before him, we cope. 
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1 
Joyce's Heliotrope 
MARGOTNORRIS 
Heliotrope, the answer to the riddle of desire in Finnegans Wake, is 
a privileged figure in Joyce's work. It is an overdetermined figure, a 
word that means many things at once and yet points to only one 
thing: desire. A heliotrope is any flower that assumes a desirous 
attitude, that turns toward the sun, like a marigold or a sunflower. 
But it is also a specific flower, a fragrant, purple annual called 
heliotrope, whose sweet scent draws people toward it in a desirous 
movement. As parts of its whole, heliotrope is the light purple or 
reddish lavender color of the heliotrope, and, of course, its perfume, 
the desirable parts of the desirable whole. Heliotrope is another name 
for the gem with the oxymoronic alternative name of bloodstone. 
Heliotropism is a gesture of turning toward the sun—a gesture whose 
form is a dance or a movement in a desirous ballet. As a gesture or 
a signal, heliotrope is implicated in nonverbal language or pantomime, 
for it functions as a signal that refers us to acts and gestures rather 
than speech—including speech acts rather than the semantic content 
of discourse. A heliotrope is a signaling device using mirrors to reflect 
the rays of the sun: a semiological technique reflected in Joyce's works 
when its heliotropic references and gestures mirror and reflect each 
other in a thematics of desire. In all these ways, heliotrope functions 
as a trope, a metaphor or figure of the movement of longing, reaching, 
turning, communicating, and dancing that signifies desire. As all 
these things, in the plenitude of its overdetermination, and with its 
significatory function, heliotrope is the answer to the riddle of desire 
not only in "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies" in Finnegans 
Wake, but in Joyce's oeuvres as a whole. 
By serving as the answer to a riddle, heliotrope functions as an 
intellectual paradigm and suggests a model of reading Joyce's work 
that is unconventional both in its procedures and its goals, for a 
heliotropic reading of Joyce keeps its eye on the pantomime (rather 
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than its ear on the speech) and works to decipher nonverbal semiol­
ogies. It is a Shaunian rather than a Shemian mode of reading—not 
surprisingly, since Shaun (or Chuff, the angel in the "Mime") suc­
cessfully solves the riddle of desire, while Shem (the devil, Glugg) 
fails. The basis of "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies" is 
a children's guessing game called "Angels and Devils or colours," 
that Joyce described to Harriet Shaw Weaver like this: "The Angels, 
girls, are grouped behind the Angel, Shawn, and the Devil has to 
come over three times and ask for a colour, if the colour he asks for 
has been chosen by any girl she has to run and he tries to catch her. 
As far as I have written he has come twice and been twice baffled."1 
Since clues to the answer of the riddle are embedded in gestures, 
flowers, colors, dances, charades, and the like, guessing the answer 
requires talent at reading the signs of nonverbal languages—the reason, 
presumably, why the spirit of Marcel Jousse hovers over the chapter 
(Weir). It was James Atherton who suggested that Joyce intended the 
Pantomime as a metaphor for Finnegans Wake as a whole, and indeed, 
if one thinks of the pantomime as a carnival of nonsense, of discred­
ited, devalued, partial, truncated language whose subtraction of sense 
is designed to produce delight and pleasure, one has a fair description 
of the text of Finnegans Wake. As the product of an intellectual knot 
or puzzle, may heliotrope not reveal something hidden and disre­
garded—perhaps the desirous or libidinal aspect ("Angelinas, hide 
from light those hues that your sin beau may bring to light! [FW 
233.5]) of intellectual activity? Is there not in the act of reading 
Finnegans Wake, in our desire for intellectual intimacy, our movement 
toward intellectual closure, our longing to possess its meaning, some­
thing of a heliotropic motion? 
Joyce adds to the children's guessing game a small erotic twist. 
It is not only the little girls' colors, but the colors of their panties 
the boy angels must guess. The game thereby becomes a ritual of 
courtship and seduction, and the operatic analogues Joyce introduces 
into the "Mime" 's texture—the religious quest of Parsifal and the 
dangerous guessing game of Turandot (Hodgart)—serve to elevate the 
sense of the stakes in the riddle of desire, and to illuminate the logic 
of the repressions that produce its frustration. Perhaps this is what 
makes my claims for the heliotropism of the Joycean text seem so 
heretical. The best authorities have denied or denounced its pleasure: 
Judge Woolsey, who legally and officially denied the aphrodisiac 
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quality of Ulysses, and Stephen Dedalus, who terms the kinetic 
response to art pornographic, when it incites desire. The desirous 
nature of reading, the amorous or erotic relationship with the Joycean 
text, has been primordially tabooed. For Stephen, indeed, the aesthetic 
text is like a Freudian primal scene, that is, a view of the parental 
copulation or of the mother's body, that mandates the denial and 
repression of desire, and thereby becomes the site of misreading. 
Stephen philosophically interrogates his origin in the parental copu­
lation— "They clasped and sundered, did the coupler's will" (3.47)— 
but by subtracting from his imaginings all feeling, all libido, all 
pleasure, his theories of love remain as sterile as his theories of 
aesthetics, from which he likewise amputates the kinetic, the vital, 
the libidinal, the erotic element. It is Stephen, I believe, who is 
parodied in the "Homework" chapter of Finnegans Wake, as one of 
the little boys who study the "whome" of their "eternal geomater," 
the mother's genitalia (whose veiled and infantile form were the 
colored panties) armed with surveyor's equipment, diagrams, and 
mathematical calculations. They may indeed succeed in mapping her 
geometrical surface (Solomon, Brown)—but at the risk of missing the 
erotic point. The "Homework" chapter of Finnegans Wake serves as 
a caveat to the reader of the Joycean text, and especially to the reader 
of Finnegans Wake. Approaching that work with theories, diagrams, 
numerology, and other systems, may yield much information, but at 
the price of missing the pleasure of the text. 
Because it is apt to be disconcerting to find ourselves heliotrop­
ically reflected in the signaling mirror of criticism as pleasure-seeking 
readers, I chose an unconventional form for exploring the riddle of 
desire in Joyce's work. Instead of a scholarly anatomy or a theoretical 
dissection of desirous reading, I chose to do a dramatization. I 
transformed the Joycean text into a valentine for Joyce lovers: a 
romantic collage of hearts, flowers, candy, and cupids—sentimental 
and decorative, insipid and intellectually retrograde—with the bland 
wit and easy puzzling that Bloom (kinetic poet), the master of the 
valentine, sent to Miss Marion (Molly) Tweedy on the 14 February 
1888— 
Poets oft have sung in rhyme 
Of music sweet their praise divine. 
Let them hymn it nine times nine. 
Dearer far than song or wine. 
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You are mine. The world is mine. 
(17.410—16) 
It is offered with affection and a twinkle of the eye in the hope of 
seducing readers to the fond delusions woven into the more somber 
naturalistic hues of the Joycean text. If Joycean women suffer brutal 
lives of "commonplace sacrifices closing in final craziness" ("Eveline" 
40; Bauerle, Devlin), they also have their heliotropic moments: "So 
she had had that romance in her life: a man had died for her sake" 
("The Dead" 222). These pleasures and gratifications are virtually 
always retrospective and textualized, represented as tender moments 
from the past encoded as personal myth and nostalgic history. These 
romantic fictions are no more and no less emotionally authentic and 
significant than women's suffering, and their retrieval is a legitimate 
critical enterprise even when, as in this instance, it elides their dark 
frame. The Joycean text can be wielded in many ways and with many 
intentions by critics, and Finnegans Wake, especially, is easily flour­
ished cruelly, as a punishment to teach the confident reader humility 
and diffidence before the indomitable text. I choose to flourish it 
like a fan, or a bouquet, in the hope of charming the reader with 
the text's poesy. If this retrieval of the discredited feminine—both in 
my critical gesture and in the feminization to which I plan to subject 
the text—seems hopelessly regressive, I would suggest that it is not 
only the male writer and thinker who may appropriate the figure of 
"woman" and the disguise of the "feminine" to explore transpor­
tations into states of "otherness" (Jardine, Spivak). I intend it, in 
this instance, only as a momentary and playful masquerade, and I 
ask readers to remember that my subject, the heliotrope, is, after all, 
embedded in a Pantomime. 
I begin my floral rehabilitation of Finnegans Wake by suggesting 
the flower as an alternative to the architectural and geometrical 
metaphors that have historically dominated our thinking about its 
structure. Implicit in the hope of finding a "skeleton key" to 
Finnegans Wake (Campbell and Robinson), for example, is not only 
its depiction as a chamber or a building whose entry would ensure 
intelligibility. This architectural notion also tends to imply a logical 
and systematic construction on Joyce's part, from which a coherent 
aesthetic and narrative structure can be deduced. This model further 
produces such ancillary structural concepts as the architectural hier­
archization of textual effects: the illusion that one can separate 
structure and embellishment.7 As an alternative to this mode of 
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thinking the Wake architecturally, I suggest the flower as a textual 
model that is organic and generational. Flowers are not designed by 
a mind or constructed by hand, but grow out of other flowers, and 
their structure is therefore neither logical nor systematic, but evolu­
tionary, created unconsciously out of others of their kind, under the 
sway of the exigencies of necessity in the interest of survival. Even 
if our study of the production techniques of Finnegans Wake were 
to show that Joyce indeed worked rationally and systematically at its 
construction, I would argue that the text represents not his mind, 
the actual working author's mind, but a different mind, an intuitively 
and emotionally remembering mind absorbed in its history, and 
impelled not by architectural ambitions but by the psychological 
necessities of desire. Flowers grow out of other flowers, and if we 
picture Finnegans Wake as stories that grow organically, unconsciously, 
out of older stories, stories already contained in the earlier Joycean 
texts, we can see its structure as floral: petals enfolding other petals— 
invaginated (Derrida)—to use the botanical term that preserves the 
female resonance, the erotic allusion. The amorous undertone of this 
structural metaphor is quite helpful for illuminating the emotional 
gesture implicit in the remembering of old stories, particularly the 
preservation and enfolding of old stories, as constituting a kind of 
narrative embrace, a textual act of love. Figuratively, Finnegans Wake 
is a flower or a bouquet embedded in a female imagination.3 Joyce 
gives us an image of such an invaginated text representing a female 
imagination in Molly Bloom's soliloquy, which is a bouquet of love 
stories that enfolds the tales of many flowers, rhododendrons on 
Howth Hill, poppies for her birthday, a wish for a room swimming 
in roses, and the most precious of all, a poetic flower of the 
mountain, remembered and enfolded in Molly's heart. 
How does one read a floral text, particularly a lush and bountiful 
garden, like "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies" in 
Finnegans Wake} One reads not only about a pantomime riddle, 
but one begins to interpret the silent gestures and signs themselves 
in their overdetermined multiplicity. Because the languages acted out 
in the chapter are children's languages, primitive verbal and musical 
languages full of rhymes and rhythms and preverbal visual and 
symbolic languages, they require a sensual interpretive mode. Reading 
the language of perfume or flowers or color in the "Mime" is less 
a matter of decoding them according to some conventional archaic 
system, a scholarly foray into arcane flower symbolisms, than the 
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exercise of an intuitive aesthetic response armed with a finely tuned 
sense memory for hues of color, redolence of perfume, delicacy of 
texture, and a gift for recapturing the pleasures they produce. The 
reader of the "Mime" must, I believe, cultivate an erotic herme­
neutics. Such an enterprise requires access to the workings of infantile 
logic—whose best model is still supplied by the theories of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. For the purpose of pursuing the heliotrope in Joyce's 
work, I will borrow only one of its procedures: free association. It 
functions both rhetorically and hermeneutically in the Wake, I 
believe, as symbolic codes are created by free association, and its 
exercise by the reader makes their interpretation possible. In practical 
terms, it is, of course, not a private free association that the reader 
practices (of what colors and fragrances and flavors remind us) but 
a literary free association, a remembrance of the remembrances of 
Joycean figures in their experiences with the aesthetics of love and 
seduction. 
We could, of course, learn all this from Molly Bloom as well 
as Freud. For if a floral text works like a woman's mind—a woman's 
mind, that is, when occupied with the figurations of her emotional 
life—then its technique of free association is simply a way of 
remembering that is impelled by desire, and a way of selecting and 
combining that is motivated by pleasure. When Molly moves from 
hill to hill, from man to man, from kiss to kiss in her imagination, 
she constructs neither a system, nor a lesson, nor a linear narrative, 
but a floral gyre of amorous experience that signifies no more and 
no less than does the language of a flower, whose heliotropism 
bespeaks only the subtle rhythms of its own vitality. Insofar as Joyce's 
heliotrope is my lure, the riddle of desire I hope to solve and the 
object of desire that leads me along a trail of amorous musings in 
Joycean characters, I inscribe a critical heliotropism in my text. My 
procedure becomes as overdetermined and multiplicitous as heliotrope 
itself, as the trail crosses over characterological and textual bounda­
ries—like the word "heliotrope" transgressing semantic boundaries 
to live, like desire itself, in a space of indeterminacy. I pursue 
heliotrope along a concentric journey into the old love stories of 
Joycean figures, on a route that leads from "The Mime of Mick, 
Nick, and the Maggies" to "Nausicaa," and from there on to "The 
Dead"—then back again from the "Mime" to an elided moment 
in Portrait. Only then does the invagination of the "Mime" 's 
structure become clearly visible, as an experience from Stephen's 
childhood that was repressed and forgotten, a moment absolutely 
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interiorized, becomes dramatized and exteriorized, outer, in the 
pantomimic forms of the "Mime." 
I'll begin my heliotropic pursuit of heliotrope with its fragrance, 
because it signifies the insubstantiality of heliotrope that seems so 
disproportional to its emotional power, its status as a kind of "trace," 
an effaced sign always there and yet not there, mysterious and elusive, 
invested in hints and suggestions like the word "heliotrope" in the 
"Mime." I first follow its redolent trail to an imaginary appearance 
in "Nausicaa," where it surfaces embedded in a riddle with three 
guesses, ostensibly as a wrong guess. "Wait. Hm. Hm. Yes. That's 
her perfume," Bloom thinks, as he catches a whiff of Gerty 
MacDowell's sachet. "What is it? Heliotrope? No. Hyacinth? Hm. 
Roses, I think." (13.1007). Gerty's perfume ambushes Bloom at a 
critical moment, as he speculates on the secret of desire in what 
seems like his usual, casual, pseudoscientific way—that yet masks the 
personal anxiety and painful urgency of the new cuckold who fears 
he has lost it. Gerty's perfume diverts Bloom from a fruitless foray 
into the positivism of physics, explaining sexual attraction as molecular 
magnetism ("Fork and steel. Molly, he" [13.993]), and puts him 
on the right track by putting him on the scent of the scent, as it 
were. Bloom's empirical models are inadequate to the mystery of 
desire because desire is premised on a lack and structured around a 
palpable absence. Once he leaves off science and follows the subjective 
colorations of his aesthetic imagination, he begins to explain the 
chemistry of perfume and of female fragrance in diaphanous imagery 
that oscillates between presence and absence: "Tell you what it is. 
It's like a fine fine veil or web they have all over the skin, fine like 
what do you call it gossamer, and they re always spinning it out of 
them, fine as anything, like rainbow colours without knowing it" 
(13.1019). Bloom comes much closer here to solving the riddle of 
desire than does little Glugg or Shem in the "Mime," for he 
understands the synesthetic ambiguities of eroticism, the sensuous 
response to essences as evanescent as the fragrances of flowers, the 
prismatic colors of the rainbow, the impalpable textures of gossamer— 
the whole range of responses to beauties on the edge of substantiality 
that prefigures the overdetermination of "heliotrope" in the 
"Mime"—suspended as it is between color, fragrance, substance, 
and gesture. 
It is ironic that the heliotropic gestures of other women—Gerty 
opening to him and revealing her "roses," as it were—stimulate 
Blooms' own heliotropism toward Molly. This mirroring effect of 
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desire that generates many displaced versions, and demonstrates that, 
even if he is a Flower, one woman's sun (her object of desire) can 
be another woman's Bloom (or desiring subject), enacts the sense of 
heliotrope as a reflecting solar signaling device. It is Martha Clifford 
who produces a heliotropic trope in the rhetorical gesture of her own 
desire amid the forced erotic verbal postures in her letter to Bloom: 
"I have never felt myself so much drawn to a man as you" (5.249). 
Here too heliotropism expresses itself in the erotic semiology of 
perfume, "P.S. Do tell me what kind of perfume does your wife 
use. I want to know" (5.258). This would be a very funny question 
if Martha Clifford were a funny woman—a little joke asking Henry 
Flower how Mrs. Flower smells—but we must assume she betrays 
here a highly conventional romantic desire. Her question is aimed 
at discovering the secret of Bloom's desire by eliciting the nature of 
his aphrodisiac. But the swift and clear certainty with which Bloom 
answers this question in his imagination holds out little hope for 
Martha Clifford's aspirations: "Why Molly likes opoponax. Suits her, 
with a little jessamine mixed" (13-1010). For Molly is to Bloom a 
very fragrant bloom indeed, as he demonstrates how intimacy is the 
fulfillment of desire because it abolishes the distance, the separation, 
at the heart of desire. In his imagination the thought of her fragrance 
lures him back to their bedroom strewn with Molly s redolent things, 
"Clings to everything she takes off. Vamp of her stockings. Warm 
shoe. Stays. Drawers. . . Also the cat likes to sniff in her shift on 
the bed. Know her smell in a thousand" (13.1022). In his imagination 
he follows her fragrance to its source in the "holes and corners" of 
her body, "Wonder where it is really. There or the armpits or under 
the neck. Because you get it out of all holes and corners" (13-1025). 
Desire is constituted of absence and distance that inaugurates a 
motion of yearning, a heliotropic odyssey toward the closure of 
intimacy, that transforms Bloom into a kind of bee following the 
lure of women's fragrance from flower to flower, from Gerty's cheap 
perfume, to Martha Clifford's "no smell flower" pinned to her 
letter, and onto Molly's scent that he knows "in a thousand." 
As a movement toward the sun, as a desirous motion, helio­
tropism enacts a romantic ballet or a seductive dance. If we strip 
from "Nausicaa" the seductive language of the narration, that urges 
us to believe its flattery of Gerty and tempts us to assume the 
admiring posture of the hypothetical suitors she wishes for but never 
possesses, we are left with a nearly silent pantomime or dance that 
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can be recognized as a model for "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and 
the Maggies." For the scene consists of three girls dancing to attract 
the attention of Bloom: Edy to a lesser extent, but Cissy's leaps and 
gambols are choreographed, if comically, like a ballet, and Gerty in 
her stationary high-kicking does indeed, like the flower girls of the 
"Mime," show Bloom the colors of her drawers. As a Pantomime, 
"Nausicaa" functions like the adolescent screen memory that is 
replicated in an infantile retrieval in "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and 
the Maggies": Bloom is Chuff, the angel who is the object of the 
flower girls' heliolatry; Gerty, Cissy, and Edy are the seductive flower 
girls; and Tommy Caffrey is Glugg, the little devil who is rejected 
and rebuffed by the girls in favor of his rival—Bloom. The verbal 
echoes that make the tripartite riddle of Glugg ("—Haps thee 
jaoneofergs?—Nao" \FW 233.21]) a replay of Tommy Caffrey's own 
tripartite riddle ("Is Cissy your sweetheart?—Nao, tearful Tommy 
said" [13.66])4 make the figures of the two little boys analogues as 
failed tiddlers and rejected suitors. This echo in the "Mime," of 
the infantile riddle of desire, obliges us to interrogate the function 
of the children in "Nausicaa" as Ulysses does not. Why did Joyce 
add the children, the twin boys and the baby, to "Nausicaa," when 
they are absent from the Homeric narrative? They serve virtually no 
plot function in the chapter, and could be omitted without altering 
the erotic dynamic of Bloom and the girls. Did Joyce plan to have 
the children's perspective, occluded in Ulysses, become retrospectively 
important through its retrieval in the "Mime"? Does the "Mime" 
oblige us to reread "Nausicaa" from Tommy Caffrey's point of view? 
Does Tommy come close to tears because the delay of the teasing 
sweetheart riddle nearly causes him to wet his pants (as the riddle 
in the "Mime" does Glugg)? Or does Tommy Caffrey have a 
sweetheart after all, and is he sweet on Gerty, or even his sister 
Cissy, as Glugg is sweet on his sister Issy? Does the sweetheart riddle 
therefore sexually excite him and create in him the infantile version 
of an erection, which a child could construe only as a need to 
urinate? Did he feel rejected and rebuffed when the girls teased and 
titillated him with their sweetheart riddle, but then gave their real 
attention, their adoration, to his rival, Bloom? I would argue that 
the children's game in the "Mime" reenacts a hidden childish love 
story concealed in "Nausicaa" of a little boy who feels teased and 
excited by a bevy of girls, and who watches in baffled frustration as 
they caper and gesture their pantomimic seduction of a lucky rival, 
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a victorious other, who appears to possess the answer to the riddle 
of desire. 
This structural reversal, of foregrounding occluded perspectives 
from the earlier works in Finnegans Wake, allows the later dream 
work to retrieve infantile experience and feeling. Once Tommy Caffrey 
is recognized as a prototype for Glugg, the little devil of the "Mime," 
other verbal echoes become audible in the "Mime" that confirm its 
organic generation from the thematic structures of "Nausicaa."5 The 
infantile equation of love and sweet food is one such structure. We 
learn in "Nausicaa" that "Tommy Caffrey could never be got to 
take his castor oil unless it was Cissy Caffrey that held his nose and 
promised him the scatty heel of the loaf or brown bread with golden 
syrup on" (13.30). In the "Mime" the golden syrup is embedded 
in the formal structure of a children s game that mimics courtship 
and marriage while preserving the connection of love and food as 
parallel forms of gratification and frustration— 
As Rigagnolina to Mountagnone, 
what she meaned he could not can. 
All she meaned was golten sylvup, 
all she meaned was some Knight's ploung jamn. 
(FW 225.15; rhyme structure added) 
McHugh (225) and Rose and O'Hanlon (129) provide much useful 
information about this game, including the original rhyme: 
There stands a lady on a mountain, 
Who she is I do not know. 
All she wants is gold and silver; 
All she wants is a nice young man. 
We see here the technique of invagination, as the inchoate feelings 
of an interiorized, infantile trauma are translated into the exteriorized, 
public, conventional form of the game, play, ritual, and song. This 
game, titled "Lady on a Mountain," is an infantile parody of 
romantic and worldly desires that acts out infantile fears of rejection 
and hunger through the form of a courtship ritual. In the game, 
the little boy's marriage proposal, "Madam, will you marry me?" is 
turned down with a resounding "No!" and his request for breakfast, 
"What's for breakfast, love?" is answered with an increasingly 
repulsive menu, degenerating from "Bread and butter, watercress" 
to "Squashed flies and blackbeetles" (Rose and O'Hanlon 129). 
Glugg presumably fails to guess that the lady wants golden syrup 
and nice plum jam (the infantile versions of gold and silver and a 
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nice young man). He gets neither castor oil nor golden syrup to 
alleviate his gripes, nor even bread and butter. His breakfast is first 
"breath and bother and whatarcurss," degenerating into "no breath 
no bother but worrawarrawurms." Infantile rejection and lovelessness 
is figured as a diet of bread and water and curses, or a Diet of 
Worms, or a diet of nothing at all, like Baby Boardman, who is 
given an empty nipple to suck. Bloom predicts that this deprivation 
will produce a colicky baby—"Oughtn't to have given that child an 
empty teat to suck. Fill it up with wind" (13.958) and, indeed, a 
devilish or Mephistophelian stomachache, a "muffinstuffinaches" 
afflicts the little devil, Glugg. The "Mime" aggravates the significance 
of this deprivation even further by having the little girls promise 
Chuff, the Shaunlike angel, a sort of gustatory Bloomusalem, an 
infantile Schlaraffenland or Good Ship Lollypop, in which sweet 
foods are personified and elevated into an accommodating aristocracy 
of sweet figures— 
Lady Marmela Shortbred will walk in for supper with her 
marchpane switch on, her necklace of almonds and her poirette 
Sundae dress with bracelets of honey and her cochineal hose 
with the caramel dancings. . . . And the Prince Le Monade has 
been graciously pleased. His six chocolate pages will run bugling 
before him and Cococream toddle after with his sticksword in a 
pink cushion." (FW 235.32-236.5) 
Although "Lady on a Mountain" belongs to a large repertoire 
of children's games in "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies,"6 
it describes—in its social and spatial elevation of the unattainable 
object of desire—the psychological abyss of the rejected suitor. In 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud explains the function of this 
type of children's game by arguing that children will often repeat 
unpleasurable experiences in their games in order to acquire mastery 
over their own painful feelings and fears. Once cued to its figure 
and its function, we can see the typology of "Lady on a Mountain" 
occurring earlier in "Nausicaa" where its meaning shifts with the 
relative position of the suitor. If beautiful Gerty MacDowell sitting 
on her rock on Sandymount strand were indeed an unattainable Lady 
on a Mountain to little Tommy Caffrey, she is no more than a girl 
on the rocks to Bloom, who has his own Lady on a Mountain: the 
beautiful Marion Tweedy of the Rock of Gibraltar, who many years 
ago, on another mountain, or hill, the Hill of Howth, answered his 
implicit proposal, "Madam, will you marry me?" with her breathless 
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"Yes I will yes," and his tacit "What's for breakfast, love?" with 
a bit of seedcake from her kiss. Bloom himself remembers that 
meal—"Softly she gave me in my mouth the seedcake warm and 
chewed" (8.907)—but it is joy he eats, "Joy: I ate it: joy" (8.908). 
There is an earlier figure who, like Bloom, eats joy—for 
breakfast. Indeed, Gabriel Conroy announces many configurations of 
desire that Bloom will either enact or reverse: for example, the ironic 
"Judgment of Paris" or celestial beauty contest he invokes to 
compliment the three Morkan spinsters, which Bloom later enacts 
with Gerty, Cissy, and Edy, and which is further miniaturized in 
Tommy Caffrey's riddle ("Is Cissy your sweetheart?. . .is Edy Board-
man your sweetheart?" etc.). It is in relation to Gabriel that heliotrope 
is first announced in Joyce's fiction, not as a flower, but as its light 
rosy purple color that becomes, even more remarkably, the color of 
a text: "A heliotrope envelope was lying beside his breakfast-cup 
and he was caressing it with his hand. Birds were twittering in the 
ivy and the sunny web of the curtain was shimmering along the 
floor: he could not eat for happiness" (D 213). Amid the starburst 
of romantic memories that Gabriel Conroy conjures for himself in 
"The Dead," the image of a heliotrope envelope blooms. By 
contextual inference, and borrowing the "Mime" 's Lady on a 
Mountain motif, one could construct the following plausible narrative 
fiction of this moment at the breakfast table: Gabriel has posed to 
Gretta the game's question, "Madam, will you marry me?" and her 
heliotrope letter answers, like Molly, "Yes I will yes." Gabriel reads 
the letter and cannot eat for happiness, for, like Bloom, "Joy: I ate 
it: joy." The ludic question, "What's for breakfast, love?" has 
become its own answer, "What's for breakfast: love." But Gabriel's 
heliotropic envelope, in its multiple displacements, opens up to us 
the painful truth of desire, that it is constituted of a gap, a space, 
a lack, an absence, a distance at the heart of desire, that the 
heliotopic gesture, the gesture of yearning and longing, is meant to 
conquer. "A heliotrope envelope was lying beside his breakfast-cup 
and he was caressing it with his hand." The heliotrope envelope is 
itself a trope, a metonymy, that simultaneously announces Gretta's 
absence from and presence at that breakfast table. It is a synecdoche, 
a part of Gretta, a metonymy, a symbolic extension of her, and 
Gabriel caresses it as Gretta's proxy. It is further synechdochic because 
it is not even a letter, but only its tinted cover, bearing, presumably, 
Gabriel's name. It therefore represents Gretta not as an object of 
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desire but as desiring subject enacting a heliotropic gesture: Gretta 
as reaching out to Gabriel and returning to him his own name 
encircled in heliotrope, encoded as the object of her desire, the sun 
of her universe, her Lord on a Mountain, as it were. 
This is the rhetorical function of "heliotrope" as a trope, a 
poetic figure in Joyce's work. His symbolic act of love often takes 
the form of a poetic gesture, a verbal embrace, a transformation of 
the beloved's name into a flower of rhetoric: Gabriel Conroy's name 
inscribed in heliotrope, Bloom transforming Molly into a Bloom, a 
moly, a mountain flower, and HCE giving ALP all the things a Lady 
on a Mountain could desire: gold and silver, a nice young man 
(himself), and a nice young name—"I am leafy, your goolden, so 
you called me, may me life, yea your goolden, silve me solve, 
exsogerraider!" (FW 619-29). He named her Liffey, he called her 
his golden leaf, he called her his life, his treasure of gold and silver: 
and he thereby gave her her name back embossed in love, enriched 
in value, enfolded in his poetry. But it is the elided love song of 
Simon Dedalus to May Goulding as well—elided because Stephen 
either does not know it or does not wish to own it—Simon Dedalus 
calling his beloved, his May Goulding, his golden, his May, his 
life—"I am leafy, your goolden, so you called me, may me life, yea 
your goolden." ALP remembers this flowery language with awe— 
"But there's a great poet in you too." The gift of an amorous 
antonomasia is a love gift without substance, made up purely of 
words, of verbal gestures. But it is the most enduring token of love 
in Joyce's universe, because it enhances in value over the years, it 
becomes more precious with age, and it remains transactionable for 
it may always be returned again, enriched in value, with a glorious 
patina, as a cherished memory. It is the gift ALP gives HCE when 
she reminds him that she has remembered and treasured his ancient 
and poetic gift of her transformed name over all the years. It is the 
gift that Molly returns to Bloom—who gave her a potentially inelegant 
name ("bloomers. .1 suppose theyre called after him" [18.839] that 
he poetically translates for her, "he said I was a flower of the 
mountain yes so we are flowers all a womans body yes that was one 
true thing he said in his life and the sun shines for you today yes 
that was why I liked him because I saw he understood or felt what 
a woman is" (18.1576). Bloom transforms Molly into a moly, a 
flower, a heliotrope with himself as the sun that shines for her, and 
after sixteen years of marriage she remembers his poetry verbatim, 
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embraces it, and imaginatively returns his gift. Heliotrope as a trope, 
a rhetorical figure, has the power of sealing the temporal and 
naturalistic chasm that the years of marriage, childbearing, poverty, 
and death open between lovers. 
This is what Gabriel Conroy believes and desires ("Their chil­
dren, his writing, her household cares had not quenched all their 
souls' tender fire" [D 214]) but cannot achieve. Curiously, it is an 
antonomastic failure that symbolizes Gabriel's marital failure. His 
gift to Gretta is not a verbal embrace, a poetic translation of her 
name, but its opposite: a refusal and inability to rename her in 
words of love. He gives Gretta a poetic negative, an image of his 
own self-consciousness as a poet that effaces her altogether from his 
words: 
In one letter that he had written to her then he had said: Why 
is it that words like these seem to me so dull and cold? Is it 
because there is no word tender enough to be your name?" 
(D 214) 
The artifice of the rhetorical question betrays his total negation of 
her even as his addressee, for it makes the question one she could 
never properly answer except by appreciating the litotic intention, 
and thereby admiring his poetizing more than his ardor. His language 
transforms her from love object to audience, and effects that subtle 
egotistical boomerang by which attention putatively paid to her is 
diverted back upon himself. Because he has given Gretta no verbal 
gift of love, Gabriel gets none back. The night of the Morkan's 
party, when Gabriel desires desire, he tries to close the distance 
between himself and his wife by writing in his imagination a 
heliotropic script for her to enact: 
When the others had gone away, when he and she were in their 
room in the hotel, then they would be alone together. He would 
call her softly: 
—Gretta! 
Perhaps she would not hear at once: she would be undressing. 
Then something in his voice would strike her. She would turn 
and look at him. . . " (D 214) 
In the ellipsis that follows, Gretta's heliotropic gesture is proleptically 
inscribed. She is to turn toward him like a flower to the sun. But, 
of course, she turns instead to the memory of a man who gave her 
a gift of love, a song, a devotion, a life. Unlike Joyce's other lovers, 
Gabriel cannot receive from Gretta the rhetorical keepsake the other 
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wives can return to their husbands, enriched with their own loving 
remembrance. The auto-eroticism of his enamourment with his own 
language, his own poetizing, leaves him with nothing to quote but 
his own cold love letters, in which he tells his beloved that he has 
no metaphors, no tropes, no love name to give her. One of the 
bitter secrets of desire that Gabriel learns late in his life, and late 
in his marriage, is that the object of one's desire is also a desiring 
subject, and can therefore be both coveted and won by a rival. 
Bloom even knows that the same lure that excites him works in the 
same way on his rivals, as he remembers being enticed by Molly's 
perfume on the very night she meets Boylan: "At the dance night 
she met him, dance of the hours. Heat brought it out. She was 
wearing her black and it had the perfume of the time before" (13. 
1011). Joyce structures the romantic fates of Gabriel Conroy and 
Leopold Bloom as precise opposites. Gabriel desires his wife in the 
present, but is defeated by a rival from the past; Bloom appears to 
be vanquished by a rival in the present, but remains the successful 
suitor from her past. With respect to the secret of desire, Gabriel is 
Glugg or Shem, the poet who fails; Bloom is Chuff or Shaun, the 
angel who succeeds—like Michael Furey, the Archangel Michael, the 
Mick of "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies." The ability 
to collapse adult and infantile rivalries as versions of one another, 
to see the triangles of Glugg, Issy, and Chuff as homologous and 
analogous to those of Gabriel, Gretta, and Michael Furey, or Tommy 
Caffrey, Gerty MacDowell, and Bloom, or Stephen, Emma Clery, 
and Father Moran, bespeaks the organic and floral structure of psychic 
life. Psychoanalytically, the adult still enfolds the child he or she 
once was, and adult erotic behavior reenacts infantile erotic desires. 
This leads me to the final love story that I find embedded in 
Finnegans Wake's "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies." It 
accounts, I believe, for its most aesthetically and erotically appealing 
features: the wonderful concatenation of flowers, girls, games, and 
desire in the magic childhood garden of the "Mime." The "Mime" 
enfolds "Nausicaa" with its infantile and adult games of desire, yet 
"Nausicaa" itself already enfolds another such memory of a lovely 
springtime garden party that was the setting for adolescent, and 
perhaps also infantile, love. "Mat Dillon and his bevy of daughters: 
Tiny, Atty, Floey, Maimy, Louy, Hetty, Molly too. Eightyseven that 
was" (13.1106). This is Bloom's heliotropic memory, and he turns 
toward it frequently, for it offers him the gratifying image of flowers 
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and girls conflating into a seductive beauty that opened itself to 
him. "But it's the evening influence. They feel all that. Open like 
flowers, know their hours, sunflowers, Jerusalem artichokes, in ball­
rooms, chandeliers, avenues under the lamps. Nightstock in Mat 
Dillon's garden where I kissed her shoulder" (13.1088). Mat Dillon's 
bevy of six daughters, who together with Molly form a group of 
seven so pretty they rival the flowers in loveliness, prefigure the 
dancing, seductive flower girls of the "Mime"—now named "Winnie, 
Olive and Beatrice, Nelly and Ida, Amy and Rue. Here they come 
back, all the gay pack, for they are the florals, from foncey and 
pansey to papavere's blush, foresake-me-nought, while there's leaf 
there's hope, with primtim's ruse and marrymay's blossom, all the 
flowers of the ancelles' garden" (FW 227.14-18).7 
In Bloom's memory, Mat Dillon's Maytime garden party held 
at Roundtown in 1887, is remembered as a triumph. There he first 
met and wooed Molly, his future wife. But there is an infantile 
witness to their meeting: Stephen Dedalus—and, indeed, all three 
principals of Ulysses possibly all meet there for the first time: Bloom 
at twenty-one, Molly at sixteen, and Stephen at five.8 There, at the 
very dawn of their story, they play a game of desire and form a 
romantic triangle, no less intense for its incongruous configuration. 
Since Stephen was there, Mat Dillon's garden party ought, hypo­
thetically, to be an event in Portrait where it would have occurred 
just prior to Stephen's entry into Clongowes; but it is elided and 
thereby serves to remind us how partial and selective the strokes of 
Portrait's portrait are. In Ulysses Mat Dillon's party emerges as a 
collection of memory fragments, distorted and colored by desire. It 
is not until the "Mime" that the event's repressed and emotional 
residues are exteriorized and dramatized as a Pantomime that replays 
this springtime festival from the emotional perspective of its youngest 
guest, the five-year-old Stephen. I will now reconstruct Mat Dillon's 
garden party, not as history—for we can never know what happened— 
but as a fable of the experience of an overstimulated little boy who, 
intoxicated by the perfume of spring flowers and dazzled by the 
glamour of a bevy of beautiful young girls, is heartbroken when 
they turn heliotropically toward the dashing older man who becomes 
his successful rival—the twenty-one-year-old Leopold Bloom. 
The setting is Mat Dillon's opulent villa in Roundtown, a grand 
house whose gorgeous implements of hospitality are remembered by 
the Blooms as including a solid silver coffee service on the mahogany 
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sideboard, fine cigars, and "Tantalus glasses" (6.1008; 18.723). The 
spacious grounds include a lilac grove and a green on which bowls 
could be played on a warm May evening. Leopold Bloom and the 
law student John Henry Menton are among the players, and they 
are highly self-conscious of being watched in their game by the 
pretty young girls: 
A shaven space of lawn one soft May evening, the well-
remembered grove of lilacs at Roundtown, purple and white, 
fragrant slender spectators of the game but with much real 
interest in the pellets. . .And yonder about that grey urn where 
the water moves at times in thoughtful irrigation you saw another 
as fragrant sisterhood, Floey, Atty, Tiny and their darker friend 
with I know not what of arresting in her pose. . " (14.1362) 
Their "darker friend" is the buxom and exotic looking daughter 
recently brought back from Gibraltar by Major Brian Tweedy, who 
is partial to his drop of spirits, and who is friendly with his host, 
the kindly ("Heart of gold really" [6.1010]) and jovial Mat Dillon. 
The darling little boy Marion Tweedy and her girl friends are holding 
aloft on an urn over the pool, like a little Cupid, is Stephen Dedalus, 
who is there with his mother. "A lad of four or five in linsey­
woolsey . .  . is standing on the urn secured by that circle of girlish 
fond hands" (14.1371). 
What happened at this garden party? Very little, probably, 
except perhaps some small romantic dramas that were never forgotten 
and never forgiven. Bloom's ball sails inside Menton's during the 
game of bowls, and Menton treats Bloom contemptuously seventeen 
years later at a funeral. There were parlor games and entertainments, 
but the outcome was not only a tie at musical chairs, but marriage 
and a daughter and a son mourned. Yet on this evening Molly 
Tweedy still distributes her favors among her rivals, dancing with 
John Henry Menton, but letting Bloom turn the pages for her when 
she sings the song Waiting, at the piano perhaps gallantly offered 
by the kindly Mat Dillon, "her father was an awfully nice man he 
was near seventy always goodhumored well now Miss Tweedy or Miss 
Gillespie theres the piannyer" (18.721). Later, on a walk in the 
garden scented by the opening nightstock, Bloom kissed her shoulder. 
How much of this does Stephen take in and see? Did the girls show 
him the flowers still furled in their buds and ask him to guess what 
their colors were? Did he, dazzled by their gossamer, tissue-thin 
dresses, confound the girls and the flowers, and find himself stupidly 
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unable to answer the question because it had become for him a 
sexual question, and a sudden inhibition9 made his myopic eyes 
erotically blind? Did his spectacles become the true "Tantalus 
glasses"—proffering objects of irresistible desire that he could not 
grasp? Was he smitten by one of the girls, perhaps the dark one 
with the Spanish eyes and the cherries hung like earrings on her 
ears? Molly seems to think so, "I suppose hes a man now by this 
time he was an innocent boy then and a darling little fellow in his 
lord Fauntleroy suit and curly hair like a prince on the stage when 
I saw him at Mat Dillons he liked me too I remember they all do" 
(18.1310). Was little Stephen first titillated, and then heartbroken, 
when his flower girls abandoned him to give their attention helio­
tropically to another? And did he then despair of ever guessing the 
riddle of desire?10 
Of course, I am speculating a great deal here. But my aim is 
to show how easily and naturally this romantic garden party could 
have become the dream of "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the 
Maggies." The first erotic experience of a five-year-old, presenting 
to him the mystery of sexuality in the images of flowers and courting 
couples, of music, dances, games, and riddles, could in later years 
have resurfaced in a dream—perhaps on the very night he encountered 
again the very same romantic couple, Leopold Bloom and Molly 
Tweedy, now long married and living in prosaic domesticity on Eccles 
street. Stephen could have dreamt Mat Dillon's garden party again 
as his private Paradise Lost, enhanced with the glamour of Boxing 
Day pantomimes and the music of opera, the half-remembered 
nursery rhymes and children's games, the flower girls from Parsifal 
merging into the Dillon girls, the worrisome questions they asked 
him taking on the danger of the naming riddle from Turandot, 
Ophelia's flower speech from Hamlet echoing from his library lecture, 
and the celestial battle of Lucifer and Michael restaged not over the 
theological issues that Stephen claims as the motive of his non 
serviam, but over love. Stephen, like Bloom after his heliotropic 
experience, could have dreamt a pantomime, and where Bloom 
dreamt the mime of his imago, Sinbad the Sailor, at the end of 
"Nausicaa," Stephen might have dreamt the mime of "Mick, Nick, 
and the Maggies." 
Joyce, with a psychoanalyst's respect for the significance of 
childhood experience, cues us in the "Mime" to the historiographic 
functions of the retrieval of children's memories. The dreams of a 
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Stephen, who in his waking hours teaches history and hallucinates 
its apocalyptic end, may well offer, as Freudian wish-fulfillment, a 
benign dream of organic history figured as floral pollination, regen­
eration, and perpetuation. Joyce wove into the Wake the sentence 
from Edgar Quinet that he loved, and that imagines the continuity 
of natural life in the universal and eternal endurance of wildflowers: 
Today, as in the time of Pliny & Columella, the hyacinth disports 
in Wales, the periwinkle in Illyria, the daisy on the ruins of 
Numantia; & while around them the cities have changed masters 
& names, while some have ceased to exist, while the civilisations 
have collided with one another & smashed, their peaceful 
generations have passed through the ages & have come up to 
us, fresh & laughing as on the days of battles. (McHugh 281) 
This is the submerged reassurance that eludes Stephen's waking 
nightmare eschatology of history culminating in toppled masonry and 
shattered glass—and that appears to become available in dream only 
as the vision he cannot glimpse, the truth he cannot guess. The 
secret of desire, the mystery of sexuality, offers not only the personal 
salvation of regeneration and propagation, but it offers a saving 
historical perspective as well, a vision of perdurable organic life 
surviving repeated colonizations with vigor and joy. Floral history is 
the dream antidote to an apocalyptic cultural history, and in it 
sexuality is history in the making, a ballet of pollination and 
procreation— 
Just so stylled with the nattes are their flowerheads now and 
each of all has a lovestalk onto herself and the tot of all the 
tits of their understamens is as open as he can posably she and 
is tournesoled straightcut or sidewaist, accourdant to the coursets 
of things feminite, towooerds him in heliolatry. . .(FW 236.33— 
237.1) 
The flower girls, the angels, dance around Chuff, Mick, Bloom the 
heliotropic dance of the flowers, their version of the dance of the 
hours, the organic dance of history. Because the "Mime" s floral 
history is a vital, erotic, kinetic history, Joyce emphasizes its heliotropic 
momentum by retelling Quinet's sentence in the "Mime" as the 
eternal history of dance (FW 236.19-32), of stately pavanes giving 
way to lively waltzes in the suburban streets of Dublin, Miss 
McCloud's Reel ("mismy cloudy")—the same to which the Donnelly 
children danced in "Clay"—is tripped daintily by Issy's "hercourt," 
and rigadoons and modern ragtime lead to zany cancans ("cancan­
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zanies") of the kind Gerty imitates in her high-kicking for Bloom. 
But in the end, it is the female imagination in Joyce's text that 
intuitively grasps, in waking thought, this floral philosophy which 
may elude Stephen even in dream. Perhaps you have to be a Bloom 
to understand the cosmic significance of flowers, and to intuit Quinet 
and encode his floral philosophy as a kind of religion. "I love 
flowers," thinks Molly. 
Id love to have the whole place swimming in roses God of 
heaven theres nothing like nature the wild mountains then the 
sea and the waves rushing then the beautiful country with the 
fields of oats and wheat and all kinds of things and all the fine 
cattle going about that would do your heart good to see rivers 
and lakes and flowers all sorts of shapes and smells and colours 
springing up even out of the ditches primroses and violets nature 
it is as for them saying theres no God I wouldnt give a snap of 
my two fingers for all their learning" (18.1557). 
NOTES 
1. Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, 22 November 1930 (355). 
2. See Derek Attridge's "The Backbone of Finnegans Wake" for an interesting 
discussion of this issue. 
3. I am not suggesting here that the "dreamer" of Finnegans Wake is female, 
but that the dreaming mind, insofar as it can be thought of as enfolding the old 
stories of its history, acts like a female imagination. 
4. Although I had mentioned this echo in my Decentered Universe of 
Finnegans Wake, (135-36), John Gordon recently pointed out to me that Adaline 
Glasheen had mentioned it even earlier in "A Riddle Not Answered." A Wake 
Newslitter IV/5 (1967):100-101. 
5. The draft evidence for this chapter (HA) is interesting, because it indicates 
that the "Nausicaa" references, while not belonging to the very earliest draft, were 
added soon after, as if to deliberately cue readers to the similarity. See MS 47477­
64, for example, where Glugg's answered "Now" and "Nowhowhow" is changed 
to "Nao" and "Naohaohao," or MS 47477-10, where "All she meaned was 
multimoney, all she meaned was a nyums nyum nyam" was changed to "All she 
meaned was golten sylvup, all she meaned was some knight's ploung jamn." 
6. Grace Eckley's Children's Lore in Finnegans Wake is the only book length 
study of children's games in the Wake, but it neither mentions nor discusses the 
role of "Lady on a Mountain" in the "Mime." 
7. Vincent Cheng points out that this is one of many versions of Ophelia's 
disbursement of flowers in the Wake (67-68). Its appearance in the "Mime" is 
especially motivated by the complex role of Hamlet motifs in the children's games: 
an incongruence softened by remembering that the "low art" of the Pantomime 
readily assimilated popular bits and pieces from the "high arts.' Insofar as this 
spreads a dark lining under the flower motifs in the "Mime," it may well allude 
to more tragic female fates, for example the martyrdom of Issy's prototype Isabel 
in Stephen Hero, following her banishment to a nunnery, or ALP's shedding all of 
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her leaves (or lcafies) but one, as her death approaches and she leaves (Rose and 
O'Hanlon 328). 
8. Molly does some of this arithmetic herself in "Penelope"- "I wonder is 
he too young hes about wait 88 I was married 88 Milly is 15 yesterday 89 what 
age was he then at Dillons 5 or 6 about 88 I suppose hes 20" (18.1326). 
9. One can readily make guesses about the nature of this inhibition. My own 
best inference is that Mat Dillon's garden party might serve as » screen memory for 
another kind of infantile scopophilia: the desire to see the mother's body that is 
dramatized in the next chapter, the "Homework" chapter. This may also have been 
the transgression censored in Portrait, for which Stephen is threatened with the 
ocular punishment of blindness. The larger consequence of such an infantile trauma 
might be a taboo on any kind of desirous seeing, a fear whose adult rationalization 
might be found in Stephen's promotion of a static response to art over the more 
dangerous and culpable kinetic response to beauty. That not only Stephen's, but 
Joyce's, constitution as artist is reworked in the serious Shem parodies of Finnegans 
Wake is an important theme in Bernard Benstock's Joyce-Again 's Wake. 
10. Patrick McCarthy points out the similarity between Glugg and Stephen 
in that, even though they themselves pose riddles, they are unable to solve others 
(141). 
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2 
Joyce the Verb 
FRITZ SENN 
in the muddle was the sounddance 
{FW 378.29) 
I begin with a few sample quotations. These are not for your applause 
or disagreement, but merely in order to probe and appreciate the 
semantic variety of the one recurrent word, "Joyce": 
Joyce was born in 1882. —The Tenth International James Joyce 
Symposium. —Joyce was conscious of his control of English and 
other languages. —This book enters Joyce's life to reflect his 
complex, incessant joining of event and composition. —From his 
late adolescence onward, James Joyce intended to be a writer. — 
The sacred is at the heart of Joyce's writing experience. —Joyce 
insists that man's will is free, that it can be exercised for good 
or evil, and that the state of the world's affairs will vary with 
the quality of leadership. —What does Joyce assert or imply 
about guilt in U/ysses? —Joyce is disgusted by sexual impulses 
regarded as normal by most standards of behavior. —Joyce's mind 
was at all times engaged in the search for truth. —When I first 
met Joyce in 1901 or 1902, he was beginning to emerge as a 
Dublin "character." —Joyce was too scrupulous a writer to 
tolerate even minor flaws. —Joyce spent his life playing parts, 
and his works swarm with shadow selves. —Joyce's laughter is 
free and spontaneous. —Joyce wrote not for literature, but for 
personal revenge. —Jim Joyce devoted a whole big novel to the 
day on which I was seduced. —Joyce is writing the book of 
himself. 
There needn't be any contradiction at all, but meanings differ. 
It is equally true to say "Joyce has been dead for 45 years," as to 
claim "Joyce is alive." "Joyce" does not equal "Joyce": What is the 
statue of Joyce in the Fluntern cemetery of Zurich a statue of? Joyce 
Symposia, among other events, give partial answers. 
The question will not be pursued here. It is the name, noun, 
nomen, "Joyce," that interests. It epiphanizes a bewildering diversity 
of meanings, semantic differences that we, the professional differen­
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tiators, do not always notice. The diversity at first sight would appear 
odd, for names, of all words, ought to distinguish persons; it is their 
function. They often fulfill it. Reading Joyce (you see, we use the 
name but don't mean the person), we might learn about the chanciness 
of easy identification by nominal labels. Insofar as names are for 
things, the distinctions work reasonably well. But even so, undoubtedly 
concrete objects like keys or bowls are not just objects. Keys can open 
or lock, they are for entering, for excluding, for taking along, for 
forgetting, for being handed over, for ruling or usurping. Bowls are 
for carrying (or "bearing"), for holding aloft, for shaving, for mock­
ing, they may play the roles of chalices at times, and chalices, we 
have read, may contain wine, or be empty, even "idle," can be 
broken—or not broken. Such objects, many at the beginning of 
Ulysses, are for actions, or acting. 
Those privileged and, usually, capitalized nouns, however, that 
have no general referent, the names, serve to keep persons apart for 
convenient identification. Not unconditionally. You may remember 
Kitty O'Shea, the one that, Molly says, had a "magnificent head of 
hair down to her waist tossing it back," and who lived "in Grantham 
street" (U 18.478). This name then has different reverberations for 
a reader who (a) knows no Irish history at all, for one who (b) knows 
a little, and for one who (c) is an expert. It is the knowledge we 
bring to bear on the name that makes the difference. But even a 
historian well versed in late nineteenth-century Irish affairs will have 
to match Molly's acquaintance, at least for a fleeting instant, against 
the bad woman "who brought Parnell low," and then decide against 
an attractive identification. A name translates into knowing, or not 
knowing. Walter W. Skeat, the English etymologist, makes one of 
his infrequent negative remarks in the entry on "NAME": this work 
and its Latin cousin nomen are "not allied to 'know. " The two 
word families are not related, but in practice they work together. The 
cognates of "know," however, are allied to that one item in the 
much-quoted triad of strange words at the opening of "The Sisters"— 
"gnomon" (D 9). And this gnomon merely sounds like, but has 
nothing to do with, Latin nomen, though it happens to be one; the 
similarity is deceptive and ominous. 
The platitudinous pay-off of all this, predictably, is that in 
identifying we are doing something. All the meanings we concede, 
knowingly or not, to the term "Joyce" imply some kind of activity. 
At one extreme the word does duty for a life lived in various cities 
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in the course of almost sixty years; at the other possible ends of the 
scales it suggests writing, thinking, creating, developing, intending— 
you name it, and you name it appropriately by verbs. Such verbs also 
become our panels and lectures and animated disputes. Aware of 
such dynamisms, some of us have quite independently—when this 
could still be done with impunity and even self-respect—coined the 
verb REJOYCE or REJOYCING. 
Even the adjective "Joycean" predominantly means not some 
stable quality, but rather what Joyce actively provoked and what, 
conspiratorially, we now do in turn and with considerable energy. 
None of us may be able to define "Joycean" adequately, but we 
vaguely sense that it connotes some heterogeneous, but characteristic 
hyperactivity: words seem to be charged, or else we readers charge 
the words, somehow, it seems, beyond the norm. Ask anyone in 
Dublin. 
To simplify the foregoing, names, for all their accepted sub­
stantiality, soon dissolve into doings, into the verbs from which 
grammar distinguishes them, at least in Indo-European languages. If 
at this point you nod facile assent and find, rightly, that I am kicking 
oudated horses and dismiss notions long out of date—or that someone 
has already put all this into a system of trendy abstractions—then 
just look at most of our practical applications. Look at how we, 
commentators or critics, seem often at pains to re-reify all that elusive 
work in progress, to freeze it into solid theses, symbols, parallels, 
discourses, or even "puns," things that we can categorize and 
administer. 
Joyce might be the antidote. His works release the processes out 
of the nouns, nouns which are so much easier to handle than events 
or doings. The pioneering etymologists who drew up a set of language 
origins of common Indo-European ancestry, usually tabulated roots 
that tended to be verbs of action. Joyce seems to descend to such 
origins. The roots of the two cultures that he revived bear this out 
as well. 
Dominenamine (U 6.595) 
Once the God of the Old Testament had spoken light into being 
and approved of it, he went on and "called the light Day" (Gen. 
1:4). Genesis follows the birth of the world right away with the birth 
of the first noun. Somehow Joyce celebrated this pristine noun thus 
generated in his secondary creation; we in turn now also use "Blooms­
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day." God then, soon after, shaped a being that was called "man." 
His personal name emerges first in the midst of another naming 
process: 
The Lord brought [the beasts of the field] unto Adam, to see 
what he would call them [and we find an almost Joycean sort of 
divine curiosity]: and whatsoever Adam called every living crea­
ture, that was the name thereof. (Gen. 2:19) 
Calling ("quod vocavit," as the Vulgate has it) precedes the name 
("ipsum est nomen eius"). And Adam, the first-named, started giving 
the animals around him names; he also decided that the outgrowth 
of his rib shall 
be called Woman, because she was taken out of man. (Gen. 
2:23) 
Adam is the object of naming and becomes its prolific active 
subject right away. Creator and first creature are both protonomastic, 
not only the first namers around, but also those who start with naming 
before almost anything else they do on the record. The names, of 
course, allow the record to be written. Conversely, the calling of 
names in the upward direction, towards the divinity, might be ta­
booed. Potent naming and ineffability go together. Naming is potent, 
and so is knowing or uttering a name. Adams powerful prerogative 
is shared by writers of fiction. 
The Hellenic version differs in conception and idiom, but the 
Greek epics, oldest witnesses, work the naming of some of their heroes 
into their tales. In the most famous digression in literature, Odysseus 
is named in what appears the most arbitrary and whimsical way, in 
almost Saussurean fashion, and yet the random signifier becomes 
potently ominous. Since grandfather Autolykos passing by at the birth 
happened to be "odyssamenos," the child was called, "epony­
mously," "Odysseus." The participle form "odyssamenos" is either 
"made angry" or else "making angry" (reductive philologists, like 
their Joycean counterparts, may disagree); it suggests a man connected 
with wrath or odium, and it came to signify both a wrath inflicted 
and a wrath suffered. 
So naming has been around, from the beginning. Joyce, the 
Namer, is well within a tradition that allowed for metamorphotic 
scope. A central name "Bloom" coincides with a common noun, 
offshoot of a verb BHLO (cf. florere, bliihen, etc.), but a noun for 
some live process, blossoming, growing, changing, withering, radi­
 29 Joyce the Verb
ating, smelling, all astir with poetical echoes. When Miss Marion 
Tweedy adopts it by patriarchal custom through marriage, her rivals 
inevitably joke: "youre looking blooming" (U 18.843). The verbal 
connection offers an appropriate flourish for the central onomastic 
cluster. Names, necessary social designations, arise out of, and turn 
again into, verbal energies, long before Finnegans Wake. 
Joyce the Writer set off with almost no names, as suits lyrical 
poetry. Chamber Music can do, practically, without them. But not 
prose narrative; Dubliners has a wide range of appellative possibilities: 
full-fledged name (Ignatius Gallaher), last name only (Lenehan, Far­
rington), or first name alone (Maria, Lily), with or without a honorific 
(Mr James Duffy, Mr Duffy, but Corley), with a sprinkling of epon­
ymous flourishes (Hoppy Holohan, Little Chandler). In all this di­
versity, the first three stories do not divulge what the protagonist 
narrator is (or the three narrators are) called. The technique of 
gnomonic elision or silence extends to names: one that is pointedly 
withheld seems to assume even more power than those known. But 
from now on there are names in abundance: a whole critical study 
(Who's He When He's At Home?1) can be devoted to them. Some 
were taken from Joyce's own background, some appropriated abroad, 
from printed sources, or invented, many synthesized. Perhaps the 
most outstanding example of imaginative naming is "Stephen De­
dalus," in defiance of almost all realistic plausibility: it represents a 
soaring, mythical, high water mark of portentous naming—its growing 
significance is thematized in A Portrait. But more and more, especially 
from Ulysses onwards, personal names are shown to be problematic. 
In the final work, they have lost their discriminative graphic edges, 
and identification becomes our readers' necessity and pastime more 
than an overt concern of the work. It would be difficult to talk about 
the Wake if we had no nominal handles for its profusion. But its 
nominal blurrings would not be accepted by immigration officers on 
our passports, and our computers too would be obstinately 
uncooperative. 
So we might roughly sketch a curve rising from pristine, lyrical 
anonymity to mythological ostentation, and down again towards a 
terminal pseudonymous fuzziness. But such a simplification would 
obscure the innate perplexity in between, the inherent riddling nature 
of names. But throughout, I submit, the naming is at least as 
important as the individual names used. Joyce's methods are often 
genetic. Ironically, the first occurrence of "name" in Dubliners is 
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connected, not with something coming into being, but with the loss 
of the vital force. The reverberating term "paralysis" is introduced 
as sounding strangely like the name of some maleficent and sinful 
being (D 9), attached to a mortal activity, an action which means 
the disablement from acting. Appropriately then, the priest's name 
is not communicated to us until it is being read on his death notice, 
when paralysis has done its fascinatingly "deadly work." 
Before any one person in A Portrait has been identified, the 
process of naming is put before us. The opening tale within a tale 
features a "nicens little boy named baby tuckoo"—named. Named 
by others, from outside, imposed from above. It will happen to the 
main character soon "—O, Stephen will apologize," and whether 
guided by the precedent of Genesis or simply by empirical common 
sense, we take the name on trust ever after. Stephen hardly thinks 
about it until others remark on its strangeness. Once the naming of 
"baby tuckoo" has taken place, incidentally, the fairy story is 
discontinued right away, as though it had now, the secret being out, 
lost all further interest. 
When real names do take over, we are not always helped. One 
fully labeled "Betty Byrne" is never heard of again. Soon we will 
come across a "Michael Davitt," but few readers nowadays could 
tell, offhand, untutored, who he is; for all we know at first, it might 
be a member of the family. (If you disagree, you are simply 
substituting scholarly annotation for average knowledge.) One early 
conspicuous name, "Dante," is flickeringly misleading. Most of us, 
semi-erudite, will have to discard the nominal association of an Italian 
poet who will be named, towards the end of the book. But the 
person called Dante early on will later translate itself unexplained 
into "Mrs Riordan." In life and in literature, we usually come to 
terms with such confusion. Joyce exploits the confusions inherent in 
naming. Coincidences and convergences will later facilitate the me­
chanistics of Finnegans Wake. 
When Stephen s family name, commented on all along, is 
linked to its mythological origin and import, it translates into such 
actions as flying, soaring, falling, creating and, later on, estheticizing, 
or forging. Most of these active revelations follow close upon the 
mocking evocation of a Greek participle, "Bous Stephanoumenos," 
in which Stephen's Christian, very Christian, name is made to derive 
not from crown, the object, but from a verb for crowning. The 
fourth chapter, where all this happens, moves from a static beginning 
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of almost lifeless order and institutional clusters to an ecstasy of 
motion. 
It would be idle to repeat how deceptively the first names come 
on in Ulysses, "Buck" and "Kinch." Commentators who claim that 
"Chrysostomos" in the earliest non-normative, one-word, sentence, 
"is" the name of some specific saint disregard the inherent process 
of naming through characterization, a process which may very well 
then lead to one particular saint. Stephen silently bestows an appe­
lation on the usurper2 who towers over him, one that fittingly singles 
out his most prominent organ. In some way this is Stephen's tacit 
hellenized tit for Mulligan's loudly voiced tat, "Kinch." Ulysses 
starts naming procedures even before the absurdity of "Dedalus" or 
the trippingness of "Malachi Mulligan" are remarked upon. 
One whole chapter is notably given over to the bafflement of 
naming. It begins with " I ,  " the polar opposite to individual verbal 
labels, a pronoun without a noun. Unique among words, its meaning 
changes with every speaker. As Stephen intimates in a passing "I , I 
and I. I ." (U 9-212), the meaning may even change for any one 
person—through time; "I am other I now." The "Cyclops" chapter, 
whose governing saints are "S. Anonymous and S. Eponymous and 
S. Pseudonymous and S. Paronymous and S. Synonymous," contains 
"Adonai!" in its terminal paragraph (12.1915), a word that looks 
and functions like a name but pointedly is not. It is in fact a 
substitute for one that is unspeakable and prohibited. "Adonai" is 
making a nominal noise for a sacred onomastic absence. 
One minor event in Ulysses is the devious misnaming of 
"M'Intosh" by a collusion of oral, written, and printed communi­
cation. The mystery surrounding this figure is mainly due to its 
being given a name that we know to be chancy. If there had been 
no newspaper reference and if Bloom had wondered, at the end of 
his day, who the man in the macintosh was, very little print would 
be expended on him. It is our knowledge of his pseudonymity that 
provokes so much curiosity. As naming, however, the procedure is 
true to universal type. What we wear can turn into what we become 
known by (Robin Hood may be a case in point; his sister Little Red 
Riding certainly is). 
The misnomering integrated into the texture of Ulysses is 
intimately tied up with fiction, a process of feigning (or the invention 
of "figures"). As an obliging intermediary, Leopold Bloom assists 
in dissimulating the presence of M'Coy among the mourners (who 
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is neither present nor mourning). Newspaper fictions get M'Coy as 
well as Stephen Dedalus B.A. into this second Nekuyia. In the midst 
of what looks like the least questionable list of mere names some 
fictions have intruded; we, in our superiority, translate the fictions 
into complicated actions and dysfunctions of information. We still 
don't know who "M'Intosh" is (some readers have thought they do, 
others claim we never will; but knowing who he " i s" would mean 
substituting his wrong name by one that is considered circumstantially 
plausible—a change of labels), but we recognize "M'Intosh" as a 
series of mishappenings. Joe Hynes's misunderstanding also shows 
the reporter's need for labels of that sort. As we do not know the 
civil service data of the person who tells us what goes on in Barney 
Kiernan's bar, we change this negative condition into a name and 
refer to his as "The Nameless One," following a hint (U 15.1144). 
Namelessness is unsettling. So that in Finnegans Wake we are striving 
for identification tags to attach to the paronymous noncharacters, 
and we co-create Earwickers and Porters, or pit Shems (in Hebrew 
shem intriguingly means name) against Shauns even where these 
configurations of letters do not occur, in the majority of cases, and 
we treat them as though they were friends of the family we would 
recognize anywhere. 
Naming confers power. The namer feels superior to the namee 
(who is generally a helpless infant). Once a name is given, it tends 
to stick. Only when we assume important positions, like Pope or 
King, may we choose our own different names. Writers can do it 
too. They can name themselves, or one of their figures, "Stephen 
Daedalus" or "Dedalus." Or they can title a prose work about a 
day in Dublin "Ulysses," and we realize the potency of this when 
we consider what difference it would make if someone discovered 
that Joyce's real intention had been something like "Henry Flower" 
or "Love's Old Sweet Song," "Atonement," or "The Rose from 
Gibraltar." 
if we look at it verbally 
Naming, however, is just one of the many activities we find in 
Joyce's cosmos, but a prominent one—of paradigmatic significance: 
an action through words. My exemplification is simply a renewed 
demonstration of a direction away from the stability of things or 
persons towards movement, change. Verbs, which here represent 
action, movement, processes, are less tractable than nouns (nouns 
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are ideal for catalogues or filing cards), less easy to pin down. Verbs 
have more flexibility, or flexion. They extend beyond the immediate 
present, or presence, into the past and the future; they are not 
restricted to what is, but can imply variant attitudes towards factuality, 
what might be. They have, in other words, tenses, moods, aspects, 
voices. At the present stage of ignorance it might be more profitable 
to phrase our views of literature in general, and Joyce in exemplary 
particular, in terms of inflexion and syntactic interaction than as an 
assembly of themes, ideas, messages. Physics in the twentieth century 
developed in a similar direction: things, bodies, mass, matter seemed 
to give way to motion, energies, speeds—nouns into verbs. Contem­
porary theories also tend towards verbal processes. I hope the simplistic 
way of putting it here is seen for what it is, a corrective convenience 
for illustration. As Finnegans Wake tries to spell out, "perhaps there 
is no true noun in active nature" (523.10). 
I am going to apply my figure of speech—taken from the parts 
of speech—to the newly edited text of Ulysses on the occasion of its 
first rebirth in a new dress, the paperback Blue Book of Errors 
Corrected. Some of the arguments of last year (1985) might have 
been controverted with more urbane understanding if the issues had 
not been treated as things, choices right or wrong, but had been 
seen as problems of the verbs that are implied. What the text of 
1984 offered is not so much an object rectified in 5,000 instances 
and made reliably stable—or else, in an opposing view, a product 
wholly misconceived and faultily executed. It is, if anything, recti­
fication in visible progress. The process is spread over the entire 
synoptic array on the dynamic left-hand page, down to footnotes, 
into the back of the book with textual notes, a historical collation, 
and a discursive afterword. The constant scuttling it demands of its 
users is troublesome, but essential, work in progress. The left-hand 
page activates us. 
One might say in metaphorical exaggeration that the left-hand 
page, the one with all the action, constitutes the verbs as against 
the deceptively stable nouns on the page that provides the final (not 
definite) results in undisturbed typography. By common, misleading, 
usage a text is called "established"—the Munich text emphasizes 
establish/^. Those sinistrous verbs have changing forms, have tenses 
(the page is diachronic), have moods, have voices. All the nonal­
phabetic features, those elevated diacritical irritations, are functional 
imperatives: they tell us what to do, where to go'—to the drafts, 
34 Fritz Senn 
fair copies, proof sheets, and all the rest. They also actively report 
what Joyce did. 
It is for us to translate the left page, which by itself does not 
make immediate sense, and not because of the editors' instinctive 
nastiness. The pages on the left are "genetic," they display becoming. 
Our own postcreative retracings match the author's creative bustling: 
an author who was indeed auctor, an "increaser," and an excreaser. 
To bone-set, after the act, excrescences that extended over three cities 
and seven years is a task to tax the best prepared of experts, almost 
beyond the reach of prescriptive principles. That the synoptic, left-
hand page and the internal explications offered in the edition require 
conjugations that happen to surpass my own mental capacities does 
not detract from the necessity for conjugation, Joycean conjugations. 
What we face, inevitably, is not a text freed from error (though 
this in itself was a worthwhile goal which resulted in a great number 
of unquestioned improvements), but a refined documentation of 
what an error might be. The apparatus shows how errors came about. 
The text, in its hazardous growth, was in itself erring all along (the 
drafts show abortive attempts and wrong starts). It, Ulysses, in its 
laborious progress from abandoned short story to no-longer novel, 
had its share of vicissitudes or, to borrow some quotations, it 
travelled far—was fated to roam—many a way wound—was 
harried for years on end—was driven far journeys—was made to 
stray—had a changeful course—multum erravit. 
All these paraphrases refer, of course, to Odysseus, whose changeful 
course was due to force of circumstances and to his own nature. The 
text of Ulysses, similarly, was redirected at various points, on various 
pieces of paper." It had to suffer countless injuries done to it from 
outside, but it also, in the nature of its being, caused many of its 
own predicaments. Ulysses was in need of reediting, not only because 
of the shortcomings of typists and printers, but because it is as 
it is. 
So it is now for us to sort out the highroads and the deviations 
and to synopt. We know that some of our synoptions are chancy, 
many wayward itineraries of long ago remain irretrievable. The new 
edition strives to leave out scribal sins—what inattentive or meddle­
some copyists had committed or omitted by faulty conjugation, 
departures that usually consist of words known to all men with the 
possible exception of French typesetters in Dijon. What all this 
implies, in practice, is that Joyce (here in the sense of someone 
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writing, revising, adding, proofreading), actively engaged in new 
creations, was passively overlooking thousands of wrong turns, or 
gaps. Preoccupied with what lay still ahead, he was not undoing the 
doing of fallible mediators. The Munich team stepped in and did 
the close examination that Joyce was incapable of, had failed to carry 
out, and so they incurred, as one might telegrammatically put it, 
the immense debtorship of a thing done sixty years later. 
From my given bias, I stress the verbal framework—Joyce actively 
composing the end of Ulysses, passively overlooking numerous mis­
adventures of transmission. "Passive authorization" is a conventional 
technical contradiction of terms, the notion for a principle that is 
not valid for the new edition of Ulysses. The principle defines Joyce's 
oversights as failed actions, failures by inattention, which the approval 
of a bon a tirer does not authorize. If Joyce had noticed the errors, 
the assumption is, he would have interfered. You notice that an 
edition of Ulysses can hardly remain in the indicative mood; 
conditional5 or subjunctive aspects (what would have been, or should 
have been) come into play. 
The accomplicity long after the fact, which results in so many 
improvements, worries me all the same. How are we to deal rationally 
with what, by definition, is not a rational decision, is outside the 
normal range of conscious volition? A new psychology that was 
coterminous with Joyce's development and coincided with some of 
his insights, diagnosed overlooking—forgetting, lapsing, erring (and 
all parapractic varieties)—no longer as neutral, accidental blanks 
among business as usual, but as negative actions, as significant not 
looking, not recalling—as twisted, deviant, aberrant doings outside 
of consciousness. Psychomorphoses of that kind are, furthermore, 
vitally part of Joyce's realistically erroneous cosmos of words; the 
verb to err is integrated into Joyce's works (and I still believe that 
its concurrence in the first word of Finnegans Wake is significant: 
"Riv-err-un"). What is the meaning of that other world, the one 
thought to be outside of what our minds know they know? How 
are we to deal with those verbs below the surface of reason and, 
perhaps, an author's conscious control? 
Or, to put it differently, if so much care was not taken by 
Joyce, as evidenced by the much touted number of 5,000 errors, 
would not this fact in its totality constitute a kind of vague cumulative 
volition? Authorization and will are related. "Which will" ("We 
are getting mixed," U 9.794)? Who was it again that was troubled 
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all day long about the correct voicing of—"voglio"—or is it perhaps 
"vorrei"? (auxiliary verbs are tricky and ubiquitous). I have no 
solution to offer for what the author's will may have been when. 
This was an author fretted, harried, optically handicapped, oblivious 
and, at that stage, not omniscient, certainly no longer scrupulous 
over minor flaws, an author who missed hundreds of commas that 
had been officiously introduced into the typescript of "Eumaeus." 
We all have overlooked commas in our petty time, nothing is easier. 
But can the wholesale sprinkling of them be missed? Does Joyce's 
noninterference mean Will, Impotence, Carelessness, or Passive Res­
ignation? If Joyce—"writing the mystery of himself" (FW 184.9), 
"lisant au livre de lui-meme" (U 9-114), that is rereading the proofs 
of himself—so often forgot himself, which part of Joyce are we going 
to call up in his stead? I, for one, do not have the strong verbs to 
tackle such questions, and so commas will continue to haunt, 
subjunctively, the Eumaean prose for me. 
My phrasings have been hovering, in subtle confusion, between 
activity and passivity in which author and transmitters shared. The 
text was made, begotten, augmented, changed, it suffered damage, 
neglect, was interfered with, but there is also a sense, much amplified 
in current vogues, in which Joyce's texts seemed to have a will of 
their own, appear to have written themselves, autogenetically. The 
synopsis of the new Ulysses, writes Hans Walter Gabler, using a 
reflexive form, displays "a text as it constituted itself in the process 
of writing" 6 The works, moreover, tend to comment on themselves 
in narcissistic self-preoccupation and internal reciprocality. Later texts 
also look back, retrospectively, on the earlier ones. We now discover 
more and more, and pontificate on, how Ulysses and Finnegans 
Wake are self-reflexive. 
reluctant to use the passive voiced (FW 523.8) 
Now verbs can be used either actively or passively in our languages 
(those that concern us here), and that seems to be all. But our Indo-
European dialect once expressed a third, in-between, possibility, with 
separate forms. The Greek prototexture of a work entitled "Ulysses" 
may permit a look into that language, a characteristic it had preserved 
from its ancestors. The verbal system included what was called a 
"middle diathesis" (disposition), in Latin grammar the genus ''me­
dium," the so-called Middle Voice, partaking of the active and the 
passive. It was an old, original part of its inflected system (in fact 
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the passive voice has been thought to derive from it). "But learn 
from that ancient tongue to be middle" (FW 270.17). 
Nowadays the main use of the Middle Voice is to bewilder the 
student of Greek and the translators, but it once expressed, very 
sensibly, a most common involvement of the subject beyond its own 
grammatical confinement within the sentence. Definitions speak of 
"actions viewed as affecting the subject," which is a very general 
condition to which formal attention was paid long ago. The Middle 
Voice is an "intermediate between active and passive," or a voice 
which "normally expresses reflexive or reciprocal action." Another 
traditional way describes its function as "the voice of verb inflection 
in which the subject is represented as acting on or for itself.'' By 
chance this may almost sound like, and remind us of, Stephen's 
Shakespeare: "He acts and is acted on" (U 9-1021). A Greek writer 
might well have used one verbal form for this, and we would then 
wonder if the passive or the medial sense is dominant. The verb 
"act," Stephen's choice, is a good paradigm: it shows that verbs 
too play roles, roles that were distinguished and highlighted in Greek. 
"Epiphany," a favorite term of Joyce's youth, has much to do with 
the middle voice: "epi-phainesthai," "to manifest itself, appear, 
come into view"; it can also mean, of course, passively, "to be 
manifested." The Latin equivalents are the Deponents, verbs with 
passive forms but active function—hybrids. Joyce acknowledged them. 
A defendant in court becomes a "Deponent" (as a witness he would 
have to "depone"): 
the deponent. . . may have been (one is reluctant to use the 
passive voiced) may be been as much sinned against as sinning, 
for if we look at it verbally perhaps there is no true noun in 
active nature. . . (FW 523.7) 
Anyone accused is likely to present himself not as an agent but 
as a passive victim; "more sinned against than sinning" is a moral 
medial position between the voices that grammar keeps apart. A 
deponent verb is passive ("sinned against") in looks but active 
("sinning") in intent. Another court room situation also plays on 
the morality of the verb: 
no longer will I follow you oblique like through the inspired 
form of the third person singular and the moods and hesitensies 
of the deponent but address myself to you, with the empirative 
of my vendettative, provocative and out direct (FW 187.2) 
Grammatical terms reappear: 
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And egg she active or spoon she passive, all them fine clauses. . . 
never braught the participle of a present to a desponent horta­
trixy, vindicatively. . .(FW 269.29) 
The verb contained in "hortatrixy" is a well-known paradigm for 
the deponent, hortor or hortari, passive in appearance, in the active 
sense of exhort or incite. 
Being "one of those mixed middlings" and volatile, unstable, 
formally not always distinguished from the passive, the Middle Voice 
tended to disappear as a separate category, not, however, as an 
inherent assignment in language. If we want to express medial 
participation in English, we usually choose a form in which the 
subject finds itself at either end of the inflected verb. My sentence 
just did that: "the subject finds itself. . .  " Characteristic is a bending 
(flectere) back {re-) upon the agent, so we call it "re-flexive." 
Stephen's theory can be rephrased in grammatical metaphor. 
One of its cornerstones is the report that Shakespeare the actor took 
the part of King Hamlet's ghost. A premise is that Shakespeare 
played, acted, himself in this role, and from this a whole algebra 
of equations is then extrapolated. Of Shakespeare, named Will, the 
"unremitting intellect is. . Iago ceaselessly willing that the moor in 
him shall suffer" (U 9-1023). This is the activity and passivity of 
suffering.7 Shakespeare's errors are "volitional"; yet he is pained 
because he was "overborne in a cornfield" (9.456) by Anne who 
"hath a way" over others' will. So—always according to Stephen's 
self-projections—Shakespeare, partly driven, in varied reiteration wills 
himself into his writing. Hamlet is, in Mallarme's phrasing, "lisant 
au livre de lui-meme, don't you know, reading the book of himself." 
He does this, we are told, walking—in reflexive French: "// se 
promine" (9.114). 
Stephen may vary his views in terms of scholastic actuality and 
possibility: "He found in the world without as actual what was in 
his world within as possible," and he adduces a saying of Maeterlinck's 
"If Socrates leave his house today he will find the sage seated on 
his doorstep" (9.1041). The "sage," reciprocally, is Socrates, the 
subject. We walk through ourselves, meeting many people along the 
road, but always, in fateful fulfillment, meeting ourselves. 
The Shakespeare posited by Stephen is that of a compulsive 
and highly versatile auto-bio-grapher of enigmatic genius. Psycholog­
ically, the life acted and suffered and partly self-determined, can 
hardly help writing itself out into the plays. Autobiography is 
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tautologically medial. So is a basic assumption of a writer s biography: 
the personality must be reflected, repeated, modified, conjugated, 
"worked off," in the work. The consubstantiality of any writer's life 
and writings looks like a medial truism. Whitman's "One's self I 
sing" could be seen as the traditional epic invocation translated into 
the Middle Voice and into English near-reflexivity. 
In the following presentation I will deflect the Middle Voice 
(often using the Latin term medium) as an analogy or descriptive 
handle for Joycean features that are already well known, in what I 
hope will be mainly quick illustrative flashes. 
"What would grammar matter?" (D 66) 
"The Boarding House" may serve as a convenient sample. Consider 
dominant Mrs. Mooney, who manipulates two lives with a firm hand, 
as almost exclusively expressed in the active voice, with purposeful 
active verbs. And isn't her voice active! She even does the speaking 
for others, her own last word is on behalf of Doran: "Mr. Doran 
wants to speak to you" (D 69). Mr. Doran, in the role of victim 
(as he would see himself), is largely and momentously passive, in 
behavior and in grammar: he is being sent for and being decided 
on, even his "wants" are expressed for him: "he was being had" 
(D 66). Polly Mooney, the strategic intermediary, conducts herself a 
good deal in the middle voice: "She knew she was being watched. . . 
She would put an end to herself." In her own little scene towards 
the end, "she dried her eyes, .refreshed her eyes. . .She looked at 
herself in the mirror." She falls into a revery, withdraws into her 
own memories and visions. When her story is continued into Ulysses, 
the brief sketch of "the sleepwalking bitch, .the bumbailiff's daugh­
ter," retains its typical quasi-reflexive syntax even in hyperbole: 
"without a stitch on her, exposing her person" (12.401). 
Bob Doran finds fault with Pollys vulgar grammar: "sometimes 
she said 'I seen' " (D 66). What she means is, actively, I have seen, 
but her wording is passive, as though she were using a Latin deponent. 
Her "being seen," of course, is literally an ingredient in the seduction 
(a scene mainly hidden from us). Seduction, as active strategy, passive 
entrapment, or some medial involvement, of the main persons, is 
one of the story's themes. Up to a point, the grammatical distribution 
40 Fritz Senn 
works; if taken too far into a system, it would become as absurd 
and constrictive as all such attempts. 
Stephanoumenos 
We also find the detached artist-God in Stephen s esthetic procla­
mation on either side of the verb: 
The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or 
behind or beyond or above his handiwork. . . .(P 215) 
and no matter how refined out of existence, or indifferent,the pose 
expressive of such indifference is manifested by the type of verbal 
form which in Greek grammar is always instanced as typical middle 
voice (louomai bous podas: I wash my feet = myself): "paring his 
fingernails" (P 215); which becomes, naturally, a reflexive form in 
French: ("en train de se limer les ongles"). 
The would-be artist who thinks like that is to declare, program­
matically: "I will not serve that in which I no longer believe. . .and 
I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as 
I can and as wholly as I can" (P 224). Our stress is on "myself." 
The triad of arms to be used in defense ends on "cunning," and 
it is oddly fitting that the Greek prototype name Daidalos translates 
into "cunning." Dedalus using cunning (the skill of being daidalos) 
is a piece of philological reflexivity. 
One of the classmates' appellations, "Bous Stephanoumenos" 
will be repeated and remembered in Ulysses, where it leads to another 
Greek participle of echoing ending and like form, "Autontimorou­
menos" (9-939)- The latter is close to the title of a play that Terence 
adapted from Menander. The title is conspicuously reflexive: it moves 
the self into the accusative case: auton-\ the "Self-Tormentor," as 
it is translated. The Greek participle written into Ulysses is in the 
middle voice. Tormenting and being tormented: so is Stephen. The 
verb timoreo (active), originally did not mean torment, but "to 
help" and then "to revenge." In this collection we also see a change 
rung on the Hamlet theme. Prince Hamlet and Stephen do take 
revenge, but in part on themselves; an unvoiced middle participle 
brings this out. 
Stephen's entry into Ulysses is revealing. He is first an object 
when Mulligan catches sight of him and goes into a mimetic routine 
of exorcism. Then the perspective changes: 
Stephen Dedalus, displeased and sleepy, leaned his arms on the 
top of the staircase. 
 41 Joyce the Verb
He leans part of himself (or, in reflexive French: "il s'inclina") 
onto the world outside. Soon after he will "lean his palm against 
his brow" (1.100). In "Eveline" such leaning had a strongly passive 
air, here it expresses a more in-between stage. Notice what Stephen 
is: "displeased." No doubt the overbearing Mulligan displeases him, 
perhaps also the raving Englishman in the tower; but the word 
mainly expresses an internal disposition. In translation such medial 
forms usually come out twofold: passive (as in "contrarie" or 
"contrariato"), or in partial self-inducement: "malhumorado-mis­
slaunig-med mis hag." In A Portrait Stephen had been characterized 
twice as "displeased"—one of his habitual moods. It is hard to 
imagine him pleased. The opening beat, "displeased," is in the 
right medium. The epithet relates him to Telemachos, who was beset 
by afflictions from outside, and it also differentiates him from the 
Greek role and prepares the way, psychologically and grammatically, 
for Autontimoroumenos. 
Psychogrammar 
On a much grander scale, we may redescribe what has been Bloom's 
affliction. He suffers his wife's adultery, is being injured and 
victimized, yet he also co-determines this state of the affair, he 
connives and goes out of his way to make it possible. All of this is, 
in the characterization of the middle voice, action also "for himself." 
The hyperballistics of the Circean mode transform such attitudes into 
large stage action and passion. In a climactic scene Bloom watches 
and applauds Boylan's copulation with his wife through a keyhole 
in twisted enjoyment of cockoldry, being "bawd and cuckold" 
(9-1021). The situation leads right into the vision of Shakespeare s 
face in the mirror: the optical multiplicity involves Stephen and 
Bloom and, in widening perspective, the creator of the scene and 
its voyeuristic readers. It is an interreflective node of voices and 
visions, a muddle of reciprocity. 
Bloom's medial actions do not always, as we recall with divergent 
evaluations, conform to the stereotypes of sexism. It is on record 
that the male has predominantly been equated with active action, 
the female with passive submission. Something of this sexual grammar 
is mediated in an Ithacan passage 
the natural grammatical transition by inversion involving no 
alteration of sense of an aorist preterite proposition (parsed as 
masculine subject, monosyllabic onomatopoetic transitive verb 
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with direct feminine object) from the active voice into its 
correlative aorist preterite proposition (parsed as feminine subject, 
auxiliary verb and quasimonosyllabic onomatopoetic past parti­
ciple with complementary masculine agent) in the passive voice 
(U 17.2217) 
Into such a system, which Dublin society at the turn of the 
century would no doubt uphold, Joyce inserted a middle way which 
manifests itself first, mildly, in Bloom's sympathy, or compassion, 
for women: he can put himself in their position. This makes him 
an outsider, particularly in the male congregation of the maternity 
hospital. In a transitive sense, Bloom is not very active. Activity is 
the role of the Boylans and the Mulligans who in turn are not too 
sensitive and, on the whole, lack empathy. When critics, superior 
by self-appointment, judge Bloom a failure or decree, for instance, 
that throughout his day he takes the "wrong choices" (not going 
home to assert a possessive masculinity), it is generally done within 
a transitive patriarchal framework. 
Bloom, the reproach goes, is "one of those mixed middlings. 
Lying up in the hotel. . .once a month with a headache like a totty 
with her courses" (12.1658). In "Circe" such traits are externalized 
and Bloom is turned into yet another paradigm, "a finished example 
of the new womanly man" (15.1798). This puts him midway between 
the "manly man" of Gerty MacDowell's imagination, and how very 
soon after she views herself as a "womanly woman" (13.210,435). 
There is then, as Bloom asserts in one of his defense speeches, "a 
medium in all things" (15.878). He is not explaining Greek grammar 
by a Latin term, but echoing Horace's familiar "est modus in rebus' 
("there is a measure in all things"), and asking for moderation. But 
medium he is, all the same, also between male and female. 
Circean androgyny enables the newly generated finished example 
to finish the example by giving birth to eight male children. It so 
happens that the number eight is also that of Molly Bloom's 
"sentences" in her chapter, eight verbal units generated by the 
book's representative woman: there may be a numerical correspon­
dence. Bloom's children are "respectably dressed and wellconducted" 
(15.1824): both epithets are in the middle voice, in particular 
"wellconducted": it can be construed as active or medio-passive. 
Androgynous features animate Finnegans Wake and extend 
across genders or religions to appellations like: 
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In the name of Annah the Almaziful, the Everliving, the Bringer 
of Plurabilities, haloed be her eve, her singtime sung, her rill 
be run, unhemmed as it is uneven (FW 104.1) 
in which august divinities are feminized and brought into line with 
Eve, or in which Moslem and Christian prayer become assimilated 
to the beginning of Finnegans Wake itself, with "rill be run" 
echoing "riverrun." The equation of Annah, ALP, Eve, with Allah 
and the Lord looks like a cosmogenetic middle voice. All of this ties 
in with the observation that in Latin grammar verbs as well as nouns 
have genus, gender. Active, passive, and medium, are "genera." 
Medial Monologue 
The interior monologue once seemed the most striking feature of 
Ulysses, the one that once attracted most of the serious attention. It 
is a kind of speech not addressed to an outside object; the subject, 
as it were, is talking to and often about itself. In a very loose and 
yet coincidentally precise sense, Bloom, Stephen, and Molly become 
reflexive verbs. They mirror the outside world but also, and at times 
exclusively, their own selves, "bend back" (re-flect) on themselves. 
In Homeric diction "thinking" is often expressed by a person 
addressing his (her) heart, or breast, or mind: "I think" is "I said 
to myself." By a definition that is almost grammatical and, again, 
tautological, everything thus expressed is "subjective." What is 
perceived is subjected to the perceivers nature. One of the narrative 
advantages is the economy of such characterization that is two-
directed: towards the world without and within: "She understands 
all she wants to. Vindictive too. Cruel. Her nature. Curious mice 
never squeal. Seem to like it" (4.27). This tells us something about 
cats, and mice, but even more about Bloom (at a later stage we may 
find, moreover, that some of Bloom's attitude towards his wife is 
already caught in this observation). We can move, in other words, 
towards the thing said (thought) and towards the sayer (thinker). 
We generally recognize the reflector, can tell Bloom from Stephen 
or, by extrapolation, deduce the author himself who, biographically, 
is all to all, Bloom and Stephen and Molly and Lenehan. All the 
works are, truistically, piece de Joyce. 
The internal middle voice appears in a very brief flash on the 
first page: "Chrysostomos." Insofar as it is a naming (see above), it 
characterizes the person named as well as the namer, indicates 
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something about his erudition as well as his state of mind. The 
interior monologue's official initiation takes place fittingly at the 
moment when, looking at the mirror held out to him, Stephen 
begins internally to speak to himself: "As he and others see me" 
(1.136). At this point perspective, pronouns, tenses, all have changed. 
The reflexion is optical, psychological and grammatical. The self seen 
in the mirror reflects back: "Who chose this face for me?. . .It asks 
me too": the face that is being addressed reciprocally asks back. 
Interestingly enough, Stephen sees himself when he "bent forward"; 
bending forward is the mirror reflexion of bending (fleetere) backward. 
Gerty MacDowell, whose thoughts are presented more indirectly, 
also "bent forward quickly," after "being bent so far back" 
(13.742,728); but her physical action is described more as leaning: 
"she leaned back" we read several times (13.695,715, "ever so far," 
717,941), or she "had to lean back" (744). We know that this 
enables her, medio-passively, to be seen in a particular way. Recip­
rocally, however, Bloom in his turn "was leaning back," he "coloured 
like a girl," also reciprocally (13.743). All these bendings and leanings 
are not connected with the thinking that goes on but with the 
chapter's activities which are more solitary (or "ipsoerelative") than 
other-directed (or "aliorelative," as in 17.1350). 
Physically, the associations of the middle voice can be extended 
to masturbation. Whether through necessity or fastidiousness, the 
subject also becomes its own object. In the "Nausicaa" chapter, the 
arena for such economy or auto-reciprocity, Gerty and Bloom are not 
so much transitive verbs with each other as objects, at least not each 
others direct objects, except visually. Something as erotic and tactile 
as "the quick hot touch of his handsome lips" occurs only in Gerty's 
imagination (13.708). Bloom wets and stains himself. Even his watch 
has stopped. In Greek such intransitive stopping would be in the 
middle voice (pauesthai as against an active pauein, to stop): "Funny 
my watch stopped at half past four" (13.846); the watch, clearly, 
ceased its activity, it "stopped itself"; what Bloom considers "funny" 
seems to be that whatever went on at home had some enigmatic 
influence and, actively, stopped it. In this view or superstition, the 
watch, like Bloom, acts and is acted on. 
Both Gerty and Bloom, reflect, often in reciprocal convergences. 
Nothing is passed across but looks, and "a kind of language between 
them." Gerty MacDowell, "lost in thought" or "wrapped in 
thought," as the medial phrases have it, acts, in terms of the 
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grammatical descriptions indicated before, mainly "on herself or for 
herself." She is conscious of her effects on others, admiration that 
turns back on her. With the rest of humanity she shares the delight 
in the "lovely reflection which the mirror gave back to her" (13.162). 
Her circumambient style shows her as the victim of forces that have 
shaped her. They range from society s conventions and imperatives 
to the injunctions of advertising and the illusions of compensatory 
literature. But she is also their subject and, in her own conditioned 
turn, now regenerates the same attitudes in cosmetic circularity. She 
reshapes life in the style that shaped her. Lest this sound too 
condescending, let me add that I believe such medial conditioning 
holds true for most of us in all culture contexts. Stephen, for 
example, is similarly co-determined by the Catholicism he projects in 
his very efforts of rejection. I can't answer for any of you out there, 
but for me, Gerty MacDowell "c'est moi." 
The chapter's events are set off against the "voice of prayer" 
emanating from the nearby church, and the refrain of the litany, 
"pray for us," is woven into the foreground. Prayer is a model for 
the middle voice; in practice it often amounts to wishing something 
for oneself: ora pro nobis. The Greek verb was naturally medial: 
euchesthai, both in Homer and in the New Testament. Bloom notes 
the repetition of "Pray for us. And pray for us. And pray for us" 
and links it to his profession: "Same things with ads. Buy from us. 
And buy from us" (13.1122). Advertisements proclaim themselves; 
what Catesby's Cork Lino or Plumtree's Potted Meat spell out is, 
above all, "Buy me!" 
Middler the Holy Ghost 
The economy of heaven, androgyny, and a masturbatory Everyman 
Immorality Play are combined with gusto by Bullocky Mulligan at 
the end of "Scylla and Charybdis." But we have never been far 
from the consubstantial intricacies that obsess Stephen. His silent 
creed looks like a travesty of a Divine Middle Voice 
He Who Himself begot middler the Holy Ghost and Himself 
sent Himself, Agenbuyer, between Himself and others. . .sitteth 
on the right hand of his Own Self. . . (9-493) 
("on the right hand of His Own Self" has come true of the synoptic 
text of Ulysses). All of the middling has been transposed to patristic, 
Sabellian absurdity and incestuous economy. Unmistakable are the 
mocking reflexivity and the trailing, echoing Selves. "Middler the 
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Holy Ghost"—in one sweeping generalization one might yoke the 
third person of the Holy Trinity to my grammatical analogy in the 
conjugation of an all-powerful Verb. But in cosmogonic reticence I 
refrain from such comprehensive usurpation and merely indicate 
possible directions for research. 
Even so, the heretical bending back on itself exaggerates ideas 
of creation. The world, as some of our myths have it, came into 
being by the emanating voice of a god, by his speaking. In the 
Greek transformation of Genesis (whose original Hebrew phrasing 
would demand separate, corrective attention) the Creator's voice was, 
inevitably, a middle one. The first word ever uttered is 
Genetheto (medium imperative) 
and it is followed (and followed, it would seem, in most languages) 
by the noun: genetheto pbos-fiat lux—let there be light! The verb, 
preceding, brings the noun into existence. In a partial imitation 
Stephen begins one of his verbal creations (the one that recalls Joyce's 
first prose work and may also represent some of Ulysses) with an 
echo of Genesis: "Dubliners. . .Let there be life" (7.922,930). 
The effect of the imperative expresses itself in a change of the 
verb form: "kai egeneto phos: et facta est lux—And there was 
light." The verb used, "genetheto-egeneto" is the paradigmatic 
type of the medium, genesthai, the verb of becoming; it has no 
other voice (the Latin equivalent, factum esse, looks passive). This 
is not some odd coincidence, but the nature of the concept. Genesis, 
by definition and by its own essence, is medial becoming. The author 
of the world, it implies, also put himself into the oral work and 
participates in it. The naming processes immediately following have 
already been mentioned: words create the world, and within this 
new world, words have to be created to distinguish things and doings 
in genetic reciprocity. 
In the rereading of the original account by Christianity—which 
of course projected itself into the reading—the aspect of becoming 
is circumstantiated. St. John puts it like this: "All things were made 
by him [the word, logos]." Again the passive English construction 
does duty for a medial "panta di' autou egeneto" (John 1.3). St. 
John's memorable opening is as full as it must be of variations of 
gignesthai or genesis (in fact the first gospel begins as the book of 
"genesis": "Biblos geneseos Iesou Christou" (Liber generationis Jesu 
Christi, "the book of the generation," Matt. 1.1). The term "only­
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begotten," which reverberated down patristic controversies and is 
taken up in Ulysses, belongs to the same cluster, mono-genes (John 
1.14, 18, 3.16, 18, etc.). "Begetter" and "begotten" are recalled 
by Stephen Dedalus. Less known is that an approximation of the 
consequential term mono-genes also appears in Finnegans Wake, 
with just one letter changed that makes all the genetic difference— 
a Y for an E—the last chapter personifies: "if Monogynes his is or 
hers Diander" (613.33). This refers ostensibly to botanical generation 
("monogynia" and "diandria" are the first two classes in a sexual 
system); genders are mixed, "his or hers," and "Monogynes" changes 
a theological "his ," a divine male "monogenes" to a female shape, 
gyne (or gune), woman. The theological inversion is matched by one 
of the usual Wakean constellations of one central male facing two 
girls: we now find one woman, "mono"-"gyne" and two ("di") 
men ("aner, andro-"). 
Creating, begetting, giving birth, changing across categories 
make up the economy of Finnegans Wake. There is no middle voice 
in Anglo-Irish, but countless muddled phrasings, like "Creator he 
has created for his creatured ones a creation" (29.14). The sentence 
echoes and elaborates on its own subject, or its verb; again we have 
reciprocity and mirroring self-perpetuation; or semantic masturbation. 
In "understanding" such sentences we move forward and backward: 
this is just what Latin reciprocare meant, going backward (re) and 
forward (pro). So is the recirculatory technique of reading the Wake, 
"preprocession and proprecession" (156.8), or a "rotary processus 
and its reestablishment of reciprocities" (304 L3). This essay too is 
an exercise in reciprocity. 
At the opening of the learned, studious tenth chapter we seem 
to be looking for our place: we haply return. . .to befinding 
ourself 
and we find ourselves (or in German "betinden uns") once more 
reflectively on either side of the verb: 
when old is said in one and maker mates with made (261.5) 
The incestuous mating leads, in more echoing self-perpetuation 
("having conned the cones. . .") , to the Seven Wonders of the 
World. More narrowly, in the mythography of Finnegans Wake, the 
creator sinned himself into the world by an original act of medial 
self-pollution, as James S. Atherton long ago pointed out. This 
creator is 
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the first old wugger of himself in the flesh" (79.2)8 
The "old wugger" incarnates "himself in the flesh." The reflexive 
duplication of "wuggering"—offsetting the rather sterile act of 
buggery implied—is similar to the Wake's first clearly medial verb, 
the "rocks" that "exaggerated themselse" and went "doublin their 
mumper" (3.7). Part of the activity of exaggerating is directed 
towards others ( " - e l s e " ) , part bends back on the subject 
("themsel[ves]"). 
laughing-like to himself 
I have wuggered myself into a hyper-emphasis of a grammatical ploy, 
what the Greek called the middle diathesis, the Romans the genus 
medium. The whole point could have been made, more briefly, by 
focusing on Joyce's first and last work. In "The Sisters" a declining 
priest wants to reshape an impressionable boy in his own likeness; 
perhaps he obliquely tries to continue himself through the disciple. 
Professionally he listens to the confession of others, yet in the boy's 
dream and a reversal of roles, the priest seems to be confessing. In 
confession we say something to someone about ourselves; appropriately 
the Latin word for it is a deponent again, a medio-passive confiteor 
(the word is repeated in the partly auto-confessional Portrait: 78.9, 
82.17, 143.31). Confieri (infinitive form) is derived from fari (to 
speak) of which it is a special, retroactive, variant. "The Sisters" is 
a story in which the same boy later retells the events. Our last 
glimpse is of Father Flynn "sitting up by himself in the dark of his 
confessionbox, wide-awake and laughing-like softly to himself" (D 
18). The distortive confession is repeated, as if for emphasis: "Wide­
awake and laughing-like to himself" towards the end, and we know 
that "there was something wrong with him" 
Sitting, laughing to himself—that is one of Nora's reports of 
her husband composing Finnegans Wake, which has also been 
considered a twisted confession where much has gone wrong. It 
contains a "convulsion box," a "confisieur" and "confussion" 
(261.F3, 531.2, 353.25). It is a work that repeatedly speaks about 
itself, to itself, or tangentially admits that it is "a letter selfpenned 
to one's other" (489-33). This also ties in with the dream analogy 
of the Wake (which, to some of its commentators, who seem to 
know what a dream is, achieves axiomatic status). Most interpreters 
of dreams agree that whatever they contain, the dreamer is also 
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voicing him/herself in intricate guises and that dreams are a tortuous 
kind of confession. 
Revoicings 
With considerable metaphorical latitude I have been applying a 
grammatical analogy in free and easy dispersion. Analogy is what 
Joyce works with. On a small scale his Revoicings take the form of 
all those evocations of prior phrasings, often the most memorable 
ones of literature, sometimes the tritest of ready-made stereotypes. 
They may be formulas, clearly marked "quotations," or the most 
evanescent of "allusions." There is a medial sense in them, insofar 
as only a portion of their semantic energies are directed toward 
external actuality. The rest bends back, or retroflects, on their origin 
or the fashion of their articulation. The ghosts of former texts are 
called up, called up for readers in proportion to their familiarity 
with them. Some attention then turns back on the source, literary 
or otherwise. In Ulysses the method is heralded by Buck Mulligan 
who exhibits, from the start, remarkable mimetic and recitative skills. 
One reason why some of our initial effort is required to figure out 
the external setting is that most of Mulligan's second (perhaps 
golden-) mouthed pronouncements deflect our attention away from 
what referential direction they have. A ceremoniously intoned "/'»­
troibo ad altare Dei'' tells us less about what is really going on than 
about the history and proper context of the words quoted. A tension 
is set up between the two. 
Quotations brought to bear upon "reality" also detract from 
it. This is in the nature of the title "Ulysses," or of an entire 
chapter like "Oxen of the Sun," where indeed the literary parading 
so far has engaged most of our critical endeavors. Each Revoking 
(which here subsumes all evocations of prior texts) contains a feature 
of the middle voice, standing midway between what is being pointed 
out and its own peculiar manner of pointing. Each quotation in part 
epiphanizes itself. "Thalattal Thalatta!" (U 1.80) refers to the visible 
sea, but also to a speaker who flaunts classical knowledge: it looks 
forward to an object, and backwards towards a secondary quoter 
(Mulligan) and beyond to a primary author (Xenophon), and, from 
another angle, to one more adventurous journey with a return, 
analogous to the one of Odysseus. When Bloom enters his back 
garden in the morning and we read 
-50 Fritz Senn 
No sound. Perhaps hanging clothes out to dry. The maid was 
in the garden. Fine morning. (4.472), 
he is taking stock of what he sees and hears. But "The maid was 
in the garden" does not belong to this order. At least to a majority 
of those initiated (having a nursery rhyme in their ears), this is not 
a comment on a maid's presence. The maid leads a mere fictional, 
evocative existence "in the garden," she is in another grammatical 
mood, a subjunctive wish-fulfillment. The quotation—if recognized— 
displays itself as a medium. It refers back to a cultural thesaurus 
and applies one of its items to an analogous occasion. If we do not 
know the sentence as an echo we may misread the situation. "The 
maid was in the garden" means, if anything, its own opposite: a 
conspicuous, frustrating absence. The quotation fills the vacuum of 
"No sound." It utters mainly its existence as language re-used. 
In this allusive function, language still transitively refers to 
something outside: there is a possible transition to an actual situation. 
In its self-expressive, autophanic, effects, however, it moves closer to 
the middle voice. Semantic energies are divided as well as multiplied. 
Language itself, and by extension Literature, can be said to have a 
middle voice, mediating between an external objective, and a preening 
self-consciousness. Joyce, as usual, carries both functions—referential 
potency and the retroflection of utterance—to extremes. 
Nominal Shorthand 
In my confession I have said nothing that might not have been 
known before. Do not write this statement off as modesty—the same 
claim could be made about Finnegans Wake. I just tried to use a 
point of view (taken from classical languages) to subsume a variety 
of Joycean features that might otherwise have little in common. The 
terminology chosen tried to do more justice to Joyce's kinetics than 
what nominal stability might describe. There are, naturally, excellent 
reasons for still resorting to the fixation that nouns tend to indicate. 
Certain situations require classification or a provisional foothold. We 
need reassuring support as we need the solidity of a verifiable city 
of Dublin of 1904 to get our bearings and as a backdrop for the 
elusive narrative processes in Ulysses. The format of Notes or An­
notations, of brief glosses, allows for little else. Nominal shorthand 
saves time and space. The discursive articulation of verbal motion is 
laborious and hardly ever completed: a Protean sense of not-quite­
thereness always remains. 
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As long as we know about the necessity for convenient simpli­
fication, the danger is minimal. Take the practical requirement for 
a concise commentary on Finnegans Wake. As an example we hold 
up for inspection the first word in the text that is clearly not English: 
by a commodius vicus of recirculation (3.2) 
Annotations says (and must say, reductively): "Vico." We have a 
right to expect this sort of information, not to give it would be 
wrong. But the abbreviated near-truth is less justified when we deal 
with credulous novices. In a first learning process such premature 
labeling (nothing but the name "Vico") is unhelpful or even 
impedimental. For "vicus" (lower case) should be treated in its own 
right, or else brought back into the contextual currency (the English 
language) from which it sets itself off. In its prima facie inassimil­
ability it acts as an imperative for transformation: translate me! (or 
else, it leads us to different environs). A Latin dictionary would offer 
several interconnected meanings: "district of a town, village, neigh­
borhood, street, hamlet." Out of this spectrum, "street" or "road" 
seems to fit best, for we are casting about for something to move 
in ("brings us back"). But even so, we have to discard—or hold in 
suspense—all the other possible meanings: this is already semantic 
work in progress. A diachronic view of language as growth through 
time (remember "past Eve and Adams") would assemble cognates 
like English "wick" (in the sense of hamlet, village, mostly in place 
names) and, in particular, Greek "oikos" (house), and it would lead 
us back to an original root, deduced from existing words, which in 
this case would sound, of all things, like WEIK—very close to how 
we pronounce (Finnegans) Wake. Such a phonetic coincidence need 
not be belabored as part of an intended meaning, but some readers 
might be intrigued that an early non-normative word can recirculate 
to an element of the book's title. What an etymological excursion 
into history reveals is that development, becoming, time, are involved. 
That oddity "vicus" acts like a signpost and takes us elsewhere (and 
perhaps back to the context). 
Going along the road of wakeful meanings, we will, in the 
course of further input, also arrive at Giambattista Vico, eighteenth-
century Italian philosopher estimated by Joyce. For the initiated the 
click may set in as early as "recirculation." At some stage and time, 
recognition turns "vicus" into "vico" as a plausible matching. Once 
this has occurred, supportive hindsight evidence then may become 
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overwhelming (with the stress again on becoming): It was words of 
the type and ending like "vic-aj" that tended to turn into Italian 
words like "vic-o" (though this one does not exist, Latin commodus, 
on the other hand, became comodo). We may recall that the 
philosopher of temporal patternings used Roman history and Latin 
etymologies to illustrate recurrencies and changes. Finnegans Wake 
anachronistically inverts the process. We can retranslate, by a similar 
leap across languages, "riverrun" into a favorite Viconian term, 
ricorso (the flowing back, run, of a river, with the phoneme ri—as 
an external common link). Many additional roads can be traveled 
towards the particular goal. One is Vico road in Dalkey, obligingly 
incurvated, a parochial accident to be exploited by Joyce on further 
occasions. An instrumental preposition like "by a commodius vicus" 
would properly take the ablative case in Latin and change to "vico"— 
but this would be our doing. "Vico" in fact originates through our 
cooperation: the textual irritations prompt us into hermeneutic 
activity. 
If you insist that, all right, many semantic manipulations may 
be necessary to construe an Italian name out of a Latin noun, but 
once that is done, on all recirculatory readings there will be an 
instant identification, and no further quibblings, then you simply 
neglect how much "vicus" on all occasions also visibly protests against 
such violation. Wakean vital gestures towards dissociation are disre­
garded a trifle too complacently. "Vicus," in other words, may well 
strive to collide with "Vico," but with equal validity it aims to 
escape from the restriction. Neither turn should be ignored in our 
scope, nor the awareness that it is a matter of turning, of conversion. 
Vico, as a reductive name, is a valid and poor interpretation of 
"vicus" (among other things simply because it leaves out "us"), 
but it is an excellent verb to conjugate the Wake. 
Nothing new has been said, nothing for which external sources, 
protographs, archetypes had to be called in, not even a smattering 
of little Latin and less Greek: other catalysts would have done just 
as well. Nothing has been put forward that might not have been 
noticed from immediate observation, unaided, by verbal communi­
cation with the text. 
The most programmatically pertinent verb of them all may be 
reading. We know from experience it is both transitive and self­
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reflexive. What we gather, select, recognize, rearrange, construe, from 
the alphabetical configurations, we remake in our own likeness. It is 
no secret that some likenesses are more rewarding and conveyable 
than others, and, for better or worse, at a Symposium most likenesses 
are speaking, are our vocal confessions, with a fair proportion of 
self-display. Leopold Bloom exemplifies one of the pitfalls when he 
hastily projects his own name into a word that for a few letters looks 
alike: 
Bloo. . .Me? No. 
Blood9 of the Lamb. 
(t/8.8) 
In his zeal and inclination—misreading the throwaway of himself— 
he has forestalled us all. It is to his credit that he corrects himself 
in time. We don't always. That is one reason why we depend on 
each other's self-pennings. And one reason why I have argued in 
favor of interactions, at our conferences, against long, monologous, 
medial, "major" addresses, with all the tedium between active oral 
pontification and passive auditive suffering. 
In the beginning, we have learned, was the joy. The enjoyment 
that makes life, perhaps, almost worth reading.. It is a reading, also, 
of ourselves; but the selves may become a bit more aware, or refined, 
or sensitive, in the process, in all those processes that, when old is 
said in one, have gathered us here together and will continue to 
bring us back to Joyce—the Verb. 
NOTES 
1. Bcnstock, Shari and Bernard. Who's He When He's at Home: A James 
Joyce Directory. Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1980. 
2. "Usurper" (as in U 1.744) derives from a verb usurpare, one of whose 
meanings is "to call names." 
3. One of the abbreviations used in the footnotes "STET" in the old code 
of the typesetters is an injunction "Let it stand!" 
4. Such documents are called "witnesses," not just passive products of writing 
or printing, but live persons actively making statements that have to hold up to 
cross-examination. 
5. The conditional nature of the text that has been established is well in 
evidence in Richard Ellmann's wording: "What Gabler aims at is an ideal text, 
such as Joyce would have constructed in ideal conditions." "Preface" to Ulysses: 
The Corrected Text (see next note), p.x. 
6. "Afterword." In Ulysses: The Corrected Text, edited by Hans Walter 
Gabler with Wolfhard Steppe, p. 649. New York: Random House, 1986. 
7. The verb "to suffer," active in form, is medio-passive. "Stephen suffered 
(Mulligan] to pull out and hold up on show by its corner a dirty crumpled 
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hankerchief" (U 1.70). The transitivity is deceptive and reciprocal: something is 
done to Stephen and he suffers from it, he also suffers it. But there is self-
involvement in the action. The Latin for suffering, pati, patior, is naturally a 
deponent; its derivatives are passio and our "passive," the name for the genus 
which translated Greek "pathetikos," from pathos or a verb paschein, in whose 
system active and medio-passive forms intermingle. 
8. Atherton, James S. The Books at the Wake, London: Faber & Faber, 1959, 
p. 196. 
9. Walter W. Skeat with some reservation ("doubtfully") mentions the root 
BLOW for "blood," which would connect it to "bloom." An Etymological 
Dictionary of the English Language, Oxford (1909). 
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Every Irish schoolboy and schoolgirl—and consequenrly every serious 
Joycean—has heard of the Battle of Clontarf: how, in the year 1014 
at the place called the Meadow of the Bulls, the saintly Irish King 
Brian Boru drove the heathen Danes into the sea, and how King 
Brian was surprised at prayer and killed by the cowardly Bruadar. 
Like a good deal of what every Irish schoolboy and schoolgirl—and 
every serious Joycean—knows, this account is somewhat wide of what 
might loosely be termed the truth. In fact, it is part of a propaganda 
campaign run by Brian's supporters, the chieftains of Munster, to 
assert the primacy of the southern province over the rest of Ireland. 
The actual situation was more complicated. You must understand 
Dane to mean not merely an inhabitant of Denmark but any of the 
Scandinavian adventurers who tried his luck in Ireland. You must 
understand Irish to mean not all the people of Ireland but only those 
who were allies of Brian of Munster. The people of Dublin sided 
with the Danes which is not really surprising because Dublin, like all 
the major Irish towns, was a Scandinavian foundation. And the Danes 
were not expelled from Ireland: a large Scandinavian element re­
mained, became assimilated with the locals and fought side by side 
with them when the next wave of invaders—the Normans—arrived 
in the twelfth century. 
This essay is concerned with another piece of Munster propaganda 
which every Joycean is familiar with and which, given the constant 
increase in the popularity of Joyce's writings, every Irish schoolboy 
and schoolgirl may know before long. 
In January 1932, shortly after the death of his father, Joyce wrote 
to Harriet Weaver: 
He thought and talked of me up to his last breath. I was very 
fond of him always, being a sinner myself, and even liked his 
faults. Hundreds of pages and scores of characters in my books 
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came from him. . . . I got from him his portraits, a waistcoat, a 
good tenor voice, and an extravagant licentious disposition (out 
of which, however, the greater part of any talent I may have 
springs) but, apart from these, something else I cannot define. 
(JJII 643) 
I want to take as my topic those portraits which are now in 
Buffalo and, more especially, the purple hunting waistcoat in the 
Joyce Museum in Sandycove. This garment was made by Ellen Joyce 
for her son, John Joyce, who gave it to his son, James Joyce. Its 
fictional form figures in "The Dead" when Gabriel remembers that 
one year his mother had worked for him as a birthday present a 
waistcoat of purple tabinet, with little foxes' heads upon it, lined 
with brown satin and having round mulberry buttons. (D 186) 
Associated with this waistcoat is a tale of two cities, Dublin, the 
capital of Ireland, and Cork, on the south coast, the capital of Munster, 
both of them originally Scandinavian settlements and both of them 
crucial to any account of the life and writings of James Joyce. 
Though he loved his father dearly Joyce would not return to 
Dublin to see him. He kept him 
constantly under the illusion that I would come and was always 
in correspondence with him but an instinct I believed in held 
me back from going, much as I longed to. (JJII 643) 
Joyce often expressed a fearful unwillingness to put himself in 
the hands of those in Dublin who had proved so treacherous and 
malignant in the past and this may be the instinct he refers to. 
However, like much that seems strange in the career of James Joyce, 
his failure to make an appearance at the death-bed of his beloved 
father is not quite so strange when seen in the context of his family 
history. John Joyce, it would seem, was also absent from the death­
bed of his father. 
At the time of his father's death, Joyce was living comfortably 
in Paris, the hero of the literary avant garde. Many were taken by an 
apparent contradiction between James Joyce, the daring apostle of 
literary freedom, and Mr. Joyce, the formal man who frowned on any 
references to sex, who loved to dress up for the Opera and who was 
surprised by the effect he had on some people: 
My habit of addressing people I have just met for the first time 
as "Monsieur" earned for me the reputation of a tout petit 
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bourgeois while others consider what I intend for politeness as 
most offensive. (JJII 510) 
Had these people known Joyce's family background or had they read 
his writings more carefully they would have recognized his social 
demeanor as yet another aspect of his paternal inheritance. 
John Joyce was born in Cork in 1849 and died in Dublin in 
1931 at the age of eighty-two. Though he spent most of his life in 
Dublin—having moved there in his mid-twenties—he remained a 
Corkman all his life, and his son recognized this when he had his 
gravestone inscribed in memory of John Stanislaus Joyce of Cork. 
Among the many remarkable things about John Joyce is that, 
having lost his job in the Rates Office in 1891—at the age of forty— 
he never again reaped the benefits or bore the strain of full-time 
employment. His life divides neatly in two. Before 1891 he was a 
man of means, albeit of diminishing means, who had inherited a 
considerable amount of property in Cork; not long after 1891 he had 
mortgaged his properties away and was the unemployed father irre­
sponsible for the welfare of a wife and ten children. John Joyce was 
a spectacularly inadequate breadwinner. He earned little by a series 
of occasional jobs but his social pleasures seem to have taken prece­
dence over his domestic obligations. He abused his children physically 
and verbally and he made several attempts to inflict grievous bodily 
harm on his wife. Here is the opinion of one who knew him well: 
He was a man of unparalleled vituperative power, a virtuoso in 
speech with unique control of the vernacular, his language often 
coarse and blasphemous to a degree of which, in the long run, 
he could hardly himself have been conscious. . . [His] stones would 
be of a perfectly drawing-room character till suddenly, as if taken 
unawares, he would slip into the coarse vein and another side of 
his nature and vocabulary would be revealed. (Curran 69f.) 
And yet—and this is not the least remarkable aspect of the man— 
despite the humiliations of poverty, despite the loss of employment, 
property, and social status, and despite his ignominious flights from 
angry landlords—John Joyce retained an invincible sense of himself 
as a gentleman and he sought to transmit that consciousness to his 
eldest son. At bay before a Clongowes bully whose father is a 
magistrate, Stephen maintains that his father is a gentleman. Even 
as he loses the last of the Cork properties, Mr. Dedalus clings to his 
hopes for a well-bred future: 
—When you kick out for yourself, Stephen—as I daresay 
you will one of these days—remember, whatever you do, to mix 
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with gentlemen. When I was a young fellow I tell you I enjoyed 
myself. I mixed with fine decent fellows. . .we were all gentlemen, 
Stephen—at least I hope we were—and bloody good honest 
Irishmen too. (P 91) 
Though like all fathers and sons they had their little disagreements, 
John Joyce always had hopes for James, and James, as he grew older, 
saw himself increasingly as his father's son. Just as John Joyce combined 
"a perfectly drawing room character" with what his son euphemized 
as "an extravagant licentious disposition," so too James Joyce, having 
scandalized the western world with his writings, could put on his 
evening clothes and appear at the opera as a model of bourgeois 
propriety. 
Stanislaus Joyce, who hated his father and his native land with 
a religious passion, wrote as follows in My Brother's Keeper: 
The two dominant passions of my brother's life were to be love 
of father and of fatherland. . . love of his country, or rather of 
his city, that was to reject him and his work; love of his father, 
who was like a mill-stone round his neck. (238) 
Throughout his many wanderings James Joyce carried his family 
portraits as pius Aeneas bore his household gods. These portraits were 
the icons of a family cult, an oral history which transcended genealogy 
and attained the status of a foundation myth or an epic. We may 
refer to it as The Joycead in order to emphasize the conventions which 
govern it and to distinguish it from more orthodox history. The full 
text was lost, as it were, with the last breath of John Joyce, who was 
the principal author of this epic, but it is possible to reconstruct The 
Joycead by conflating the derivative versions found in the writings of 
his sons, James and Stanislaus. It is then possible to deconstruct this 
reconstruction by relating it to the historical circumstances and to 
contemporary records of people and events mentioned in The Joycead. 
The fact is that, despite the impression given in The Joycead, the 
Joyces made no lasting mark on Cork: their only existence is in the 
dusty obscurity of public records, legal documents, rates valuations, 
and commercial directories. John Joyce's attitude was more histrionic 
than historical. His pride in the Joyces was matched only by his scorn 
for the families of those women—including his wife and his mother— 
who married Joyces and thus—at least in the eyes of the world— 
contributed an equal share to the genetic pool. 
Although The Joycead does not stress the far distant past, we 
may assume that Joyces were Scandinavians who settled in what is 
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now northwestern France and later on, in the twelfth century, took 
part in the Norman invasion of Ireland. In Ireland they have always 
been associated with a part of a western county, Gal way, which is 
known as The Joyce Country. What we think of as traditional Norman 
virtues—urban development and regulation—do not appear to have 
found much expression on the western seaboard but the Joyces were 
not utterly lost in the Celtic ethos of Connemara: one strain moved 
south and into the Irish historical record at the end of the eighteenth 
century as builders. (They may have been connected with the marble 
quarries of Connemara where Joyces are still working.) They settled 
around the town of Fermoy in East Cork, the only part of Cork where 
the name is still reasonably popular. To this day the Joyces of East 
Cork preserve a tribal memory of their Galway ancestry and they 
believe, with justification, that they are descended from masons who 
came south in search of work. They prospered but at some stage they 
excited the envy or the disdain of their neighbors who composed a 
saying which still survives: never trust a Joyce, or Rice or a Quirke. 
In many ways the history of the Joyces is the history of the 
Catholic middle class in Ireland. During the eighteenth century Irish 
Catholics suffered under a system of penal legislation which was 
designed to bar any Catholic from social advancement. During the 
nineteenth century, thanks to a series of measures which culminated 
in the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, middle-class Catholics came 
to dominate most aspects of Irish life. This social adjustment did not 
take place without a great deal of pushing and shoving as middle-
class Catholics and Protestants sought to claim or maintain what they 
believed was exclusively theirs. Against the Protestant claim that the 
Catholics were treacherous and ignorant bog-trotters, the Catholics 
maintained that they were every bit as honest, as intelligent, and as 
cultured as the Protestants—in other words, the Catholic was just as 
much a gentleman as the Protestant. 
The Joycead, in true epic style, launches forth in medias res with 
the Joyces established in the forefront of Catholic society. It does not 
inquire too deeply into the manner in which they achieved their social 
status but the fact is that the Joyces, like Tim Finnegan, rose in the 
world by carrying a hod. They made bricks with which they made 
houses with which they made money. 
The move from manual labor to property development coincides 
with the move from the town of Fermoy into the city of Cork around 
1800 and is associated with James Joyce, "manufacturer and chapman 
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of salt and lime." Though it seems an unlikely combination today, 
salt and lime were essential commodities in the economy of Cork at 
the time. Lime was used in the making of building bricks and mortar 
and also as a fertilizer; salt was always in great demand in a city 
which was the center of the British butter trade. Various dependable 
documents—legal records, rates valuations, trade directories—establish 
James Joyce in the city of Cork as the owner of a brick-building 
business, of a salt and lime business, and of property. 
In The Joycead this primal James Joyce functions as a cultural 
hero whose exploits hover between mythological and academic history. 
If we recall that in this form he is the creation of John Joyce, we 
shall not be surprised if he epitomizes the virtues which his creator 
would claim as quintessential^ Joycean. Here he is in A Portrait of 
the Artist: 
He was a good Irishman when there waS no money in the job. 
He was condemned to death as a whiteboy. But he had a saying 
about our clerical friends, that he would never let one of them 
put his two feet under his mahogany. (38) 
In other words: James Joyce was the model of a spirited Irish 
gentleman. The Whiteboys were a clandestine agrarian terror society 
and were active around Fermoy in the late eighteenth century but 
the name was often used to indicate any secret society which used 
extreme methods on behalf of Catholics. The episode suggests that 
the Joyces, like many ambitious Catholics, resented the advantages, 
commercial and social, enjoyed by their Protestant competitors. This 
would have made them sympathetic to secret societies and, conse­
quently, brought them into conflict with the Catholic clergy whose 
official position was in support of the status quo. Nationalism and 
anticlericalism are intertwining threads of The Joycead and of Irish 
political history. 
James Joyce's unexplained reprieve may seem odd unless we 
remember we are dealing with a myth which is not constrained by 
the conventions of realism. The mythic element is more obvious in 
the case of James' son, James Augustine, who was born in 1827 in 
Rose Cottage, just outside Fermoy and quite close to several limestone 
quarries. The road between Rose Cottage and the main road to 
Mallow was known into our own time as Joyce's Boreen. In The 
Joycead James Augustine is the most obviously superhuman of the 
Joyces: almost everything about him suggests a quasi-divine status. 
He was "the handsomest man in Cork" and, most tellingly, a man 
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of "angelic temper" (My Brother's Keeper 21, 23)- Even his physical 
position is on high: in the pageant of the past he rides along, aloft 
on his horse, resplendent in his red hunting jacket, the admiration 
of all who gaze up at him (P 94). He was also above vulgar commerce 
with such mundane materials as salt and lime—he went bankrupt 
at least once—but before alluding to his human imperfections it is 
necessary to say something about his marriage. 
In My Brother's Keeper, Stanislaus, presumably repeating his 
father, writes that James Augustine 
married a woman of some means, an O'Connell, one of a family 
of nineteen, the daughter of the proprietor of one of the largest 
general stores in Cork. Some of the nineteen became priests and 
nuns. (22) 
John Joyce was the only child of an only child and his own 
domestic circumstances did not encourage him to admire large 
families. He had little to say in favor of the O'Connells who figure 
in The Joycead as the antitheses of the Joyces: graceless, superstitious 
and, despite their commercial success, peasants. He may even have 
blamed his own prolific paternity on the O'Connells.1 
James Augustine's father-in-law, the polyphiloprogenitive shop­
keeper, was also a representative figure of Irish life in the early 
nineteenth century. John O'Connell was a successful draper who had 
served in local politics. His political beliefs may be deduced from 
his claimed relationship with Daniel O'Connell, the Liberator of Irish 
Catholics by means of constitutional agitation and clerical support, 
and an uncompromising denouncer of political violence. I have been 
able to trace only five O'Connell children, four of whom answered 
the call to the religious life. One of these was Ellen O'Connell who 
followed her sister, Alicia, into the South Presentation Convent in 
Cork in October 1836. Ellen left the convent after four months/ 
Ten years later she was still unmarried but her patience was to be 
rewarded with a proposal from "the handsomest man in Cork." 
They were married in 1848, an exceptionally unhappy year for Ireland 
which was being ravaged by the Great Famine. In July 1849 their 
only child was born, John Stanislaus, the father of James and 
Stanislaus and the main author of The Joycead: a child of the 
Famine, he was to prove himself a great survivor. 
The documentary history of the marriage is mainly legal. A 
deed of settlement records the merging of assets: the Joyces contrib­
uted house property close to their own town residence and the 
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O'Connells gave land and quarries close to the Joyce brick-building 
business outside the city in Ballinlough. Stanislaus suspected that 
the parents looked to the mature Ellen to temper the extravagance 
of James Augustine and teach him the sober virtues of the O'Connells. 
Not the least of Ellen's attractions was the equivalent of $100,000 
she brought in hard cash but hopes of a successful merger were vain: 
four years later James Augustine was bankrupt. In retrospect it is 
clear that the angelic James Augustine frittered the family fortune. 
Before his early death in 1866 he had lost the family interests in 
brickmaking, building, and the sale of salt and lime. His death 
certificate describes him as Inspector of Hackney Coaches—almost 
certainly a sinecure in the gift of the O'Connells.3 
The mythological history of the union is much more interesting 
and is concerned with the nature of James Augustine, the nature of 
Ellen O'Connell, the nature of the marriage, the naming of the 
child, and finally, the amazing survival of the child. As usual the 
sordid commercial details are more or less dismissed as vulgar and 
beneath the notice of gentlemen. 
The story of James Augustine and Ellen may be seen as a 
parody of the Adonis theme, with James Augustine as Adonis and 
Ellen as a dull peasant Persephone; there is even in My Brother's 
Keeper the suggestion of occasional visits to Aphrodite (23). James 
Augustine was young, exceptionally handsome and "of angelic tem­
per"; no longer young, Ellen was plain and shrewish. Nor would 
Ellen's defection from the convent have added to her attractions in 
a society which branded young men who left the seminary as "spoiled 
priests." 
Here, to change terms, was a Dido whom James Augustine 
should have loved and left. What prevented him? What else except 
the malign influence of the priest-ridden O'Connells? At least that 
is how it was in The Joycead as reported in My Brother's Keeper 
(23). No doubt the O'Connells blamed the failure of the marriage-
carnal and commercial—on the fecklessness of the ill-disciplined and 
licentious Joyces, but the Joyces saw things in a different light. The 
marriage was a loveless and grotesque conjunction contrived by the 
O'Connells and their clerical mentors as a last ditch effort to marry 
Ellen off to the angelically ingenuous James Augustine. 
The most farcical of the mythological episodes was that of the 
naming of the only son. According to The Joycead it was intended 
to christen the son James but, thanks to the bungling of a drunken 
parish clerk, the baby was named John. It is infinitely more likely 
 63 The Joycead
that John was named after his maternal grandfather, the irreproach­
able John O'Connell. The story of the drunken clerk was a Joycean 
denial of the O'Connell heritage, a heritage which teemed with 
scheming clerics. 
One can only guess as to which Joyce was responsible for this 
tale. Its garrulous form suggests John Joyce but perhaps it originated 
as James Augustine's apology for not protecting his son more 
effectively from the O'Connells. More than likely, both men had a 
hand in it for they were unusually close to each other, "more like 
brothers than father and son." John Stanislaus had been a weak 
child and had suffered from typhus, the disease which would later 
kill James Augustine. He was saved by James Augustine in a manner 
which would not have been out of place in a more ancient myth: 
James Augustine arranged for his son to go out in the pilot boats 
and the fresh salt air of Cork Harbour not only cured him of childish 
illness but enabled him to live to the age of eighty-two. 
John Joyce remembered his twenty-five years in Cork as a sort 
of paradise. Wanting for nothing, assured of everything, innocent of 
the harder facts of life, free from the inconvenience of work, he set 
out to emulate his father: he excelled at outdoor pursuits—riding, 
sailing, rowing, bowling, athletics—and, spoiled with money, an 
engaging manner, a good voice, and a talent for mimicry, he was 
equally successful as a young man-about-town. Even the early death 
of his angelic father does not seem to have interrupted the blissful 
tone of his youth. The story is that James Augustine, as he lay 
dying, urged his son to go to the Opera House (My Brother's Keeper 
23). The death of James Augustine left John Joyce alone among the 
O'Connells. He went up to Queen's College, now University College, 
to study medicine in order to consolidate his social status by earning 
a living as a professional gentleman; but it was his Joycean spirits 
that won out and he dedicated himself so assiduously to athletics 
and dramatics that there was no time for studies and he abandoned 
his attempt to become a professional gentleman, preferring to live 
the life of a gentleman of leisure. One presumes that the O'Connells 
tried to point out the weakness of his position—that his inheritance 
was not unlimited, that he was living off his capital while creating 
none; at any rate, his relations with his mother and her people may 
be gauged from another episode of The Joycead. 
The story goes that in his early twenties John Joyce made two 
efforts to join violent organizations, the French Army and the Fenian 
Brotherhood. In the first case he was frustrated by his mother who 
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followed him to London and dragged him home; to extricate him 
from the Fenians his mother took him to Dublin where she hoped 
he would find some respectable and profitable expression for his 
political energies. Ellen O'Connell appears here as typically O'Con­
nell, dull, constitutional, and bent on repressing the extravagant 
disposition of the Joyces. As a man of property John Joyce should 
not have sympathized with the Fenians but he needed some outlet 
for the colorfully rebellious streak he had inherited from his father's 
people. Soon he was to find a cause which would allow him to 
become involved in radically nationalist politics without prejudicing 
his position as an Irish Catholic gentleman. Charles Stewart Parnell 
united almost all strands of Irish nationalism behind him: a Protestant 
landlord who was as anti-English as any Catholic peasant, Parnell 
seemed set to deliver a new Ireland in which men like John Joyce 
would come into their own. John Joyce became his fanatical supporter. 
Though removed from his southern paradise, John Joyce con­
tinued on the primrose path. Against the wishes of their parents, 
he married May Murray and in 1882 their son was born and christened 
James Augustine: there was no bungling this time. John Joyce took 
his family to live in Bray—on the coast just south of Dublin—where 
he resumed the water-sports he had excelled in while in Cork. There 
were danger signs but spotting them had never been a Joyce forte. 
The series of only boys was broken and then gradually shattered as 
May Murray showed herself to be the equal of any O'Connell when 
it came to bearing children. John Joyce must have known that he 
was living beyond his means but if he did, he took no corrective 
measures. As a gentleman of means he sent his son James to 
Clongowes, a prestigious and expensive school run by the Jesuits for 
the sons of Catholic gentlemen. 
And here endeth the first part of The Joycead. 
The child James Joyce was nourished on this family myth and 
within it he found his role: he was Sunny Jim, first in line to the 
solar throne which had been occupied by the immortal James I whom 
even a sentence of death could not kill, by the angelic James 
Augustine whose brief life shed sunshine on all around him (with 
the possible exception of his wife and his creditors), and by his own 
father. John Joyce was not the least superhuman of these Joyces: the 
only begotten son of a heavenly father and an all-too-earthly-mother, 
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he had grown up in the distant paradise that was called Cork and 
he would establish his beloved Jim in the promised land into which 
Mr. Parnell was about to lead all the people of Ireland. At the same 
time young Jim was being nourished—some would say force-fed— 
on another myth: "Dante" was instructing him in the Roman 
Catholic religion. 
The central episode of the second part of The Joycead was the 
loss of paradise: this fall from graciousness was not due to the sin 
of any Joycean father but to the meanminded treachery of the Irish 
people. A less creative account would point out that the Joyces had 
been living beyond their means for two generations and that James 
Augustine's commercial ineptitude had only been disguised by his 
alliance with the O'Connells. John Joyce had failed either to earn 
enough money or to marry a sufficiently rich woman to finance his 
life of genteel leisure. It was only a matter of time before he fell 
into debts which could not be sustained. 
John Joyce had begun to mortgage his property ten years before 
the fall of Parnell but according to The Joycead the fall of John 
Joyce was part of the greater fall of Parnell. Both men had been 
betrayed and deserted in their hours of need by the uncouth Irish 
rabble encouraged and directed by their masters, the Catholic bishops 
and priests. It was probably at this juncture, c. 1891, that the family 
myth assumed its final form, which I have called The Joycead and 
which, for John Joyce, provided an acceptably coherent account of 
the fate of the Joyce family. The Joyces were gentlemen and not to 
be confused with the peasants who marveled at them as the Joyces 
rode past. The Joyces were good Catholics and good Irishmen but 
they were contemptuous of the Irish Catholic clergy whose bullying 
of the Irish was matched only by their subservience to the English. 
The Joyces were men of spirit who had sported in paradise until 
they were trapped into marriage with the O'Connells, a dull priest-
ridden family whose only achievement was the breeding of priests 
and nuns, the same priests and nuns who had organized the peasants 
against Parnell and thereby thrown away the future of Ireland. 
Joyce had been removed from Clongowes in June 1891- A 
Portrait of the Artist suggests that hints of John Joyce's troubles had 
begun to filter through beforehand: Stephen is upset by the aggressive 
snobbery of Nasty Roche and the mean behavior of Athy whose 
father owned horses and was probably, thinks Stephen, another 
magistrate. 
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[Stephen] thought of his own father, of how he sang songs while 
his mother played and of how he always gave him a shilling 
when he asked for sixpence and he felt sorry for him that he 
was not a magistrate like the other boys' fathers. Then why was 
he sent to that place with them? But his father had told him 
that he would be no stranger there because his granduncle had 
presented an address to the liberator there fifty years before. 
(26) 
If he was not a magistrate, that is, if he could not afford to 
send his son to Clongowes, why had he sent him there? John Joyce's 
reassurance is a reference to The Joycead: Clongowes was for young 
Catholic gentlemen and James' status was assured because an an­
cestor—for once the O'Connells proved useful—had presented an 
address to Daniel O'Connell there. But such references would not 
satisfy a bursar and young James did not return to Clongowes after 
the summer vacation of 1891 • 
Perhaps the most amusing testimony to the power of The 
Joycead is Joyce's implicit denial—in A Portrait—of his attendance 
at North Richmond Street Christian Brothers School. While Stephen 
enjoys what is termed a "long spell of leisure and liberty" (71) 
between Clongowes and Belvedere, it is almost certain that James 
Joyce spent the corresponding period with the Christian Brothers. 
The writer who would become notorious for his relentless honesty 
drew the line at subjecting his fictional self to the tender mercies of 
the Christian Brothers. His fictional father would have agreed: 
—Christian Brothers be damned! said Mr Dedalus. Is it 
with Paddy Stink and Micky Mud? No, let him stick to the 
Jesuits in God's name since he began with them. They'll be of 
service to him in after years. (P 71) 
The Jesuits were the teachers of young gentlemen, the Christian 
Brothers of the lower orders, the peasants and urban proletariat. The 
Christian Brothers were members of the gang which had betrayed 
Parnell—and Ireland—in the name of Catholic morality. They would 
therefore have been allies of that uncouth and meanminded clergy 
which had always been the traditional enemy of the Joyces. 
Although the Jesuits retained their access to the more exclusive 
corridors of power, the Christian Brothers were more overtly influential 
in the post-Pamell era. They were associated with the popular wave 
of cultural nationalism which was organized by the Gaelic League 
and was eventually taken over by the revolutionaries who would 
beget the Irish Free State in 1923. Despite the passionate nationalism 
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that was a family tradition, John Joyce took no part in these 
developments: he remained on the sideline, utterly contemptuous. 
John Joyce withdrew from active political involvement partly 
because he could no longer afford to contribute as he had done and 
partly because, having identified so completely with Parnell, there 
was no way he could join with those who had, in his opinion, 
betrayed him: Irish history was—and would always be—a series of 
great men betrayed, a view which he impressed on his favorite son. 
Why did he not lend his support—even his verbal support—to the 
"hillsiders and fenians" who, despite the threats of the bishops, 
were plotting to bring about an independent Ireland? After all, his 
grandfather was reputed to have been involved with the precursors 
of the Fenians and he himself had flirted with the Fenians in Cork: 
why not support the new Fenians? Because the Gaelic League had 
transformed nationalist politics. The ideal of the Gaelic League was 
a new Ireland which sought its inspiration not in British Victorian 
society but in the Gaelic culture of Ireland's past, a culture which 
had only survived in the remotest parts of the country and especially 
along the western seaboard. This did not appeal at all to people like 
John Joyce who in the course of the nineteenth century had established 
themselves as gentlemen by distancing themselves from the hovels 
and the peasants which the English satirists associated with Irish 
separatism. And yet the members of the Gaelic League—like Miss 
Ivors in "The Dead"—saw these peasants as cultural heroes of the 
new Ireland they hoped to bring about. The Joyces were among 
those who were intensely proud of the fact that they had made their 
way from the hovel to the city, from scratching a living to making 
a fortune, from rags to hunting waistcoats. Though they had come 
a long way, they were still too close to their rural origins to relish 
any idea of return: for them the cult of the Irish-speaking peasant 
was a relapse into barbaric isolation. 
Like almost everybody else, James Joyce was attracted by the 
excitement which the Gaelic League generated but he resisted the 
cult of the peasant which Yeats and Synge and Lady Gregory had 
made fashionable. In his journal for April 14, Stephen mocks this 
fashion but the tone changes from mockery to something more 
complex when he imagines the face of the peasant: 
I fear him. I fear his red-rimmed horny eyes. It is with him I 
must struggle all through this night till day come, till he or I 
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lie dead, gripping him by the sinewy throat till. . Till what? 
Till he yield to me? No, I mean no harm. (P 252) 
Like Gabriel Conroy, Joyce came to accept his relations with 
the Irish past but, like his ancestors, he preferred to look to the 
future and head for the city. And that future would be outside 
Ireland altogether. Joyce lived through the achievement of an Irish 
Free State but, despite the traditional nationalism of his family, he 
was always careful to avoid any remark or gesture that could be 
understood to imply his approval of the new Ireland. 
In far-off Trieste in 1907 Joyce decided to recast his autobio­
graphical novel into a fictional account of his development as an 
artist. The opening section is dominated by his memories of the row 
which spoiled the Christmas dinner at 1 Martello Terrace, Bray, in 
1891. In his clash with Mrs. Conway, John Joyce was supported by 
Mr. John Kelly from Tralee who had been imprisoned on several 
occasions for his political activities and who was, according to 
Stanislaus, "of peasant stock" (13). Of Mrs. Conway Stanislaus says, 
vaguely, that "she seems to have been some distant relative of my 
father's" (7). Given Stanislaus' attitude to Mrs. Conway and his 
attitude to his O'Connell relations, one must assume that he was 
unable to accuse Mrs. Conway of being related to John Joyce's mother 
rather than his father: if there was even a hint that Mrs. Conway 
was of the tribe of the O'Connells, we can be sure that Stanislaus 
would have mentioned it for Dante embodies all that The Joycead 
mocks as typical of the O'Connells—even to her spell in the convent 
and her romantic ineptitude—plus an extravagant aggression. 
Uncle Charles is based on William O'Connell who came to live 
with the Joyces shortly after the death of his wife on August 4, 
1881. Though very much an O'Connell—quiet and religious—he is 
somebody who understands Simon Dedalus' references to Cork. On 
their Sunday walks Stephen absorbs details of The Joycead as Uncle 
Charles and his father speak constantly 
of the subjects nearer their hearts, of Irish politics, of Munster 
and of the legends of their own family, to all of which Stephen 
lent an avid ear. (P 62) 
But why should John Joyce welcome an O'Connell into his 
home, particularly an O'Connell who had a son and grandchildren 
in Cork? Perhaps it was a case of simple generosity; perhaps a clue 
is to be found in the marriage settlement of James Augustine and 
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Ellen back in 1848. Among the Joyce contributions was property in 
White Street where, according to Griffith's Rates Valuation, James 
Joyce is listed as the owner of number 17—bouse, offices and yard— 
and of Joyce's Alley (also known as Joyce's Court), a lane of seven 
small houses which survived into the 1930s. In 1852—the year in 
which Griffith's Valuation was published and thus some time after 
the actual research—James Joyce went bankrupt. A Rates Assessment 
of 1854 confirms that he lost the White Street property which was 
then owned by one William O'Connell. It is hard to avoid the 
suspicion that, faced with the inevitability of bankruptcy, James Joyce 
"sold" this property to William O'Connell who somehow "donated" 
it back to the Joyces; at any rate, it is among the properties which 
John Joyce mortgaged and finally sold in 1894. If Uncle William 
had indeed been so considerate in the Joyces' hour of need, he 
would have been a welcome guest in their home when he, having 
lost both his money (P 62) and his wife, fell on hard times. Shortly 
after the Christmas Dinner of 1891, when it became clear that John 
Joyce was in financial difficulties, Uncle William returned to Cork: 
there is a death certificate for a William O'Connell, draper, who 
died of heart failure on August 31, 1892. 
Two years later John Joyce brought James to Cork to see where 
the episodes of The Joycead had taken place and to be present at 
the sale of the last of the ancestral properties—including that in 
White Street which Uncle William may have "minded" for them 
in the past. His eyes unmoistened by alcohol, young James did not 
see Cork as the paradisal scene of his father's narratives but as a 
fallen world of booze and bombast where people preferred to live 
pseudo-heroic roles from the mythical past rather than face the facts 
of contemporary life. 
There is no allusion in A Portrait to any meeting with relatives 
in Cork. Ellmann reports that they heard an O'Connell cousin sing 
for them when they visited the Presentation Convent in Crosshaven, 
a nearby seaside resort (37). This was May O'Connell, a granddaughter 
of William O'Connell, who was a student at the convent and who 
went on to become a Presentation nun, Sr. Mary Ita O'Connell. The 
visit to the convent was an embarrassing failure and yet another 
indication of how the Joyce stock had fallen. According to The 
Joycead the convent in Crosshaven had been planned and paid for 
by Alicia O'Connell—daughter of John O'Connell and sister of Ellen 
and William—who had been inspired by a dream "that she was 
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standing on a hill overlooking the sea, succouring children" (JJII 
13).4 In 1894 John Joyce had come to ask that what he thought of 
as more or less a family foundation should take two of his daughters 
as boarders at reduced rates. He was not pleased when his request 
was refused by the principal, Mother Teresa, whose version of the 
founding of the convent differed from that given in The Joycead. 
Alicia O'Connell entered the South Presentation Convent in 
Cork city in 1836 and became Sr. Mary Francis Xavier. While it is 
likely that she had—with or without the assistance of dreams—taken 
part in the planning of the convent in Crosshaven and had given or 
raised money for the project, she died of liver disease in 1872, four 
years before the foundation of the convent. The money which enabled 
the nuns to open it was donated by a former student who married 
a rich American and who is buried in the convent.5 The adjacent 
grave is that of Mother Teresa, "our beloved foundress." Although 
Mother Xavier is remembered with affection and respect by the 
Presentation nuns she does not, in their records, figure quite as 
prominently as she does in The Joycead. 
It is a commonplace of criticism that in A Portrait Joyce used 
the visit to Cork to dramatize Stephen's emerging individuality; it 
is likely that this was inspired by his own experience in Cork where 
he became aware of the gulf between the world his father lived in 
and the world he himself inhabited, between the romance of The 
Joycead and the facts of his own circumstances. Unlike his father, 
he could not close his eyes to the grim reality. His revised role in 
The Joycead could be understood by reference to another myth—the 
myth which he had first heard about from Dante and which was 
the theme on which the Jesuits had constructed their rich and subtle 
intellectual structures: because of the sins of our first—and only— 
parents, we had been deprived of the paradise which might so easily 
have been ours. If there is one central theme in his work from the 
earliest verse on Parnell up to Finnegans Wake it is that of the fall. 
He had been born Sunny Jim, heir to the solar throne, but he soon 
preferred to make a virtue of his fall and see himself as Lucifer, 
splendidly rebellious and spectacularly fallen. Because of the sins of 
his father he had been deprived of the cricket fields of Clongowes, 
of the elegant houses and big gardens south of the river, of the 
privileges and prospects of a gentleman's son; he found himself 
living among the navvies and assorted commoners of the northern 
suburbs where the little back gardens reeked of ashpits. 
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There was not return to paradise in this life but there was one 
obvious way back to the world of Clongowes and elegant culture: to 
accept the invitation of the Jesuits and become The Reverend James 
Joyce, SJ. But he resisted the temptation of the order and went 
home: 
The faint sour stink of rotted cabbages came towards him from 
the kitchen gardens on the rising ground above the river. He 
smiled to think that it was this disorder, the misrule and 
confusion of his father's house and the stagnation of vegetable 
life, which was to win the day in his soul. (P 162) 
In contrast to the saintly namesake who had written of the city 
of God, he would dedicate his life to the city of fallen man. He 
would accept the facts of his life and would celebrate the common 
people who walked the mean streets rather than the blustering heroes 
of ancient glories. He would not, as his father did, actually believe 
in the account of the personal, familial or racial past or present 
which he found in The Joycead but neither would he, as his brother 
did, dismiss the extravagances of The Joyceadwith contempt; rather, 
with an extraordinarily sane generosity, he would understand why 
and how human beings tell each other stories to pass the time 
outside paradise. 
Prompted to some extent by genetic pressure he became a 
maker, a word-mason, a masterbuilder, erecting the most famous 
city of modern literature, the Dublin of U/ysses, a city which has 
survived better than the city on which it was based, thanks to the 
new Homeric scaffolding system which he invented and patented. 
He would not have been displeased to be described as a builder. 
His work was construction, putting his city together brick by brick, 
using words rather than the bricks and mortar the earlier Joyces had 
used. While others lauded his powers of imagination, he claimed it 
was simply memory (JJII 661). As he followed the tradition of his 
ancestors by traveling as a wandering craftsman from Dublin to 
Trieste to Zurich to Paris he came to treasure what his father had 
given him, not least the purple hunting waistcoat made by Ellen, 
the wife of the earlier James Augustine Joyce, a genuine relic of the 
world of The Joycead, the world of his father's tales which he himself 
had quarried and refined as his ancestors had quarried and refined 
the limestone of Cork. 
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NOTES 
1. John Joyce, after his fashion, treated James as if he was an only child and 
in his will made him sole benefactor. Despite his low opinion of his father, Stanislaus 
too believed that the O'Connells were genetically inferior to the Joyces. See Healy 
21, 37, 72. 
2. The convent records show that Ellen followed her sister's example and 
entered the convent in October 1836. The records have this to say about her when 
she left: // was a matter of her own choosing. She became nervously and unnecessarily 
anxious about her health, which was not, in reality bad. She had just finished the 
fourth month of her Postulant ship. She was a nice, amiable and good girl— too 
good, to encounter the rough sea of this world; where, she can scarcely escape the 
meeting of many a rock and many a breaker—but, little as her religious training 
has been, may she have learned in her short Noviciate, to look up only to the one 
eye, that steadily and securely guides, each bark of this uncertain life. Her brother 
Charles (1826-1872) attended Maynooth, spent seven years in West Cork and then 
thirteen as a curate in Carrignavar. Ellmann reports the rumor that he had been 
silenced for refusing to accept offerings from his poor parishioners. The fact that 
no mention of this is made in his death notice in the Cork Examiner is by no 
means a disproof, and it is not impossible to imagine a rich priest sparing his 
parishioners in time of Famine, but it would be typical of The Joycead to mitigate 
the existence of a priestly relation by having him incur the wrath of a bishop. At 
Charles' funeral was his brother, Fr. O'Connell CM, of Castleknock, about whom 
I could discover nothing else. 
3. For details of the settlement see JJII 747. There were many O'Connells— 
a popular name in Cork—in the hackney business and James Augustine's office was 
in a boarding house owned by a Miss Hannah O'Connell. One of the taxi firms in 
Cork today is called Joycecabs; the eponymous owners do not claim any connection 
with the late inspectot and rest their claim to fame on the prowess of their sons in 
international amateur boxing. 
4. Sec JJII 13. Though the Joyces were not overly impressed by her singing 
in 1894, Sr. Mary Ita retained her interest in music—and in literature—throughout 
her life. Though typically O'Connell in her vocation, Sr. Mary Ita is said to have 
been a passionate nationalist who offered the sanctuary of the convent to several 
guerillas during The Troubles. For this and for other kindnesses some older people 
in Cork still speak warmly of her. Born on February 2, 1883, May O'Connell shared 
a birthday with James Joyce but even this connection did not earn her a mention 
in Joyce's fiction. Although she did not wish to be publicly associated with Joyce, 
she spoke privately of her relationship and her meetings with him. Her attitude to 
Joyce softened as a result of her correspondence with his sister, Margaret, who 
became a nun and lived in New Zealand. 
5. The orthodox history is quite as romantic in its own way: a former student 
of the South Presentation Convent in Cork went to America where she was wooed 
by a wealthy Jew whom she accepted on condition that he become » Catholic. She 
used some of her newly acquired wealth to endow the Crosshavcn project. 
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Inscribing James Joyce's Tombstone 
BERNARD BENSTOCK 
Preamble 
A recxamination of literary modernism, and Joyce's role as a modernist, 
might well concern itself with the relationship between /ascription 
and Ascription, between the spoken and the written word, the living 
and the dead, the voice and the written text. "Inscribing James Joyce's 
Tombstone" isolates the tombstone as a simulacrum of the literary 
artifact—both as claimed by the individual artist and as attributed 
by an external audience—and as a device for questioning the status 
of narrative voice as opposed to narration. 
Modernists have been credited with opening up a new relation­
ship with the past (Pound's MAKE IT NEW and Gertrude Stein's 
"continuous present" and Joyce's "continuous present tense" of 
"cyclewheeling history"), implying a rethought relationship between 
the past and the present, the ancient and the modern. Modernists 
were especially sensitive to the degree to which the present will soon 
fade into the past, the living voice (heard throughout all modernist 
texts) will soon be deadened into the written epitaph. In "The 
Preludes" T. S. Eliot isolated "grimy scraps / Of withered leaves 
about your feet / And newspapers from vacant lots," and in "East 
Coker" the same wind shakes "the tattered arras with a silent motto." 
Later in "East Coker," Eliot comments on "a lifetime burning in 
every moment / And not the lifetime of one man only / But of old 
stones that cannot be deciphered." I will be turning over old stones 
and attempting to read silent mottoes, employing Joyce as a test case 
of the ways in which writing emerges in modernist works as both 
subject matter and writing practice, and investigating differences in 
status between various kinds of written texts within the larger text: 
postcards, letters, newspaper notices, tombstones. 
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Inscribing James Joyce s Tombstone 
We are all aware that James Joyce has had the honor of having been 
buried twice, the first time as a pauper, the second as a celebrity. It 
is that first flat, embedded tombstone that interests me at the moment, 
a small, simple rectangle that marked his burial in Fluntern cemetery 
on 15 January 1941, with the laconic inscription: JAMES JOYCE 1882­
1941. So terse a commentary seems hardly worthy of so overwhelmingly 
verbal a writer, who himself scratched endless additions on galleys 
and placards of his endlessly extendable Ulysses. How disproportionate 
compared to the commemorative awarded a totally insignificant Dub­
liner in Ulysses, who is granted a whole quatrain: 
It is now a month since dear Henry fled 
To his home up above in the sky 
While his family weeps and mourns his loss 
Hoping some day to meet him on high. 
(17 91) 
Dear Henry's epitaph, however, is not that which had been engraved 
in stone, but merely set in type on the pages of the Freeman's Journal, 
and in this meandering quest for the perfect Joyce inscription, I will 
be gravitating between the printed and the engraved, the scriptural 
and the sepulchral. The easy modulation between the two was apparent 
within a year of Joyce's death, when Louis Gillet published Stile pour 
James Joyce, the Grecian stele-stone serving as prototype for the book 
title—a book itself structured along the lines of a stele. Where the 
context shows itself to be indeterminate—as in the list of Finnian 
characteristics in the riddles chapter of Finnegans Wake—the gap 
between print and embossing diminishes: "his birth proved accidental 
shows death its grave mistake" (FW 134.20-21). Here the succinct­
ness and the subject matter conspire to make this grave statement as 
apt as the dates 1882 and 1941, the boundaries of the message 
clearly set. 
Nowhere has the potency of a tombstone inscription been as 
sanctified (and simultaneously derided) as in William Faulkner's Ab­
salom, Absalom!, where Mr. Compson comments about the family 
of mourners, noting that "to them their funerals and graves, the 
puny affirmations of spurious immortality set above the slumber, are 
of incalculable importance." Puny affirmations are apparent to Bloom 
as he glances at the Freeman's Journal, noting the pathos of "dear 
Henry fled." The obituary verse, that printed remembrance a month 
after the funeral, seems pathetically transitory to Bloom: "Inked 
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characters fast fading on the frayed breaking paper" (U 91), he 
comments. From paper then to stone: soon after, the funeral carriage 
that carries Bloom and the other mourners nears the cemetery, and 
he muses: 
The stonecutters yard on the right. Last lap. Crowded on the 
spit of land silent shapes appeared, white, sorrowful, holding out 
calm hands, knelt in grief, pointing. Fragments of shapes, hewn. 
In white silence: appealing. The best obtainable. Thos. M. Den­
nany, monumental building and sculptor. (U 99) 
Puny affirmations have not as yet expressed themselves, since the 
unbought, unmarked stones are silent, awaiting the appropriate death, 
and there is no message there for Bloom to read. As an advertising 
canvasser, however, Bloom reads the message of the living, the self-
advertisement of the monumental builder and sculptor Thos. H. 
Dennany, who is responsible for the sign that claims The best available. 
In his hyperbolic description Dennany emerges as an avatar of God— 
and of James Joyce the Creator, monumental builder and sculptor. 
After the funeral service, the casual mourners "moved away 
slowly, without aim, by devious paths, staying awhile to read a name 
on a tomb" (U 112), Bloom among them. And he now allows himself 
some random thoughts on funeral literature, the writings on the 
stones: 
Who passed away. Who departed this life. As if they did it of 
their own accord. Got the shove, all of them. Who kicked the 
bucket. More interesting if they told you what they were. So and 
so, wheelwright. I travelled for cork lino. I paid five shillings in 
the pound. Or a woman's with her saucepan. I cooked good Irish 
stew. Eulogy in a country churchyard it ought to be that poem 
of whose is it Wordsworth or Thomas Campbell. Entered into 
rest the protestants put it. Old Dr Murren s. The great physician 
called him home. (U 113) 
Bloom's botched attributions are themselves diagnostic: William 
Wordsworth may not have been responsible for Thomas Gray's "Elegy 
Written in a Country Churchyard"—and neither was Thomas Camp­
bell—but Wordsworth did indeed write an "Essay on Epitaphs." 
Even more significantly, Bloom has shifted the emphasis from the 
elegiac to the eulogistic, and in the process domesticates the specific 
pieces of information. 
Had Joyce sought a similar style of immortality for himself, he 
need only to have waited until the memorial plaques began appearing 
76 Bernard Benstock 
on the walls of his cities of residence and refuge, in Dublin on the 
houses where he was born and where Bloom lived (one of them at 
least probably the correct address) and on a park bench for himself 
and his father; and in Trieste, Rome, Zurich, and St. Gerand-le-Puy. 
A street staircase in Trieste, for example, was renamed Scala James 
Joyce, with the familiar opening and closing dates, but a bit more 
largesse than the pauperstone: "Scrittore Irlandese," it reads, which 
Bloom might translate as "He cooked good Irish stew." At one of 
his Triestine residences the information recorded is that he wrote the 
first chapter of Ulysses there (which is a start), while at the house in 
Rome where his brief odyssey had once taken him the plaque reports 
that Joyce evoked the story of Ulysses. Knowing as we do that "Not 
marble, nor the gilded monuments of princes, shall outlive this 
powerful rhyme," it is not surprising that the city of Zurich chose 
the most enduring of the eight Joyce residences there for the single 
plaque, what is now a dormitory for nurses and therefore least likely 
to be bulldozed for urban renewal. It was disappointing that no 
plaque was placed at Elsinore, during the Symposium, since the castle 
there also looked as if it might withstand the temptation for urban 
renewal.1 
Tombstone literature provides a form of post-creation, a filling 
in of the blank, but within a restrictive space. Nietzsche's declaration 
that God is dead serves as an epitaph, neither elegiac nor eulogistic; 
Roland Barthes's contention that the author is dead (Joyce might have 
preferred "refined out of existence"), placed alongside Nietzsche's, 
neatly parallels God and the author, a parallel that already has a 
Joycean imprimatur. The ways in which the creation outlasts the 
creator—and even retrospectively mocks the Creator—are suggested at 
various instances and in various manners throughout the Joyce canon. 
When he sent Chamber Music from Trieste to Elkin Mathews, the 
live inspiration was in full force, yet when it was accepted for 
publication, Joyce regretted the death of that inspiration, and even 
considered cabling London to have the poems retracted, labeling them 
"dishonest," having essentially outlived them. The telegram, had it 
been sent, would have served as a death notice, or even a death 
warrant, but Joyce's ultimate revenge was already destined to be 
engraved on the cover of the book, the title having been chosen both 
for its suggestion of restrained lyricism and its allusion to chamber 
pot tinklings. 
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The history of the Finnegans Wake title, a title that spells the 
death of poor Finnegan (but not for long), is accepted as a com­
monplace by Joyceans, but can still cause a raised eyebrow when 
reported to normal people. During the sixteen years of composition 
that title, known only by its creator, was mysteriously and supersti­
tiously withheld from public knowledge, until the tentatively titled 
Work in Progress was completed and the epitaphic statement was 
about to be embossed on the book. The hundreds of pages of galleys 
now in the Lucie and Paul L6on/James Joyce Collection at the Uni­
versity of Tulsa library indicate that even the printers in Glasgow 
thought that the ultimate title was Work in Progress: every signature 
page has its WiP From 1923 to 1938 the hypothetical cover of the 
book was a blank, like Thomas Dennany's hewn stone, in white 
silence, awaiting completion, awaiting a death, for a lasting 
inscription. 
No matter how minimal or condensed the memorial message 
may be, there is often the possibility that it says more than intended, 
or more than should have been intended. Triestine pride of place 
credits the city for being the site where Joyce began Ulysses, while 
the Roman plaque addresses Romans who may never have heard of 
the wandering Joyce, but certainly heard of the wandering Ulysses, 
the Latinized Odysseus. What would one expect, for instance, as an 
epitaph for the creator of as famous a literary personage as Sherlock 
Holmes, and what does his epitaph actually specify? 
STEEL TRUE

BLADE STRAIGHT

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE

KNIGHT

PATRIOT, PHYSICIAN & MAN OF LETTERS

A grateful nation had knighted him for his propagandistic pamphlet 
justifying the British action in the Boer War. At the tag end he is, 
however, remembered as a "man of letters." 
With the same degree of calculation, James Joyce was himself 
quite skillful in writing the extended death notice, the overly inform­
ative but concise capsulization of a life. On the opening pages of his 
first story, an important message replaces the notice that appeared 
on "ordinary days. . .Umbrellas Re-covered." Instead, the boy in 
"The Sisters" reads from "a card pinned on the crape": 
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JULY 1ST, 1985 
THE REV. JAMES FLYNN 
(FORMERLY OF S. CATHERINE'S CHURCH, MEATH STREET) 
AGED SIXTY-FIVE YEARS 
R.I.P. 
(D 12) 
The story of Father Flynn is the story of a man who has died twice: 
how absolute is that telltale "formerly of S. Catherine's," insisting 
on the first death, which the boy will only learn about after he has 
absorbed the message of the second death of a priest whose first 
coffin was a confession box. 
Leopold Bloom spends his time at Glasnevin cemetery "reading" 
coffins, and hits upon a concept of post-creation that involves the 
recuperation of some aspect of the newly deceased, discovering the 
possibility of the voice as the medium of retaining the living 
experience by gramophonic re-creation: 
Have a gramophone in every grave or keep it in the house. 
After dinner on Sunday. Put on poor old greatgrandfather 
Kraahraark! Hellohellohello amawfullyglad kraark awfullyglada­
seeragain hellohello amarawf kopthsth. Remind you of the voice 
like the photograph reminds you of the face. (U 114) 
No such creaking recording exists for Bloom of any of his ancestors, 
and it is with alacrity that he transfers the "speaking eiptaph" out 
of the grave and places it in the home. In his own home, of course, 
he keeps various memorabilia of his dead father (whose speaking 
voice will pursue him later through Nighttown). The written record­
ings of his father's words are retained in the old man's suicide note 
that Bloom retrieves (not for the first time) in Ithaca from the bureau 
drawer. The broken phrases retrieved from that retrieval serve as the 
dead mans own funeral inscription, his attempt to write the post­
humous message of importance ("it is of no use" or "with your 
dead mother" or "all for me is out"), but most graphically in the 
italicized final fragments: 
das Herz. . Gott. . .dein. {U 723) 
(The great hotel proprietor called him home.) Carefully preserved, 
and handled only by the intended recipient, the suicide note 
withstands the onslaughts of time better than the "inked characters 
fast fading on the frayed breaking paper"—a paper, incidentally, 
that Bloom was intent on throwing away. 
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Far more substantial and permanent are words carved in stone 
(Shakespeare's "unswept stone, besmeared with sluttish time"), and 
none is as monumental as the Commandments, celebrated by Pro­
fessor McHugh conjuring up the voice of John F. Taylor (and available 
to us in a gramophone recording made by greatgrandfather Joyce). 
Taylor is quoted as intoning: "He would never have spoken with 
the Eternal amid lightnings on Sinai's mountaintop nor ever have 
come down with the light of inspiration shining in his countenance 
and bearing in his arms the tables of the law, graven in the language 
of the outlaw" (U 143). The Mosaic tablature marks not a death 
and interment, but the birth of a religion, a people, a race, a 
civilization. The gravity of that engraving allows for no measure of 
levity, yet the Joycean perspective is often tempered by tables of a 
different color, particularly the Smaragdine Tablet of Hermes Tris­
mesgistus, where Joyce found that "that which is below is like that 
which is above" (or, in Finneganese, "The tasks above are as the 
flasks below, saith the emerald canticle of Hermes"—FW 263.21­
22). Bloom's tendency to trivialize, or perhaps merely to domesticate, 
reflects the temptation to reduce exalted properties to the mundane, 
and the Tables of the Law return in Ulysses to just a reduction. In 
Aeolus the subject had been the subjected Gaelic and Hebrew races, 
but in Ithaca it is the Gold Cup, and Bloom's awareness that he 
had inadvertently tipped Throwaway as the winner: 
when Frederick M. (Bantam) Lyons had rapidly and successively 
requested, perused and restituted the copy of the current issue 
of the Freeman's Journal and National Press which he had been 
about to thrown away (subsequently thrown away), he had 
proceeded towards the oriental edifice of the Turkish and Warm 
Baths, 11 Leinster street, with the light of inspiration shining 
in his countenance and bearing in his arms the secret of the 
race, graven in the language of prediction. (U 676) 
The Ascot race replaces the Hebrew race, the newspaper the tablets; 
Bloom replaces Moses, the language of prediction the language of 
the outlaw. 
The Tables of the Law come replete with an implied author, 
whose name remains ineffable and whose signature a constant in the 
landscape. Bloom's sense of caution prevents him from uttering the 
name of Jesus Christ, and that of Blazes Boylan (things above and 
things below), a moral censoring that may have less to do with his 
discomfort with the Christian religion, which had been so ineptly 
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assigned to him, than a carryover from the older faith that prohibited 
the use of the Ineffable Name. Moses had requested a signatory 
name for the tables and received instead the epigraphic "I am that 
I am." On the level of things below, Bloom attempted the signature 
of self-identification on a tablature even less permanent than paper 
or stone, the sandy beach at Sandymount, printing in virtual darkness 
with a wooden stick " I . . .AM. A. "—the message remaining incom­
plete, the signature absent. Even as he begins, he realizes the futility 
of the writing, simultaneously recognizing that a more permanent 
script already exists around him: "All these rocks with lines and 
scars and letters." His final verdict on the transitory nature of his 
effort is that "All fades," an echo of his verdict on "Inked characters 
fast fading" (U 381). His intended inscription might have been 
more identifying, individuating, confessing, conjecturing, complain­
ing than merely "I travelled for cork lino" or "paid five shillings 
in the pound." 
On the same strand Stephen had mused, "Signatures of all 
things I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, 
that rusty boot" (U 37). Were he to repeat his stroll on Sandymount 
Strand the next day, his might be the "flatfoot" that Bloom assumes 
would "tramp" on his writing "in the morning," which he prevents 
by tramping on it himself, effacing "the letters with a slow boot" 
(U 381). If it was God's signature Stephen was intent on reading, 
he had already proven himself master of that reading when the 
writing was on material even more transitory than sand: he had 
identified the combination of "whirring whistle" and preceding 
cheers from the hockey field as "God. . .A shout in the street" 
(U 34). The shout and the whistle are then transcribed on the 
printed page, in imitation of auditory effects, as "Hooray! Ay! 
Whrrwhee!"—on close inspection these prove to be the Tetragam­
maton, containing Y.H.W.H. in abundance, Yahweh written on the 
wind. Stephen later attempts to codify his own identity, a historical 
continuity of shifting selves from past into future: 
But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under 
everchanging forms. . . . 
I, I and I. I. 
A.E. I. O. U.

(U 190)

In each case the self-signature represents a transitional stage of 
selfhood, potentially seeking realization, nonetheless under the final 
 81 Inscribing James Joyce's Tombstone
rubric of the accomplished self. Thereafter, Stephen codifies the 
interrelationship of that Self with an Other, in this mundane instance 
that of theosophist George Russell, his creditor. Russell had deter­
mined that most minimal of signatures in the digraph A—in itself 
reflected in that small word of vastness, aeon—but to both Stephen 
and Bloom the linked letters are separated into commonplace initials, 
so that Bloom can conjecture on "Albert Edward, Arthur Edmund, 
Alphonsus Eb Ed El Esquire" (U 165), a further exercise in trivial­
ization, a means of reducing the augmented and auspicious to human 
and mundane commodities—common names. Stephen has done 
precisely the same in "signing" an I.O.U. to A—"haggling over 
money." 
In A Portrait Stephen learned early on that proper names were 
boxes into which people were put—or put themselves. "Victoria and 
Stephen and Simon, Simon and Stephen and Victoria. Names" 
(P 92). Boxed in between his father and the name of the hotel 
where they are staying, he is boxed in between the Name of the 
Father and the Name of the Queen, "a servant of two masters." 
To re-name himself posits a way of escaping from a preordained 
box, so when invited to consider a vocation as a Jesuit, "His new 
name in that new life leaped into characters before his eyes": "The 
Reverend Stephen Dedalus S. J . " (P 161). The face he imagines as 
accompanying the name is not his own, however, but "a mental 
spectre of the face of one of the Jesuits whom some of the boys 
called Lantern Jaws and others Foxy Campbell." Even the augmented 
and reverend name is externally determined, preordained and deter­
mining by ordination, so that in Ulysses he realizes that names are 
"impostures. . .Cicero, Podmore, Napoleon, Mr Goodbody, Jesus, Mr 
Doyle" U 622). Names are externally imposed, and the act of naming 
a part of the process of literary creation. Having slipped past the 
trap of a clerical calling, Stephen passes a "squad of Christian 
brothers," and hears one of them addressed as "Brother Hickey" 
(P 165), and having decided that "Their piety would be like their 
names, like their faces," he goes on to impose names on the others: 
Brother Quaid. 
Brother MacArdle. 
Brother Keogh. 
(P 166) 
"Low" Irish names box them in, diminish them, despite the elevation 
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of their calling. In effect, Stephen is engraving their tombstones— 
irrevocably—as he does for all those who have betrayed him. 
Of the three "friends" who span A Portrait and Ulysses, Cranly, 
Lynch, and Mulligan, each is disposed of with a unique method of 
entablature. Stephen effectively decapitates the unfaithful Cranly in 
the diary pages, "a stern severed head or deathmask" (P 248), and 
writes his epitaph at two stages in Ulysses: "Cranly's arm"; "Cranly's 
smile" (U 7, 184), relics of the dead friend (the embracing arm and 
the disarming smile designate the betrayer). Lynch is renamed as 
Judas and condemned to hanging ("Exit Judas. Et laqueo se suspen­
dit"—U 600). But for Mulligan three affixing nails are chosen: 
looking at his golden teeth, he pronounces "Chrystostomos" (U 3); 
turning his back on the renter of the tower, he assigns "Usurper" 
(U 23); and mistrusting the intentions of Mulligan's embracing arm, 
he decides "Catamite" (U 204). In contrast to such serious and 
stately applications of summary accusations, we can turn to that of 
the Alf Bergan (or possibly Richie Goulding) deathnote for the 
pathetic Denis Breen, the devastatingly dismissive "U.P.: up" 
(U 158) and read that as Breen s epitaph. 
The postcard sent to Denis Breen serves as a paper tombstone, 
equivalent in size and shape, one supposes, to those library slips 
that Stephen keeps forgetting to appropriate for the writing of his 
verse. Stephen had, on at least one previous occasion, found himself 
without the necessary sheet of writing paper, foolscap, sheepskin, 
parchment, papyrus, without which no writer since Homer could 
long survive: in A Portrait he awoke with nocturnal inspiration and 
no bedside tablet: 
Fearing to lose all, he raised himself suddenly on his elbow to 
look for paper and pencil. . . He stretched his arm wearily 
towards the foot of the bed, groping with his hand in the 
pockets of the coat that hung there. His fingers found a pencil 
and then a cigarette packet, placed the last cigarette on the 
window ledge and began to write out the stanzas of the villanelle 
in small neat letters on the rough cardboard surface. (P 218-19) 
In Ulysses an alternative expediency presents itself: on Sandymount 
Strand, reading the signature of all things, he is inspired to write 
his "pale vampire" quatrain, and like Hamlet calls for "My tablets." 
Again he searches his pockets: 
Paper. The banknotes, blast them. Old Deasy's letter. Here.

Thanking you for hospitality tear the blank end off. Turning

 85 Inscribing James Joyce's Tombstone
his back to the sun he bent over far to a table of rock and 
scribbled words. That's twice I forgot to take slips from the 
library counter. (U 48) 
When the poem resurfaces in Aeolus, Miles Crawford makes the 
obvious assumption and nastily asks, "Who tore it? Was he short 
taken?" (U 132). 
The cloacal inference, assuming that the missing piece was used 
as emergency toilet paper, establishes the relationship between poetic 
inspiration and the excremental, just as the villanelle had fixed the 
relationship betwen poetic inspiration and nocturnal emissions, lead­
ing directly to the making of ink out of feces in Finnegans Wake. 
The formula for making "indelible ink" by producing "nichthem­
erically from his unheavenly body a no uncertain quantity of obscene 
matter not protected by copriright in the United Stars of Ourania" 
(FW 185.26-31) almost all Joyceans have now accomplished in their 
own laboratories, but what Shem uses in lieu of library slips is also 
significant in the inscribing of the Joycean tombstone: "every square 
inch of the only foolscap available, his own body" {FW 185.35-36). 
Writing on the body not only transcends such prosaic materials as 
cigarette packets and the bottoms of letters, or even Baudelairean 
bottoms, but places the Joycean inscription within a taboo area, 
violating the proscription in the Old Testament. Whereas Exodus 
32.16 proclaims what God wrote and on what surface ("the tables 
were the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God, 
graven upon the tables"), Leviticus 21.5 specifies a surface that may 
not be engraved: "They shall not make baldness upon their head, 
neither shall they shave off the corner of their beard, nor make any 
cuttings in their flesh." Those who have been fortunate to have 
heard Jane Marcus's paper, "Laughing at Leviticus," will be familiar 
with the text that she explicates in the light of a violation of this 
prohibition, Djuna Barnes's Nightwood, in various ways a companion 
text to Ulysses, or perhaps a work that negotiates the space between 
Ulysses and the Wake. 
In Nightwood Dr. O'Connor recalls a circus bear-fighter, tat­
tooed over every square inch of his own unheavenly body: 
There he was, crouching all over the arena without a stitch on, 
except an ill-concealed loin-cloth all abulge as if with a deep-
sea catch, tattoed from head to heel with all the ameublement 
of depravity! Garlanded with rosebuds and hackwork of the 
devil—was he a sight to see! Though he couldn't have done a 
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thing (and I know what I am talking about in spite of all that 
has been said about the black boys) if you stood him in a gig-
mill for a week, though (it's said) at a stretch it spelled 
Desdemona. 
O'Connor spares us none of his descriptive powers, reading ad 
infinitum that writing on Nikka's body, ending with the inscription 
on the bottom: 
And just above what you mustn't mention, a bird flew carrying 
a streamer on which was incised, "Garde tout!" 
O'Connor's concern with Nikka's genitalia—in both tumescence 
and detumenscence—is hardly casual, as he himself exposes his own 
in the Church of St. Merri, bewailing its very existence and giving 
it an appellation that serves as its death knell: Tiny O'Toole. At a 
stretch Nikka's tool spells Desdemona (he therefore signs himself as 
Othello the Moor), but at its far more usual repose, one can only 
speculate that a variant of the hoary joke makes it a mere Mona. 
Tumescence and detumescence bother the mind of Bloom-the-Scribe 
on Sandymount Strand: his own masturbation he aligns with the 
pyrotechnics: "My fireworks! Up like a rocket, down like a stick," 
(U 371). His attempted message in the sand, written with a "Bit of 
stick," proves impossible, after which "He flung his wooden pen 
away. The stick fell in silted sand, stuck" (U 381). He observes the 
phenomenon with awe, and comments: "Now if you were trying to 
do that for a week on end you couldn't." The wooden pen, the 
Roman candle, the erect penis: Bloom, whose own body is undoubt­
edly innocent of any carvings proscribed by Leviticus, has in effect 
written with his wooden pen on the naked flesh of Gerty MacDowell, 
just as Nikka, himself a parchment for any and every tattoo artist, 
is maligned as phallically unable to write on the body of Desdemona. 
What literature offers regarding the esoteric art of tattooing 
may be minimal—and marginal at best—but several instances are 
worth noting, keeping in mind the able-bodied Murphy who shows 
off the nautical and numerical carvings on his chest, also admitting 
that his body is constantly in the process of being written upon by 
lice and other vermin. In Garcia Marquez's One Hundred Years of 
Solitude Jose Arcadio emerges from the jungle covered with tattoos: 
"there was not a square inch of his body that was not tattooed, 
front and back, and from his neck to his toes." (Compared to Nikka 
and Shem and Jos6 Arcadio, the Marine who has "Mother" inscribed 
on his bicep is a minimalist.) Jos6 Arcadio has been written upon 
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by his exile, his wanderings, his experiences in the jungle. In Kafka's 
"In the Penal Colony" the method of punishment employs a machine 
that carves its message into the flesh of the convicted felon, a sadistic 
analogue to God's brand on the forehead of Cain. The seafaring 
tradition accounts for the incredibly memorable Queequeg in Mel­
ville's Moby Dick, whose "dark, purplish, yellow skin" is covered 
with tattoos of "large, blackish looking squares"; and of the pro­
tagonist of John Hawkes' Second Skin, whose daughter Cassandra 
forces him to have a name tattooed on his chest in green, but not 
the name he expected. And in Shakespeare's King John, the dying 
monarch makes no secret that it is Death that is writing on his 
entire body: 
I am a scribbled form, drawn with a pen 
Upon a parchment, and against this fire 
Do I shrink up. 
Almost in the same breath that God prohibits carving on the body, 
He also insists on circumcision, His own carving on every male body, 
of which Bloom is also innocent. Under that guise God is referred 
to by Mulligan as "the collector of prepuces" (U 13), and he 
underwrites the Nietzschean death notice by asserting that "Jehovah, 
the collector of prepuces, is no more" (U 201). Circumcision serves 
as God's signature on all things, and the Dedalian/Shemian insistence 
on writing on any available surface, even the human flesh, pronounces 
the open defiance of God's exclusive privilege. The artistic creator 
rivals God the creator, despite the awful threats from a Deity described 
in the Wake as "Him Which Thundereth From On High" (none­
theless capable of "abundant mercy"—FW 62.13-14). Shem, con­
sequently, is characterized as "Tumult, Son of Thunder, self exiled 
in upon his ego, a nightlong a shaking betwixteen white or reddr 
hawrors, noondayterrorised to skin and bone by an ineluctable 
phantom (may the Shaper have mercery on him!) writing the mystery 
of himsel in furniture" (FW 185.36-186.2). Carving one's initials or 
name in furniture ("I, I and I. I"—or the word "Foetus") is 
minimal immortality compared to the message on the tombstone, 
and the transportation of the letter " F ,  " missing from "himself," 
changes the tablature from furniture to funereal urn. 
Shem insists that he has been denied "romeruled stationery," 
and must resort to making "synthetic ink and sensitive paper for his 
own end out of his wit's waste" {FW 185.5-8), yet in A Portrait, 
where such deprivations originate, the surfaces for inscriptions are as 
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numerous as they are ubiquitous; the desks in schoolrooms, the 
bulletin boards on school walls, the flyleaves of books, the walls of 
toilets, the signs on street walls, the slates in a school yard. From 
his first days at Clongowes, Stephen claims his territory as the world, 
inscribing himself as a resident of that world in his geography book, 
yet Fleming usurps that privilege and rewrites Stephen's inscription— 
"for a cod" (P 16). Also for a cod, the "thick slabs of slate" in 
the Clongowes square2 are anonymously inscribed, and 
Behind the door of one of the closets there was a drawing in 
red pencil of a bearded man in Roman dress with a brick in 
each hand and underneath was the name of the drawing: 
Balbus was building a wall. 
Some fellows had drawn it there for a cod. It had a funny face 
but it was very like a man with a beard. (P 43) 
The bearded face is the obvious parody of the feminine genitalia, 
the male "writing-over" of the woman's body, and Stephen comes 
very close to reading the palimpsest. And a subsequent piece of 
graffiti declares itself in palimpsestic punning, that 'Julius Caesar 
wrote the Calico Belly' (P 43). To achieve his own immortality, 
Lynch admits to having written his name "on the backside of the 
Venus of Praxiteles in the Museum" (P 205). 
The maniacal insistence on transcribing oneself persists through­
out the Penman chapter of the Wake, Shem having intoned the 
Vulgate Psalm 44 while manufacturing his fecal encaustic: "Lingua 
mea calamus scribae veliciter scribentis"—my tongue is the reed of 
a scribe swiftly writing. Tongue/reed/wooden pen/moving finger 
(that have writ moves on)/penis: the implement with which he 
"scrabbled and scratched and scriobbled and skrevened nameless 
shamelessness about everybody ever he met" (FW 182.13-14) and 
to "stipple endlessly inartistic portraits of himself" (FW 182.18—19). 
Pariah Shem represents the extreme outpost of the lonely artist, and 
the act of writing on his own body displays itself as masturbatory. 
In A Portrait Stephen had awakened from an erotic dream, a dream 
he had already recorded on his own body, before he sets out to 
record its "literary" translation on a cigarette packet, and when his 
inspiration flagged, and mundane thoughts intruded, Stephen res­
timulated that inspiration through masturbation in order to complete 
the villanelle, to write its envoi. In Ulysses Bloom follows his 
masturbatory act with the added gesture of writing in the sand, a 
replication of the futility of lonely self-expression. And in his own 
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life James Joyce wrote a series of letters to Nora, letters he saved 
and later worried about, letters of "nameless shamelessness," but 
letters that clearly delineated its Sender and its Receiver. Not on his 
own body, but on the body of the beloved, the writer writes the 
mystery of himself, using the penis as his pen, and, as he indicated 
in those letters, his tongue as well. 
The erotic letters to Nora would not have fared well if they 
had been exposed in 1909 to the bourgeois Edwardian world, a 
world nicely depicted in Ulysses, its genteel pretentions apparent 
throughout Stephen Hero as well, as witnessed in the Irish language 
class Stephen attends: 
It was a beginners' class and its progress was retarded by the 
stupidity of two of the young men. The others in the class 
learned quickly and worked hard.. . .The class was very serious 
and patriotic. The only time Stephen found it inclined to levity 
was at the lesson which introduced the word "gradh." The three 
young women laughed, finding something very funny in the 
Irish word for "love" or perhaps in the notion itself. But Mr 
Hughes and the other three young men and Stephen were all 
very grave. When the excitement of the word had passed 
Stephen's attention was attracted to the younger of the stupid 
young men who was still blushing violently. (SH 60) 
Writing on the delicate fabric of genteel Irish society in late Victorian 
and Edwardian times required careful circumventions around the 
Irish word for love, a delicacy that Joyce displayed again in Exiles, 
where Robert Hand pens a clandestine note to Bertha that reads: 
"There is one word that I have never dared to say to you. " When 
Bertha asks to hear the word (written communication had obscured, 
rather than revealed it), Robert merely reports "that I have a deep 
liking for you" (E 34). The word, which had remained unwritten, 
also remains unspoken, and Robert is offered a second opportunity 
to speak the word, this time by Richard: "Explain to me what is 
the word you longed and never dared to say to her. If you can and 
will" (E 75). Robert's second venture is no better than the first: "I 
admire very much the personality of your. . .of. .your wife. That is 
the word. I can say it. It is no secret." Neither "liking" nor 
"admiring" is quite the same word as "love," and the potent word 
itself was destined to lie dormant for quite a while. 
Reticence over the word love may have remained a Joycean 
concession to a verisimilitudinistic representation of his age had it 
not surfaced recently, many decades after the world had given up 
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on it. The new "Critical and Synoptic" edition of Ulysses has restored 
some missing lines from that text, including the privileged positioning 
of the banned word: "Love, yes. Word known to all men" (U-G I, 
419). Love, then, in all senses, voices, connotations, declensions: over 
which stupid young men blush and for which seducers seek euphe­
mistic substitutes. Those of us who might have despaired of anything 
other than elliptical and indeterminate statements from James Joyce 
(except perhaps for "Love that dare not speak its name"—U 202) 
now hailed the advent of the word LOVE, if not exactly carved in 
stone, at least lofted on high. The answer is especially welcome since 
we have always known that there was a question, and it was asked 
by Stephen of the ghost of his dead mother: "Tell me the word, 
mother, if you know now. The word known to all men" (U 581). 
Mrs. Dedalus, however, rattles on about her care and concern for 
her wayward son, repeating her belief in the efficacy of prayer, and 
insisting that Stephen repent. (If it were left to Mrs. Dedalus, the 
Word would either have been Prayer or Repentance.) 
Stephen's question derives from his mother's recollection of the 
song he used to sing to her, "Love's bitter mystery'1 so Love 
engenders the question and perhaps anticipates the answer. The 
associations in Circe derive from the earlier appearance of Mrs. 
Dedalus in Telemachus: Mulligan's admonition to "Give up the 
moody brooding" brings Stephen's thoughts to the Yeats lyric— 
"And no more turn aside and brood/Upon love's bitter mystery"— 
which in turn invites thoughts of singing the song for his dying 
mother, and her reaction then: "For those words, Stephen: love's 
bitter mystery" (U 9). The confrontations between Stephen and his 
mother in the morning and midnight scenes are mirror images of 
each other, and whereas Mrs. Dedalus concerns herself with the words 
("love" and "bitter" and "mystery"), Stephen strives for the single, 
all-inclusive word, without bitterness and no longer a mystery. The 
restored passage, occurring as it does between these two confronta­
tions, demonstrates that Stephen knows the word in the afternoon— 
why then is he asking to know the word late at night? Within the 
context of Shakespeare's Pericles "love" functions as the word, but 
only temporarily and within a given context that soon changes. The 
one word that has no prevailing significance as the word known-to­
all-men may well be that overworked and slippery word, LOVE. 
As the incomplete last sentence of Finnegans Wake may indicate, 
Joyce could be exceedingly reticent to put the last word on anything. 
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His attitude toward epitaphs generally may be gleaned from the 
status of Robert Emmet's epitaph as the final words of Sirens, Emmet 
himself a reluctant epitaphist. His last words from the dock after his 
sentence of death are historically read as an epitaph for a dead 
Ireland, as well as a harbinger of a resurrected Ireland. Bloom sees 
a printed version of Emmet's words in a shop window: 
When my country takes her place among.... 
Nations of the earth. . . 
Then and not till then. . . 
Let my epitaph be. . . 
Written. I have. . . 
Done. 
(LT 291) 
Bloom experiences gastric upset leading to flatulence as he reads 
these potent words, and he waits for the sounds of a passing tram 
to cover his farting, so that the Emmet epitaph vies with both the 
gurgling flatulence and the clanging tram for auditory privilege, 
causing the insignificant word " the" (destined to be the last word 
of Finnegans Wake) to be lost from the Emmet statement, a victim 
of contending nonverbal sounds, the noise of the tram and of broken 
wind. 
Several Joyceans, notably Clive Hart, have commented on a 
tendency toward sentimentality that Joyce obscured with irony and 
irreverence, and the concept of LOVE conquering all, sweeping the 
country, making the world go round, might even be embarrassing 
to Leopold Bloom, who, compelled to deal with the word, defines 
it as "the opposite of hatred," and quickly adds, "I must go now." 
The enraged Citizen reacts with: "Love, Moya! He's a nice pattern 
of a Romeo and Juliet"—while the parodic narratives that evolve 
from the discourse in Barney Kiernan's provide a mocking commen­
tary, beginning, "Love loves to love love," and concluding with: 
"and this person loves that other person because everybody loves 
somebody but God loves everybody" (U 333). 
Not to be put off by irony and irreverence, as readers we search 
for the Joycean signature of all things, aware of the search that is 
in operation within the Joyce texts. At the dawn of protohistory, in 
the opening chapter of the Wake, the unswept stones of earliest 
civilization are being read by humans not quite erect on two feet: 
"He who runes may rede it on all fours" (FW 18.5-6). And we are 
invited to read along: 
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(Stoop) if you are abcedminded, to this daybook, what curios 
of signs (please stoop), in this allaphbed! Can you rede (since 
We and Thou had it out already) its world? It is the same told 
of all. Many. (FW 18.17-20) 
Rather than the words, the concentration is on the individual 
letters of the alphabet, the "root language," from which all words 
and names evolve in myriad patterns. Reading the runes, we uncover 
in the Wake a footnote to the Doodles family, a series of seven 
signs, sigla that represent members of the family and contiguous 
outsiders, and even the book itself, the outline of a square that 
Joyce used for his untitled mamafesta, his daybook, Finnegans Wake. 
The quest for the signature of the individual author, or the individual 
character, leads to the hieroglyphics of ancient inscription, the signs 
of the human family. 
The Doodles family, Fl, A, —I, X, D, A, d . Hoodie 
doodle, fam.? 
NOTES 
1. On the building next to the Pakhus where the Symposium took place a 
brass plaque high up announced that it had been etected in 1882. 
2. An epitaph to Stephen Dedalus's tetminated youth is the sign Lotts neat 
the morgue (P 86). Breathing in the "good odour" of "horse piss and rotted 
straw" calms his heart—but that is the subject of a companion essay, "James Joyce: 
The Olfactory Factor." 
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I wish I could go to Denmark. Ferrero says that Abo, Stockholm 
and Copenhagen are the finest cities in Europe, 
(Letters II, 201) 
Following Joyce's wish, we have at last rearrived in Denmark, but I 
have chosen to begin a discussion of the ideology of modernism with 
these words from Joyce's Roman period not to direct attention to this 
fine city but to notice the authority Joyce gives for his desire. The 
mediator of this desire is Guglielmo Ferrero, whose book, L'Europa 
giovane (Young Europe) Joyce was reading in 1906 (he lists it as next 
to Mercredy's Map of Ireland on Shelf J, back, among his books in 
Trieste). Joyce was much taken at this time with Ferrero, whose study 
of European culture, published in 1897, is subtitled "studies and 
voyages in the countries of the north." In September of 1906, Joyce 
found a picture postcard of Ferrero in Rome, and wrote to his brother 
about it: 
By the way, talking of faces I will send you a picture postcard 
of Guglielmo Ferraro and you will admit there is some hope for 
me. You would think he was a terrified Y.M.C.A. man with an 
inaudible voice. He wears spectacles, is delicate-looking and, 
altogether, is the type you would expect to find in some quiet 
nook in the Coffee-Palace nibbling a bun hastily and apologet­
ically between the hours of half-past twelve and one. (Letters II 
159) 
Among other things, these remarks suggest that Joyce saw some 
parallels between Ferrero and himself. 
One day in November of 1906 Joyce wrote to Stanislaus that he 
was thinking of beginning his story Ulysses but felt too oppressed 
with cares. In the next sentence he turned to a discussion of Ferrero's 
views of Jews and anti-Semitism, noting that "The most arrogant 
statement made by Israel so far, he says, not excluding the gospel of 
Jesus, is Marx's proclamation that socialism is the fulfillment of a 
natural law" (Letters II 190). In the reference to this letter in the 
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index to Richard Ellmann's edition of the letters, what should be 
"Ferrero on Marx" unaccountably appears as "Ferrero on Mary." This 
tiny change, the Freudian slip of a pious compositor, no doubt, is 
effected by simply cutting off a bit of Marx's X (a bit off the bottom, 
so to speak), turning Marx into Mary with a minimum of fuss. How 
Joyce would have loved this error! Roland Barthes would also no 
doubt have found this emblematic castration of Marx both amusing 
and significant. 
For me it also symbolizes the tension between Christianity and 
socialism that constitutes one of the structuring polarities of modernist 
ideology. The movement of W H. Auden, for instance, from one 
end of this polarity to the other over the decade 1929-1939 is 
emblematic of this dimension of modernism. One can also find the 
two opposites dangerously conflated in a typical thirties poem like C. 
Day Lewis's Magnetic Mountain, as in the following lines from the 
well-known section that begins, "You that love England. . . " 
You who go out alone, on tandem or on pillion, 
Down arterial roads riding in April, 
Or sad beside lakes where hill-slopes are reflected 
Making fires of leaves, your high hopes fallen: 
Cyclists and hikers in company, day excursionists, 
Refugees from cursed towns and devastated areas: 
Know you seek a new world, a saviour to establish 
Long-lost kinship and restore the blood's fulfilment. 
. . .We can tell you a secret, offer a tonic; only 
Submit to the visiting angel, the strange new healer. 
. . .You shall be leaders when zero hour is signalled, 
Wielders of power and welders of a new world. 
{Magnetic Mountain, Poem 32) 
This poem, which first appeared in the tendentious collection, New 
Country, in 1933, is a communist manifesto, written by a committed 
party member, but the rhetoric of saviour and angel is thoroughly 
imbued with Christian connotations, as if Day Lewis could express 
his hopes convincingly only through discursive features that he should 
have repudiated. The poem is also full of a deeply felt sense of place 
that is just a step from nationalism: "You that love England, who 
have an ear for her mus ic . . . " Similarly, "the visiting angel, the 
strange new healer" may refer to your local CP recruiter, but it exudes 
disturbing connotations of the Vuhrer Prinzip. One of the other 
structuring polarities of modernism is defined by the opposition 
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between equality and hietarchy or, in more purely political terms, 
between democratic and authoritarian notions of government. This is 
a polarity that existed within the socialist movement, for instance, 
and not simply as a difference between socialism and conservative or 
reactionary parties. 
Let x/y, then, symbolize the whole set of polarities that shape 
the ideology of modernism as it emerged in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. To describe these polarities fully is both 
theoretically and practically impossible, since each description would 
itself enter the play of ideological discourse. On an occasion such as 
this, one can only begin to sketch certain dimensions of this field. I 
propose, then, to examine some interactions between literature and 
politics, as we can trace them in the lives of a few young men of 
Joyce's generation, including of course, Joyce himself. We can begin 
with a brief summary of a paradigmatic life story of such a young 
man. 
He was born in the early 1880s into a family with little money 
which managed nonetheless to send him away to religious boarding 
schools. A biographer describes his father as one who "like his son 
after him nurtured a mixture of contradictory ideals" (Mack Smith 
2). The father's carelessness about money made life a struggle for the 
family. At school the young man was troubled by illness and was 
punished by the authorities. He preferred reading to playing with 
the other children. At one point he led a revolt against the quality 
of the food. He refused to go to mass and once had to be dragged 
to church by force. In his second school his interest in music flourished 
and he was asked to give a speech at a local theatre in honor of 
Giuseppe Verdi. At the age of 17 he was known as a hermit and 
misanthrope, but he made regular visits to a local brothel. He received 
his diploma shortly after the turn of the century, at which time his 
biographer describes him in this way: "there was already much of 
the intellectual bohemian about him. He was writing poems and 
trying, if unsuccessfully, to get them published. He knew long passages 
of Dante by heart and was a voracious reader of novels and political 
tracts" (Mack Smith 5). 
After a brief job as a substitute teacher, borrowing money from 
a number of people, he went into self-imposed exile, leaving behind 
debts and unpaid rent. In his adopted country he drifted from one 
job to another. He was a socialist but he had (his biographer tells 
us) "little patience with sentimental reformist socialism or with dem­
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ocratic and parliamentary methods; instead he preached revolution to 
expropriate a ruling class that would never voluntarily renounce power 
and possessions" (Mack Smith 7). He spent some time in Paris in 
1904 but did not settle there. He worked on foreign languages and 
practiced translating books from both French and German. He taught 
school briefly but had trouble keeping order. His biographer tells us 
that "his mother's death at the age of forty-six caused him great 
grief and perhaps some feelings of guilt for having been so inattentive 
a son" (Mack Smith 9). He spent hours in a university library "on 
a somewhat rambling and random course of reading that later stood 
him in good stead" (Mack Smith 8). He set up housekeeping and 
started a family in a one-room apartment in the Italian part of Austria 
with a woman he later married, who is described as taking no interest 
in his writing or in politics and having "no intellectual pursuits of 
her own" (Mack Smith 16). A knowledgeable observer has described 
his political views while in his early self-imposed exile as follows: 
. . . more the reflection of his early environment than the product 
of understanding and conviction; his hatred of oppression was 
not that impersonal hatred of a system shared by all revolution­
aries; it sprang rather from his own sense of indignity and 
frustration, from a passion to assert his own ego. . . .(Angelica 
Balabanoff, in Mack Smith 11) 
He tried his hand at both journalism and fiction but had trouble 
finding a publisher for his fiction. 
Whose early life is described in this brief sketch? It is much like 
that of James Augustine Aloysius Joyce, is it not, this early life of 
the man christened Benito Andrea Amilcare Mussolini? Joyce, of 
course, was named after three saints and Mussolini after three left-
wing revolutionaries, but the patterns of their early lives are strikingly 
similar. In describing Mussolini's youth I have carefully followed Denis 
Mack Smith's biography, only I have suppressed the repeated incidents 
of physical violence and brutality that distinguished the personality 
of the young Mussolini from that of the young Joyce. Mussolini was 
quick to rape a reluctant female or stab an antagonistic male, actions 
that situate him at an enormous distance from the essentially gentle 
and monogamous Joyce. This violence led to a number of impris­
onments that also distinguish the youth of Mussolini from that of 
Joyce. There are other differences as well, in class background for 
instance, but these very differences emphasize the strikingly similar 
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patterns in the lives of these two young men who were born a year 
apart in two troubled countries. 
Joyce seems to have abandoned socialism—and all political com­
mitment—some time before war broke out in 1914, though I believe 
his socialistic views were entirely serious in the days when he was 
reading Avantil and describing himself as a socialistic artist. Mussolini, 
of course, was fervent enough as a socialist to become the editor of 
Avanti! in 1912, at which time he also tried to establish another 
journal named Utopia in honor of St. Thomas More, whom he admired 
as the first socialist. For two years at Avantil Mussolini upheld the 
international socialist line, but as the war approached he became more 
nationalistic, to the point where he was expelled from his editorship 
in November of 1914 and by December had founded the first fascio 
d'azione rivoluzionaria. In November 1906, at the height of his interest 
in socialism, Joyce had expressed his admiration for Arthur Griffith 
and said in a letter to his brother, "If the Irish programme did not 
insist on the Irish language I suppose I could call myself a nationalist" 
(Letters II 187). Both Joyce and Mussolini were responding to similar 
nationalistic feelings. One of the polarities that shape the modernist 
dialectic for several decades is this tension between nationalism and 
internationalism, which in extreme forms turns into a struggle between 
socialism and fascism. The Stalinist move to "socialism in one 
country," preserving the Russian revolution by sacrificing a number 
of others, is a response to the same nationalistic surge in the ideology 
of modern Europe felt by Joyce and Mussolini a decade or so earlier. 
For Mussolini, fascism was the answer to his disillusionment with 
international socialism. As his fascist party developed after the war, 
gaining more and more power, he gradually discarded the socialist 
elements of his program, abandoning both his antidericalism and his 
sympathy for the proletariat. What he kept was his attitude toward 
parliamentary forms of government, an attitude highly visible in the 
Avantil of 1906, for instance, which Joyce read and discussed regularly. 
The view of parliamentary government that Joyce found most 
appropriate in the latter part of 1906 was that expressed by the 
syndicalist Arturo Labriola. Joyce explained this in a letter to Stanislaus 
which is worth quoting at some length: 
I am following with interest the struggle between the various 
socialist parties here at the Congress. Labriola spoke yesterday, 
the paper says, with extraordinarily rapid eloquence for two hours 
and a half. He reminds me somewhat of Griffith. He attacked 
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the intellectuals and the parliamentary socialists. He belongs or 
is leader of the sindicalists.... They assert that they are the true 
socialists because they wish the future social order to proceed 
equally from the overthrow of the entire present social organi­
zation and from the automatic emergence of the proletariat in 
trades-unions and guilds and the like. Their objection to parlia­
mentarianism seems to me well-founded.... Of course the sind­
icalists are anti-militarists but I don't see how that saves them 
from the conclusion of revolution in a conscriptive country like 
this. {Letters II 173-74) 
We should notice a number of things in Joyce's analysis, including 
his lack of faith in parliamentary government (which we Americans 
usually refer to as democracy), a position which he also takes in other 
letters of this period. The evidence suggests that he accepted the 
socialist critique of parliaments as tools of the bourgeois oligarchy for 
maintaining their own power and wealth. Certainly his hatred for 
what he called "the stupid, dishonest, tyrannical, and cowardly 
burgher class {Letters II 158) and "these insolent whores of the 
bureaucracy" {Letters II 164) is well documented. 
Joyce's connection of Arturo Labriola to Arthur Griffith is also 
interesting, but the truly devastating point of his commentary on 
the syndicalists is his dismissal of any possibility of obtaining power 
for the proletariat other than revolution. He is quick to reject (in 
another part of the passage from which I have already quoted at 
length) the syndicalist dream of a general strike. The most damning 
thing he says against the syndicalists is that they have come to 
resemble the English socialists. They repress the necessity for revo­
lution because they ignore the fact that "the Italian army is not 
directed against the Austrian army so much as against the Italian 
people." In the years when Joyce gave his serious attention to politics, 
he favored a revolution that would suppress parliamentary govern­
ment, expropriate the vast wealth of the Catholic Church {Letters II 
165-66), punish the bourgeoisie, and emancipate the proletariat 
{Letters II 198). This became, in fact, the program of Mussolini's 
fascists, until he abandoned the genuinely socialist elements of it in 
1921, retaining only its antiparliamentarity. 
I do not wish to suggest that Joyce was a proto-fascist in 1906, 
but to point out that he had attended carefully enough to the 
dialogue of the Italian socialists for several years to see the over­
whelming problems facing the socialist enterprise in Italy, which 
boiled down to the question, How do pacifist internationalists make 
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a national revolution in a country with a standing army? It took a 
world war to answer that question, and even in Russia after 1917 it 
finally took the authoritarian nationalism of Stalin to sustain that 
revolution. Joyce's turn away from politics, which took place around 
the time we have been examining, was no doubt determined by 
many things, among them the impossible contradictions he could 
see in the political position he found most congenial. But there is 
more to the story of Joyce's socialism than this, and we must examine 
certain features of it more thoroughly to discover some of what he 
learned during his political years. 
For the space of about a year, in 1906 and 1907, when he was 
finishing Dubliners and planning A Portrait and his "story" Ulysses, 
Joyce thought of himself—frequently and earnestly—as a socialist. 
After that period he certainly took less interest in politics, but he 
neither repudiated his earlier views nor adopted any of the alternatives 
that were so visible and insistent around him. We are generally less 
aware than we should be of Joyce's socialism, mainly because Ellmann, 
who has been in most respects an exemplary steward of the Joycean 
oeuvre, adopted a view of Joyce that did not admit of a serious 
commitment of this sort, at one point in the biography observing, 
"At least Joyce can scarcely have been a Nietzschean any more than 
he was a socialist" (JJI 147), and at another arguing that any interest 
Joyce took in socialism was motivated by a petty hope for personal 
gain, believing that "the triumph of socialism might make for some 
sort of state subsidy of artists like himself" (204). 
It is a wise biographer who knows the heart of his subject, but 
Ellmann is not seeing into a heart, of course; he is constructing a 
portrait of a writer as a young man. His young man frequently 
returned to the theme of socialism in letters to his brother. Ellmann's 
way of acknowledging this is to say that Joyce "labored to make 
socialism an integral part of his personality," the implication clearly 
being that such labor was in vain; but producing an integrated 
personality is more the biographer's problem than his subject's. 
Consider, for a moment the passage Ellmann introduced in the 
biography as an example of Joyce's vain labor: 
It is a mistake for you to imagine that my political opinions 
are those of a universal lover: but they are those of a socialistic 
artist. I cannot tell you how strange I feel sometimes in my 
attempt to lead a more civilized life than my contemporaries 
But why should I have brought Nora to a priest or a lawyer to 
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make her swear away her life to me? And why should I 
superimpose on my child the very troublesome burden of belief 
which my father and mother superimposed on me. Some people 
would answer that while professing to be a socialist I am trying 
to make money: but this is not quite true at least as they mean 
it. (205) 
The passage goes on for some distance. What it reveals, among other 
things, is that for Joyce his rejections of church and state in his own 
life—as represented by rejection of formal marriage and baptism or 
religious instruction for children—are aspects of what he calls his 
socialism. Ellmann's comment on all this is a laconic put-down: 
"socialism has rarely been defended so tortuously" (205). Unfortu­
nately, however, socialism has been rarely defended in any way other 
than tortuously, as a little reading in Marx, Adorno, or Lukics would 
quickly demonstrate—and there are overwhelming reasons why this 
must be so. One cannot argue for a new way of thinking from 
within an old way of thinking except with the kind of self-conscious 
complexity that is all too easily dismissed as "tortuous." My purpose 
here, however, is not to defend socialistic discourse but to explore 
the ways in which socialism and other ideological currents merge and 
diverge during the period we call modernist. In particular I am 
interested in the ways in which European culture shaped the minds 
of those individuals who later helped to change the literary and 
political map of Europe. 
In the case of Joyce, we have never, for instance, properly 
appreciated the contribution of Guglielmo Ferrero to his thinking. 
The only serious attempt I know of to accomplish this is Dominic 
Manganiello's, in his useful book, Joyce's Politics, but the book has 
not received the attention it deserves, and even Manganiello, who 
treats Joyce's debt to Ferrero at some length, ignores some small but 
extremely interesting matters. 
One of these is the fact that the immediate source of Joyce's 
often repeated characterization of the style in which he had written 
the stories of Dubliners is certainly to be found in Ferrero's L'Europe 
giovane. Joyce alluded to Ferrero in a letter to Grant Richards 
defending his stories "Counterparts" and "Two Gallants," in which 
he went on to say that he had written Dubliners "for the most part 
in a style of scrupulous meanness" (Letters II133-34). This expression 
is Joyce's translation of a phrase Ferrero applies to the treatment of 
sensual love in French novels: "Che cosa si trova in Balzac, in Zola, 
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in Flaubert, in De Goncourt? Descrizione dell'amore sensuale, fatte 
bene o fatte male, fatte con scrupulosa esatezza di analista. 
(175). Ferrero goes on to condemn the lack of attention to the 
mental and moral dimensions of sexual psychology in the French 
novelists. These are commonplaces of the period. One can find them, 
for instance, in Henry James's criticisms of Flaubert; but for our 
purposes that striking phrase, "scrupulosa esatezza di analista," is 
more important. In Italian, as in English, the idea of exaction has 
connotations of the sort of meanness one associates with the exaction 
of taxes, for the cognate of esatezza, esatore, means tax collector. 
Stanislaus Joyce, in My Brother's Keeper (204) has claimed that 
"scrupulous meanness" is simply a revision of the phrase "studiously 
mean" which Joyce used in a 1902 review of William Rooney's 
Poems and Ballads that appeared in Dublin's Daily Express (and has 
been reprinted in Joyce's Critical Writings, 84-86). We should pause 
and examine this claim. Joyce wrote of Rooney's verses that little is 
achieved in them "because the writing is so careless and yet is so 
studiously mean. For, if carelessness is carried very far, it is like to 
become a positive virtue, but an ordinary carelessness is nothing but 
a false and mean expression of a false and mean idea" (85, emphasis 
added). Stanislaus argues that his brother should have said (and 
must have meant) that Rooney''s poems "are the false and mean 
expression of a false and mean idea, but that studious (that is, 
careful) meanness can become a positive virtue" (204). He adds that 
he raised this objection in a letter to his brother at this time, thus 
laying the groundwork for Joyce's use of "scrupulous meanness" 
four years later. This may indeed be the case, but usage is often 
overdetermined, and I would argue that Ferrero's phrase was a more 
immediate stimulus, providing the key word, "scrupulous," that had 
previously been lacking. After all, Ferrero was so much on Joyce's 
mind that he was mentioned in the very same letter, and Joyce's 
phrase is in exactly the same vein as Ferrero's, connecting Joyce to 
the French naturalists Ferrero was discussing: "I have written it for 
the most part in a style of scrupulous meanness and with the 
conviction that he is a very bold man who dares to alter in the 
presentment, still more to deform, whatever he has seen and heard." 
Ellmann's note on Ferrero in his edition of the letters describes 
him as an "Italian historian and antifascist social critic," which is 
true enough but doesn't really locate him politically; moreover, 
Ellmann's description of what Joyce learned from Ferrero is bizarre: 
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"Ferrero finds a secret alliance between Puritanism, sexual aberration, 
and military destructiveness, using Bismarck as his example" (133). 
In the passage Ellmann cites, Ferrero speaks of Bismarck's hatred of 
France and his desire to destroy Paris by cannon fire as the action 
of a puritan, not an ascetic, describing Bismarck as "un rude 
monogamo" who detested the city of "aesthetic vice." If Ellmann 
is right, we must add "rude monogamy" to the list of sexual 
aberrations, but I doubt if Ferrero would approve. 
Ferrero was in fact a classic liberal humanist, a true child of 
the Enlightenment. It is also the case that he was infected by 
nineteenth-century racialism to some extent. His explanations accord­
ing to racial characteristics appear ludicrous now, but there is much 
in L'Europagiovane that is still interesting. Joyce's "tortuous" defense 
of his socialism no doubt owes something to passages like this one: 
A man can become a socialist through class interest; that is, 
because he sees in the socialist party the best defense of his own 
interest. But a man can also become a socialist against the interest 
of his class, for moral reasons, because the numerous defects 
and the many vices of modern society have disgusted him; and 
that is the case of many bourgeois socialists, independent profes­
sionals, scientists, rich people, who in many countries of Europe, 
and especially in Italy, participate in one way or another in the 
socialist movement. (361, my translation) 
That is not so bad for 1897. Ferrero was friendly to socialism, and 
accepted much of Marx's criticism of bourgeois society as justified, 
but he thought that when it came to the crucial matter of the 
future, Marx had substituted Semitic religiosity for the science he 
claimed to profess. Joyce told Stanislaus in a letter of November 
1906 that he had just finished reading Ferrero's Young Europe: 
He has a fine chapter on Antisemitism. By the way Brandes is 
a Jew. He [Ferrero] says that Karl Marx has the apocalyptic 
imagination and makes Armageddon a war between capital and 
labour. The most arrogant statement made by Israel so far, he 
says, not excluding the gospel of Jesus is Marx's proclamation 
that socialism is the fulfilment of a natural law. In considering 
Jews he slips in Jesus between Lassalle and Lombroso: the latter 
too (Ferrero's father in law) is a Jew. {Letters II 190) 
This passage is Joyce's own conflation of many pages in Ferrero's 
book. (Ellmann's note on the passage cites many sections, but they 
are simply taken from the "Indice" and are not accurate.) Joyce 
learned about Brandes'sjewishness, for instance, from Ferrero s report 
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on an interview with Brandes in this city of Copenhagen. In Ferrero s 
book Joyce's interest in Jews and this interest in socialism were both 
fed. Here are excerpts from a crucial passage: 
The great men of the Hebrews have almost all had a transcendent 
consciousness of their own missions. . .; they have all felt them­
selves, more or less lucidly, to be Messiahs. The old popular 
legend has become a living sentiment, a reality, in the con­
sciousness of the great representatives of the race. Every great 
Hebraic man is persuaded, even if he does not say so, of having 
a mandate to inaugurate a new era for the world; to make, in 
the abyss of darkness in which humanity lives, the opening 
through which will enter for the first time, and forever, the 
light of truth. Of course this consciousness may be more or less 
clear, take one form or another, have a greater or lesser amplitude 
according to the times and the individuals, but it is there in all 
of them; it is in the ancient prophets who were precursors of 
the Messiah, it is in Jesus come to announce the heavenly 
kingdom; it is in Marx come to announce the proletarian 
revolution; it is in Lombroso, come to deliver the true scales of 
justice, after so many ages in which men through ignorance and 
malice have adopted the false. (366, my translation) 
This passage obviously made an impact on Joyce, providing 
much of what he reported to his brother in the letter already cited, 
but it also provided something else: a verbal formula that came in 
handy when he sought a ringing phrase for the conclusion of his 
first novel. Listen to it again, this time in the Italian: "La vecchia 
leggenda del popolo e diventata sentimento vivo e realta nella 
coscienza dei grandi rappresentanti della razza." For years we have 
wondered where that curious phrase "conscience of my race" came 
from. Now we know: "nella coscienza. . .della razza." Ferrero con­
tributed something to the creation of both Stephen Dedalus and 
Leopold Bloom (as Dominic Manganiello noted in Joyce's Politics). 
It is supremely ironic, then, that when Joyce and Ferrero met it was 
at a PEN meeting at Paris in 1937, where a virtually blind Joyce 
listened to the exiled Ferrero lecture passionately on the burning of 
Joyce's books by the fascists, thinking all the time only of the 
infringement of his copyrights and afterwards complaining bitterly 
that politics had spoiled the meeting (see W Potts, Portraits of the 
Artist in Exile, 155-56). Ferrero died the year after Joyce, also in 
Switzerland, where he was teaching at the University of Geneva. 
We do not know exactly when the apolitical Joyce whom Ferrero 
encountered in 1937 displaced the political Joyce of 1906, with his 
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syndicalism and revolutionary fervor, but it may be that Ferrero, by 
directing Joyce's attention to a religious element in Marxism, helped 
to disillusion him. We can no longer ignore the fact, however, that 
certainly in Dubliners and probably in much of his other work, Joyce 
felt himself to be engaged in a bringing to consciousness the social 
problems that beset his nation, or in his own language, in a style 
of scrupulous meanness creating a conscience for his race. We know 
enough about his thinking in those years to attempt a summary of 
his literary and political attitudes. 
He was antibourgeois, anticlerical, antiparliamentary, antimili­
taristic, antibureaucratic, an Irish nationalist, and definitely not an 
anti-Semite, though extremely interested in Jews. In literature he 
admired Ibsen, Hauptmann, Tolstoy, Maupassant. In particular he 
liked the "scrupolosa esatezza di analista" that he found in these 
writers. What he did not like is well expressed in his comments on 
George Gissing in a letter of November 1906: 
I have read Gissing's Demos; A Story of English Socialism. Why 
are English novels so terribly boring? I think G has little merit. 
The socialist in this is first a worker and then inherits a fortune, 
jilts his first girl, marries a lydy, becomes a big employer and 
takes to drink. You know the kind of story. There is a clergyman 
in it with searching eyes and a deep voice who makes all the 
socialists wince under his firm gaze. (Letters II 186) 
In this critique Joyce's socialism and anticlericalism are inextricably 
bound up with his sense of realities and his aesthetic judgment. He 
is judging by a standard in which realism and aestheticism are allied 
rather than antagonistic. 
Certainly one of the polarities that structure modernist ideology 
is that between naturalism and aestheticism. That particular division 
of what had been in the nineteenth century a unified realism is one 
of the decisive breaks that constitutes modernism as a cultural 
hegemony. Joyce in 1906 was poised right on that break, seeking a 
way of extending realism without its fragmenting into aesthetic and 
naturalistic poles. Certainly, the stories of Dubliners can be usefully 
seen in exactly that light. It will be helpful in appreciating his 
position to look carefully at his thoughts on a writer whom most 
critics would see as tending toward the naturalistic pole to a greater 
extent than Tolstoy, Maupassant, or Ibsen may be said to do. I refer 
to Gerhard Hauptmann, whose Rosa Bernd Joyce acquired, though 
he could scarcely afford it, at a time in the autumn of 1906, when 
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he was also taking Danish lessons to read Ibsen more easily in the 
original. Joyce had admired Hauptmann for some years but his 
appraisal of Hauptmann's drama was this side idolatry: 
I finished Hauptmann's Rosa Bernd on Sunday. I wonder if he 
acts well. His plays, when read, leave an unsatisfying impression 
on the reader. Yet he must have the sense of the stage well 
developed in him by now. He never, in his later plays at least, 
tries for a curtain so that the ends of his acts seem ruptures of 
a scene. His characters appear to be more highly vivified by 
their creator than Ibsen's but also they are less under control. 
He has a difficulty in subordinating them to the action of his 
drama. He deals with life quite differently, more frankly in 
certain points. . . but also so broadly that my personal conscience 
is seldom touched. His way of treating such types as Arnold 
Kramer and Rosa Bernd is, however, altogether to my taste. His 
temperament has a little of Rimbaud in it. Like him, too, I 
suppose somebody else will be his future. But, after all, he has 
written two or three masterpieces—"a little immortal thing" 
like The Weavers, for example. I have found nothing of the 
charlatan in him yet. (Letters II 173) 
Joyce's praise of Hauptmann s vividness of characterization, his 
frankness, and his freedom from charlatanry is balanced by a dissat­
isfaction that is partly aesthetic (a disparity between characters and 
actions) and partly ethical: he deals with life "so broadly that my 
personal conscience is not touched." The immediate contrast, only 
partly explicit here, is with Ibsen, whose control and balance brings 
him near the top of Joyce's aesthetic scale. The young Joyce's reactions 
to Gissing and Hauptmann can help us to locate his own position 
with respect to naturalism. He rejects the sentimentalized naturalism 
of Gissing and prefers the harsher, franker naturalism of Hauptmann. 
But he is troubled by two features of Hauptmann's work, a certain 
lack of aesthetic "control" (which Ibsen so obviously had) and a 
crudity or broadness that left his "personal conscience" untouched— 
a criticism similar to Ferrero's critique of the French novelists. The 
need to reconcile the naturalistic presentation of life with an aesthetic 
control that would affect the personal conscience merges from these 
critiques as the central problem for Joyce as a writer. It is the 
paradigmatic problem for the modernist writer of plays or stories, a 
problem that other modernists, such as Hemingway and Lawrence, 
would also have to solve. 
This problem became central in the work of another young man 
of Joyce's generation, whose experience will serve to close this little 
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excursion into modernist ideology. He was born in the 1880s in a 
city on the edge of Europe. Though raised in a bourgeois family he 
rebelled against bourgeois manners and values. He was a bright 
student in school: outwardly conforming but inwardly rebellious. 
One of the earliest literary works to impress him was Lamb's Tales 
from Shakespeare. At a later age he discovered "Baudelaire, Verlaine, 
Swinburne, Zola, Ibsen, and Tolstoy as leaders and guides" {Record 
of a Life 147). As he matured, he continued to admire the radicalism 
of Scandinavian and Russian literature. Years later he recalled his 
relationship with his family in this way: 
I was completely estranged from my family, or at least from a 
part of it. I did not have any relationship with the family at 
all. . . . My mother was a shrewd woman who soon saw what 
was happening. She fell seriously ill and died of cancer of the 
breast. Under pressure from other members of the family, I 
wrote her a letter. When she received it she said, "I must be 
very ill for [my son] to write me a letter." (35) 
Rejecting marriage as a bourgeois convention, he went into self-
imposed exile. Looking back on his twenty-third year, he wrote, "In 
my case. . .absolute independence in order to produce, and for that 
reason silent rejection" (151). This was his version of the Joycean 
"silence, exile, and cunning." He came to admire the work of a 
poet who expressed his own values, seeing in this poet in 1906, as 
he later recalled, "a revolutionary who regarded the revolution as 
indispensable for his own self-realization" (39). He had ambitions 
to write a treatise on aesthetics and to be a dramatist. "I started to 
write plays in the manner of Hauptmann and Ibsen" (31), he later 
recalled, and he translated The Wild Duck into his native language 
(34). Writing about Hauptmann some time after his youthful en­
thusiasm, he praised in particular the dramatists "great and beautiful 
honesty." Living in Italy in his twenty-sixth year he began a major 
work on aesthetic theory but set it aside the following year. When 
he was about twenty-five he discovered French syndicalism, which, 
he says, "at the time I regarded as the only oppositional socialist 
movement that could be taken seriously" (41). He condemned 
conditions in his own country, which he seriously hoped to change 
through his own work, but, as he has said, "this did not mean that 
I was prepared to accept English Parliamentarianism as an alternative 
ideal." 
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The young man I have been describing, as you have no doubt 
realized was Georg Lukacs, the Hungarian Jew who became Europe's 
leading Marxist literary critic and theoretician. Considering the fact 
that he came to be a major opponent of the kind of modernism he 
felt to be manifested in Joyce's work, it is useful to see how much 
the two writers shared in the cultural matrix from which modernism 
emerged. But at the point where Joyce turned from politics to art, 
Lukacs turned in the opposite direction. At the end of his life an 
interviewer asked him about shift of interest: 
Int: You said you gave up aesthetics because you had begun 
to be interested in ethical problems. What works 
resulted from this interest? 
G.L.: At that time it did not result in any written works. 
My interest in ethics led me to the revolution. (53) 
Both of these young men reached a similar point of decision 
and made their choices, living the lives that followed from them. 
They had also made other choices, Joyce abandoning criticism as 
Lukacs abandoned drama, but these were more personal, matters of 
talent primarily. Perhaps the ideological choices stem as much from 
personality as anything else, but there is a lot we do not know about 
these things. In the case of Joyce, for instance, what may have been 
a crucial year of intellectual decision, 1908, is simply a blank on the 
biographical record. For the first eleven months of that year we have 
five lines of correspondence and precious little else. We know a lot 
about what Joyce was in 1906 and what he later became. About the 
transition itself, we are ignorant. 
We know, however, that Georg Luklcs became the most artic­
ulate critical opponent of modernism in literatute (with the possible 
exception of Wyndham Lewis). Lukdcs's critique of modernism has 
a philosophical basis that allows him to set modernism against realism, 
in fact to see modernism as a perverse negation of realism. For 
Luk&cs realism is based on the view of man as a zoon politikon, a 
political animal. Modernism, on the other hand, is based on a view 
of human existence as, in Heidegger's expression, a Geworfenheit ins 
Dasein, a "thrownness into being." Realism, says Lukacs, depends 
upon perspective and norms of human behavior, whereas modernism 
destroys perspective and glorifies the abnormal. Realism assumes the 
objectivity of time and modernism assumes time's subjectivity. For 
Lukics, Joyce acquired the proportions of the arch-modernist, whose 
works displayed an exaggerated concern with form, style, and tech­
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nique in general, along with an excessive attention to sense-data, 
combined with a comparative neglect of ideas and emotions. 
Lukacs's unfavorable comparison of Joyce to Thomas Mann, 
however, has affinities with Joyce's comparison of Hauptmann to 
Ibsen. It should also be noted that Lukacs does not trivialize Joyce's 
enterprise. He is perfectly ready to call Ulysses a masterpiece, as he 
does in the following passage: 
A gifted writer, however extreme his theoretical modernism, will 
in practice have to compromise with the demands of historicity 
and of social environment. Joyce uses Dublin, Kafka, and Musil 
the Hapsburg Monarchy, as the locus of their masterpieces. But 
the locus they lovingly depict is little more than a backdoth; it 
is not basic to their artistic intention. {Realism in Our Time 21) 
Lukacs particularly criticized Joyce's use of the stream of consciousness, 
in which, as he argued, "the perpetually oscillating patterns of sense 
and memory-data, their powerfully charged—but aimless and direc­
tionless—fields of force, give rise to an epic structure which is static, 
reflecting a belief in the basically static character of events" (18). 
This is by no means a trivial or inaccurate description of Joyce's 
major enterprise, though I think the Joycean stream of consciousness 
is more directed and purposeful than Lukacs gives it credit for being. 
Lukacs is surely right, however, when he borrows Walter Benjamin's 
description of Romantic and Baroque art to characterize the allegorical 
tendencies of modernism: "Every person, every object, every rela­
tionship can stand for something else." (42). It is surely this, and 
the Joycean sense that history is an endless repetition of such 
transformations that make Joyce a fearful object to Lukacs, whose 
faith in progressive possibilities could only abhor what he called the 
"religious atheism" that animated Joyce's modernism. 
For all their differences, however, they were products of very 
similar cultural interests and pressures. To emphasize that, I shall 
close by presenting to you some excerpts from one of the last things 
Lukacs wrote, his Gelebtes Denken or preliminary notes for an 
autobiography that he did not live to finish. To my ears they connect 
him across time, across politics, across experiences, across Europe, 
with the writer who most symbolized for him the mistaken ways of 
modernist prose. Listen: 
Objectivity: the correct historicity. Memory: tendency to relocate 
in time. Check against the facts. Youth. . . . 
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No poet. Only a philosopher. Abstractions. Memory, too, organ­
ized to that end. Danger: premature generalization of spontaneous 
experience. But poets: able to recall concrete feelings. . . That 
already means at the right place at the right time. Especially: 
childhood. . . 
Live here: over 80—subjective interest in reality maintained—at 
a time when the contact with early youth often lost. Long and 
even now, an undeniably industrious life—my right to attempt 
to justify this posture.... 
Thus an old Hungarian Jew, back from exile, planning to justify his 
life, lapses into a prose somewhere between an outline and a stream 
of consciousness. He wants to fight the tendency of memory to relocate 
in subjective time, seeks the objective, the facts, but also says "No 
poet, Only a philosopher. Abstractions." He fought to the end the 
tendency of his own discourse toward modernism and the power of 
his own subjectivity, which had been formed in the same European 
crucible as that of those he criticized. Sometimes, at some levels, 
x = y. 
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CRITICAL

STUDIES


Farrington the Scrivener:

A Story of Dame Street

MORRIS BEJA 
I might as well be talking to the wall as talking to you. 
—Mr. Alleyne, in James Joyce, "Counterparts" 
At the start of Herman Melville's short story "Bartleby the Scrivener: 
A Story of Wall Street," originally published in 1853, the narrator, 
an elderly lawyer, speaks of a "singular set of men" of whom, as far 
as he knows, "nothing" has "ever been written—. . .the law-copyists, 
or scriveners" (92). Since then, at least one other major writer—James 
Joyce—has written a story centering on such a scrivener: "Counter­
parts." Melville's lawyer says of his scrivener that he was "the strangest 
I ever saw, or heard of" (92). Nothing that we shall discover in this 
essay about Joyce's scrivener, Farrington, will match Bartleby for 
strangeness. Nor, I should stress at the outset, is my bringing the 
two scriveners together meant to discuss or even suggest any sort of 
possible "influence." I am confident that Joyce would not have 
known what was at that time an obscure tale by a largely neglected 
writer when he wrote his own story in 1905. I am not in any case 
interested in the question of influence; for my purposes, the fact that 
there was surely no awareness on Joyce's part of Melville's story makes 
it all the more intriguing to compare and contrast the two works, 
and above all the two men: Joyce's brutal bully and Melville's passive 
victim. 
So different are the two characters, actually, that at first it would 
seem that only the contrasts between them and their tales are worth 
mentioning, and that their one genuine point of convergence is their 
mode of employment. On the evidence of both stories, the job of 
the scrivener—that is, of copying legal documents in those pre-Xerox 
days when typewriters were also either nonexistent (as in Bartleby's 
time) or not yet widely accepted for legal purposes (as in Farring­
ton's)—would seem to have been tedious, mechanical, and alienating: 
a daily grind demanding no thought and yielding little self-respect. 
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Such characteristics seem especially emphasized in Melville's story. 
It is narrated by Bartleby's employer, a New York lawyer who tells 
about his office and its two scriveners, Turkey and Nippers, and the 
errand-boy, Ginger-Nut; the lawyer had determined that there was 
too much work for his current staff and so advertised for another 
scrivener. In response, one day "a motionless young man" (99) stands 
upon his threshold: Bartleby. The lawyer hires him, and for a time 
the young scrivener's work is exemplary, and Bartleby does "an 
extraordinary quantity of writing" (100). So it is all the more surprising 
when the lawyer, having asked him to help examine some previously 
copied work, hears from Bartleby the reply, "I would prefer not to" 
(101). The lawyer feels at that moment too busy to pursue his anger, 
but he does so a few days later upon again hearing the scrivener use 
that enigmatic phrase: "I would prefer not to." The other members 
of his staff agree with him that Bartleby's behavior is reprehensible 
and even outrageous, but in view of the young man s excellent work 
otherwise, and his quiet demeanor, the lawyer does not turn him 
out, even when, as the days go by, the same response is forthcoming 
when any request is made of Bartleby—and indeed when he eventually 
stops copying altogether. At around that time, as well, the lawyer 
discovers that Bartleby apparently never leaves the office premises, 
before or after work hours, subsisting on "nothing but ginger-nuts" 
(104). Attempting to be sympathetic, the lawyer pleads with the 
young man to provide information about his background, but Bartleby 
replies only that he would prefer not to reply. The lawyer at last fires 
him, but to no avail: Bartleby simply remains in his little corner, 
behind his screen and facing a wall opposite the office window. 
The lawyer comes to feel that he is no longer in control of his 
own offices, and in a kind of panic he resolves that if Bartleby will 
not leave, he will; so he changes his premises. Even after the move 
takes place, Bartleby continues to haunt the old offices—and then, 
when turned out by the new tenant, the building. Returning there 
on the plea of the landlord, the lawyer is so touched by Bartleby's 
plight that he offers to take him with him—not to the new offices 
but to the lawyer's own home; but Bartleby replies that he would 
prefer not to. Days later, the lawyer hears that the police have removed 
Bartleby and taken him to the Tombs, the prison in the Halls of 
Justice. The lawyer visits him there, where Bartleby says, "I know 
you. . .and I want nothing to say to you" (128). The lawyer arranges 
for the young man to be treated and fed well, but when he returns 
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a few days later he finds Bartleby huddled at the base of the wall, 
dead. In a postscript of sorts, the lawyer informs us that some months 
later he heard a rumor that Bartleby had once worked at the Dead 
Letter Office. "Ah, Bartleby!" he ends his narrative, "Ah, human­
ity!" (131). 
"Bartleby the Scrivener" is a complex, packed work, perhaps 
overdone in parts and not always in full control of its ambition; but 
for all that it is a genuine masterpiece, an obsessively haunting tale. 
Joyce's "Counterparts" is finally less ambitious, but on its own it is 
also masterful, perhaps even flawless. It succinctly recounts the events 
of a single day in the life of a man who would seem to be not so 
much a Bartleby as an anti-Bartleby. 
Farrington, already regarded by his employer—the lawyer Mr. 
Alleyne—as a shirker, has failed to complete some copies when they 
are needed, and when asked to provide them he tries to pretend he 
knows nothing about them. In front of the entire staff, his furious 
employer asks him, "do you take me for a fool? Do you think me 
an utter fool?" Before he realizes it, Farrington replies, "I don't 
think, sir. . .that that's a fair question to put to me" (91). 
Threatened with the loss of his position, Farrington must apol­
ogize abjectly for his witticism. At the end of the day, he is still 
thirsty—despite his having sneaked off to a pub during working 
hours—and in need of a night out with his friends, so he pawns his 
watch. His story of the incident at the office is a success with his 
chums, but as the pub crawl continues the evening is disappointing. 
He spends too much money, is frustrated when he feels unable to 
respond to an apparently flirtatious woman in one pub, and then 
loses an arm-wrestling contest to Weathers, a younger man. On his 
way home, he feels "humiliated and discontented; he did not even 
feel drunk; and he had only twopence in his pocket. He cursed 
everything. He had done for himself in the office, pawned his watch, 
spent all his money; and he had not even got drunk" (96-97). His 
wife not at home, he asks his son Tom about his dinner. The young 
boy says he is going to cook it; but Farrington sees that the fire has 
been allowed to go out and, furious, viciously beats him with a 
walking-stick. Terrified, the boy squeals, "Don't beat me, pa! And 
I'll. .I'll say a Hail Mary for you. .I'll say a Hail Mary for you, pa, 
if you don't beat me. . . I'll say a Hail Mary. . .  " (98). 
Obviously, there is a marked difference in the reader s degree 
of sympathy or, certainly, identification with the protagonist of each 
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story.1 Joyce forces us to understand a brute like Farrington, and—I 
shall attempt to show—to realize our own kinship with him, but 
most of us are readier to identify with his son, or even with Bartleby. 
Many readers who seem to have no qualms about identifying them­
selves with a catatonic and schizophrenic like Bartleby—as the exis­
tential victim—would recoil with repugnance at any attempt to as­
sociate them with Farrington, or indeed with either of the employers 
in the stories. Such readers are ready enough to sentimentalize Bar­
tleby's plight by turning him into a prophet, wiser in his "irrational" 
existence than the rest of humanity in its desperate "sanity." Yet it 
does not take so romanticized a view of Bartleby to feel that there is 
an integrity in his self-destructive and futile mode of behavior that 
is lacking in Farringtons self-deceptive and futile modes of rebellion. 
Not to put too fine a point on it, Farrington is after all a 
"ruffian." The term is Mr. Alleyne's—hardly a totally sympathetic 
or unbiased judge of Farrington's character—but the narrative voice 
of the story uses not dissimilar terms, as we hear that Farrington feels 
"savage and thirsty and revengeful" (92), or that he is "full of 
smoldering anger and revengefulness" (96). Bartleby, in contrast, is 
said to be a "poor, pale, passive mortal. . .a helpless creature" (123). 
Each character is given the sort of physique that would be expected, 
given their roles: Bartleby the victim is described as "lean," and as 
"thin and pale" (109, 111), while Farrington the bully is "tall and 
of great bulk," and he walks "with a heavy step" (86). 
They contrast with one another in additional physical ways as 
well. Bartleby is constantly in stasis. He seems never to move: "I like 
to be stationary," he remarks in his exasperating mode of understate­
ment (126). Farrington is constantly hyperkinetic: "his body ached 
to do something, to rush out and revel in violence" (90). He leaves 
the office whenever he gets the chance (Mr. Alleyne accuses him of 
taking extra-long lunches, and of never being there when he is wanted; 
and we see him pretend to go to the men's room when he is actually 
going out to a pub)—in contrast to Bartleby, who is at first praised 
by the lawyer for the fact that he is always there: "I observed that 
he never went to dinner; indeed, that he never went anywhere. As 
yet I had never, of my personal knowledge, known him to be outside 
of my office" (104). In time the lawyer becomes less sanguine about 
this clinging, static quality in his scrivener, who finally refuses to quit 
the lawyer's office altogether. 
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As all that suggests, the relationships between employee and 
employer in the two stories are also studies in antithesis, as are the 
employers themselves. Mr. Alleyne is impatient and short-tempered. 
While there has been some critical disagreement about the efficacy 
of the lawyer's good intentions in "Bartleby the Scrivener," and some 
critics have attacked, for example, his "exploitative" role as a rep­
resentative of "Wall Street," few of us mere mortals (as distinct I 
gather from literary critics) could claim to be as patient, as generous, 
or as long-suffering as Melville's lawyer, who tries—truly sincerely, it 
seems quite clear, however ineffectively or hopelessly—to deal with 
and confront Bartleby's painful case. It is true that he is the one to 
tell us, but there seems little reason to disbelieve the lawyer's assertions 
that, for example, "I seldom lose my temper; much more seldom 
indulge in dangerous indignation at wrongs and outrages" (93); and 
it is clearly accurate for him to claim, as he does, that (unlike Mr. 
Alleyne, certainly) he resorts to "no vulgar bullying, no bravado of 
any sort, no choleric hectoring" (117). In contrast, we see no reason 
to doubt Farrington's fear that from now on "Mr. Alleyne would 
never give him an hour's rest; his life would be a hell to him" (92). 
To give Mr. Alleyne his due, he does not have a model employee in 
Farrington, who surely would be an exasperating person to have in 
one's office. 
So would Bartleby, no doubt. Yet in the end it is the psycho­
logical and spiritual differences between the two scriveners that seem, 
at least at first, to control our views when we look at them together. 
Both men are self-defeating; but Farrington's mode of self-destruction 
follows what is, unfortunately, probably the more usual pattern. For 
he strikes out, bitterly and openly, at other people as well, even 
resorting to—seeking out, and ready to "revel in"—violence: "he 
longed to execrate aloud, to bring his fist down on something 
violently" (90). In some ways, he seems closer to the other scriveners 
in the office of Melville's lawyer than to Bartleby himself: to Nippers, 
for one, who, "if he wanted anything, it was to be rid of a scrivener's 
table altogether" (96). Nippers, however, is "at least, a temperate 
man" (98), so Farrington—with his determination "that he must 
have a good night's drinking" (87)—seems even more like Turkey, 
as they both practice a profession that Joyce s scrivener would agree 
is, in Melville's lawyer's words, "a dry, husky sort of business" (98). 
Turkey is notorious in the office for becoming less agreeable and 
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more irascible and cantankerous after his lunch, when he has had 
some beer, which leads him to be (like Farrington, after his glass of 
porter) "rash with his tongue—in fact, insolent" (95). The alcohol 
also makes both men prone to violence: in the morning, Turkey 
seems the soul of patience with respect to Bartleby's odd conduct; 
after experiencing the "effects of beer," however, he displays "com­
bativeness," throwing "his arms into a pugilistic position" and 
offering to "go and black his eyes" (105, 106). In contrast, Bartleby, 
whose "pale face clearly indicated that he never drank beer like 
Turkey" (111)—or Farrington—displays "freedom from all dissipa­
tion," and "great stillness" and "unalterableness of demeanor under 
all circumstances" (107). He is a completely nonviolent person, whose 
stance takes the form of totally passive resistance—a "poor, pale, 
passive mortal" (123). Fascinatingly, his rebellion is ultimately no 
less real than Farrington's, and much more effective in many essential 
ways: "nothing," as Melville's lawyer points out, "so aggravates an 
earnest person as a passive resistance" (104). Yet, after all, Bartleby's 
rebellion is also self-defeating, and hardly a model for others to 
emulate. 
In that and in other key ways as well, despite all these contrasts 
between the protagonists of the two stories, the similarities between 
the two men, and between their plights, are much more revealing 
and suggestive, if subtle and surprising. The comparison may suggest 
that similar forces are present in their lives—however ultimately 
difficult it may be to pin down those forces—which make them both 
not merely unwilling but unable to get down to work, to copy their 
papers: to get along in their worlds. Bartleby's inability (or unwill­
ingness) to copy is all too obvious as his story proceeds. Farrington's 
inability is less extreme, but it seems acute from the start, as he has 
for some reason been unable to finish his copy of an important 
contract for Mr. Alleyne, who accuses him right off of having "always 
some excuse or another for shirking work" (87). Farrington too would 
prefer not to; and he doesn't, sort of. He may not have the absolute 
courage of his convictions we see all too present in Bartleby, but in 
this pivotal matter he is his counterpart. 
And indeed they are genuine "counterparts." Above all they 
are so to each other, but they are also counterparts to secondary 
figures in their respective stories. If we had any doubts about that 
in Joyce's story, the title makes it clear enough, with a near explicitness 
in which Joyce rarely indulges, except—as here—in some of his titles 
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(A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Exiles, Ulysses, Finnegans 
Wake). Farrington is played off against Mr. Alleyne; against Weathers, 
the young man who beats him at arm wrestling (and who has 
apparently slipped out from work in order to join them at the pub); 
and most compellingly against his young son, Tom. The counter­
pointing is so close and so effective that even in the short space of 
this brief tale we come to understand that, at least in respect to Mr. 
Alleyne and Tom, it is not a question of their merely being "foils" 
for Farrington: they are in fact his counterparts, his doubles or 
"doppelgangers." 
As a number of critics have shown, "Bartleby the Scrivener" is 
also a tale of doubles,2 with its major and minor characters serving 
as "counterparts" to one another: above all, the lawyer and Bartleby; 
but also the other two scriveners, Nippers and Turkey (mirroring one 
another like the morning and afternoon personalities of a single 
character—the nip and tuck, as it were); and the lawyer and each 
of those two characters (especially the elder, Turkey); as well as those 
scriveners (and, perhaps, Ginger Nut) and Bartleby. It is one thing 
to recognize that all these characters are doubles, however, and quite 
another to perceive the full significance of their doubling in this 
mysterious tale. An especially crucial area of exploration is the 
relationship each scrivener has with his employer/double. 
Joyce's Mr. Alleyne, as we have seen, is petulant and in general 
apparently a hard, irritable man to work for. In the first sentence 
of the story he rings the bell "furiously," and speaks through the 
tube in "a furious voice" and in "a piercing" accent (86). In 
contrast, Melville's lawyer is apparently justified in claiming at the 
start that "I seldom lose my temper" (93). Yet he finds Bartleby s 
behavior so provoking that he responds at times in ways that, by his 
standards in any case, come quite close to the mode of response of 
Mr. Alleyne: at first he merely reports his "rising in high excitement," 
but he soon enough finds himself speaking "in a louder tone"— 
indeed " 'Bartleby,' I roared"; and "sometimes, to be sure, I could 
not, for the very soul of me, avoid falling into sudden spasmodic 
passions with him" (101, 106, 107). 
The two employees, however, are portrayed as powerless— 
impotent—in their respective spheres. Bartleby manifests impotence 
through passivity (although through passive resistance), Farrington 
through impotent rage. But in each their sense of powerlessness and 
alienation seems exacerbated by the contrasts between themselves and 
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their employers—and their employers' positions in the world. Bartleby 
shares the traits his employer ascribes to himself: he too wants a 
"snug retreat" and acts—with a vengeance—as though he has a 
"profound conviction that the easiest way of life is best" (92-93). 
But within the social world of the story—given, that is the socio­
political and economic forces at work—the lawyer can convert these 
traits into success, authority, and power, while for Bartleby they are 
self-destructive. 
Both Bartleby and Farrington live and work in a system in 
which they cannot succeed. Bartleby's "passive resistance" occurs in 
a society far removed from Thoreau's; or, more accurately, given his 
class, his social status, and the economic realities of his situation— 
all of them more comparable to Farrington's than Thoreau's—there 
is no possibility of Bartleby attaining some genuine mode of triumph 
or success through such passive resistance. 
Farrington clearly envies his employer's potent, active rage and 
energy, manifested in an ability to fire Farrington or to see that "his 
life would be a hell to him" (92). Mr. Alleyne's forcefulness has an 
outlet that society sanctions; Farrington s only outlets—or so it would 
seem to him—are through drink and abusing his son. But, as with 
Bartleby, his mode of behavior is self-destructive. 
In Melville's story, all that does not make us lose sight of how 
the lawyer takes on a positively fatherly role in regard to his young 
employee—just as, perhaps, it is a similar recognition of their paternal 
relationship that leads Bartleby in his turn to choose the lawyer for 
his own needs. Those needs, as much of what I have said would 
suggest, seem at least twofold: for one thing, to involve a young 
man's need for a father, but for another to include a son's presumably 
inevitable need to rebel against that father. Moreover, the lawyer 
seems more or less to recognize his role in such a pattern, and the 
necessity for it. At one point, he even suggests that his own needs 
are thereby being met, when he says in regard to Bartleby's actions 
that "I burned to be rebelled against again" (106). In the end, he 
goes so far as to offer to bring Bartleby into his own home—to 
adopt him, in effect. But Bartleby would prefer not to. 
Paternal benevolence is not enough, nor is mere kindness. 
Bartleby's employer is much more humane than Farrington's (or, as 
I have argued, than most employers would ever be), but that does 
not save Bartleby, and it would not save Farrington either. 
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The paternity theme in "Counterparts" is illuminated if com­
plicated by the fact that in portraying and naming Mr. Alleyne, 
Joyce is—as a loyal son—paying off one of "his father's scores," as 
Richard Ellmann puts it (16); for a Henry Alleyn was a dishonest 
businessman and supervisor of a firm with which the older Joyce had 
worked, and he had run off with the firm's funds. But Farrington 
himself, unlike Bartleby (we can only assume), is also a father, not 
merely a son: in that context, the biographical associations are 
complicated by the fact that Farrington seems at least partially based 
on Joyce's father, John Joyce, as well as on Joyce's uncle, William 
Murray. According to Stanislaus Joyce in an entry in his diary during 
1904, "the manner in which Uncle Willie tyrannizes his children is 
to me an intolerable and stupid cowardice," and Stanislaus goes on 
to report that "on one occasion Bertie, then an infant of six or 
seven, begged Uncle William not to beat him and promised to say 
a 'Hail Mary for him if he didn't" (37). Stanislaus' attitude toward 
such brutality is commendable, but it is one of my arguments that 
James Joyce's presentation, while no less damning, also brings us 
closer to a genuine understanding, even a degree of compassion, for 
Uncle William's counterpart. As Joyce once wrote in a letter to 
Stanislaus, "if many husbands are brutal the atmosphere in which 
they live (vide Counterparts) is brutal. . .  " {Letters II 192). 
Intriguingly, the authors of both stories use similar imagery in 
evoking the anguish and situations of their scriveners. Bartleby's story 
is a "Story of Wall Street," and he is constantly associated with 
walls, particularly "the dead brick wall" upon which his office 
window looks (111); at the Tombs he at last dies "strangely huddled 
at the base of the wall" (130). Farrington is "tall and of great 
bulk," and Mr. Alleyne claims that "I might as well be talking to 
the wall as talking to you" (86, 87). And Farrington (we are told 
several times) has "heavy dirty eyes" (94; cf. 86), while Bartleby, 
at death, has "dim eyes" (130). 
In a well-known letter of 1904 to Constantine P Curran, Joyce 
said that he was calling his book "Dubliners to betray the soul of 
that hemiplegia or paralysis which many consider a city" (Letters I 
55); two years later he reiterated, to Grant Richards, that "I chose 
Dublin for the scene because that city seemed to me the centre of 
paralysis" (Letters II 134). If anything, the sense of paralysis is even 
greater in Bartleby's tale than in Farrington s, for Bartleby is for all 
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practical purposes quite literally paralyzed and static—even to the 
degree of seeming at last catatonic. He displays "great stillness," 
and "long-continued motionlessness" (107, 111); the mildness and 
stasis with which he utters his "I would prefer not to" portray not 
action but inaction, and a preference for it; he goes nowhere—"I 
like to be stationary"—and finally the lawyer is the one who is 
forced to move, since Bartleby does not and will not. 
Farrington would seem to be constantly active, yet the effect is 
often curiously similar. Confronted with Mr. Alleyne's anger at his 
not yet having done his copying at the start of the story, Farrington 
remains in front of his employer's desk, immobile, until at last Mr. 
Alleyne bursts out, "Are you going to stand there all day?" Returning 
to his desk, and despite the urgency of his need to get down to 
work, or because of it, Farrington is paralyzed with an inability to 
copy even a single word: "he continued to stare stupidly at the last 
words he had written" (88). At the end of his evening s pub crawl, 
this clerk who has longed to leave his office "loathed returning to 
his home" (97), so that Bernard Benstock's phrasing is right on the 
mark when he observes that Farrington "moves from pub to pub 
until time and money run out and he is fixed in a catatonic moment 
of entrapment" (35). 
The social context of each story brings out the stasis and paralysis 
on the communal level; both men are paralyzed by the worlds in 
which they live. Their resulting immobility and inertia are personally 
ruinous and seemingly irrational, as are, in context, the comments 
each makes to his employer which bring on the respective crises. 
Bartleby's "I would prefer not to" makes no ordinary "sense" at 
all. And for his part Farrington's reply to Mr. Alleyne's demand 
that he answer the question about whether he takes him for a fool— 
that, in effect, he would prefer not to ("I don't think, sir, he said, 
that that's a fair question to put to me" [91])—is similarly disastrous. 
It is precisely equivalent to Bartleby's answer at one point in his 
story: " 'At present I prefer to give no answer, he said. " (113). 
It is essential to understand the significance of the closeness of 
their responses, which are in substance interchangeable. For in each 
case the behavior of the given scrivener is to himself not as outrageous, 
as incomprehensible or as irrational, as it will necessarily seem to the 
rest of the world. It is a mode of coping. Even perhaps a strategy, 
a tactic. Their action and inaction seem to them the only means 
they have to handle what they regard as an unlivable situation. 
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Bartleby's behavior is clearly ludicrous, absurd, even sick, if you are 
not Bartleby; Farrington's behavior is clearly crude, brutal, even 
cruel, certainly indefensible, if you are anyone else in the world 
except Farrington. "At present I would prefer not to be a little 
reasonable," says Bartleby for both of them (113). 
The ultimate point of the comparisons I have discussed, after 
all, is to attempt to illuminate what happens in both stories, and 
why—or out of what forces. I feel especially that the comparisons 
help us to comprehend "Counterparts" more fully. Bartleby certainly 
remains a mysterious figure, and any attempt to explain completely— 
or to explain away—his motivation, or the sources in his psyche for 
what he does, is doomed to failure. There are ambiguities enough 
in Joyce's story, but for once another writer seems even more 
indeterminate than he. Yet however uncertain we remain about the 
true sources of Bartleby's behavior and his plight, we must—given 
the comparisons I have pointed out—feel that at least some may 
well be shared with Farrington: and among those their frustration 
and alienation and social plight are surely central. And for my present 
purposes, it is Farrington's character which is particularly illuminated 
in this light, for the comparison enables us to see him from a 
perspective that grants us a greater receptivity to compassion for this 
fierce and ill-natured man with a wasted life. We become his as 
well as Bartleby's counterparts. 
Ah, Farrington! Ah, humanity! 
NOTES 
1. I have argued elsewhere against the frequent assertion that it is the lawyer, 
rather than Bartleby, who is for most readers the central interest in Melville's story. 
In that same essay, I pursue the relevance of "schizophrenia" as a clinical term in 
attempting to comprehend Bartleby, his state, and his behavior. See "Bartleby and 
Schizophrenia." 
2. See for example the works cited for Marcus, Widmer, Rogers, Keppler, 
and Beja. 
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The Language of Exiles 
CLIVE HART 
I am simply using the language of people whose opinions 
I don't share 
—Robert 
Robert, the journalist, the glib professional, bases his hopes of an 
affair with Bertha on the utterance of a "word": "There is one word 
which I have never dared to say to you" (34.7).1 Superficial, conven­
tional, false, the language which he manipulates is nevertheless the 
vehicle by which he hopes to achieve gratification of the flesh: "Your 
eyes. .1 want to speak to you. Will you listen to me? May I speak?" 
(35.10-11). Incapable of saying the true, simple word "love," he has 
recourse to lame paraphrase: "I have a deep liking for you" (34.10). 
However clumsy, the avowal brings the reward of the first kisses. 
There follows a curious passage: 
BERTHA 
(closes her eyes and kisses him quickly) There, (puts her hands 
on his shoulder) Why don't you say: Thanks? 
ROBERT 
(sighs) My life is finished—over. 
BERTHA 
O don't speak like that now, Robert. (40.27-41.2) 
I begin with this because the language is double-edged. Rather than 
wince at the exchange, trying to imagine it as the potential speech 
of real people living in Dublin in 1912, we might feel more com­
fortable responding to the dramatic artifice. The "thanks" which 
Bertha proposes he offer would be at once an expression of Robert's 
linguistic conventionality and of the essentially self-seeking emotional 
bargaining in which he indulges. He responds, instead, with a still 
more conventional piece of emotional melodrama, which attracts 
Bertha's mild protest: "O don't speak like that now." Hear! Hear!: 
one is inclined to voice warm agreement. This passage is as much 
about possible modes of speech, desirable and undesirable ways of 
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relating words to emotions and situations, as it is about the experience 
of two dramatic characters. 
Critics have often been troubled by Exiles, the trouble arising 
in many cases, I believe, because the dialogue has been understood 
as an attempt at pure realism. There are at least three good reasons 
why that should have been so: first, the play is in the "well-made" 
tradition, in direct line of descent from the realism of Ibsen s middle 
period; second, most readers and theatre-goers are influenced by the 
undeniable realism of the dialogue in nearly all of Joyce's prose before 
Finnegans Wake; third, the play is tricked out with realist settings 
and props, and bears many stage directions having a flatly documentary 
tone. We would nevertheless do better, I believe, to look beyond 
these comparisons and assumptions and to recall, on one hand, that 
Joyce had early shown an immediate sympathy with the double vision 
of Ibsen s last plays, and, on the other, that he had only recently 
finished work on A Portrait of the Artist, one of the most salient 
stylistic characteristics of which is the "Uncle Charles Principle": "the 
narrative idiom need not be the narrator's" (Kenner 18). That prin­
ciple is at work in the play also: the dramatic tone need not be the 
dramatist's. Nor, of course, entirely that of the characters: the idiom 
of Exiles is curiously poised between the two, leaving the characters 
and their actions half real, half reinterpreted with a critical, ironic 
voice. Clearly aware that our responses are baffled if we try to locate 
the play within any of the familiar dramatic categories, Mr. Kenner 
writes: 
Unhappily Exiles refuses to be farce; it wants to be a strenuous 
drama of ideals. Drama is more ritualistic than Joyce appears to 
have supposed. If it is not to enact straightforwardly the ritual 
of farce or the ritual of pathos, then its recourse must be, as 
Shakespeare knew, to the ritual of a formal language which can 
hold the farcical and the tragic in suspension. (25-6) 
He goes on to say: "But Joyce wanted his actors to exchange sentences 
of plain decent prose" (26). Here I begin to differ. Exiles is conceived, 
it seems to me, in a thoroughly mixed genre of a new kind, both 
farce and strenuous drama simultaneously, the two not held in sus­
pension but welded together by subtle manipulations of language. If 
we take full note of its manifold uses of reflexive techniques we 
begin to see that the prose is neither so plain nor so straightforwardly 
decent as we first thought. Although unusual in the theatre, the 
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mixture is familiar enough to readers of Ulysses, who experience a 
similar double vision in some of the later chapters. 
Mr. Kenner says of Joyce's apparent intentions: "He needed to 
write something with no point of view, no narrator, whatever: some­
thing wholly 'objective': something in which the only point of view 
would be that of the spectator" (24). It may well be that Joyce set 
out to do something of the kind; in the event, his rapidly developing 
sense of multiple vision led him to a somewhat different execution. 
Unable, except in the stage directions, to deploy his own wide range 
of third-person voices, Joyce resorted to a texture of reflexions and 
inversions which radically qualify the play s apparent objectivity. 
Speaking of the characters, Ruth Bauerle rightly says that they "often 
echo one another in speech, and appear to have been conceived by 
Joyce as complex double images of one another" (x). Similar state­
ments could be made about most other elements of the play. 
I shall examine the language of Exiles in relation to the play's 
governing polarities: speech and silence, bondage and freedom, cer­
tainty and doubt. Returning to the passage with which I began, I 
take up the matter of self-reference by comparison with another, 
earlier passage. According to the stage direction, Richard speaks 
"fiercely" about his dead mother, using highly colored, emotional, 
and histrionic phraseology. As in the later exchange, the female 
interlocutor, in this case Beatrice, asks him not to do so. He never­
theless persists, growing ever more clich£d: 
RICHARD 
(fiercely) How can my words hurt her poor body that rots in the 
grave? Do you think I do not pity her cold blighted love for me? 
I fought against her spirit while she lived to the bitter end. (he 
presses his hand to his forehead) It fights against me still—in 
here. 
BEATRICE

(as before) O, do not speak like that!

RICHARD 
She drove me away. On account of her I lived years in exile and 
poverty too or near it. I never accepted the doles she sent me 
through the bank. I waited too. Not for her death but for some 
understanding of me, her own son, her own flesh and blood. 
That never came. (24.7-19) 
The motif " D o not speak like tha t " closely associates these two 
passages of false male speech, both about love and death. Here, as 
on many other occasions, both men say too much and with too little 
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effect. The theme is further developed through another motif, the 
opening stage direction "fiercely." Of no great weight when consid­
ered here in isolation, the word gains powerful connotations through 
its later association with Swift, in whose saeva indignatio Robert sees 
a model for Richard's character: "You have that fierce indignation 
which lacerated the heart of Swift" (51.34-52.1). Both in Richard's 
unavailing speech about his mother, and in the vision of him as an 
escapist which lies at the core of Robert's newspaper article (128.28­
129.12), it is nevertheless an impotent verbal ferocity capable of 
achieving only pain for others and wholly lacking Swift's creative 
energy. 
Less directly associated with Swift, the phrase "'almost fiercely," 
which occurs twice in stage directions, forms an independent motif 
with a life of its own. Both occurrences are embedded in the intense 
dialogues of Act II, and both are used in association with the idea 
of freedom in love. First Richard speaks "almost fiecely" about the 
need to allow Bertha the possibility of personal development: 
RICHARD 
(turns towards him, almost fiercely) Not that fear. But that I will 
reproach myself then for having taken all for myself because I 
would not suffer her to give to another what was hers and not 
mine to give, because I accepted from her her loyalty and made 
her life poorer in love. That is my fear. That I stand between 
her and any moments of life that should be hers, between her 
and you, between her and anyone, between her and anything. I 
will not do it. I cannot and I will not. I dare not. (87.5-13) 
Towards the end of the act, Robert adopts the same tone to pursue 
the subject to his own advantage: 
ROBERT 
(still more warmly) I am sure that no law made by man is sacred 
before the impulse of passion, (almost fiercely) Who made us for 
one only? It is a crime against our own being if we are so. There 
is no law before impulse. Laws are for slaves. Bertha, say my 
name! Let me hear your voice say it. Softly! (112.30-34) 
While Robert's ferocity is applied as a melodramatic dramatization 
of his sensuality, Richard is trying to hold himself in check, to maintain 
control. Acutely aware of the danger and difficulty of words, he is 
oppressed by his heavy responsibility to use their power correctly or 
not at all. At times he seeks to be silent rather than to involve himself 
in unsatisfactory exchanges. When Bertha herself takes up his talk 
about emotional freedom, she challenges him "hotly" with "You 
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love her." He "throws out his hands with a sigh" and responds: 
"Love! [. . .] I cannot argue with you" (67.5-9). When Richard is at 
his most human, is most like the others—when emotion gets the 
better of him and he relaxes his grip—he is able to use language 
most freely. At such times, however, he capitulates to the words 
which lie outside him, is unable to escape from the accents of the 
market place. When, by contrast, he is most aware of words, he is 
paradoxically reduced to silence, can generate nothing from within. 
We learn that he has written a book, but in his present phase he 
appears paralyzed, sterile, his control over language having been 
reduced to little more than the power to throttle it. 
For the others, silence is a threat, a trap. As soon as Richard 
confronts Robert, in Act II, with his awareness of betrayal, Robert 
says: "Listen to me, Richard [. . .] Let me speak frankly, will you? 
Let me tell you everything" (74.21-2). When assured that Richard 
already knows everything, he takes up the motif of his approach to 
Bertha, saying that "a word," which had the power to start the train 
of events, could also have stopped it: "And you never spoke! You 
had only to speak a word—to save me from myself" (75.30-31). 
Now, at last, the word has been uttered: "I cannot tell you what a 
relief it is to me that you have spoken—that the danger is past [. . . ] 
Because. . there was some danger for you too [. . ] if you had not 
spoken" (77.15-22). Later in the act he makes a similar point to 
Bertha: "Why did you not stop me? You could have—with a word" 
(97.29-30). The motif appears for the last time in Act III when 
Richard contemplates the bitter possibility that freedom may entail 
separation. After Bertha has cursed the day that she met him, he 
says "I am in the way, is it? You would like to be free now. You 
have only to say the word" (134.28-29). In the next exchanges of 
this low-leveled quasi-marital dispute, there is irony at Richard's 
expense as Bertha repeats his taunt about her "lover," using the 
word in ways which he fails to recognize. 
In a wry moment in Act II, Robert comments to Bertha: "We 
all confess to one another here. Turn about" (106.2-3). But it is rare 
for confession to flow freely. Early in the play, when interrogated by 
Richard about her awareness of her inspirational role, Beatrice says 
that she can respond only to direct inquiry: "I cannot say it. You 
yourself must ask me, Mr Rowan" (19-9-10). Invited thus to pursue 
his questioning, Richard attributes to Beatrice the same fear of uttering 
a word which has inhibited her cousin Robert: "Could not because 
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you dared not. Is that why?" (19.18-19). Much later, discussing the 
same subject with Bertha, he invites her to act as her own interrogator: 
"You know why, Bertha. Ask yourself" (95.8). Even when handing 
the words over to others, Richard always assumes that he remains in 
charge of them. 
The repeated acts of confession, "turn about," form one of the 
ways in which the play exploits symmetry and inversion. Readily 
apparent in the relationships of the principal characters and in the 
a-b-a structure of the three acts, this architectural harmony is a 
fundamental feature of the plays design. A cyclic pattern, establishing 
an inverse relationship of beginning and end, was Joyce's norm. A 
major shaping force in Dubliners, A Portrait, and Ulysses, it is also 
dominant in Exiles, the last act of which may be seen as a shortened 
mirror-image of Act I. Acts I and III both explore a daytime world 
of social order, in contrast to the potential misrule of the night of 
Act II. Although all three acts take place indoors, Act II, with its 
garden, its rain, and its relatively remote location, offers a somewhat 
sardonic parallel to the green-world experience at the center of much 
Elizabethan comedy and romance. Like Act IV of The Winter's Tale, 
Act II of Exiles is in a sense a dream: "You dreamt that I was yours 
last night" (138.2-3). As we enter Act III, the sense of return to 
reality is immediate, the contrast with the previous night being 
unwittingly underlined by Brigid's question to the now exhausted 
Bertha: "Had you a bad dream that woke you?" (115.23). The 
pattern of return is developed not only through thematic parallels in 
the dialogue, but also by recurrences of stage business, such as Bertha's 
offering and being offered tea, and by incremental repetition of image 
and motif. Recurrences in Act III of the language used in Act I are 
often quite detailed. In the third speech of Act I, Brigid solicitously 
asks Beatrice "[ . .] Were you long in the train?" (14.5), a question 
echoed at the equivalent point in Act III, when she asks Bertha: "Are 
you long up?" (115.19). In Act I she comments to Beatrice: "You're 
tired out, I'm sure" (14.10), while in Act III she says to Bertha 
" [  . .] you must be dead t>red [ . . ]  " (115.28). In her first speech 
about Richard in Act I, Brigid says of him "Up half the night he 
does be" (14.27), which, as soon as he is mentioned in Act III, she 
echoes with " [  . . ] he does be in there [ . .] half the night at his 
books" (116.16-17). Most poignant of all is a growth in resonance 
of the thematically important word "back." First heard in the play's 
opening speech—"Did you send word you were back, Miss Justice?" 
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(13-31-32)—it is soon repeated by Beatrice, whose life is little more 
than a long and hopeless waiting; "I can wait here till they come 
back if they are not long" (14.30-31). The tensions surrounding 
absence and return are hinted at a few moments later by Richard 
when he speaks of the two women in succession: "Bertha will be 
back any moment [. . ] I had begun to think you would never come 
back" (16.2-6). In Act III, however, Richard is the one who is 
emotionally absent, in voluntary exile, Sensing this, Brigid tries in 
vain to comfort Bertha: "Leave him alone. He'll come back to you 
again" (116.17-18). Although Richard professes to be unaware of his 
emotional distance, Bertha puts the matter plainly before him: "You 
left me: and I wanted for you to come back to me" (145.8). As we 
hear in the highly charged last lines of the play, she must nevertheless 
continue her vigil: "O, my strange wild lover come back to me 
again!" (147.18-19). 
Important echoes bear on the theme of truth and falsehood. 
The Italian newspapers of which Brigid is faintly dismissive and 
which at first seem to be introduced merely to fill out Richard's 
adopted foreignness, serve as a valuable preparatory gloss on Robert's 
journalistic betrayal in Act III. Both are implicated in the language 
of disguise, a theme emphasized by the secretiveness inherent in 
Richard's keeping the domestic letterbox locked. The half-disguised 
quality of the attack in the leading article is entirely appropriate to 
Richard's personality. Although wishing to establish himself as the 
proponent of total openness and truthfulness, in contrast to the 
"liar, thief and [. . .] fool" (63.29) which he deems his friend to 
be, he is himself tortuous, evasive, and capable of outright lying. 
Although Bertha would not mean to be understood literally when 
making her anguished statement "Every word you say is false" 
(133.28-29), there is more truth in her criticism than Richard is 
willing to recognize. His fallibility as the custodian of language and 
honesty is clearly demonstrated when Act I closes, a few minutes 
after his outburst to Bertha, with the very painful little scene in 
which he lies to his son. Bertha leaves, reminding Richard that she 
"did not deceive" him (70.30) immediately after which Richard 
unashamedly deceives Archie: 
ARCHIE

(quickly) Well, did you ask her?

RICHARD

(starting) What?
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ARCHIE

Can I go?

RICHARD

Yes.

ARCHIE

In the morning? She said yes?

RICHARD

Yes. In the morning.

[He puts his arm round his son's shoulders and looks down at 
him fondly) (71.5-17) 
Richard did not ask her. 
Richard's evasiveness contaminates others. Unwilling to confront 
Robert in Act I, he invites Beatrice to lie on his behalf: "I cannot 
see him now. Say I have gone to the post" (26.9-10). In another 
context, this formal social excuse might well pass for relatively 
innocent; in the context of such intense care for nuances of meaning 
and honesty as permeates the world of Exiles, it can only be seen 
as culpable evasion, a denial by Richard of his primary role as truth-
teller. Although Beatrice, who lives on the fringes of that world, is 
willing to cooperate with Richard's excuse (29.31-32), she is not 
seriously tainted by it. Bertha, on the other hand, suffers a night­
marish period during which she succumbs to it wholly. Parallel to 
Richard's lie in Act I is her panic-stricken response to the arrival of 
Beatrice in Act III: "Say I'm not up, that I'm not well [. . .] No, 
say I'm in [. .] Say I've just got up" (120.7-19). 
More important than straightforward lying is the pervasive 
uncertainty as to the relationship of appearance and reality, statement 
and intent. The tension is most clearly felt in the case of Robert, 
the conscious deceiver. The gap between the surface of his words 
and the thoughts that lie beneath is developed in a little motif 
coupling the words "saying" and "thinking." It first occurs in Act 
I, after his avowal of affection for Bertha, who wonders "if that is 
what you say—to the others" (35.29-30). Robert reassures her, after 
which she adds, rather cautiously, it seems: "Thank you for saying 
it—and thinking it" (36.17). Already made a little doubtful of 
Robert's sincerity (though his physical desire is real enough) we are 
given an open expression of the distinction between words and 
thoughts during the subsequent confrontation between Robert and 
Richard. Adopting a wholly theatrical style at a moment of great 
stress, Robert pauses, "strikes his forehead with his hand'' and 
continues: "What am I saying? Or what am I thinking? I wish you 
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would upbraid me, curse me, hate me as I deserve. You love this 
woman [ . . . ]  " (78.26-28). 
For Robert, the gap between saying and thinking appears briefly 
to close at the moment when he believes he has won Bertha. The 
moment is neatly signaled by his use of an endearment which is 
both caressive and possessive: Bertha says, with downcast eyes, "I 
too want to speak to you," to which he responds "tenderly" with 
the phrase "Yes, dear, I know" (41.21-23). That he does not in 
fact "know," is almost immediately indicated by a painful and 
ludicrous blunder: 
ROBERT 
(tenderly) Yes, dear, I know, (he kisses her again) I will speak 
to you, tell you all then. I will kiss you then, long long kisses— 
when you come to me—long long sweet kisses. 
BERTHA

Where?

ROBERT 
(in the tone of passion) Your eyes. Your lips. All your divine 
body. 
BERTHA 
(repelling his embrace, confused) I meant where do you wish 
me to come. (41.22-33) 
The irony attaching here to the inadequacy of Robert's knowledge 
of human responses casts an interesting and cautionary light on the 
scene between Richard and Bertha which follows soon afterwards. 
Richard is guilty of a similarly ludicrous if less painful misunderstanding: 
BERTHA

He asked me to give him my hand.

RICHARD

(smiling) In marriage?

BERTHA

(smiling) No, only to hold. (58.20-25) 
In the middle of his inquisition about Robert's physical behavior, 
Richard reveals himself more seriously when he twice asserts his 
control of the whole situation in a tone of emotional arrogance: 
BERTHA 
[. . . ] (she breaks off suddenly) 
Tell me, Dick, does all this disturb you? Because I told you I 
don't want that. I think you are only pretending you don't 
mind. I don't mind. 
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RICHARD 
(quietly) I know, dear. But I want to find out what he means 
or feels just as you do. 
BERTHA 
(points at him) Remember you allowed me to go on. I told you 
the whole thing from the beginning. 
RICHARD 
(as before) I know, dear. . .And then? (59.15-27) 
There is little to choose, it seems, between Robert's and Richard's 
knowledge of Bertha. 
Among the most resonant motifs in the play is the reason 
offered by Beatrice for her visit to Richard's house: "Otherwise I 
could not see you" (18.8). At first an apparently straightforward 
statement of fact, it acquires a mysterious quality through repetition 
and modulation.2 Immediately after she has first uttered it, Richard 
repeats the phrase, "uncertainly." Thrown into confusion by Richard's 
attention to her words, Beatrice threatens to leave but is persuaded 
to stay and to listen to Richard's comments on his literary relationship 
with her. At the approximately equivalent point in Act III, Richard 
again repeats the phrase, this time attributing it to malevolent 
demons: 
RICHARD 
(stands in the doorway, observing her for some moments) There 
are demons (he points out toward the strand) out there. I heard 
them jabbering since dawn. 
BEATRICE

(starts to her feet) Mr Rowan!

RICHARD

I assure you. The isle is full of noises. Yours also. Otherwise I 
could not see you, it said. And her voice. And his voice. But, 
I assure you they are all demons. I made the sign of the cross 
upside down and that silenced them. (127.27-128.5) 
Inability to see is an important theme. "I cannot see him 
now," says Richard of Robert (26.9-10); "I cannot see her now," 
says Robert of Bertha (91-6); "I can't see anyone," says Bertha, 
tired and in distress (120.8). Physically unable to see Robert in Act 
II, Bertha experiences a moment of undefined panic—"I feared 
something. I am not sure what" (102.26-27)—from which she feels 
secure only when Robert reappears: "O, now you are here. I can 
see you. Now it has passed" (102.31). But it is Richard's raising of 
the motif to an almost metaphysical level by his parable of the 
demons which most firmly establishes the failure of people to see 
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each other clearly. The demons on the strand, impersonating "the 
voices of those who say they love me" (142.12-13), tell Richard to 
despair. Although he refuses to do so, silencing the demons by the 
use of their own symbolic weapons, he himself has chosen to avoid 
what the inhabitants of the everyday world consider immediacy and 
clarity of focus. Out of touch with Bertha, he gazes at her "as if to 
an absent person" (147.4). In the final words of the play, Bertha, 
unseen, unable to penetrate Richard's mask, "closes her eyes" 
(147.20). 
Reflecting the self-conscious role-playing of many of the char­
acters, an appropriate degree of theatricality pervades the stage 
directions. Indeed, the actors are guided by so many stagy adverbs— 
"darkly" "moodily," "earnestly," "desperately," "bitterly"—that 
readers have sometimes wondered whether Exiles should not after all 
be played as burlesque. While many of the directions have to do 
with physical action—"half closing her eyes" (21.24)—or are directly 
expressive of manner—"intensely"—others exhibit an interesting 
interplay of language, personality, and implicit authorial comment. 
A simple example is found in the description of Brigid's first action 
in Act III: "she halts suddenly and blesses herself instinctively" 
(115.11). Fresh from writing A Portrait, Joyce well knew the meaning 
of "instinctively." Indeed, still with a trace of the Uncle Charles 
Principle but this time applied more correctly, the word is used again 
later in the act, in relation to Beatrice: " [••• ] instinctively) It is 
true then!" (127.20). Prone to appeal for sympathy because of his 
"fight," his "struggle," Richard is twice described as "struggling 
with himself (87.34, 95.27). Apparently nurtured, like others of 
Joyce's women, on the naive style of magazine stories, Bertha "tosses" 
her head, "flings" a slip of paper on to the couch, gestures 
"impulsively." Robert, who fears the "torture" of an emotional 
trap, and who sentimentally describes Richard as "torturing" himself, 
adopts a "tortured expression." 
Interesting distinctions may also be seen in the longer, more 
descriptive stage directions. Beatrice is introduced on the first page 
with grace of language and clarity of focus: "BEATRICE JUSTICE is a 
slender dark young woman of twentyseven years" (13-25-26). This 
contrasts both in rhythmic quality and precision of statement with 
the clumsy description of Robert: "ROBERT HAND is a middlesized 
rather stout man between thirty and forty" (26.24). We learn still 
less about Richard's age, but once again the prose, assured and 
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fluent, is expressive of character: "He is a tall athletic young man 
of a rather lazy carriage" (15.4-5). Of Bertha also, introduced in 
simple, pleasing rhythms, we learn that she is "young," but her 
age is left imprecise: "BERTHA is a young woman of graceful build. 
She has dark grey eyes, patient in expression, and soft features" 
(30.10-II).3 Although relatively unassertive, the language of the stage 
directions is by no means featureless. As in the case of the dialogue, 
much of the meaning arises from echo and antithesis. 
Only once, at the beginning of Act II, is there any significant 
period of dumb show. Joyce takes the opportunity to tune his prose 
to the curious blend of lumpiness and high color which characterizes 
Robert: 
[ROBERT HAND, in evening dress, is seated at the piano. The 
candles are not lit but the lamp on the table is lit. He plays 
softly in the bass the first bars of Wolfram's song in the last 
act of Tannhauser. Then he breaks off and, resting an elbow 
on the ledge of the keyboard, meditates. Then he rises and, 
pulling out a pump from behind the piano, walks here and 
there in the room ejecting from it into the air sprays of perfume. 
He inhales the air slowly and then puts the pump back behind 
the piano. He sits down on a chair near the table and, smoothing 
his hair carefully, sighs once or twice. Then, thrusting his hands 
into his trousers pockets, he leans back, stretches out his legs 
and waits. 
A knock is heard at the street door.. He rises quickly] (72.16-27) 
It is entirely appropriate if at this stage the audience is, as Mr Kenner 
suggests, "helpless with laughter" (25). But the farce coexists with 
seriousness and pain. Deaf to rhythmic and other subtleties, Robert 
assuredly does not realize how much irony he addresses to himself 
by evoking the strenuous clash of sacred and profane loves in 
Tannhauser\4 Nor is it for nothing that in the verbal model of 
Robert's movements on stage the word "then" should appear so 
often. Marking off the successive phases of his preparations with a 
heavy, unsubtle narrative hand, the word is an echo of Richard's 
insistent questioning of Bertha toward the end of Act I: four times 
Richard asks "And then?" urging her to continue her anatomy of 
the wooing. Even in performance, Robert's step by step arrangement 
of the scene in his love nest may remind us of the tone of the 
previous analysis. The pattern of repeated "then," expressive of 
Robert's manipulative approach to life, turns up again, and for the 
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last time, in the "story [ . .] not very nice" (141.9), which he tells 
of his night out with "the divorced wife of a barrister." Joyce's 
sensitivity to the word is further shown by his having deleted it from 
the last stage direction of Act I, which originally read "[He puts his 
arm round his sons shoulders, and then looks down at him fondly]" 
(MacNicholas 1979:66, 91). Rendering Richard's movements less 
consecutive, less mechanical, the change softens the tone, increases 
the sentiment, and further distinguishes the relationship of father 
and son from that of father and mistress. 
Do people really go on in that embarrassingly flamboyant way? 
Considering each scene in isolation and without reference to the 
distancing effect of the artistic context, many might be prepared to 
agree that the personal encounters dramatize something not far from 
everyday truth. But the interest of Exiles lies neither in the realism 
of the action nor in the psychology of the characters, expressed in 
language which is by turns stiff, overlush, trite, or muted to 
extinction. It lies, rather, in the curious blending of a serious plot 
about freedom and bondage, creativity and sterility, with a gamut 
of language which explores, without, as it were, sparing the characters' 
feelings, how to talk about it all, how not to talk about it, how to 
engage with each other, how to make a mess of personal relationships. 
Selecting, juxtaposing, counterpointing the registers, an "arranger" 
makes the play as much an artifact as a slice of other people's lives. 
The distancing created by that comparative linguistic exercise allows 
the work, however painful it may sometimes seem, to be perceived 
as essentially comic. As in Ulysses, the comedy collaborates with 
rather than attenuates the seriousness of the thematic content. 
Living inside this subtle verbal framework, the characters of the 
play are isolated as much by words and silence as by their personal 
circumstances. For much of the time Beatrice is almost unable to 
speak; Bertha's prelapsarian simplicity of language fails to connect 
with the complex world into which she has been drawn; Robert's 
ready-made narrative glibness gives him only the illusion of com­
munication. Richard's many-sided difficulty is in a sense a superfluity 
of communication. Only partly aware of his own tendency to degrade 
language by histrionics and cliche, he acts as though he were the 
sole custodian of words, often using them in attempts to mold others 
to his liking. He admonishes Bertha: "do not say things you will 
be sorry for" (65.5-6), and his first reaction to the news of Robert's 
latest sexual advances is to "Tell him [ . .] A few words will do" 
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(64.4-5). In cringing support of Richard's self-assessment, Robert 
twice alludes to Bertha as if she were one of Richard's verbal creations: 
"She is yours, your work" (78.29); "You have made her all that 
she is" (84.21-22). In similar vein, Richard speaks of himself as a 
godlike artist, pre-existent, unchanging: "I did not make myself. I 
am what I am" (133-24). Asserting his authority over the power of 
words, he poses as if he may utter when he pleases, be silent when 
he pleases. Others suffer accordingly. But while enjoying his position 
of power, Richard also suffers. Sensing, with half-justified arrogance, 
that everyone else looks to him for guidance and strength, he seeks 
a means of escape from the unwelcome role of a fallible god whose 
creatures appear to lack free will. By urging on Robert and Bertha 
the freedom to act, he arranges for himself the gap between words 
and truth which troubles all the others but which he sees as a 
necessary condition of liberation for the artist. In place of the physical 
wound in which Thomas found assurance, Richard seeks an intangible 
wound of doubt in the soul, a wound which, unlike that of Amfortas, 
will never be healed: "You will tell me. But I will never know" 
(133.8); "Yes, yes. The truth! But I will never know, I tell you" 
(133.13-14). Richard's last self-imposed exile is from the certainty 
of language. 
NOTES 
1. Page/line references in parentheses are to the edition of Exiles published 
by Penguin Books, Harmondsworth and New York, 1977, corrected in accordance 
with the information supplied by MacNicholas (1979)- Suspension points within 
brackets are my own; others are authorial. I do not deal with Joyce's notes to the 
play, nor with the fragments reproduced in MacNicholas. I am grateful to Simon 
Evans for many useful comments on an early draft of this essay. 
2. Cf. its appearance in GJ: 
"Why?" 
"Because otherwise I could not see you." 
Sliding—space—ages—foliage of stars—and waning heaven—stillness—and stillness 
deeper—stillness of annihilation—and her voice (16). 
3. In Joyce's notes to the play her age is given as 28 (148.13). 
4. For further discussion of the relevance of Wagner, see MacNicholas (1975). 
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And the Music Goes Round and Round:

A Couple of New Approaches to Joyce's

Uses of Music in Ulysses

ZACK BOWEN 
Musical scholars continue to seek out additional song references, 
operatic motifs, and musical parallels to the structure of individual 
episodes and scenes from Joyce's great Bloomusalem in song. Just 
when we think we've located them all, more come along, with new 
methods of interpretation, new applications of fugal structure, new 
references to popular songs long forgotten. But while the identification 
of songs and motifs is important, it does not tell the whole story of 
Joyce's genius in interweaving music into the text of his fabulous 
voyage. 
I would like to consider in this paper two examples of ways Joyce 
used music differently from any other writer before or since, ways 
which, unless the reader were a professional singer familiar with the 
history of music theory, would normally escape comment or seem to 
be of little special significance. 
I deliberately chose the first example from the "Sirens" episode, 
and the second from "Circe." "Sirens" is transitional from the earlier, 
realistic section of the novel to the book's latter half, with its con­
centration on language and linguistic variation. "Circe," while 
squarely in the second category, is largely recapitulatory, seeking new 
ways to represent motifs already established in the novel. It draws 
much of its material from earlier episodes, but transforms and trans­
mutes earlier situations and language, combining seemingly disparate 
characters and events into interchangeable, if amorphous, new entities. 
For the first example, try to put yourself into the position of 
aging singers, whose professional performances have largely evolved 
into amusements for drinking buddies—singers who no longer practice 
continually in preparation for concerts, operas, or oratorios, but who 
maintain a repertoire of old favorites, accompanying themselves on 
the piano when there is no professional accompanist handy, and in 
137

138 Zack Bowen 
the process generally seeking to entertain rather than impress their 
friends. On occasion they may be capable of the glories their voices 
could once command, but they don't want to take too many risks to 
prove that they can still do it. Mix into your scenario an old musical 
purist like Father Cowley, who knows how the music should be 
performed and what the singers were once capable of vocally accom­
plishing. The result is so realistic it hurts. 
Simon Dedalus, Ben Dollard, and Father Cowley are performing 
on a stage in the back of the Ormond bar while Bloom sits eating 
liver and bacon in an adjoining room. 
Over their voices Dollard bassooneed attack, booming over 
bombarding chords: 
— When love absorbs my ardent soul. . . 
Roll of Bensoulbenjamin rolled to the quivery loveshivery 
roof-panes. 
—War! War! cried Father Cowley. You're the warrier. 
—So I am, Ben Warrior laughed. . . . 
—Sure, you'd burst the tympanum of her ear, man, Mr 
Dedalus said through the smoke aroma, with an organ like yours. 
In bearded abundant laughter Dollard shook upon the 
keyboard. He would. 
—Not to mention another membrane, Father Cowley added. 
Half time, Ben. Amoroso ma non troppo. Let me there. (U 270) 
In reading the passage one might think that Dollard merely belts 
out every song that he sings, but we are to learn later that is certainly 
not the case in his rendition of the "Croppy Boy," when his tender 
and modulated tones nearly provoke his audience to tears. What Joyce 
does not say is that the song Ben is singing is a duet for tenor and 
bass. The tenor line, "When love absorbs my ardent soul," is a 
fourth higher than its counterpart melody, "When War absorbs my 
ardent soul," sung by the bass. Father Cowley, correcting Ben, cries 
"War! War! You're the Warrior." But that still doesn't explain why 
Dollard was singing so loudly. Joyce, an experienced singer, knew 
that when basses are called upon to sing in their top register, in this 
case up to a high G, they often are able to sing the higher notes 
only by increasing their volume. Cowley, who has been dying to play, 
takes Ben's seat at the piano, either to transpose the key downward 
so that Ben can sing the lover-tenor part in a normal voice, or to 
continue the accompaniment as Dollard starts to sing the bass part. 
But a transposition of key, if Dollard were singing the bass solo line, 
would take him down to a low E. We don't know whether Dollard 
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in fact switched to the bass line, because the words "when (love or 
war) absorbs" are replaced by an ellipsis in the text. But the sup­
position is that he was singing the warrior's (bass) part because the 
music stopped so abruptly, presumably at the place where the bass 
and the tenor join and the bass is forced to sing harmony to the 
tenor melody line. Had Ben been singing the tenor line he could 
have finished the song. 
Bloom, who is sitting in the next room, can tell by the touch 
on the keys that Cowley is playing and is surprised by the abrupt 
cessation of the music. Ben, corrected by Cowley, is forced to give 
up both piano stool and musical choice to his ungrateful but accurate 
accompanist, as Cowley resumes playing another unnamed song, and 
presumably asks Simon Dedalus, a tenor, for a rendition of "M'ap­
pari." It is only natural that Ben Dollard, the bass, whose belongings 
in tight trousers underscore his manliness, should be a little chagrined 
at having to yield the stage to his tenor counterpart, Simon. While 
Joyce doesn't explicitly say this, Dollard's growl, "Go on blast you. 
Get it out in bits," assumes what Joyce as a singer and performer 
well knew, the perennial sensitivity and even occasional jealousy among 
singers who on the surface seem the closest of friends. Simon, however, 
is not the professional musician that Dollard is, despite a tenor voice 
which we will learn is capable of genuine brilliance. Cowley, the 
musician, wants to hear "M'appari" in Italian, but Simon will sing 
it in English. Cowley momentarily abandons the piano stool to sing 
a brief version of "M'appari" to a girl painted on a seascape which 
hangs behind the stage. Then Simon, a bit reluctantly and apolo­
getically, looks to Dollard, who has been offended and slightly miffed, 
for approbation, and when Dollard's mood changes Simon sits down 
at the piano. 
—Go on, Simon.

—Ah, sure my dancing days are done, Ben. . . Well. . .

Mr. Dedalus laid his pipe to rest beside the tuningfork and,

sitting, touched the obedient keys. (U 271) 
It is a Joycean irony that while Dedalus earlier sounded the 
tuningfork to check the piano's pitch, he now sits down to play the 
song, not in F major, the original key, but transposed, probably down 
to D. In other words, he does not have the requisite confidence that 
he will be able to hit the high B flat called for at the end of the 
song, and so wants to transpose the song downward a minor third. 
He has evidently been taking it easy on himself for a number of 
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years, because he seems to remember how to play the song only in 
the lower key, and when Cowley, who has already ruined Dollard's 
performance, insists that Simon put the song back in the original, 
Simon has forgotten how to play it. 
No, Simon, Father Cowley turned. Play it in the original. 
One flat. 
The keys, obedient, rose higher, told, faltered, confessed, 
confused. (U 271-72) 
The confession of the errant keys is that Simon would have been 
happy to settle for less than a brilliant performance in the habitually 
lower key of recent past performances, but that the old musical pedant 
and perfectionist, Father Cowley, will not let him get away with it. 
"Here, Simon. I'll accompany you, he said. Get up" (U 272). And 
so, a magnificent performance of "M'appari," an aria that relates 
Lionel's plight over his lost love to Bloom's four o'clock cuckoldry 
predicament, is rendered by Simon. It is "Heard from a person 
wouldn't expect it in the least" (U 274), who at the end of the song 
becomes Siopold, a combination of Simon, Lionel and Leopold. Thus 
does Joyce take trivial realistic musical details and weave them into a 
delicate but exceptionally realistic drama of musical performance and 
musical sensibilities. 
The second example, like "Circe" itself, is both transformative 
and recapitulatory, as well as considerably more complicated. Instead 
of simple song references, Joyce uses harmonics, Greek modes, and 
musicology as well as direct references to several musical works to 
develop what is perhaps the primary motif of the entire novel: the 
transformation process, with its attendant variations on language, 
characters, and themes. 
When Bloom, still in front of Bella Cohen's, hears Stephen 
playing Benedetto Marcello's psalms on the piano inside, he makes 
the same shrewd sort of guess he did when he identified Father 
Cowley by his touch earlier in the Ormand. "A man's touch. Sad 
music. Church music. Perhaps here" (475). Zoe, who greets him on 
the street, is identified as Jewish by singing "I am black yet comely, 
O ye daughters of Jerusalem" from "The Song of Songs." Her suspect 
Semitic origins are not so much at issue here as the ancient Jewish 
chant. Marcello (1686-1739) set the psalms to melodies patterned 
after ancient Hebrew musical settings for the poetry, acting on the 
assumption that these compositions were closest to the tonal patterns 
of the Greeks. 
 141 And the Music Goes Round and Round
This brings us around to harmonics and Greek modes based on 
the mathematical relations of string vibrations, or nodes. It is pointless 
to recapitulate here Edmund Epstein's brilliant explication of Ste­
phen's speech about the hyperphrygian and mixolydian modes (JJQ 
6, 1968, 83-86) except to say that Marcello transformed the Greeks' 
musical worship of Demeter and Ceres, through an emulation of 
Jewish religious music, into Roman Catholic ecclesiasticism. This is 
what Stephen means when he refers to "texts so divergent as priests 
haihooping round David's that is Circe's or what am I saying Ceres' 
altar and David's tip from the stable to his chief bassoonist about 
his almightiness" (504). 
As Tindall has pointed out so many years ago {James Joyce, 
pp. 31-32), we are led to the observation that all religions, characters, 
and situations converge. "Jewgreek is greekjew. Extremes meet" 
(504). As Epstein points out, Stephen's subsequent observations on 
musical intervals and the relation of dominant to tonic in terms of 
their reconciliation in the octave form a harmonic analogy to the 
diverse religious music sources of Marcello's composition, and set the 
stage for the commonality between Stephen and Bloom. When 
Stephen turns and sees Bloom, whom we have earlier in Cyclops 
seen as a Christ figure, Bloom s entrance is associated with the 
Antichrist; and his fundamental unity with Stephen, whose Christlike 
and Satanic credentials have already been verified, is established. 
Epstein and I have long shared Tindall's theory of the commonality 
of characters in Ulysses. 
There is still another melody to be played at the transformative 
concert, however. It concerns the idea of the messianic-prophetic 
figure who will lead the Irish people out of their bondage. Stephen 
has seen himself in that light ever since the concluding passages of 
Portrait, and Bloom has been cast into the role of prophet-messiah 
repeatedly in earlier episodes. In Circe, however, hints become 
concrete images, as Bloom's messianic turn comes. The conversation 
between Bloom and Zoe on Bella s doorstep, in which Semitism has 
played a considerable role, gives way to Bloom's Utopian visions of 
himself as politician-soldier-statesman-savior of Ireland, who promises 
"the new Bloomusalem in the Nova Hibernia of the future" (484). 
Just as Stephen later tries to apply musical composition to the 
problem of interchangeable identities, an appropriate musical accom­
paniment is heard blending harmonics with a song about transfor­
mation. The speeches about harmonics which follow act as a unifying 
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agent for both Marcello's blend of religions and the interchangeability 
of Bloom and Stephen as messiah figures: 
STEPHEN 
Here's another for you. (He frowns.) The reason is because 
the fundamental and the dominant are separated by the greatest 
possible interval which. . . 
THE CAP 
Which? Finish. You can't. 
STEPHEN 
(With an effort) Interval which. Is the greatest possible 
ellipse. Consistent with. The ultimate return. The octave. Which. 
THE CAP 
Which? 
(Outside the gramophone begins to blare The Holy City.) 
(504) 
Thus to harmonic transformations Joyce adds the transforma­
tional message of the song popularly known as "Jerusalem" because 
of the name reiterated so often in the chorus. Blooms "new 
Bloomusalem" is a Joycean distortion of the refrain of the song, 
which only now appears. We have not heard the last strains of this 
particular melody, and neither has Stephen, who, caught up in 
delineating the very thesis of interchangeability or consubstantiality 
or transformation, calls the musical theme which embodies his concept 
a "noise in the street": 
STEPHEN 
(Abruptly.) What went forth to the ends of the world to 
traverse not itself. God, the sun, Shakespeare, a commercial 
traveller, having itself traversed in reality itself, becomes that 
self. Wait a moment. Wait a second. Damn that fellow's noise 
in the stteet. Self which it itself was ineluctably preconditioned 
to become. Ecco! 
Bloom enters to the triumphal strains of the refrain of "The Holy 
City." 
THE GRAMOPHONE 
Jerusalem!

Open your gates and sing

Hosanna. (507)

The meaning of the song s text was long since discussed in my 
musical allusions book. For our purposes here, however, it should 
be noted that the song is about a twofold transformation of the city 
as it transpires in the dream of the singer. In the first dream vision 
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the city is alive with the voices of children and antiphonal angels 
singing "Jerusalem," etc. The scene shifts and the voices are quieted 
in the darkened city under the shadow of a cross. The third stanza 
envisions a regenerated egalitarian Jerusalem where all might enter, 
the prototype of Bloom's new Bloomusalem. 
If Stephen fails to grasp the significance of the music with its 
transformational Utopia, Joyce is not about to let the reader do the 
same thing. The next voice we hear is that of (Ben Bloom) Elijah, 
identified at the conclusion of the "Cyclops" episode, and trans­
formed during the course of his "Circe" speech into A. J. Christ 
Dowie, whose ringing message concluded the "Oxen of the Sun" 
chapter. Ben Bloom Elijah A. J. Christ Dowie's inspirational message 
is that the entire company are consubstantial or interchangeable with 
the Son of God himself: 
ELIJAH 
. . .Just one word more. Are you a god or a doggone clod? 
If the second advent came to Coney Island are we ready? Florry 
Christ, Stephen Christ, Zoe Christ, Bloom Christ, Kitty Christ, 
Lynch Christ, it's up to you to sense that cosmic force. Have 
we cold feet about the cosmos? No. Be on the side of the 
angels. Be a prism. You have that something within, the higher 
self. You can rub shoulders with a Jesus, a Gautama, an Ingersol. 
Are you all in this vibration? (508) 
Dowie does not let us forget that the entire metamorphosis is 
essentially musical in nature: 
It vibrates. I know and I am some vibrator. Joking apart 
and getting down to bedrock, A. J. Christ Dowie and the 
harmonial philosophy, have you got that? . . .Now then our 
glory song. All join heartily in the singing. Encore! (He sings.) 
Jeru. . . 
THE GRAMOPHONE 
(Drowning his voice.) Whorusalaminyourhighhohhh. . . 
(508) 
If the characters are interchangeable with God, they also inhabit the 
bodies and abodes of whores. The first last and the last first, 
according to the classless society of the new Jerusalem. 
One final word. If Dowie's pronouncement is definitive here, 
it is no wonder that Joyce uses him to conclude the coda to Oxen. 
The narrative parodies are fairly chronological throughout the episode, 
but when we come to the concluding pages, most often described 
by critics as a modern polyglot, it is Dowie who restores understand­
144 Zack Bowen 
ability to the conclusion in the verbiage of an evangelical cough 
mixture salesman. Now we know that the elixir is the harmonial 
philosophy; and it's got a punch in it for you, my friend. Just you 
try it on! 
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"Roll Away the Reel World, the Reel World"

"Circe" and Cinema 
AUSTINBRIGGS 
Although casual references to cinematic qualities in Joyce's work are 
commonplace and although extended discussions of Joyce and the 
cinema have appeared, significant affinities between "Circe" and film 
have remained largely unnoted.1 I will discuss those affinities and 
along the way will describe a moving picture show that Bloom once 
saw. 
Even in his teens Joyce demonstrated an interest in projections 
upon screens. Among his earliest efforts at fiction that we know of 
are the "Silhouettes" he composed at Belvedere College. In the one 
recalled by Stanislaus, the narrator stands in a dark street before "a 
lowered window blind illuminated from within" (JJII 50). He watches 
the action projected on this blind (the artist who will follow Homer 
is already playing with sight and sightlessness) as a burly male figure 
staggers and then strikes the figure of a woman. 
In the "Ithaca" episode of Ulysses, Stephen and Bloom stand 
in the dark looking at a different window, at a "visible, splendid 
sign" cast by a "paraffin oil lamp. . .projected on a screen of roller 
blind supplied by Frank O'Hara, window blind, curtain pole and 
revolving shutter manufacturer" (U-G 1547.1173-76). A lamp, a 
screen, and a revolving shutter, of course, put us well on the way to 
cinema. 
As has long been recognized, we find references to cinema 
throughout the Wake—including the inevitable real/reel pun in my 
title (FIF 64.25-26)—and more than once we encounter what Andrew 
Sarris would call "the primal screen." In the cinematic dumbshow 
of Book III, for example, "the man on the street can foresee the 
coming event" of the Earwickers in their bedroom, "casting such 
shadows to Persia's blind" that their intimacy is "photoflashing. . . 
far too wide" (FW 583.14-16). 
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There is no historical impediment to Leopold Bloom's viewing 
a film in Ulysses. Although Ireland's first movie theater, Joyce's 
Cinematograph Volta, did not open until shortly before Christmas, 
1909, films were shown from time to time after April 1896 in such 
Dublin locations as the Erin Variety Theater and the Rotunda (Werner 
135, n. 6). Among the films that Bloom could have seen on or 
around Bloomsday was the most famous production of 1903, Edwin 
S. Porter's The Great Train Robbery; more to his tastes, however, 
would have been another work by Porter of the same year, Gay Shoe 
Clerk, a film remembered for its close-up of a woman's ankle and 
foot (Fell 36). 
In "Nausicaa," we are told of one and possibly two or even 
three moving pictures that Bloom actually has seen. Soon after Gerty 
MacDowell limps away, Bloom muses as follows: 
A dream of wellfllled hose. Where was that? Ah, yes. Mutoscope 
pictures in Capel street: for men only. Peeping Tom. Willie's 
hat and what the girls did with it. Do they snapshot those girls 
or is it all a fake? (U-G 793.793-96) 
Was there a movie titled "A Dream of Wellfilled Hose," or is 
Bloom remembering something like Gay Shoe Clerk? ("Loves young 
dream" for Bloom, we recall, was to be a shoefitter and "lace u p . .  . 
the dressy kid footwear satinlined, so incredibly impossibly small of 
Clyde Road ladies" [U-G 1149.2815-17].) Or is Bloom recalling a 
more direct experience, like the stylish woman he gazed at in "Lotus 
Eaters"? A tram deprived him of his glimpse of "silk flash rich 
stockings white" and left him with "flicker, flicker: the laceflare of 
her hat in the sun: flicker flick" {U-G 149.130, 139-40). 
"Flickers" or "flicks" are names for moving pictures, of course, 
reflecting the uneven shutter speed of early projection apparatus. 
When he visited the Capel Street parlor sometime after the Mutoscopes 
were introduced in 1895, though the machines required no shutter, 
Bloom would have seen flicker aplenty, for the illusion of movement 
was produced by the "flickerbook principle." "The peephole ma­
chine," we read in Gerald Mast's Short History of the Movies, used 
large photographs mounted on individual cards. The viewer 
flipped a series of cards with a hand crank. . . .The hand crank 
added to the viewer's pleasure by allowing the motion to go 
either forward or back, to go slower, faster, or stop altogether. 
(25-26)2 
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Given Bloom s masturbation in "Nausicaa," one sees the ap­
propriateness here. Hand crank indeed! And in Bloomian—or Wak­
ean—Latin, "mutoscope" gives us "dumbshow," the silent language 
we have just seen eloquently demonstrated between Gerty and Bloom. 
In "Circe," Stephen declares his quest for a "universal language" 
of gesture (U-G 933.105-06); as Eisenstein recognized when he quoted 
Stephen's remark for the epigraph to his 1932 essay "A Course in 
Treatment" (84), that quest was realized in the cinema as never 
before. 
Impatient, Bloom could have cranked the Mutoscope faster; or 
to extend the experience, he could have turned more slowly, a 
procedure that would have increased the flicker produced by the dark 
intervals between the photographic images. Had Bloom viewed a film 
on a screen in some rented hall, he might also have seen the pace 
and even the direction of time altered, for Cecil Hepworth recalled 
how as an itinerant showman he amused audiences by turning his 
hand-cranked projector faster, slower, and in reverse, and by stopping 
films entirely to freeze actors in particularly awkward positions (37). 
Even without playful showmen, early projection machinery was 
likely to produce tricks of its own; the English "scenics" he projected 
with his primitive apparatus, Hepworth said, were often so unsteady 
that "thus the Scriptures were fulfilled, and the mountains skipped 
about like young rams" (38). It is worth noting that the novelty of 
the medium, the whimsy of the showman, and mechanical problems 
in filming and projecting all conspired to make early cinema inherently 
self-reflexive to its audience. 
One looked at the Mutoscope peepshow through a little eyepiece, 
but the reference to "Peeping Tom" in "Nausicaa" may refer not 
only to Bloom's voyeurism on the beach and in the Capel Street 
parlor but also to a Mutoscope production, for there was a 1901 film 
Peeping Tom made by George W. Smith.5 I do not know what this 
Peeping Tom saw, but Smith, who has been described as a "pioneer 
in the matter of sex," was also the creator of the 1899 The Kiss in 
the Tunnel and the 1900 Things Seen Through a Telescope (Shipman 
23). The things seen through Smiths telescope include "a couple 
embracing and a woman undressing," reminding us, perhaps, that 
the twelve naked plaster sisters who make up the nine new muses of 
the New Bloomusalem include in their uncertain number "Astronomy 
for the People" (U-G 1063.1710). 
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Less conjectural than "Peeping Tom" and "a dream of wellfilled 
hose" is "Willie's hat and what the girls did with it ." As George 
C. Pratt notes in his invaluable Spellbound in Darkness, the Willie's 
Hat that Bloom recalls was an 1897 release of the American Mutoscope-
Biograph Company (18).4 Apparently considering the film too spicy 
for their regular catalogue, AM&B carried it only on their special 
"Club List." The film must have been in demand, for five years 
later, the company applied for a U.S. copyright in the only way 
possible at the time, by registering a so-called paper print, a series 
of still photographs of the entire film. 
The entry on Willie's Hat in the catalogue of the paper print 
collection in the Library of Congress describes what Bloom saw: 
In a drawing room, four young women are frolicking about. There 
is a silk hat on the table and one of the young women picks it 
up and holds it above her head, while the remaining three girls 
attempt to reach the hat by kicking high over their heads. One 
of them apparently overextends herself for she falls over, landing 
flat on her back as the film ends. (Niver 367) 
The film plays off nicely against Gerty's reflections on Cissy 
Caffrey's running: "It would have served her right if she had tripped 
over something accidentally on purpose. . . and got a fine tumble. 
Tableau! That would have been a very charming expose for a gentle­
man to witness" (U-G 773.484-88). The action of Willie's Hat, 
moreover, provides added appropriateness to Gerty's identification 
with women in "pictures cut out of papers of those skirtdancers and 
highkickers" (U-G 787.703-04), and to her "wondrous revealment 
half offered like those skirtdancers behaving so immodest before 
gentlemen looking" (U-G 789-731-33). 
When Bloom recalls Willie's Hat, our text has him asking 
himself, "Do they snapshot those girls or is it all a fake?" (U-G 
793.795-96)5 Earlier, Joyce wrote, "Do they snapshot those girls or 
is it imagination of some fellow?" (U-G 792.9). This is essentially 
the question readers ask themselves as they try to understand "Circe." 
What "really happens" and what is "the imagination of some 
fellow"? 
The answer, of course, is that everything in "Circe" must be 
granted equal authenticity. So, too, cinema claims the same reality 
for everything it shows. As Rene Clair says, it "tends to present an 
action exactly as it would have been had it really taken place and 
had been photographed" (quoted in Barsacq 7). The effect is quite 
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that of the archetypal sequence of the wall being demolished in the 
Lumiere First Program as it was run forward and backward. First we 
see workmen tug and strike at the wall until it comes down; then 
the wall rises up and reconstructs itself out of rubble. The law of 
gravity is demonstrated in the first sequence and repealed in the sec­
ond, yet the ontological authority of each occurrence is unimpeachable. 
As has long been recognized, the pantomime is a prime source 
for Ulysses and Finnegans Wake (on the very first page of Ulysses, 
Buck's "whistle of call" to transubstantiate lather into Christine 
body may echo a cue for a panto transformation).6 Especially in the 
theatrical "Circe"—with all of its costume changes and sound effects, 
and its sets and characters that appear and disappear and metamor­
phose—the pantomime is near at hand (Herr 158-61). Like many 
other popular arts, however, pantomime went directly into the 
cinema; and cinema—child of the Phantasmagoria and the Magick 
Lantern (and the Daedaleum, later patented as the Zoetrope [Fell 
9])—is even more suggestive than is pantomime of the technic of 
"Circe," Hallucination, and the art of "Circe," Magic. 
For all its ingenuity, the stage machinery of traps and flaps and 
pulleys cannot begin to duplicate the instantaneous appearances, 
disappearances, and transformations of cinema. Nor, Edward La Valley 
points out, can the panto stage engage us in the way the screen 
does by confirming our sense of a realistic spatial and temporal 
continuity in the very act of producing the impossible (147-48). 
From the day of Melies to the present, we almost reflexively speak 
of film "magic," whether in the somber existentialism of Bergman 
or the witty fantasy of Fellini or the dreary effects cranked out for 
Steven Spielberg by Industrial Light and Magic. 
Vachel Lindsay s pioneering 1915 The Art of the Moving Picture 
conveys what movies must have looked like to first-generation film­
goers like Joyce. In terms that repeatedly evoke "Circe," Lindsay 
discusses the "Hallowe'en witch-power" of cinema. He argues that 
our natural "yearning for personality in furniture" is wonderfully 
gratified in cinema (61). We recall the buttons that bip and the gas 
jets that speak in "Circe," and we recall as well the description of 
Shem as the man "writing the mystery of himsel [sic] in furniture" 
{FW 184.9-10). 
"It is a quality. . .of all photoplays," Lindsay says, "that human 
beings tend to become dolls and mechanisms, and dolls and me­
chanisms tend to become human" (53). Note how quickly, he 
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continues, "the borderline between All Saints' Day and Hallowe'en 
can be crossed. Note how easily memories are called up and appear 
in the midst of the room. In any [photojplay whatever, you will 
find these apparitions and recollections" (65). 
In "Circe," the Art designated by Joyce in the Linati schema 
as Visione animata fino allo scoppio—which Ellmann translates 
"Vision animated to the bursting point" (Appendix)—jumps and 
jerks and flickers through its astonishing transformations and wonders 
with time in a fashion analogous to the cinema. It is as magical as 
film first seemed to the audiences who turned cranks to see women 
undress or who gathered in cafes and store fronts to look at Fred 
Ott sneeze. 
According to the well-known story, Melies discovered the trick 
of stop-action substitution after his camera jammed while he was film­
ing an omnibus on the street. Only in the darkroom did he discover 
what he had done by restarting the stalled mechanism: the omnibus 
turned before his eyes into a hearse, exactly the sort of transformation 
that is one of the striking features of "Circe" (and, incidentally, a 
Viconian transformation that Joyce would have relished). 
Though the anecdote is probably apocryphal, it does explain 
the principle behind much of the trick photography that made 
Melies's magic possible. Combining sex, horror, and sentimentality, 
elements of popular art Joyce was by no means above, Melies used 
his discovery to produce marvels that repeatedly suggest Joyce's 
transformations (the films should be seen, of course, but they are 
lovingly described in John Frazer's Artificially Arranged Scenes). In 
The Wrestling Sextette, female Turkish wrestlers become men; in 
The Brahmin and the Butterfly, a fakir turns a cocoon into a flying 
butterfly-woman who turns into an Oriental princess who thereupon 
turns him into a caterpillar when he prostrates himself to kiss her 
foot; in The Famous Box Trick, one boy turns into two boys who 
fight each other (shades of Shem and Shawn); in One-Man Band, 
Melies becomes six of himself, playing six different instruments; in 
the Temptation of St. Anthony, a man whom Joyce (and Luis 
Bunuel) would have understood contemplates a skull only to see 
Jesus materialize and then metamorphose into a half-dad woman. 
(Terry Ramsaye, the so-called first film-historian, aptly dubbed cinema 
"the Prayer Wheel of Wish" [lxx].) 
Old Virag unscrews his head in "Circe" and tucks it under his 
arm, a commonplace miracle in films by M6lies and other film 
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pioneers (Ferdinand Zecca's Slippery Jim eludes capture by such 
stratagems as unscrewing his feet). And in film and "Circe" alike— 
to repeat—such wonders are perceived as "real" even while recognized 
as impossible. 
In the tableaux of "Circe"—which Joyce called a "costume 
episode" (Letters I 148)—characters play elaborate roles, yet some­
where underneath, presumably, stands reality. A speech addressed to 
Bloom by the prostitute Zoe used to perplex me. "I hate a rotter 
that's insincere. Give a bleeding whore a chance" (U-G 1083.1977­
78). One of Joyce's notes for "Ithaca" suggests what sort of sincerity 
Zoe may be asking for. "Fuck," the note reads, "only time people 
really sincere" (Herring 429). 
Although Bella Cohen's is a place designed for such carnal 
sincerity, the closest we get to it is when Bloom and Shakespeare 
play Peeping Tom, looking through the keyhole at Molly and Blazes. 
"Show! Hide! Show!" (U-G 1237.3815), Bloom cries (giving the 
flicker effect, incidentally). "Circe" promises the truth in its foray 
into the red light district, a place where reality can be seen unveiled 
and without disguise—"the raw, naked truth," as film posters put 
such matters. 
We discover disguises we had never dreamed of in "Circe," 
however. The camera, invisible, indifferent, paring its fingernails, 
was to reflect reality with a purity only a machine could boast, yet 
from the start, the movie camera projected dreams and illusion; like 
the whores of Nighttown, the cinema promises the real thing but 
turns tricks. 
However radically costumes and roles change from film to film, 
we almost always see actors on the screen as themselves. The titles 
promise Max Linder Aviator, Boxer, Virtuoso, Toreador, King of the 
Circus—but whatever the role, Max is always Max. And so, too, 
whether Moses, Michelangelo, Gordon of Khartoum, or endorser of 
Ronald Reagan, Charlton Heston remains Charlton Heston. Similarly, 
Bloom appears in "Circe" in a myriad of costumes and roles, yet 
we have no trouble recognizing him even when he is sex-changed 
or transformed into a drooling Mongolian idiot. As in the cinema, 
the theater of "Circe" presents a place where individuality triumphs 
over all other roles. 
Throughout the history of the cinema—but especially in its 
early days, as Panofsky points out—we confront instantly recognizable 
stereotypes (253-54). Playing Scotsman, Bloom must wear kilts; 
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playing schoolboy, he must wear Eton jacket. When Charles Laughton 
was proposed for the role of Bloom in a proposed film of Ulysses, 
Joyce suggested George Arliss instead (JJII 654). In at least one 
respect Arliss might have been perfect. Because he played not only 
Disraeli and Rothchild (two of Bloom's roles in "Circe") but a host 
of other historical figures including Richelieu, Wellington, and 
Alexander Hamilton, publicity releases proclaimed Arliss "the man 
of a thousand faces"; "a thousand faces," Hollywood quipped, "all 
the same." Thus with Bloom (not to mention HCE): the hero with 
a thousand faces, all the same. 
The magic of "Circe" is reminiscent not merely of the trick 
photography that has been a stock in trade of film from Melies's 
time to the present. Consider Maxim Gorki's description of the 
documentary films in the First Program of the Lumiere Brothers 
which he saw at the Nizhni-Novgorod Fair in 1896. "Last night I 
was in the Kingdom of Shadows," Gorki begins. 
Carriages coming from somewhere in the perspective of the 
picture are moving straight at you. . .; somewhere from afar 
people appear and loom larger as they come closer to you; in 
the foreground children are playing with a dog, bicyclists tear 
along, and pedestrians cross the street. . . . All this moves, teems 
with life and, upon approaching the edge of the screen, vanishes 
somewhere beyond it. (407) 
"You feel," Gorki continues, "as though Merlin's vicious trick 
is being enacted," compressing buildings and dwarfing people. 
Suddenly something clicks, everything vanishes, and a train 
appears on the screen. It speeds straight at you—watch out! It 
seems as though it will plunge into the darkness in which you 
sit. . . . 
But this, too, is but a train of shadows. (408) 
In his description, which seems almost a Circean hallucination, 
Gorki catches the marvel that even so-called actualiti presented to 
early filmgoers. They experienced a reality so palpable that they 
flinched as the train seemed to plunge toward them from the screen, 
a reality so persuasive that in 1904 one viewer, Nora Joyce, cried 
aloud after an escaping villain on the bioscope screen, "O, policeman, 
catch him" {Letters II 75). Yet at the same time, audiences gazed 
at a silent world of shadows where figures are myseriously compressed 
or expanded and in which "suddenly something clicks" and images 
appear out of nowhere. 
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In "Circe," too, we see figures dramatically compressed and 
enlarged. And Joyce uses cuts abruptly to move not only from place 
to place but forward and back in a time continuum which is, as is 
necessarily the case in cinema, that "one continuous present tense" 
in which Shem writes (FW 185.36-186.1). "And time," Bloom 
muses, "well that's the time the movement takes" (U-G 805.988-89). 
Even Joyceans who teach Ulysses year after year often cannot 
quite recall how terribly difficult the work is to first-time readers; 
harder still is it to imagine what movies must have first looked like 
to members of Joyce's generation. Rene Clair reminds us that "for 
a new eye, one image replacing another in a flash. . .[produces] the 
impression of a magical substitution or a lightning-like metamor­
phosis" (quoted in Frazer 60-61). Something of that speed must 
have hit Joyce when he wrote from Trieste to Stanislaus in 1909 of 
his flight from depression in "the sixty-miles-an-hour pathos of some 
cinematograph" {Letters II 217). 
At the climax of "Circe," Joyce returned to the projection that 
had interested him as early as "Silhouettes." "Against the dark wall 
a figure appears slowly, a fairy boy of eleven." Eleven, Joyce's 
number of renewal and the number on the ad for Kino's which is 
always in motion, bobbing on the ever-moving river that is, Bloom 
muses, not only the Liffey but life itself (U-G 323-90-95). The fairy 
boy materializes slowly, a fade-in rather than the typical jump-cut, 
because we are leaving kinesis for the silence and arrest of timeless 
(albeit temporary) epiphany. Like some image from an early hand-
tinted film, the figure has a "delicate, mauve face"; like an actor 
in a movie the figure "gazes, unseeing" out at the viewer (U-G 
1335.4956-1337.4964); like a character in a silent film, the figure 
mimes his role, reading "inaudibly" (how often is that the stage 
direction in Joyce's epiphanies?). And like all images in cinema, the 
figure is present and substantial, yet he is at the same time a 
phantom of the past, strangely transparent and insubstantial. 
Earlier in "Circe," J. J. O'Molloy projects on a courtroom wall 
a lantern picture of Bloom's extensive mortgaged property at Agendath 
Netaim. The Gabler Ulysses restores "image" for "mirage" in the 
description of O'Molloy's slide of "blurred cattle cropping in silver 
haze" (U-G 1005.985-6). A crude realism would prefer the "mirage" 
of the Random House edition in order to dismiss both Rudy and 
the Promised Land, would find both of them mere illusion in contrast 
to the time-bound reality of the drunken Stephen lying on the solid 
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on the solid pavement of a Dublin gutter. But in "Circe," as in 
film, all images—even "fake" ones—command belief. 
In this moment in "Circe," as in its dreamlike transformations 
and transitions, in the Magic that is its Art, we see instructive 
analogies between Joyce's art and cinema. The figures and objects 
shrinking and swelling in the gray space on the screen at the Nizhni-
Novrogod Fair—the world of Gorki's Kingdom of Shadows—and 
Joyce's Nighttown border on each other as projections of a modern 
way of seeing. 
NOTES 
1. The best overall treatment of Joyce and Cinema is Spiegel 71-82, et passim. 
Palmer is especially persuasive on Eisensteinian montage and Ulysses. Bazargan's 
stimulating note on cinema and "Aeolus" is much in keeping with my own 
thinking. See also: Murray 126-141, et passim; Cohen 147-56, 172-79, 187-204, 
et passim; Barrow; and Pearce 38-47 (Pearce's excellent discussion of "Circe," 41­
43, focuses on the cinematic usurpation of the narrator by the medium). 
2. I understand that original Mutoscope machines are still in operation at 
Disneyland, presumably offering different titles than those C. W. Ceram reported 
on the Hamburg Reeperbahn in the early sixties, titles such as When Women 
Become Hyenas, The Mouse at the Tea Party, and the Joycean-sounding Yes, Yes, 
Love is Blind (92). As Andtew Eskind notes, "the glory of the International 
Mutoscope production must rest with its 'Girlies,1 dance and strip-tease subjects." 
On 218 and 220, Ceram offers stills from Robert W. Paul's 1896 Kinetoscope 
Undressing Extraordinary (identified elsewhere as Exhibition), in which a gentlemen 
ogles the classical statue of a naked woman; the man's sight line appears to be 
somewhat higher than Bloom's at the National Library. 
3. Niver describes a 1905 American Mutoscope and Bioscope Peeping Tom 
in the Dressing Room (247); given peep-show devices like the Mutoscope and given 
the nature of cinema, thete must have been number of works featuring Peeping 
Toms. 
4. Pratt asks whether the Buck Mulligan in Josef von Sternberg's 1927 
Underworld may be a tribute to Joyce (456). 
5. Twenty-five words into his workbook entry "Circe" for the Wake, Joyce 
wrote, "cinema fakes, drown, state of sea, tank: steeplejack, steeple on floor, camera 
above: jumps 10 feet, 1 foot camera in 6 foot pit" (Connolly 119). 
6. An early 19th-century letter believed to be by Charles Dibden, the younger, 
one of the "arrangers" who worked with Grimaldi at Covent Gardens, is a rarity 
for its details on well-guarded secrets of panto "trickworks"; the letter speaks of 
"the whistle. . .for change" as the cue for a transformation (Meyer 147-48). 
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10 
Images of the Lacanian Gaze in Ulysses 
SHELDON BRIVIC 
Stephen Dedalus and Leopold Bloom are both preoccupied in Ulysses 
with defining for themselves the operations of their own perceptions, 
and the workings of these perceptions for the two men parallel each 
other. Moreover, these perceptual patterns also parallel one of the 
best-known theories of Jacques Lacan, the theory of the split between 
the eye and the gaze, which appears in The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis..' Lacan s concept of the gaze can help 
us to see how perception is arranged for Joyce's two protagonists, how 
they see the world and each other, and how they see the world 
through each other. 
The key principle of Lacan's idea of the gaze is that one can 
only see something by imagining that it is looking back at one: "this 
is the essential point—the dependence of the visible on that which 
places us under the eye of the seer."2 One's perception, even of 
landscapes and still lifes, must be motivated by being drawn toward 
its objects by desire, and desire is always based on an imagined 
response. This imagined response on the visual level is called the gaze 
and comes from a locus which is built into the structure of perception. 
As perception depends on being perceived by a gaze in Lacan's 
system, so does existence. Being is being seen, and seen more com­
pletely than one can oneself see: "I see only from one point, but in 
my existence I am looked at from all sides."3 The point from which 
I see is the eye and the surrounding watchfulness is the gaze that 
constitutes me as the subject of a larger human consciousness. This 
view is an extension of Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, which 
holds that an individual's personality is formed by the way others 
see him, that a child's image of himself is a reflection of the views 
of others. 
The structure of visual perception for Lacan, however, is more 
complex than this. What the eye sees is a field in which the eye itself 
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is an invisible center, and this field is seen by focusing on a particular 
point. At the same time, the subject maps himself in the picture, so 
that I project myself as a formal composition onto the field before 
me in the act of perception. At the center of the visual field or 
picture is a blind spot or hole, a reflection of my pupil, and behind 
this blind spot is situated the gaze. I can't see what is regarding me 
in all of my perceptions any more than I can see a person watching 
me by looking in his or her eyes. Lacan says, "You never look at me 
from the place from which I see you."4 The gap in the center 
corresponds to what Lacan calls the objet petit a, with the lower case 
a standing for autre. This little point of otherness is the focal point 
of desire. 
For Lacan, the point that is the object of desire always stands 
for an absent phallus. Moreover, in Lacan's system, the phallus itself 
is absent by nature, a symbolic organ defined by negation because 
we first become aware of it through the sense of castration.5 The hole 
or lack which is the object of desire stands for the flaw through which 
the other shows its need for one. Desire, for Lacan, is always the 
desire of the Other, which is to say that it always comes from a source 
one can't locate; and the center of any pictorial composition is always 
the desire of the Other to show itself behind which is the power of 
the Other to create one's being.6 This power is represented by the 
phallus, an organ which is invisible in its fully realized state, or as 
Joyce describes it, put "out of sight." The implication of Joe Hynes's 
question, "I wonder did he ever put it out of sight" (U 12.1655), 
is that if he hasn't put it out of sight, he doesn't have it. 
What can actually be seen is neither the gaze nor the subject, 
neither the Other nor the self, but the image or screen that mediates 
between them as they create each other. Lacan diagrams the eye and 
the gaze as overlapping cones pointing in opposite directions, an 
image like Yeats's gyres. The screen appears at the point where the 
intersecting cones of perspective—the one widening out from the eye 
and the other narrowing down to the gaze at the other end—have 
equal diameters.7 This screen corresponds to what Stephen calls the 
diaphane or veil of appearance. It manifests what is behind it at the 
same time that it conceals it. 
Stephen has been studying perception and concerned with what 
is behind it ever since his theories of epiphany in Stephen Hero. On 
the first page of "Proteus" he conceives of the diaphane or field of 
vision as having an aperture, as something to be passed through: 
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"Diaphane, adiaphane. If you can put your five fingers through it 
it is a gate, if not a door" (£7 3.7-9). Later, under the influence of 
Berkeley, the diaphane becomes a "veil of space with coloured em­
blems," and here again Stephen thinks of going "beyond the veil" 
(£7 3.417, 425). 
On the other side of this field of light lies the darkness which 
he calls "adiaphane," and when Stephen closes his eyes to escape 
the veil of appearances, he hopes and fears to pass beyond the diaphane 
into absolute darkness: "If I open and am for ever in the black 
adiaphane" (£7 3.26). The darkness on the other side of light cor­
responds to outer space and the void on which the world is founded, 
but also to the darkness within that Stephen finds when he closes 
his eyes. 
Stephen longs for the adiaphane because he feels trapped in his 
own mode of perception: the "ineluctable modality of the visible" 
is "thought through" his eyes (£7 3.1). He derives from Berkeley the 
idea that the visual is a flat field and that distance is produced by 
forces in the mind: "Flat I see, then think distance. . " (3.418). 
According to Lacan, distance results from a structure projected 
by desire. 
Bloom also thinks of closing his eyes as an experiment in the 
course of his meditation on what perception would be like for the 
blind: "They say you can't taste with your eyes shut. Want to 
try in the dark to see" (£7 1123, 1142). One of his main experiments 
with perception occurs when he tries to see a clock on top of a bank 
in "Lestrygonians": 
Can't see it. If you imagine it's there you can almost see 
it. Can't see it. 
The tip of his little finger blotted out the sun's disk. Must 
be the focus where the rays cross. (U 8.562-67) 
Here he moves toward the conclusion that the perception of 
depth is subjective, shaped by the mind's patterns, and that vision 
is focused on a screen. 
Stephen makes an extensive effort to understand where the 
thought of distance comes from. He recognizes that it involves the 
stereoscopic operation of two points of view. And as he has this 
recognition, he divides himself into two viewpoints, addressing himself 
in the second person and in the first person plural so as to recognize 
another within: "You find my words dark. Darkness is in our souls 
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do you not think?" (U 3.420). This darkness within is equated with 
the soul (anima) as a woman: "Our souls, shamewounded by our 
sins, cling to us yet more, a woman to her lover clinging. . . " (U 
3.421-23). By recognizing the other within through the reality of a 
woman, Stephen could see the depth of things, the reality of the 
world and its beauty. But he will not be ready to do so until after 
he makes contact with Bloom. 
Bloom's thoughts are arranged to complement Stephen's and 
his equivalent of the veil Stephen wants to penetrate appears when 
he daydreams about meeting a girl with a veil in church (U 5.376). 
A few pages after this, he visualizes Molly, her darkness, her mystery, 
and her gaze partially covered by a linen veil: "Brings out the darkness 
of her eyes. Looking at me, the sheet up to her eyes, Spanish, smelling 
herself. " (5.494-95).) Here he puts himself into her mind as she 
looks at him. When he projects Molly in her most authoritative form 
in "Circe," emphasis is placed on her being heavily veiled with a 
"yashmak" (U 15.300), and Bloom is "spellbound." The most 
immediately effective form of the veil is the semitransparent hose 
Bloom is watching on Gerty MacDowell when he has the strongest 
physical satisfaction of his day in "Nausicaa": "O , those transparent!" 
(U 13.1262). 
On one level the veil stands for the surface of material reality, 
which transfixes Bloom so that he can scarcely imagine penetrating 
it. But Stephen is also preoccupied by such a veil, and it is debatable 
whether his attempts to penetrate it are any more successful. The 
veil, then, is a general, constitutive feature of human perception. It 
corresponds to the screen in Lacan that is all we can see of the 
interaction between what is within and what is beyond that screen. 
Lacan says that in order to constitute the illusion of visual reality, a 
screen is needed: "if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents 
to him is the painting of a veil, that is to say, something that incites 
him to ask what is behind it."8 
In traditional psychosexual terms, veils, like stockings, are fe­
tishes, which is to say that they stand for the phallus. According to 
Lacan's theory, the object of focus conceals a phallic power, and the 
image of Molly that draws Bloom continually conceals a dark power 
that is manifested by Blazes Boylan. Molly certainly would not attract 
Bloom as she does if she did not have the will to seek satisfaction 
beyond what he can provide. Stephen's equivalent to Molly is his 
mother, and his preoccupation with her involves the dark powers of 
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the father and God, to both of whom she has given herself. These 
powers emerge in "Circe," where she appears in a torn bridal veil 
and says, "Beware! God's hand!" (U 15.4219). 
In the first episode Stephen strains to see the beauty of the 
world, but his vision is dimmed by the thought of his mother's 
violation (U 1.225). When he tries to see the "great sweet mother" 
Mulligan speaks of, he soon perceives his mother's wound. Behind 
that gap at the center of his perception is his mother's lost power, 
which appears in Lacanian terms as an occulted phallus through the 
memory of his mother that occurs to him: 
She heard old Royce sing in the pantomime of Turko the 
Terrible and laughed with others when he sang: 
/ am the boy 
That can enjoy 
Invisibility. 
(U 1.258-62) 
This bright, attractive moment of her life has now passed 
beyond the veil: "Folded away in the memory of nature with her 
toys" (U 1.265). 
As Stephen strives to comprehend the source of depth in 
"Proteus" and thinks of the darkness behind light (1.409), he 
apparently sees a pair of gypsies watching him and this leads to a 
series of feelings of being watched. He thinks, "If I were suddenly 
naked here as I sit?" (U 3.390), and wonders, "Who watches me 
here?" (3.414). He also refers to himself in different persons as an 
object of perception: "Me sits there with his augur's rod of ash. . . 
unbeheld" (3.410-11). His efforts to perceive the visual field, in 
accordance with Lacan's recognition, are accompanied by a sense of 
being perceived, and this pattern is acted out on a more physical 
level by Bloom. 
In "Calypso," at the butcher shop, when Bloom's senses are 
first stirred to excitement, the text describes "his soft subject gaze" 
(U 4.163). Bloom s impotence is connected to a sense of constantly 
being watched by the authorities who are finally manifested in 
"Circe." Two of the main representatives of authority there are 
referred to as "the watch" (U 15.276). Bloom's sex life presents a 
parody of the theory of the gaze because as a voyeur he likes to 
have the women he watches watching him. Gerty knows what he is 
up to in "Nausicaa," and even when he imagines himself watching 
through a keyhole in "Circe," Blazes and Molly know that he is 
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there. In fact, he needs to know that Molly knows that he knows 
about Blazes. Bloom's need to be seen watching something he 
shouldn't see is a need for shame, and shame may be a strong 
feature of all desire. It corresponds to what Lacan calls the invidious 
aspect of the gaze.9 
The feeling of being watched that Stephen has in "Proteus" 
leads through meditation on the visual field as a veil to the image 
of the soul as a woman. Thoughts of woman evoke a longing for 
contact with universal humanity, the entire outside environment 
which the gaze that looks at one from all sides represents. The first 
objects through which this contact is to be made are his mother's 
eyes: "Touch me. Soft eyes. Soft soft soft hand. I am lonely here. 
O touch me soon, now. What is that word known to all men?" (U 
3.434-36). Later, when Stephen asks his mother this question again, 
her eyes are gaping holes and she carries behind her the power of 
God. Stephen tries to overcome this hidden malignance, which has 
really been in his field all day, by shattering the perceptual field to 
cause the "ruin of all space" (U 15.4245). 
The "word known to all men," which Stephen at one point 
thinks may be "love" (U 9.429), seems to designate a common 
knowledge that would bind Stephen to humanity. The only figure 
in the book who possesses love and could give Stephen such knowledge 
is Bloom. The coincidences between their thoughts that I have cited 
here—such as the experiments with the visual field and such images 
as closing the eyes, the veil, and perception returned—are part of a 
long series of signs that they are meant to meet. Each is designed 
to serve as the aim of his opposite, the ultimate limit of the other 
man's perception. The constant blind spot in the center of Stephens 
vision may be associated with Bloom's compassion, while the blind 
spot in Bloom s vision is Stephen's independence. Bloom represents 
the Other for Stephen and Stephen represents the Other for Bloom, 
and so each tends to constitute the gaze for the other. 
It may seem foolhardy to suggest that all of their perceptions 
lead to each other, but I won't be departing far from established 
perspectives if I point out that their main actions of the day prepare 
them to meet as they do. It is well known that Stephen's theory of 
Shakespeare as a cuckold predicts Bloom, and in "Proteus," as I 
have indicated, Stephen finds in himself a need for the world. If 
Stephen hadn't argued with his friends, if Molly hadn t committed 
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adultery, or even if Bloom hadn't masturbated with Gerty, the two 
men might not have met, and one can go on finding a kind of 
preparation in virtually any perception either man has. After all, 
Stephen believes in "Ithaca" that his collapse in "Circe" was caused 
by a cloud he saw in the morning (U 17.36-42). If he hadn't 
collapsed, he wouldn't have come home with Bloom, and his reason 
for collapsing wouldn't exist if he hadn't seen this cloud. Everything 
they see and do prepares Bloom and Stephen to meet with exactly 
the kind of uncertainty that allows for the potential of their 
interaction. 
Stephen and Bloom draw each other, each the center organizing 
the other's perception, to lead themselves to realization. Lacan says 
that the gaze guides us through what appear to be the accidents of 
life: "The gaze is presented to us only in the form of a strange 
contingency, symbolic of what we find on the horizon, as the thrust 
of our experience, namely, the lack that constitutes castration 
anxiety."10 What draws us on is what we need, and whether it leads 
to fulfilment or failure—for the contact between Stephen and Bloom 
remains ambiguous—it leads us to actualize what is in us. As Stephen 
says in "Scylla and Charybdis," we wander through the world "always 
meeting ourselves" (U 9-1046). 
Of course, no one person should be identified with Lacan's 
gaze, but Stephen and Bloom, as the prime objects for each other, 
tend to dominate each other's destiny. As I pointed out earlier, 
Molly also tends to embody the gaze for Bloom, as May Dedalus 
does for Stephen. If the men have the potential to complete each 
other, they are capable of helping each other to relate to the women 
in their lives. Stephen, for example, stands for and brings out an 
adventurous element in Bloom that binds Molly to him, while 
Bloom shifts Stephen from the spirit of his mother toward the earth 
of Molly. 
The optical reciprocity of Stephen and Bloom is presented in 
images that extend from their meeting to their parting, and begin 
even before their meeting. Harry Blamires believes that the ship 
Stephen sees at the end of "Proteus," the Rosevean, prefigures 
Bloom. Blamires points out that the sense of someone behind him 
that the ship gives Stephen—"Behind. Perhaps there is someone?" 
(U 3.502)—is parallel to the feeling he later has when Bloom passes 
by him at the end of "Scylla and Charybdis": "About to pass 
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through the doorway, feeling one behind, he stood aside" (t/ 9.1197). 
Blamires says that the "crosstrees" of the ship foretell the crisis 
Stephen will encounter when he meets Bloom.11 
If we accept this reading as one level of what is going on, and 
I do, then Bloom is first manifested to Stephen when Stephen feels 
something inanimate watching him, a vivid representation of the 
gaze. Moreover, the sense of looking back involved in Lacan's le 
regard appears here as Stephen is described in heraldic language as 
"rere regardent" (U 3.503). The English regard, while it is still 
commonly used for affection, is rarely used for visual fixation, which 
is why gaze is the best translation of Lacan's term. But our regard 
can still denote gazing in extreme and old-fashioned usages such as 
Stephen's fixation on the ship and Mulligan's ironic statement, "Any 
object, intensely regarded, may be a gate of access to the incorruptible 
eon of the gods" (U 14.1166-67). 
Here is the sentence in which Bloom first sees Stephen in 
"Hades": "Mr Bloom at gaze saw a lithe young man, clad in 
mourning, a wide hat" (t/6.39). The primary meaning of "at gaze" 
seems to be that Bloom is simply staring, but the word at suggests 
that he is being watched. Such nondirected perception seems for 
Joyce to put one in touch with mental forces outside consciousness 
that manifest themselves as something looking back. 
In "Oxen of the Sun," the episode in which Bloom's mental 
contact with Stephen is established with hardly any conversation 
between them, Bloom stares for a long time at a bottle of Bass ale. 
As he does so, a heavenly bride appears, presumably looking at 
Bloom: "It is she, Martha, thou lost one, Millicent, the young, the 
dear, the radiant. How serene does she now arise. . " (U 14.1101-2). 
In "Eumeus," Bloom tells how he defeated the citizen by his 
mildness: "A soft answer turns away wrath. . Am I not right?" 
After asking this question, Bloom is described as turning "a long 
you are wrong gaze on Stephen of timorous dark pride" (U 16.1085­
89). Rather than accusing Stephen, I think "you are wrong" answers 
"Am I not right?" and characterizes Blooms "timorous" self-
defeating expression, "a glance also of entreaty" (U 16.1089)- I 
believe that Bloom's insecurity about his own authority is an im­
portant component of his appeal to Stephen. At this point Stephen, 
with irony, sees Bloom as an embodiment of Christ and the prota­
gonists are described as having "their two or four eyes conversing" 
(U 16.1091), a phrase that multiplies their visual interaction. 
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The imagery of the gaze in Ulysses reaches its climax with a 
description of Stephen and Bloom looking at each other on the last 
full page they spend together in "Ithaca": "Silent, each contem­
plating the other in both mirrors of the reciprocal flesh of theirhis­
nothis fellowfaces" (U 17.1183-84). This occurs immediately after 
Bloom has "attracted Stephen's gaze" to the "screen" in the window 
of his house that covers the lamp that denotes Molly. "Each 
contemplating the other in both mirrors" means that each is seeing 
his own face in the other's and is seeing the other's in his own. 
The infinite regress of this is accompanied by the effect of fusion in 
the world theirhisnothis. The effect of this mutual mapping of 
subjects in vision is to evoke the larger Otherness behind the 
individuals. 
This is one of the chief moments at which the possibility is felt 
of passing beyond the visual field, as it may be argued (elsewhere) 
that Ulysses does in "Penelope." But to pass beyond the veil is to 
pass into the realm of dream, a realm in which, according to Lacan, 
the gaze shows itself.13 This dream vision cannot be apprehended by 
the organized mind of waking except in distorted, fragmented, 
indirect form. As personalities, Stephen and Bloom are stuck in the 
world of separation, of the split between the eye and the gaze. 
Though Stephen feels the enclosure of the structure of perception 
more acutely and consciously, Bloom is enclosed more firmly by it, 
for he has a concrete object to fix his desire on. He is focused on 
Molly's objet petit a all day, no matter what he looks at, and his 
story ends with it in the form of the black dot that concludes "Ithaca." 
Stephen, at odds with everyone, does not have a concrete 
attachment. His connection with Bloom is the closest he comes to 
such an attachment all day, and it remains potential. The structure 
of the gaze for Stephen is highly internalized, a mental system he 
consciously controls, analyzes, and seeks to escape. He never can 
escape as Stephen the attachment to desire that encloses him in a 
shape that screens reality and leaves him subject to the gaze of 
others; but he shifts or jolts this structure into new possibilities, new 
margins of reality, by his centrifugal dynamic of defiance. This 
endeavor of his is parallel to his author's. Joyce's techniques of 
narrative and description throughout Ulysses work to realize the 
structure of the gaze not only in the sense of enacting it, but in 
that of understanding it in order to penetrate it, to carry out the 
inevitable and hopeless, but fruitful aim of passing beyond it. 
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NOTES 
1. Though the theory of the gaze is not one of the four fundamental concepts, 
it does make up one of the four quarters of the book, filling a section called "Of 
the Gaze as Objet Petit a," 67-119- I should point out that there are serious 
problems involved in translating Lacan's difficult style. For example, while Joyce's 
use of the word gaze often seems to have Lacanian overtones, it is only the best 
English translation of Lacan's term le regard. 
2. Four Concepts 72. Lacan's voyant has some of the prophetic overtones of 
its English equivalent, seer. See the French text, Les Quatre Concepts 69. 
3. The idea of being seen from all sides suggests God. Lacan says, "The 
spectacle of the world, in this sense, appears to us as all seeing. This is the phantasy 
to be found in the Platonic perspective of an absolute being to whom is transferred 
the quality of being all-seeing" (Four Concepts 75). I believe that in the largest 
sense Joyce assumes this aspect of the gaze by seeing his characters from all sides, 
but I will not develop this idea in the present essay. 
4. Four Concepts 103. Lacan's italics. 
5. This is well explained in Jacqueline Rose's "Introduction II" to Feminine 
Sexuality 40-44. 
6. Four Concepts 102, 103, 108. Lacan makes a big distinction between the 
lowercase autre and the capital Autre. The little other is the object on which one 
focuses. The big Other is harder to define, and seems to stand for the whole idea 
of otherness, the total structure of language from which any signifier is distinguished. 
Rose comments, "Lacan calls this the Other—the site of language to which the 
speaking subject necessarily refers. The Other appears to hold the 'truth' of the 
subject and the power to make good its loss. But this is the ultimate fantasy" 
(Feminine Sexuality 32). 
7. The diagrams appear on 92 and 106 of the Four Concepts. 
8. Four Concepts 112. The passage is about how a painting can seem real 
(trompe-l'oeil), but coming after discussion of the screen, it seems to apply to all 
visual reality. 
9. Four Concepts 115. Lacan here points out that invidia, "envy" comes from 
videra, "to look at ." 
10. Four Concepts 72-73. Lacan's word for "thrust," butee (Quatre Concepts 
70) involves a play on "beauty." 
11. Bloomsday Book 19. Frank Budgen, Making of Ulysses 56, points out 
that Joyce insisted on using the word crosstrees though it was nautically inaccurate. 
12. Four Concepts 75. Lacan here emphasizes that coherence and self-
consciousness are impossible in a dream. 
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Jellyfish and Treacle:

Lewis, Joyce, Gender and Modernism

BONNIE KIME SCOTT 
Wyndham Lewis, who coined the phrase "the men of 1914" to 
privilege Joyce, Pound, Eliot, and himself as modern writers, will 
serve me in discussing the relatively new designation, "male mod­
ernism," and in considering whether James Joyce belongs in such a 
category. Lewis has entered the field of modernist definition prev­
siously. Before modernism had become a widely used designation, 
Hugh Kenner proposed that Lewis's term, "vorticism," might supply 
a name to the movement of which both Joyce and Lewis were a part, 
and for which Eliot's "still point of the turning world" from "Burnt 
Norton" provides a most memorable image (Faulkner ix). Vortex: "a 
shaped, controlled and heady circling, centripetal and three-dimen­
sional, around a funnel of calm" (Kenner, Gnomon 6). With its 
calm, its control, and its geometric design, the vortex overcame the 
fear of the void, the unconscious, and the cosmic chaos suggested by 
the modern world and entered by other artists, ones Lewis would 
have labeled "feminine." 
The theory that modernism can be divided on gender lines into 
"male modernism" and "female modernism" serves to remind us 
how little female modernists were once read and studied. Lewis named 
no women of 1914, though he knew some—Virginia Woolf, Rebecca 
West, Beatrice Hastings, and Harriet Shaw Weaver among others. 
Until about ten years ago, what we studied and taught as modernism 
was (with the occasional exception of Woolf or Stein) the product of 
male artists and in large part male critics. To cite Kenner once again, 
we might note that he assigns Joyce to an eighteenth-century tradition 
{Dublin's Joyce) rather than connecting him to the romantic era or 
to the company of such female modernists as Virginia Woolf, whom 
he denounces for middle-brow aesthetics and a "treacly" mind (Pound 
Era 553). Feminist critics Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar work with 
the term "male modernism" and suggest that Joyce deserves assign­
ment to this limited category. In particular, they find in Joyce the 
practitioner of a "patrilinguistic ethic." Indeed, a logocentric, classicist 
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vision of Joyce was encouraged by Joyce critics. But the current wave 
of Joycean feminist criticism suggests that Joyce was capable of fem­
inine as well as masculine writing. I don't propose to take up the 
charges of Joycean phallogocentricity here. A more appropriate topic 
to a comparison of Wyndham Lewis and Joyce is male modernism, 
as deliberately defined and practiced by Lewis. I hope to demonstrate 
how Joyce coincides with some of Lewis's definitions early in his career, 
and how he and Lewis parted company in the 1920s, partially over 
the issue of the feminine. It is a debate that previously came to us 
under the masculine designation of Joyce as "the time man." As we 
play with new definitions involving gender and modernism, we dis­
cover that "the time man," one of "the men of 1914" was at least 
part woman, and that there was a great deal of "treacle" on and in 
his mind. 
One way of comparing aspects of gender and modernism in 
Lewis and Joyce is to turn to their two early novels, A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, and Tarr, run in immediate sequence by 
Harriet Shaw Weaver's The Egoist in 1918. I think it is interesting 
that Miss Weaver could identify with Stephen Dedalus in Joyce's 
novel, but never took to Tarr in the same way. Lewis's work was 
"clever and interesting and unusual" and "a conglomeration of smart 
views." Weaver's relationship to Joyce's work was personal; Lewis's 
brought only an intellectual response. Dora Marsden, former editor 
of The Egoist, worried that Pound and the vorticists would use Tarr 
as a "bridgehead" to occupy their journal (Lidderdale 111-14). It 
seems typical of Lewis's incapacity for friendship,or his capacity for 
envy that he tipped off Miss Weaver to Joyce's considerable drinking. 
Joyce's letter in his own defense has been analyzed in various ways, 
but one interpretation is to see in it a critique of male camaraderie: 
There is a curious kind of honour code among men which obliges 
them to assist one another and not hinder the free action of one 
another and remain together for mutual protection with the result 
that very often they wake up the next morning sitting in the 
same ditch. (Lidderdale 186-87) 
Molly Bloom implicates the same male pattern in the (presumably) 
alcohol-related death of Paddy Dignam in Ulysses: "they call that 
friendship killing and then burying one another" (U-G 18.1270-71). 
Tarr and A Portrait are most comparable for their exploration 
of the aloof young male artist, for the aesthetic discussions they offer, 
and for their encounters of women in art and life. In the life cycle, 
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Lewis's novel might be said to take up where Joyce's leaves off. Lewis 
offers no sympathetic evocation of childhood; he had little sympathy 
for children. There is no mother figure in Tarr. Lewis was strongly 
attached to his own mother, and vice versa, but he refuses to grant 
the mother an important place in his writings. (It has been argued 
by Colin MacCabe [66] that Joyce did the same through much of 
Dubliners.) There are many more young women in Lewis's novel than 
in Joyce's, and Tarr has become involved in relationships, however 
imperfectly, while Stephen Dedalus merely blunders at initiating one 
with E.C., or avoids his sisters, or visits prostitutes. Tarr has left his 
native England to live in Paris, a city which already disappoints him; 
Stephen is only approaching such a move. 
Tarr and Stephen have quite a few attitudes in common. They 
are egocentric, aloof to bourgeois middle-class culture, and distant 
from women. The misogyny of both young men has been noted, 
Suzette Henke, for example, writing on Stephen, and Michael Lev­
enson on Tarr (241-42). Tarr and Stephen tend to be protective of 
their artistic energies. For Stephen, this means denying equal edu­
cation, and even food to his siblings, and particularly to his sisters. 
To Tarr, this means a different deployment of sexuality: 
The artist is he in whom this emotionality normally absorbed by 
sex is so strong that it claims a newer and more exclusive field 
of deployment. Its first creation is the Artist himself, a new sort 
of person; the creative man. . . 
The tendency of my work. . .is that of an invariable severity. 
Apart from its being good or bad, its character is ascetic rather 
than sensuous, and divorced from immediate life. There is no 
slop of sex in that. But there is no severity left over for the work 
of the cruder senses either. (12-13) 
Tarr and Stephen are both ascetics and classicists in education, and 
they orient their intellectual lives toward other men. The above 
passage, for example, comes from a largely one-sided dialog of Tarr 
with Hobson. We might compare this performance to Stephen's 
aesthetic discussions with Temple and Cranly. Tarr and Stephen 
conceive of God and power as male, and like Aristotle and Nietzsche, 
place the female at the bottom of their conceptual hierarchies, with 
the mud, the vegetables, and the jellyfish. Tarr elaborates in a later 
dialog: 
Woman and the sexual sphere seemed to him to be an average 
from which everything came: from it everything rose, or attempted 
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to rise. There was no mysterious opposition extending up to 
Heaven, and dividing Heavenly beings into Gods and Goddesses. 
There was only one God, and he was a man. A woman was a 
lower form of life. Everything was female to begin with. A 
jellyfish diffuseness spread itself and gaped on the beds and in 
the bas-fonds of everything. Above a certain level of life sex 
disappeared, just as in highly organized sensualism sex vanishes. 
And, on the other hand, everything beneath that line was fe­
male. . . . He enumerated acquaintances evidently below the ab­
solute line and who displayed a lack of energy, permanently 
mesmeric state, and almost purely emotional reactions. He knew 
that everything on the superior side of that line was not purged 
of jellyfish attributes. (334) 
As artists, Stephen and Tarr position themselves like the god in this 
paradigm. We have only to recall Stephen's "artist, like the God of 
creation.. " P 215). 
I should like to take up the two principal women Tarr encounters 
in Lewis's novel, drawing some comparisons to Stephen's encounters 
with women to examine their respective attitudes toward the feminine. 
Tarr's encounters are much more tangible than Stephen's voyeuristic, 
internal renderings of women. There is some validity to Frederic 
Jameson's claim that Lewis is more richly dialogic than Joyce (39), 
though I would restrict this observation to their early stage of writing 
or to the strictest sense of dialog. Lewis's is a very restrained and 
protected dialog, compared with the exchanges eventually performed 
in Finnegans Wake. Though Tarr has a network of relationships, there 
is no depth or substance in any of them. Tarr wishes them to serve 
the process of his self-definition and his base needs. Lewis does achieve 
ironic distance from his protagonist—as Joyce does with Stephen— 
showing that Tarr does not succeed fully with his plan of artistic 
detachment and asceticism. 
Bertha, a German and the first woman Tarr is involved with, 
is bourgeois, sentimental, vegetative; he insultingly calls her a "pump­
kin." In short she is a safe venture for the artist wishing to preserve 
his energies because she is so alien and low. Through much of the 
novel, Tarr seeks ineffectually to rid himself of her attachment: 
He had presumably been endowed with the power of awakening 
love in her. He had something to accuse himself of. He had been 
afraid of giving up or repudiating this particular madness. To give 
up another person's love is a mild suicide; like a very bad inocula­
tion as compared to the full disease. His tenderness to Bertha 
was due to her having purloined some part of himself and cov­
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ered herself superficially with it as a shield. Her skin at least 
was Tarr. She had captured a bit of him, and held it as a hostage. 
She was rapidly transforming herself, too, into a slavish depen­
dency. She worked with all the hypocrisy of a great instinct. (61) 
Tarr has been implicated and incorporated into the feminine "mad­
ness" of love—a primordial plot perpetrated by female instinct. He 
cannot get away cleanly with his skin. There is an appalling egotism 
to the attachment—an admiration of skin or surface that is himself. 
Repudiation of her is inoculation—an artificial, scientific antidote. 
Bertha herself is the "full disease," the dangerous germs that lurk 
in a female physical interior. The Bertha subplot also allows Lewis 
to make cynical comments on the institution of marriage—an insti­
tution attacked in the more realistic writing of Edwardian ideologues 
like George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells. Joyce has Stephen 
Dedalus take up these arguments with another bourgeois female, E. 
C  , particularly in Stephen Hero. 
Tarr encounters an alternate, more masculine woman in Anas­
tasya, a figure Rebecca West described in her review of Tarr as "the 
kitch Cleopatra from Dresden," though, in a more serious vein, she 
also praised Lewis's Russian sensibilities. Unlike Stephen, who after 
Stephen Hero has no serious discussion on gender or art with women, 
Tarr has substantial dialogs with Anastasya. But he cannot figure out 
how to have both sexual and intellectual relations with a woman: 
"What a big brute!" Tarr thought. She would be just as good 
as Bertha to kiss. And you get a respectable human being into 
the bargain! He was not intimately convinced that she would 
be as satisfactory. Let us see how it would be; he considered. 
This larger machine of repressed, moping senses, did attract. To 
take it to pieces, bit by bit, and penetrate to its intimacy, might 
give a similar pleasure to undressing Bertha! (218) 
The sexual encounter anticipated here is destructive, dismembering. 
Though Anastasya seems masculinely machinelike and self-possessed, 
Tarr suspects that this is a bluff, and he fears for his art: "Surrender 
to a woman was suicide for an artist. Nature, who never forgives an 
artist, would never allow her to forgive" (219). In their dialogs, 
Anastasya accuses Tarr of a "schoolboy" attitude toward women, 
and tries to sell him on her blend of intelligence and deep sensuality. 
She reassures all too blatantly, 
"Well, I have a cave! I've got all that, too. I promise you. 
Her promise was slow and lisping. Tarr once more had to 
deal with himself. (313) 
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Anastasya has severely threatened Tarr's compartmented vision of 
femininity and creativity, and his own means of self-protection: 
He had always been sceptical about perfection. Did she and he 
need each other? His steadfast ideas of the flower surrounded 
by dung were challenged. She might be a monotonous abstrac­
tion, and if accepted, impoverish his life. . . . Irritants were useful 
though not beautiful. He reached back doubtfully toward his 
bourgeoise. But he was revolted as he touched that mess, with 
this clean and solid object beneath his eyes. 
Though Tarr positions Anastasya "above the line" of messy femi­
ninity, Lewis fails to give her a creative role, beyond her efforts to 
educate Tarr. We find Tarr mentally working her into the cubist­
vorticist, machinelike shapes of Lewis's own portraits, the hard 
factuality of things admired and promoted by Pound in Joyce as 
well as Lewis. 
Stephen makes art of E. C. and the bird girl in A Portrait. He 
is moved partially by what he perceives as the messy, degrading 
aspects of womanhood to write his Villanelle: "a tender compassion 
filled his heart as he remembered her frail pallor and her eyes, 
humbled and saddened by the dark shame of womanhood" (P 222). 
The muck of menstruation humbles her in Stephen's imagination. 
It is not quite as severe an attitude as Lewis's scheme of placing 
women below the line, or Stephen's earlier labeling women "mar­
supials" in Stephen Hero (176, 210). Stephen thinks of his sinning— 
meaning primarily his consorting with prostitutes—as a comparable 
degradation he has experienced, a comparison that does not stand 
up logically when we consider the role of volition in his action versus 
female bodily function. As with Lewis, female sexuality is dangerously 
demeaning. But for Stephen, an early artistic work, the Villanelle, 
is produced out of a fantasy of fluid female engulfment that is 
described in vital, bright, mysterious terms: 
Her nakedness yielded to him, radiant, warm, odorous, and 
lavish-limbed, enfolded him like a shining cloud with a liquid 
life: and like a cloud of vapour or like waters circumfluent in 
space the liquid letters of speech, symbols of the element of 
mystery, flowed forth over his brain. (P 223) 
With the prostitute, a younger Stephen had been touched 
physically on the lips, and metaphorically, upon the mind; he yielded 
and received a new language: 
He closed his eyes, surrendering himself to her, body and mind, 
conscious of nothing in the world but the dark pressure of her 
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softly parting lips. They pressed upon his brain as upon his lips 
as though they were the vehicle of a vague speech. . . . 
{P 101) 
This primal encounter is echoed in the Villanelle scene. It suggests, 
as Lewis had, that the feminine threatens to capture the male, and 
to overcome his control. The Villanelle is one long appeal to a 
"temptress" to give up enchanting him; her powers include a religious 
dimension missing in Lewis's females. As in Tarr's formulation, the 
feminine is the foundation that Stephen's art arises from. More than 
that, Stephen discovers a feminine language of mystery and silence 
that has its own power and he does surrender. 
Stephen had mentally rendered the bird girl he encountered in 
the previous chapter of A Portrait as a bird and an angel. She has 
her own liquid language, expressed in her action after "sufferance" 
of his "gaze" for some time, as she bent her eyes "towards the 
stream, gently stirring the water with her foot hither and thither. 
The first faint noise of gently moving water broke the silence, low 
and faint and whispering, faint as the bells of sleep.. .  " (P 171). 
Stephen's response is orgasmic and ecstatic. He founds his artistic 
vocation on her appeal, and upon the murky realms Tarr seeks to 
avoid. "His soul was swooning into some new world, fantastic, dim, 
uncertain as under sea" (P 172). He is in the jellyfish realm. 
Tarr, unlike A Portrait, does offer reactions of female characters 
to male aesthetics and actions. I have already introduced Tarr's 
dialogs with Anastasya. One of the most extraordinary moments in 
Lewis's novel comes when art and sensuality have a violent merger 
in Bertha's rape by a painter. The artist in this instance is not Tarr, 
but a fascist named Kreisler. Tarr dismisses Kreisler's painting as the 
product of an average man's sex instinct—more action than art, 
"embedded in sex, in fighting, in affairs" (320). Kreisler is as 
hopelessly engulfed in chaos as his female, bourgeois object. Woman 
is victim of such art, and Lewis allows us to experience Bertha s 
immediate reaction to rape in art. The rape is described in vorticist 
terms as the "whirlpool towards which they had, with a strange 
deliberateness and yet aimlessness, been steering" (195): 
She saw side by side and unconnected, the silent figure drawing 
her and the other one full of blindness and violence. Then there 
were two other figures, one getting up from the chair, yawning, 
and the present lazy one at the window—four in all, that she 
could not bring together somehow, each in a complete com­
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partment of its own. It would be impossible to make the present 
lazy one at the window interest itself in these others. A loath­
some, senseless event, of no meaning, naturally to that figure 
there. (195) 
Bertha and Kreisler both spend time in the uncontrolled, swirling 
region of the vortex. Bertha sees Kreisler in multiple spatial/temporal 
relations to the vortex as sexual arena—getting up to approach, 
reclining afterwards, and violently involved, as well as silently paint­
ing, the aloof artist. While she may no longer be swirled in the 
vortex, her consciousness retains its dizzying effect in these simulta­
neous images, and is far from the poised, calm view of the vorticist 
male artist. Perhaps as interesting as the fragmentation of Kreisler 
in Berthas consciousness is her socialized assumption of responsibility 
for the incident: "the moral, heavily, too heavily, driven in by her 
no doubt German fate. . . What Tarr had laughed at her for. . .that 
silly and vulgar mush, was the cause of all this" (196). We never 
see Tarr painting Bertha; he is able to distance himself from this 
invasion of sexuality into art. Still, Lewis has made a powerful 
connection, and a statement on the victimization of woman as 
art object. 
Lewis continued to define the feminine in art. His most coherent 
definitions concerning genders and modernism come in his chapter 
on Virginia Woolf in Men Without Art, where he claims to have 
taken the feminist "cow by the horns" (170). Here he dismisses 
Woolf's disputes with Arnold Bennett as petty disagreements between 
two orthodox writers, denying Woolf the eminence of the modernist 
revolutionary, and calling Bennett's realism a dead issue. As he shows 
with the "friskily feminine" character, Hobson in Tarr (5), Lewis is 
only too willing to dismiss most of his English colleagues of both 
sexes to the cultural realm of feminine mediocrity. Jeffrey Meyers's 
identification of Hobson as Clive Bell brings him into Bloomsbury 
territory (50). Lewis's theories of gender in writing are amusingly 
written; they have a satirical edge that may also have served a need 
to deny emotional involvement in such issues: 
Now there is one obvious division or opposition staring you in 
the face—and inviting you, on one side or the other, to drop 
into its pigeon hole and be at peace—that is the classification 
by gender: the Masculine and the Feminine depths of the universe. 
It is necessary for us to repeat here for the thousand and first 
time how illusory this division is found to be; to point out how 
many women are far more grenadiers or cave-men than they are 
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little balls of fluff. . .that a veneer of habit, and a little bit of 
hair on chin and chest, is about all that fundamentally separates 
one sex from the other? (Men Without Art 159) 
Though Lewis is not deterministic about sex and gender in writing, 
he dismissively assigns Woolf to the feminine category, along with 
his Bloomsbury enemies like Lytton Strachey. The attributes of the 
feminine are paleness, "a bogus sort of "time1 to take the place of 
the real 'time'—to bring into being an imaginary "time' small and 
pale enough to accommodate their not very robust talents," a "salon 
scale" (167). We are "invited. . .to install ourselves in a very dim 
Venusberg indeed: but Venus has become an introverted matriarch, 
brooding over a subterraneous 'stream of consciousness'—a feminine 
phenomenon after all—and we are a pretty sorry set of knights 
too" (167). 
Lewis resents Woolf s use of Joyce's Ulysses to derive what he 
considers a "feminine" description of modernism as "a little good 
stuff by fits and starts, a sketch or a fragment" (164). To Lewis, 
Ulysses is "robustly complete. . . It is not the half-work in short 
'pale' and dischevelled' of a crippled interregnum" (167). He 
explains, "Mrs. Woolf is merely confusing the becoming pallor and 
uncertain untidiness of some of her own salon pieces with that of 
Joyce's masterpiece" (166). 
In Time and Western Man (1927) Lewis had begun to challenge 
Joyce's feminine side. As a "time man" Joyce was falling into the 
same pigeon hole as Woolf (86-88). In his essay "Satire and Fiction" 
Lewis attacks Joyce's "internal method" regretting that it has "robbed 
Joyce's work as a whole of linear properties—contour and definition 
in fact": 
In contrast to the jelly-fish that floats in the center of the 
subterranean stream of the "dark" Unconscious, I much prefer, 
for my part, the shield of the tortoise, or the rigid stylistic 
articulations of the grasshopper. 
Lewis locates creation in human, controlled, mechanical artistic pro­
duction, disqualifying mimetic art and creation in nature, especially 
in motherhood. It was the transparent envelope of the jelly-fish, the 
darker, psychological Joyce that had won the admiration of that 
female definer of modernism, Virginia Woolf (154). 
Joyce provided deliberate responses to Lewis's brand of male 
modernism in Finnegans Wake, as its annotators have consistently 
recognized. Joyce's critique of gender in Lewis can perhaps be best 
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viewed at the end of the fable of "The Mookse and the Gripes," 
which rewrites Lewis's Time and Western Man as "Spice and Westend 
Woman" (FW 292.6).' While it still suggests that little girls are 
made of sugar and spice, and reminds us of the position of the 
London West End prostitute, this title is also subversive of Lewis's 
sexism, and makes his sort of blasting appear pseudo-revolutionary. 
Woman provides an end to the Western patriarchal values which 
have produced a literature of wasteland and fascism. Her "spice" 
presents a potent, exotic contrast to male modernist dullness of 
sensation, repetition, linear surface articulation, and sterility. "The 
Mookse and the Gripes" seems to end indecisively, with the two 
advocates of space and time (Lewis's space man, the Mookse; Joyce's 
time man, the Gripes) receding; they still carry on their tedious 
argument—"bullfolly andswered volleyball." They are watched by 
"Nuvoletta," but her coy flirtation (compounded of sugar and spice, 
perhaps) fails to distract them from their argumentative sports. Her 
sighed, "There are menner" (FW 157.8-158.5) seems an admission 
of hopelessness in gender. The scene continues, however, shifting to 
the omnipresent, feminine river, embodiment of the natural flow— 
if not the female modernist treacle—that Lewis scorned. 
The siss of the whisp of the sigh of the softzing at the stir of 
the ver grose O arundo of a long one in midias reeds: and 
shades began to glidder along the banks, greepsing, greepsing, 
duusk unto duusk, and it was glooming as gloaming could be 
in the waste of all peacable worlds (FW 158.6-10) 
Into this setting of twilight waste and feminine lament come two 
mythical women (the washerwomen) who carry off the Mookse and 
the Gripes, metaphorically dealing death to their arguments. They 
challenge Lewis's position that God is male, since they suggest the 
cyclical role of the great goddess. It seems particularly damning that 
the woman who carries off the Mookse, the Lewis character, is 
described as a powerful black woman, a political entity that counters 
Lewis's classicism, sexism and racism. 
Then there came down to the thither bank a woman of no 
appearance (I believe she was a Black with chills at her feet) 
and she gatheredup his hoariness the Mookse motamourfully 
where he was spread and carried him away to her invisible 
dwelling. . . (FW 158.25-29) 
The allusion to Oscar Wilde's A Woman of No Importance unsettles 
masculinity and heterosexuality in the scene. This final shift takes 
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us to "mother spades," a laundry, or a literary salon, and to writing 
that is comparable to the work of notable women modernists. I am 
reminded of the family allegories, the dark, carnivalesque landscapes 
and the sexual as well as animal metamorphoses of Djuna Barnes' 
Ryder and Nightwood. Gertrude Stein was engaged in a problematic 
working out of racism in her more realistic portrayal of the black 
woman of "Melanctha" in Three Lives. Virginia Woolfs last artist-
heroine, Miss La Trobe of Between the Acts, ultimately rediscovered 
words in mud when she too faced "the waste of all peacable worlds." 
The mature Joyce was willing to yield control to the feminine in 
writing and in time. One of the "men of 1914" had failed Lewis 
as a male modernist and challenged him in "femaline" language 
(FIT 251.21). 
NOTES 
1. A similar analysis of this passage of Finnegans Wake appears in my James 
Joyce (105-6). 
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The Letter Selfpenned to One's Other: 
Joyce's Writing, Deconstruction, Feminism 
ELLEN CAROL JONES 
1 coat of french polish 
—Joyce, letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver 
If we keep on speaking the same language together, we 're going 
to reproduce the same history. 
How can we shake off the chain of these terms, free ourselves 
from their categories, rid ourselves of their names? Disengage 
ourselves, alive, from their concepts? 
—Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One 
"The real metaphysical problem today is the word," Eugene Jolas 
proclaimed in his 1929 manifesto for Work in Progress. "The new 
artist of the word has recognized the autonomy of language" (79). 
In making the word "the real metaphysical problem today," James 
Joyce, like Nietzsche, challenges the assumptions underlying Western 
epistemology and metaphysics, including that of the phenomenalism 
of consciousness, by calling attention to their linguistic, rhetorical 
structures.1 That undoing entails, as Paul de Man has argued, the 
undoing of cognition. Jolas claimed that "when the beginnings of 
this new age are seen in perspective, it will be found that the 
disintegration of words, and their subsequent reconstruction on other 
planes, constitute some of the most important acts of our epoch" 
(79). For in disintegrating and then reconstructing the language, the 
new artist of the word destabilizes meaning, calls into question the 
referentiality of language, exposes its arbitrariness, its materiality, its 
status as rhetoric. 
Joyce's revolution of the word is part of the totality of our era, 
reflecting the revolutionary decentering of epistemology by nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century thinkers; Jacques Derrida lists the most 
radical articulations of that decentering: 
the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the 
concepts of being and truth, for which were substituted the 
concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (sign without truth 
present); the Freudian critique of self-presence, that is, the cri­
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tique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-
proximity or self-possession; and, more radically, the Heidegger­
ean destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, of the deter­
mination of being as presence. ("Structure, Sign, and Play" 250) 
To that list Derrida adds James Joyce: Joyce "signs into a single 
work," he claims, "something like the necessity of an epoch," "the 
meaning of the langue of our time" (Panel, "Deconstructive Criticism 
of Joyce"). This rethinking of the concept of structure Derrida per­
ceives as a "rupture" and a "redoubling ': 
that in which language invaded the universal problematic; that 
in which, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became 
discourse... that is to say, when everything became a system 
where the central signified, the original or transcendental signi­
fied, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. 
("Structure, Sign, and Play" 249) 
In this interminable play of language, the world is always already 
writing, "is, was and will be writing its own wrunes for ever."2 And 
that world is a decentered one: "Is not the scene of writing," Hdlene 
Cixous asks, "always decentered?" She claims that Joyce liberates 
signifiers from realism and from symbolism (the two poles Pound and 
Eliot prescribed, respectively, for Joyce's texts); he breaks the circle 
of what Barthes calls the "readable," the causal chain which guarantees 
the continuation of metaphysics (18, 21). 
By emphasizing the politics of language as a material and social 
structure, Joyce effects a social revolution through his poetic revolution: 
"my action," he claims in a 1906 letter to Stanislaus Joyce, "is a 
virtual intellectual strike" (SL 125). His strike emanates from his 
position as colonized subject, as outsider, as exile: not only as social 
self-exile but also as linguistic alien. As Julia Kristeva notes, "To 
work on language, to labor in the materiality of that which society 
regards as a means of contact and understanding, isn't that at one 
stroke to declare oneself a stranger to language?" (Senieiotike 1). 
Joyce's dislocutory and translating process of writing the English 
language—his transforming English to "unglish"—subverts linguis­
tically the hegemony of British culture and its language. The trans-
nationalism of Finnegans Wake, a text written in the wake of the 
Irish Free State, disarticulates, rearticulates, and at the same time 
annuls what Philippe Sollers terms the "maximum number of traces— 
linguistic, historical, mythological, religious. In what he writes, noth­
ing remains but differences, and so he calls into question all and 
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every community. . .  " (108). In challenging the epistemological pre­
suppositions of Western culture, in disrupting through his language 
the received symbolic order,3 Joyce exposes the ideologies of power 
informing language and other symbolic constructs; his revolutionary 
act is analogous to Catherine Clement's description of the feminist 
action: "to change the imaginary in order then to be able to act on 
the real, to change the very forms of language which by its structure 
and history has been subject to a law that is patrilinear, therefore 
masculine" (131)­
"The war is in words," Joyce proclaimed in Finnegans Wake 
(98.34-35), and he wages "his penisolate war" in history, in writing, 
with his pen and his slate—and his penis. In converting syntax to 
"sintalks" (FW 269.3), does Joyce hope, as he wrote of the artist in 
his Trieste Notebook, "that by sinning wholeheartedly his race might 
come in him to the knowledge of herself" (Scholes and Kain 95)? 
What is the significance of this conjunction of sexuality and writing 
in the subversion of the symbolic order? What are the historical, 
political, and psychoanalytical implications of marking that sexuality 
by sexual difference? Michele Montrelay would argue that "orgasm 
in discourse"—the breaking, the disjointing of discourse, the artic­
ulating of discourse through a meaning which endlessly escapes— 
subverts such an order and that a specifically feminine sexual pleasure 
and the literary text result from that war in words: 
Orgasm in discourse leads us to the point where feminine jouiss­
ance can be understood as writing {ecriture). To the point where 
it must appear that this jouissance and the literary text (which is 
also written like an orgasm produced from within discourse), are 
the effect of the same murder of the signifier. (234) 
But the revolutionary subject, Julia Kristeva claims, is a subject— 
whether masculine or feminine—able "to allow the jouissance of 
semiotic motility to disrupt the strict symbolic order."4 In disrupting 
the symbolic order by disrupting language, the new artist of the word 
calls into question the possibility, the very assumption, of knowledge— 
and posits its impossibility. 
But all deconstructive discourses are necessarily inscribed within 
the circle of a language based on the very metaphysical concepts they 
intend to subvert. As Derrida points out, a metalanguage is a logical 
and linguistic impossibility: "We have no language—no syntax and 
no lexicon—"alien to the history of metaphysics: "We cannot utter 
a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped into 
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the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what 
it seeks to contest" ("Structure, Sign, and Play" 250). 
Caught within the history of metaphysics, feminist critiques of 
phallogocentrism are thus necessarily determined by, frustratingly 
limited by, the dominant male discourse.> Phallogocentrism has tra­
ditionally stressed the principles of being as presence, of truth, of 
identity, of sameness, and of visibility as conditions for representation 
in language, assigning these principles to the male. Luce Irigaray 
critiques the power of the "master discourse," the philosophical logos, 
to eradicate the difference between the sexes in systems self-represen­
tative of a "masculine subject," to reduce all others to the economy 
of the same. The female is then defined within that logic "as nothing 
other than the complement, the other side, or the negative side, of 
the masculine" ("Women's Exile" 63). She is a void, a hole in 
representation. She is constituted as "not all": the phallic definition 
poses her as exclusion. As construct, "woman" exists "only as excluded 
by the nature of things which is the nature of words," according to 
Jacques Lacan; if she is excluded from the nature of things, "it is 
precisely that in being not all, she has, in relation to what the phallic 
function designates of jouissance, a supplementary jouissance,'' an 
excess of which she cannot fully know or speak ("God and the 
Jouissance" 144-45). Yet it is in that very impossibility of acceding 
to the symbolic that Philippe Sollers places Joyce's power as a writer: 
"Joyce writes precisely from that radical negation of language. He 
writes and speaks in that impossible place where there ought not to 
be anything speaking or writing, and he brings it to a highly worked 
sublimation. In other words, Joyce gets something to come which in 
principle ought not to come." And Sollers claims that it is "this 
saturation of the polymorphic, polyphonic, polygraphic, polyglotic 
varieties of sexuality, this unsettling of sexuality, this devastating 
ironicalization of your most visceral, repeated desires which leaves 
you—admit it—troubled when faced with Joyce" (119, 120). 
In a move similar to Joyce's reinscription of the sexual body into 
the language of literature, Irigaray first argues that women lack access 
to a language appropriate to the expression of their desire, that female 
sexuality cannot be articulated within Aristotelian logic: "language 
and the systems of representation," she says, "cannot 'translate' a 
woman's desire."'1 She therefore calls for a radical "disconcerting" of 
language and logic, a deconstruction of the binary logic that privileges 
the male, and for an opening of discourse to the sense of "non­
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sense," to the expression of what has always been constituted as 
other, as non-truth and non-being. Julia Kristeva believes that women 
should assume a negative function to the symbolic order: the revo­
lutionary "woman" is any resistance to culture and language. And 
although Irigaray recognizes the necessity not to define "woman," 
but to analyze how she is determined in discourse, she explores the 
possibility of a parler femme analogous to what she envisions as the 
multiplicity of female sexuality; its multiple tones and voices argue 
for no one female language, but for a plurality of languages. For 
Derrida, discourse that escapes the combinatory of the two sexes would 
be not a multiplicity of only female languages, but "incalculable 
choreographies" of sexually marked voices: 
. . . I would like to believe in the multiplicity of sexually marked 
voices. I would like to believe in the masses, this indeterminable 
number of blended voices, this mobile of non-identified sexual 
marks whose choreography can carry, divide, multiply the body 
of each "individual," whether he be classified as "man" or as 
"woman" according to the criteria of usage. Of course, it is not 
impossible that desire for a sexuality without number can still 
protect us, like a dream, from an implacable destiny which 
immures everything for life in the figure 2 . . .  . Tragedy would 
leave this strange sense. . . that we must affirm and learn to love 
instead of dreaming of the innumerable. Yes, perhaps; why not? 
But where would the "dream" of the innumerable come from, 
if it is indeed a dream? Does the dream itself not prove that 
what is dreamt of must be there in order for it to provide the 
dream? ("Choreographies" 76) 
Irigaray locates her writing within the ideological space of female 
desire, within the pre-Oedipal or the post-patriarchal, as ifvic could 
remember or imagine a space before or beyond the phallic economy. 
And Kristeva posits a language of the pre-Oedipal stage of the child's 
relation to the mother: "semiotic discourse," the gestural, rhythmic, 
pre-referential language of female jouissance, a language not neces­
sarily limited to the female speaker or writer. Indeed, she claims 
Joyce as an important practitioner of that semiotic discourse. Irigaray 
fancifully imagines a different syntactic system—one that allows the 
expression of female "auto-affection," "self-affection."7 But she 
recognizes that this different language, which would allow us to 
"touch ourselves and be touched differently,"8 will never definitively 
be found. 
Irigaray's attempt to rethink the concept of woman without 
resorting to limiting or essentialist definitions enables her to critique 
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the conceptualization of women in phallogocentric discourse, but also 
logically forces her to acknowledge as figurative and conceptualizing 
her own analogy between female sexuality and women's language. 
Since sexuality is not innate, but develops in response to a culture's 
symbolic system, much feminist theory about a female language can 
be criticized as what Ann Rosalind Jones calls "an ideal bound up 
through symmetrical opposition in the very ideological system it 
intends to destroy" (369)- The feminist critique reverses the valuation 
of the binary poles, but still participates in that male-female oppo­
sition, with man as the determining referent. Historically, as Derrida 
points out, "the determination of sexual difference in opposition" 
has been "destined, designed, in truth, for truth; it is so in order 
to erase sexual difference. The dialectical opposition neutralizes or 
supersedes the difference. However,. . .one insures phallocentric mas­
tery under the cover of neutralization every time" ("Choreographies" 
72). 
A deconstructive strategy would first reverse the binary oppo­
sition, calling into question the hierarchical valuation of the one 
pole over the other. It would move beyond the "positional" — 
difference determined as opposition—to a transformation or general 
deformation of logic. But such a strategy would also recognize that 
the reversal and displacement remain implicated in the very structure 
of privilege and power it critiques. 
Does Joyce inscribe the female body in his text? Can such an 
inscription escape the phallic economy? Carl Jung, not quite knowing 
how to deal with the intractable Ulysses, felt he could at least praise 
Joyce for the final monologue of Molly Bloom: "The 40 pages of 
non stop run in the end is a string of veritable psychological 
peaches. I suppose the devil's grandmother knows so much about 
the real psychology of a woman, I didn't" (JJII 629). Nora Barnacle 
had a more cynical view of her husband: "He knows nothing at all 
about women" (JJII 629). Molly is the quintessential male represen­
tation of the other: she is "the unsurpassable expression of the 
woman, an imaginary of the female 'flesh-without-word, the other 
who is assigned to that otherness, flesh, mystery, the inexpressible 
outside of the law and the speech of men, and is then asked to 
confirm, magically to say her reality as that" (Heath, "Language" 
135). But as Christine van Boheemen points out, "A language of 
the essentially other, alias e'criture fiminine, is a logical impossi­
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bility, based on the hypothesis of an original other (female) identity, 
and the illusion of expressing that in language—which is after all 
the very instrument and constitution of the logos/logic of difference." 
Thus, although Molly Bloom is characterized as an emblem of 
"otherness" in Ulysses, a figure for the otherness of the text as a 
whole, she never does and never can speak for herself as other. Van 
Boheemen argues that "Ulysses seems at once to suggest the futility 
and logical impossibility of a language of the other, and to depend 
on the viability of the idea of making the other present in language 
for the coherence of its structure as fiction." And she sees the 
conflation of "subject and object, self and other, in the idea of the 
mother," in "amor matris: subjective and objective genitive" (U-G 
9.842-43), as Joyce's usurpation of the role of the other as he signs 
himself at once as spiritual father and mother of his text. 
Is Joyce's signature a "terrible mastering signature"—as Derrida 
phrased it (Panel, "Deconstructive Criticism of Joyce")—because he 
signs into a single work something like the necessity of an epoch? 
Or because he usurps the role of the (m)other to write that signature? 
In the "Oxen of the Sun" episode, Joyce parallels the birth of a 
male child with the birth of the English language—the English 
language, that is, as written by literary forefathers. In Stephen's 
envisioning of the postcreation, the corruptible flesh born of the 
mother is transformed by the (male) artist into the incorruptible 
logos: "In woman's womb word is made flesh but in the spirit of 
the maker all flesh that passes becomes the word that shall not pass 
away" (U-G 14.292-94). Amor matris may be the only true thing 
in life, but Stephen's proclamations about creation, whether of art 
or of life, either ignore—or incorporate into paternity itself—the 
necessary maternal matrix. "(Male) linguistic ontogeny recapitulates 
(male) linguistic phylogeny," Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar wittily 
note. "The borning 'Boyaboy' is his language, a patriarchal word 
made flesh in the extended patrius sermo of history, and though he 
is undoubtedly torn out of the prostrate materna lingua represented 
by silent Mrs. Purefoy, he is triumphantly flung, in a Carlylean 
birth passage, into 'God's air, the Allfather's air' " (534-35). But 
paternity itself is as artificial a construct as the patrius sermo of 
history. "Fatherhood," Stephen claims, "in the sense of conscious 
begetting, is unknown to man. It is a mystical estate, an apostolic 
succession," a parthenogenetic usurpation of the maternal function, 
moving—biblically, patriarchically— "from only begetter to only be­
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gotten" (U-G 9-837-39)- "Creation from nothing," it is a mystery 
founded, like the world it both forms and informs, "upon the void. 
Upon uncertitude, upon unlikelihood" (U-G 3.35, 9.841). The 
"attribution of procreation to the father," according to Lacan, "can 
only be the effect of a pure signifier, of a recognition not of a real 
father, but of what religion has taught us to refer to as the Name-
of-the-Father" (Ecrits 199)- Or, as Joyce in the Wake phrases the 
relationship between paternity and the law: "the farmer, his son 
and their homely codes" (FW 614.31-32). In this realm of the 
symbolic Father, who authors and signifies the Law binding the 
subject, paternity may well indeed be a "legal fiction," a metaphor, 
sanctioned by its own law, for what cannot be named. And as 
Derrida argues, the concept of the father is constituted by language: 
. . .the father is not the generator or procreator in any "real" 
sense prior to or outside all relation to language. . . . Only a 
power of speech can have a father. The father is always father 
to a speaking /living being. In other words, it is precisely logos 
that enables us to perceive and investigate something like pa­
ternity. (Dissemination 80) 
As Derrida reads Socrates' myth about writing in Plato's Phae­
drus, the logos, the living, spoken word, depends on the father who 
engendered him—the logos—for his very presence: "Without his 
father, he would be nothing but, in fact, writing. . . . The specificity 
of writing would thus be intimately bound to the absence of the 
father" (Dissemination 77). A logos committed to writing, according 
to Plato, is a son who is lost, orphaned, expatriated from the 
fatherland, no longer able (or perhaps willing) to repeat his origin. 
Writing is also patricidal: it takes the place of the father, "supple­
menting him and supplanting him in his absence and essential 
disappearance" (Dissemination 89). Outside the law of the father, 
writing as supplement transgresses that law while always remaining 
external to it. In substituting "the breathless sign for the living 
voice," in claiming to exist "without the father (who is both living 
and life-giving)," writing as supplement and transgressor is clearly 
connected with death (Dissemination 92). Writing, as Derrida asserts, 
"menaces at once the breath, the spirit, and history as the spirit's 
relationship with itself. It is their end, their finitude, their paraly­
sis. . .it is the principle of death and of difference in the becoming 
of being" (Grammatology 25). 
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But the feminine subtends even the most phallogocentric theory 
of artistic creation. In Stephen Dedalus's myth about writing, where 
he "proves by algebra that Hamlet's grandson is Shakespeare's 
grandfather and that he himself is the ghost of his own father" 
(U-G 1.555-57), the absent father speaks through the son. Stephen 
will have it that Hamlet is a ghoststory. What is a ghost? He answers 
his own question: "One who has faded into impalpability through 
death, through absence, through change of manners" (U-G 9.147­
49). A ghost by absence, a ghost by death, speaking his own words 
to his own sons name. A murdered father, an unquiet ghost, speaks; 
his son hears and, although never fully certain of the authority of 
the voice he hears (significantly, a point Stephen never mentions), 
he ultimately acts on its authority. The father's ghostly voice is "a 
voice heard only in the heart of him who is the substance of his 
shadow, the son consubstantial with the father" (U-G 9-480-81). 
The son's actions are predicated on the death of the father—and, 
ultimately, on his own death: "through the ghost of the unquiet 
father the image of the unliving son looks forth" (U-G 9-380-81). 
The dead father speaks; in a specular logic of the same, the image 
of the dead son looks forth through the ghost of the speaking father. 
The law the father has revealed may the lex eterna—that which 
Stephen hopes to be "the divine substance wherein Father and Son 
are consubstantial": "Hamlet pere and Hamlet fits. A king and a 
prince at last in death, with incidental music" (U-G 3.49-50; 9-1034­
35). Or it may be the law of dissemination, a sowing of infinite 
repetition, proliferation, and supplementation. And is not symboli­
zation possible only through loss, absence, repression? In Plato's 
myth of Thoth, the Egyptian god of writing is opposed to his other— 
the father, life, speech, origin—by both supplementing and sup­
planting that other. Yet the figure of Thoth takes its shape from 
the very thing it resists and for which it substitutes. As Derrida 
points out, "The god of writing is thus at once his father, his son, 
and himself" (Dissemination 93)—or, as Stephen's algebraic theory 
proves, "Hamlet's grandson is Shakespeare's grandfather and. . .he 
himself is the ghost of his own father." And in Plato's texts, this 
play of differences, this endless supplementation, is given a name: 
"The play of the other within being must needs be designated 
'writing' by Plato in a discourse which would like to think of itself 
as spoken in essence, in truth, and which nevertheless is written" 
(Dissemination 163). Stephen describes something like this infinite 
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play of differences, this double movement of the supplement, when 
he speaks of the moment of artistic creation: 
—As we, or mother Dana, weave and unweave our bodies. . . 
from day to day, their molecules shuttled to and fro, so does 
the artist weave and unweave his image. And as the mole on 
my right breast is where it was when I was born, though all my 
body has been woven of new stuff time after time, so through 
the ghost of the unquiet father the image of the unliving son 
looks forth. In the intense instant of the imagination, when the 
mind, Shelley says, is a fading coal, that which I was is that 
which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be. So 
in the future, the sister of the past, I may see myself as I sit 
here now but by reflection from that which then I shall be. 
(U-G 9.376-85) 
That Stephen should present the creation of art in a Penelopean 
analogy, with mother Dana as the figure of the artist (the Celtic 
mother-fertility goddess Danu, AE's poem "Dana," and the maga­
zine Dana edited by W. K. Magee [John Eglinton])—both female 
and writing—may seem out of place in a theory of artistic creation 
that privileges the relationship between father and son. And of course 
that the figure of the artist is female remains unspoken. Gilbert and 
Gubar postulate the primordial self/other couple as the mother/child 
rather than man/woman or father/son. "If this is so," they ask, 
"isn't it also possible that verbal signification arises not from a 
confrontation with the law of the father but from a consciousness of 
the lure and the lore of the mother?" (537). Is it possible Stephen's 
theory of artistic creation, of the sundering and reconciling of father 
and son, constructs an elaborate guard against the lure of the mother, 
the (m)other tongue? Although Stephen grounds his theory of 
Shakespeare in a certain origin and a certain identity, that grounding 
is destabilized, called into question, by the unknown, by what 
cannot be named, by the unconscious of the subject, by the discourse 
of the other. Is not this discourse of the other the discourse not only 
of writing and of death, but also of woman's jouissancel 
His account of the experience of Shakespeare's life, the "ex­
perience" he has written, centers on one moment, the moment of 
maternal seduction. Although Shakespeare is "a lord of language," 
his belief in himself has been "untimely killed"; emasculated by 
Ann Hathaway s aggressive seduction, the artist is undone: "By cock, 
she was to blame. She put the comether on him, sweet and twentysix. 
The greyeyed goddess who bends over the boy Adonis, stooping to 
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conquer, as prologue to the swelling act, is a boldfaced Stratford 
wench who tumbles in a cornfield a lover younger than herself" 
(U-G 9-454, 257-60). Significantly, this moment of undoing—and 
artistic creation—entails the succumbing of the male body to sexuality, 
to female sexuality. As a fall into language, it acknowledges female 
jouissance as writing.9 By centering Shakespeare's life on the "first 
undoing"—"No later doing will undo the first undoing"(U-G 
9.459)—Stephen places the genesis of his art in the womb of sin of 
the fallen Eve, of the mother whose "strandentwining cable of all 
flesh" (U-G 3.37) around her children signifies no beginning or end. 
The myth of paternity entails an origin, a first creation, a creation 
from nothing: the telephone number to Edenville, to our place of 
origin, after all, is "Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one" (U-G 3.39­
40). Eve's belly without blemish may be "a buckler of taut vellum," 
an empty surface for writing, as Stephen hopes, on which he may 
inscribe his "signs on a white field" (U-G 3.42, 414). But, as Maud 
Ellmann argues, the navel—the "scarletter on the belly"—tells 
another story, that has neither a beginning nor an end: "that neither 
flesh nor words can ever say where they come from, or claim a 
unitary origin" (101). Or, as the children query in Finnegans Wake, 
"Where did thots come from?" (FW 597.25), conflating the question 
of maternal creation with that of language and of knowledge.10 
Selfpenning a letter to one's other, then, is to recognize the limitation 
of the specular construct of the self as one, the coherence and 
mastery of " I ,  " and to acknowledge the scene on which that self is 
produced: the body of the woman (Heath, "Language" 137, 143)­
Stephen would have it that the begetting of a son, the begetting 
of the logos and of the work of art, bypasses the maternal function. 
But in conflating writing with death, he unwittingly conflates it with 
the maternal. He centers Shakespeare's life on that "first undoing," 
when Ann Hathaway hath a will: the "lord of language" is "untimely 
killed" by the seduction of the maternal lover. And yet the discourse 
of the other is the discourse of the female who uses her sexuality, 
her sexual desire and desirability—"woman's invisible weapon," 
Stephen names it—to drive Shakespeare to his greatest creativity: 
there is, Stephen says of Shakespeare, "some goad of the flesh 
driving him into a new passion, a darker shadow of the first, 
darkening even his own understanding of himself (U-G 9-462-64). 
Socrates may privilege the living logos, the spoken word, over writing 
as supplement and as death, in a fable in which the "play of the 
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other within being must needs be designated writing' " (Dissemi­
nation 163). And Derrida may posit writing as absence, non-truth, 
non-essence, diffirance, and death against speech as presence, truth, 
essence, origin, and life as a pharmakon for "woman's invisible 
weapon." But Stephen realizes that even Socrates learned from the 
discourse of the other, from the (m)other tongue: "What useful 
discovery did Socrates learn from Xanthippe?" John Eglinton asks 
derisively. 
—Dialectic, Stephen answered: and from his mother how to 
bring thoughts into the world. (U-G 9-233-36) 
NOTES 
1. Paul de Man defines what Nietzsche terms the "phenomenalism of 
consciousness" as "the tendency to describe mental events such as tecollection or 
emotion in terms derived from the experience of the phenomenal world: sense 
perception, the interpretation of spatial structures, etc." (107). A critique of this 
metaphysical construct would prevent us from transforming "consciousness into an 
authoritative ontological category" (109). De Man further claims that the pattern 
of argument Nietzsche directs against the concept of consciousness is "the same 
pattern that underlies the critique of the main categories that make up traditional 
metaphysics: the concepts of identity, of causality, of the object and the subject, 
of truth, etc." (109). 
2. FW 19.35-36. Stephen Heath makes this point in "Ambiviolences: Notes 
for Reading Joyce": "For Joyce's writing there is no break between world and book, 
for the world is always already writing ('is, was and will be writing its own wrunes 
for ever'); words and things move together in the ceaseless production of 'the 
world' " (67). And of the word. 
3. In his Translator's Note to Merits, Alan Sheridan defines Jacques Lacan's 
use of the term "symbolic" as designating "signifiers, in the sense developed by 
Saussure and Jakobson, extended into a generalized definition: differential elements, 
in themselves without meaning, which acquire value only in their mutual relations, 
and forming a closed order—the question is whether this order is or is not 
complete. . . . [I]t is the symbolic, not the imaginary, that is seen to be the 
determining order of the subject, and its effects are radical: the subject, in Lacan's 
sense, is himself an effect of the symbolic" (ix). Jane Gallop defines "the symbolic" 
in Lacan's work as the "register of language, social exchange, and radical intersub­
jectivity" (59). 
Julia Kristeva posits two types of signifying processes: the "semiotic" and the 
"symbolic." The semiotic process relates to the cbora, a term Plato describes in his 
Timaeus as a "receptacle": "an invisible and formless being which receives all 
things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most 
incomprehensible" (51, quoted in Desire 6). In his Introduction to Kristeva's 
collection of translated essays, Desire in Language, Leon S. Roudicz adds that the 
chora is "anterior to any space, an economy of primary processes articulated by 
Freud's instinctual drives (Triebe) through condensation and displacement, and 
where social and family structures make their imprint through the mediation of the 
maternal body" (6). The chora's articulation is "uncertain, undetermined"; it lacks 
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"thesis or position, unity or identity" (6). The symbolic process, on the other hand, 
refers to "the establishment of sign and syntax, paternal function, grammatical and 
social constraints, symbolic law" (6-7). The signifying process results from an 
articulation between the semiotic and the symbolic; the "speaking subject is 
engendered as belonging to both the semiotic chora and the symbolic device, and 
that accounts for its eventual split nature" (7). 
4. Quoted in Moi 170. Jouissance, a tetm ubiquitous in recent French 
psychoanalytical, philosophical, critical, and feminist discourses, denotes ecstasy, both 
sexual and sublime; the enjoyment of rights and property; interest payable. Alan 
Sheridan distinguishes between "pleasure" {plaisir) and "jouissance" in his trans­
lation of Jacques Lacan's Ecrits: " 'Pleasure' obeys the law of homeostasis that Freud 
evokes in 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle,' whereby, through discharge, the psyche 
seeks the lowest possible level of tension. 'Jouissance' transgresses this law and, in 
that respect, it is beyond the pleasure principle" (x). 
5. The neologism, "phallogocentrism," underscores the complicity between 
logocentrism and phallocentrism. Logocentrism is the desire for a first cause of being 
and meaning, for a central presence as the locus of coherence and authenticity, and 
for full self-consciousness ("thought thinking itself"); phallocentrism places the 
male-identified subject at the centet of intellect, perception, experience, values, and 
language. As Derrida notes, "It is one and the same system: The erection of a 
paternal logos. . .and of the phallus as 'privileged signifier' (Lacan)" ("Avoir l'oreillc 
de la philosophie" 311). 
6. Irigaray, "Women's Exile" 71. See for this point Carolyn Burke, "Irigaray 
through the Looking Glass" 28. 
7. This Sex 132-33. See Carolyn Burke, "Introduction to Luce Irigaray's 
'When Our Lips Speak Together' " 6 7  . 
8. This Sex 147. See also Carolyn Burke's discussion of this point in "Irigaray 
through the Looking Glass." 
9. "Orgasm in discourse leads us to the point where feminine jouissance can 
be understood as writing (denture). To the point where it must appear that this 
jouissance and the literary text (which is also written like an orgasm produced from 
within discourse), are the effect of the same murder of the signifier." In defining 
writing as the jouissance of a woman, Montrelay argues that what the woman is 
writing is the name: both the nom du pere (the name-of-the-father) and the non 
(not, nothing) (234). 
10. In the 1905 "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," Freud claims 
"we have learnt from psycho-analysis that the instinct for knowledge in children is 
attracted unexpectedly early and intensively to sexual problems and is in fact possibly 
first aroused by them. . . . And this history of the instinct's origin is in line with 
the fact that the first problem with which it deals is not the question of the 
distinction between the sexes but the riddle of where babies come from" (60, 61; 
his emphasis on the riddle of birth as predating the question of distinction between 
the sexes is qualified in "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction 
between the Sexes," 1925). Freud argues in his 1909 "Analysis of a Phobia in a 
Five-Year-Old Boy" that "Thirst for knowledge seems to be inseparable from sexual 
curiosity" (51). Little Hans's sexual curiosity about male and female sexual organs 
and about how and where children originate "roused the spirit of inquiry in him 
and enabled him to arrive at genuine abstract knowledge" (51). Heath, MacCabe, 
and Ellmann all discuss the link between the origin of children—"tots"—and of 
knowledge—"thoughts"—in this passage from the Wake. 
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Simulation, Pluralism, and the Politics 
of Everyday Life 
JULES DAVID LAW 
Mortal! You found me in evil company 
—Bloom's Nymph 
The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its 
being imbedded in the fabric of tradition. [. . .] An ancient statue 
of Venus, for example, stood in a different traditional context 
with the Greeks who made it an object of veneration, than with 
the clerics of the Middle Ages, who viewed it as an ominous 
idol. Both of them, however, were equally confronted with its 
uniqueness, that is, its aura. 
—Benjamin, "The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" 
In June of I860, while browsing through the contents of an 
antiquarian street-stall in Florence, Robert Browning came across the 
quarto transcript of a seventeenth-century murder trial. The book, 
which Browning describes as "pure crude fact / Secreted from mans 
life," was to become the basis for his verse novel, The Ring and the 
Book. What is of particular interest for us, in the context of Joyce, 
is Browning's description of the book's discovery, for it would appear 
to be a model of the discovery of history in the rhythms of the 
quotidian. At the beginning of the poem, Browning describes finding 
the book: 
'Mongst odds and ends of ravage, picture-frames

White through the worn gilt, mirror-sconces chipped,

Bronze angel-heads once knobs attached to chests,

(Handled when ancient dames chose forth brocade)

Modern chalk drawings, studies from the nude,

Samples of stone, jet, breccia, porphyry

Polished and rough, sundry amazing busts

In baked earth, (broken, Providence be praised!)

A wreck of tapestry [. . . ]

A pile of brown-etched prints, two crazie each,

Stopped by a conch atop from fluttering forth [ • ]

[. . . ] these 
I picked the book from. (Vol. 1, bk. 1, 35-36, 53-57) 
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Browning describes the discovery of the volume as a "restorative" 
event, and obviously he intends this in more than one sense. As he 
describes it, the "pure crude fact" of a Roman murder case, having 
originally been forged into history through its recording and trans­
mission, and subsequently disappearing in the quotidian concreteness 
of a street-vendor's wares, has now been revivified before his very 
eyes. History steps forth from amongst odds and ends, to assert itself 
as an intensely personal fact, ostensibly eluding the tendential logic 
which has reduced it and its companion relics to objects of exchange 
in a street-vendor's booth. At the same time, this resurrection of 
history rescues Browning from the quotidian routine of his own life— 
the book's restoration is his as well. 
The metamorphosis of the quotidian into the historic is one of 
the great themes of Ulysses, and though examples abound, one passage 
bears an intriguing, if parodic, resemblance to Browning's discovery 
of his restorative book. This analogous moment occurs when the Greek 
nymph represented in the erotic art-poster above Bloom s and Molly's 
bed steps forth on the stage of Nighttown to address Bloom: 
( [ . . . ] Out of her oakframe a nymph with hair unbound, lightly 
clad in teabrown artcolours, descends from her grotto and passing 
under interlacing yews stands over Bloom.) 
THE NYMPH 
Mortal! You found me in evil company, highkickers, coster picnic 
makers, pugilists, popular generals, immoral panto boys in flesh-
tights and the nifty shimmy dancers, La Aurora and Karini, 
musical act, the hit of the century. I was hidden in cheap pink 
paper that smelt of rock oil. I was surrounded by the stale smut 
of clubmen, stories to disturb callow youth, ads for transparencies, 
truedup dice and bustpads, proprietary articles and why wear a 
truss with testimonial from ruptured gentleman. Useful hints to 
the married. (444-45) 
Though Bloom interrupts momentarily here, the Nymph goes on 
compulsively to catalogue the commercial menagerie from which 
Bloom eventually "bore [her] away" and "framed [her] in oak and 
tinsel" (445). Though she has a sense of her own context, she is 
aware of no personal history prior to her magazine existence. This is 
entirely in keeping with the ethos of the "Circe" chapter which, as 
Franco Moretti has remarked, is the "unsurpassed literary represen­
tation of commodity fetishism" {Signs Taken for Wonders 185). 
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Like Browning, Bloom rescues a subject from amongst quotidian 
odds and ends, and frames it for his own purposes. The difference, 
of course, is that Bloom s nymph is only a parody of history and 
culture. Whereas Browning's found art needs only to be polished, or 
at best, catalyzed, to restore its historical and cultural resonances, 
Bloom's found art is truly the stuff of quotidian or everyday life— 
both reproducible and disposable. Despite the oak frame which Bloom 
provides for his "photo girl" from Photo Bits, he is fully convinced 
that her picture is not "art ." Later in Ulysses he elaborates on the 
difference between "original" Greek statues and photographic 
reproductions: 
He dwelt, being a bit of an artist in his spare time, on the 
female form in general developmentally because, as it so hap­
pened, no later than that afternoon he had seen those Grecian 
statues, perfectly developed as works of art, in the National 
Museum. Marble could give the original, shoulders, back, all the 
symmetry, all the rest. Yes, puritanisme, it does though Saint 
Joseph's sovereign thievery alors (Bandez!) Figne toi trop. Whereas 
no photo could because it simply wasn 't art in a word. (533, my 
emphasis) 
Bloom here reproduces the traditional nineteenth-century assessment 
of the relationship between art and photography.1 Nevertheless, his 
assumptions about aesthetic value are undermined by the larger 
tendency of Ulysses to juxtapose the mythic and the mechanical, and 
to evoke a "culture" of everyday life. The same logic which leads J. 
J. O'Molloy to pronounce "a postcard" as "publication" (264) is 
also at work in Ulysses preparing for photography to become "art," 
and for everyday life to achieve the status of an historical and aesthetic 
object. 
The history and the culture of everyday life: are these parodic 
oxymorons, or modernist ideologies par excellence? And if it is possible 
to write the history and the culture of everyday life, is Joyce's work 
an authentic—or even, perhaps, a unique—contribution to that pro­
ject? In order to approach these questions we might first note that 
Henri Lefebvre begins his ground-breaking study, Everyday Life in 
the Modern World, by designating June 16th, 1904, as the "mo­
mentous eruption of everyday life into literature" (2). Ulysses, writes 
Lefebvre, "rescues. . each facet of the quotidian from anonymity." 
However, Lefebvre goes on to point out that Ulysses represents everyday 
life in a specifically modernist mode: as an exploration of subjectivity. 
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Ulysses is dominated by those details of subjective quotidian experience 
which now appear to us as modernist cliches: for instance, ordinary 
and private language, stream of consciousness, and the slips of tongue 
and mind mythologized by Freud in The Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life.2 By contrast, argues Lefebvre, if one were to set out to write a 
novel about everyday life in the 1960s, under the shadow of post­
modernism, one would begin with objects rather than with subjects 
(one thinks here of the novels of Robbe-Grillet). 
Lefebvre s distinction between the modernist regime of the sub­
ject and the postmodernist regime of the object, is by now a familiar 
one, perhaps even a cliche of its own. Nevertheless, to speak of a 
politics of narrative at this juncture in history without taking into 
account the notions of postmodernism, poststructuralism, and late 
capitalism which have intervened between us and Joyce, would be to 
deny our own positionality. In order properly to appreciate Joyce's 
revolutionary creation of a formal narrative from cultural bric-a-brac, 
it is necessary to emphasize how differently that bric-a-brac functioned 
in his time than in our own. Joyce assumes the inevitable structural 
presence of history and myth in everyday life—even in the patterns 
of commodity production. For Joyce, the fetishized commodities of 
everyday life hold and unsettle the consumer's gaze precisely because 
of the parodic dissonance between the cultural scenarios they gesture 
towards and the social situations in which they are actually exchanged. 
There is a dissonance too between commodities and their represen­
tation in advertising, a dissonance that advertising counts on, para­
doxically, both to "arrest" and to assist the "velocity of modem 
life." We can see this tension at work in two of Bloom's fantasies 
about the ultimate advertisement: 
What also stimulated him in his cogitations? 
[. . . ] the infinite possibilities hitherto unexploited of the modern 
art of advertisement if condensed in trilateral monoidal symbols, 
vertically of maximum visibility (divined), horizontally of maxi­
mum legibility (deciphered) and of magnetising efficacy to arrest 
involuntary attention, to interest, to convince, to decide. (559, 
my emphasis) 
What were habitually his final meditations? 
Of some one sole unique advertisement to cause passers to stop 
in wonder, a poster novelty, with all extraneous accretions ex­
cluded, reduced to its simplest and most efficient terms not 
 199 Simulation, Pluralism, and Politics
exceeding the span of casual vision and congruous with the velocity 
of modern life. (592, my emphasis)3 
However, ours is no longer an era of commodity production, and the 
objects of commercial culture no longer arrest us as the nymph does 
Leopold Bloom. Whereas at the beginning of this century, advertising 
images were still novel enough to be recognized as (pleasant or 
threatening) distortions both of everyday life and of history, now 
advertising presents a self-generating simulation of reality, without 
any historical dissonance or uncanniness.4 We like to think that if we 
scratched beneath the surface of contemporary everyday life, we would 
find the earthiness and uncanniness of Bloom's everyday life. But is 
this so? 
In a critique of Western political economy not unrelated to 
Lefebvre's, Jean Baudrillard has described the shift from a traditional 
capitalist economy organized around the commodity to a late-capitalist 
economy organized around the simulacrum {Simulations 1-13, 26­
30; The Mirror of Production 121-51). The commodity, though an 
exchange value, is not infinitely exchangeable. It is intended to be 
measured against something else, and therefore, in a sense, always 
has a residue of inadequacy, a value to be consummated later. The 
commodity is intended to be used as well as exchanged. Even if it 
is never actually used, the scenarios of its concrete use haunt it like 
a dream; its exchange only defers—without replacing—its essential 
use value.5 (In this sense, the traditional commodity follows traditional 
art; Benjamin remarks that "One of the foremost tasks of art has 
always been the creation of a demand which could be fully satisfied 
only later" [237]). In the world of Ulysses commodities are rarely 
consumed instantaneously, or once and for all, but rather decay 
through a series of use values, as if possessed of a radioactive half-
life: "huge webs of paper. Clank it. Clank it. Miles of it unreeled. 
What becomes of it after? O, wrap up meat, parcels: various uses, 
thousand and one things" (99). 
The simulacrum, on the other hand, has no such uncanniness 
or sense of deferral about it; it exists to be experienced and used 
up at the same time, like a computer graphic, a television image, 
or a media event: 
No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its 
concept. No more imaginary coextensivity: rather, genetic min­
iaturisation is the dimension of simulation. The real is produced 
from miniaturised units, from matrices, memory banks and 
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command models—and with these it can be reproduced an 
indefinite number of times. It no longer has to be rational, 
since it is no longer measured against some ideal or negative 
instance. It is nothing more than operational. 
It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor 
even of parody. It is rather a question of substituting signs of 
the real for the real itself, that is, an operation to deter every 
real process by its operational double, a metastable, program­
matic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs 
of the real. . . . Never again will the real have to be produced. 
(Baudrillard, Simulations 3-4) 
The simulacrum does not imitate or dissimulate a future use value; 
it conjures up a reality with which it is then satisfyingly isomorphic. 
The simulacrum is the fundamental unit of the information network, 
the information revolution, and the information industry. It is purged 
of both the history and the labor that creates it, and thus points to 
a universe of objects without subjects. 
The abolition of the subject and of the referent, which have 
become the distinguishing and notorious features of both literary 
and economic postmodernism, pose a challenge to our attempt to 
recover the specific mode of representing everyday life which Ulysses 
itself represents. In Browning's time, the increasing commodification 
of everyday life was simply a stage for the contrastive and restorative 
emergence of historical and mythical consciousness—thus Browning 
discovered the material for his greatest artistic achievement in the 
middle of an everyday life. Even if the possibility of an escape from 
quotidian, commercial culture was really already a fiction, late 
Victorian literature attested nonetheless to a very real and important 
nostalgia for such transcendence in the form of myth and history. 
For Joyce, everyday life—even if saturated in and by commercial 
culture—was nevertheless the repository of history, meaning, and 
myth. There was no need to extract the latter categories from the 
former.6 To read the productions of popular and commercial culture 
was simultaneously to read the mythic history of mankind. This was, 
of course, the only way for him to resolve the inherited nineteenth-
century contradiction between a "false" quotidian consciousness and 
a "genuine" historical one. 
But the apparent simultaneity, in Joyce's work, of the mythic 
and the quotidian, of historicity and contemporaneity, is perhaps 
the greatest obstacle to our historical—and thus our political— 
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understanding of Ulysses. Joyce seems to preempt the question of 
whether we read literature for historical or for contemporary ("rele­
vant") experiences, precisely by demonstrating the inevitable struc­
tural presence of history and myth in everyday life. Thanks to Joyce, 
and to other early modernist thinkers, the very notion of "everyday 
life" now has a history, a psychological theory, and an unprecedented 
aesthetic evocation. Yet whose everyday life does Joyce represent? 
Everyday lives have changed so radically even in the short time 
between Joyce's life and our own that we are already in danger of 
misunderstanding what is meant for Joyce to have transformed the 
materials of everyday life into art. What if everyday life in the 
postmodern world in fact functions not merely to produce or repro­
duce its own history (for history is in a sense always "produced," 
"narrated," "constructed," etc.), but rather in doing so to discourage 
historical thinking? 
Let me try to elaborate on this. If we were going to characterize 
Joyce's achievement, we would say that he exaggerates everyday life 
by making it denser and more complex than it "really" appears to 
the average consciousness. Thus it is his representation of subjectivity 
rather than of the physical world that we recognize as constituting 
his distinctive aesthetic deflection.7 Despite Ortega y Gasset's per­
ceptive comments about Joycean infrarealism {The Dehumanization 
of Art 35-36), it does not seem to us that Joyce distorted, or falsely 
represented the concrete objects of the quotidian world—he depicted 
them, after all, in all their obstinate and autonomous glory.8 What 
he did was to de-center the perceiving mind. But the objects of the 
quotidian world are not quite so obstinate or resistant to consciousness 
today, in a society of controlled simulations, as they were at the 
beginning of the century in an awkward, transitional phase of 
consumer culture. If the quotidian bristles in Ulysses, that is not 
something we can recapture for our own culture simply by looking 
to Joyce for new and fresh ways of seeing the world. 
It is precisely because we think of everyday life as an unprob­
lematic notion—on a par with such concepts as the normal, the 
literal, and the ordinary—that we think of Ulysses as being every bit 
as democratic in its accessibility as it is radical in its inaccessibility. 
This myth of democratic accessibility ("all interpretations are valid") 
explains perhaps why critical pluralism (whose very mention generates 
endless lame controversies elsewhere in our profession) has never had 
to pay for, or fight for, its admission into Joycean circles. Elsewhere 
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in literary academia, the concept and the representation of everyday 
life are uncritically rejected as popular culture; within Joyce circles 
we are perhaps too uncritically receptive to the representations of 
everyday life. 
Why draw this connection between pluralism and everyday life? 
Because what pluralism seems to deny, or at least to challenge, is 
the very notion of a determining intentionality. And ever since Freud, 
at least, we have considered the quotidian to be the realm of the 
unintentional. The quotidian is the unintentional. Freudian everyday 
life is defined precisely as that realm of experience in which our 
actions and expressions are so habitual and un-thought-out at the 
conscious level that their disruption by unconscious intentions is all 
the more likely to be noticed. Joyce's grand mythification of the 
quotidian reveals this "double life" of the everyday life, and has 
become, simultaneously, the greatest evocation of intentionality and 
of #«intentionality in our language. The everyday life of Ulysses, 
then, seems both to confirm and to challenge critical pluralism. But 
in order to read politically, do we have to choose between a 
conciliatory (and contemporizing) pluralism and a rigid (historicizing) 
determinism? 
I would like to say that our task is not to choose between 
pluralism and its discontents, between Joyce, the chronicler of eve­
ryday life and Joyce, the mythmaker and esotericist, but rather to 
see how this very choice arises out of an historically specific conception 
of everyday life which Ulysses itself represents, and which contem­
porary criticism represents to us as still our own.9 Seen in this light, 
what Ulysses has to contribute to a politics of narrative is precisely 
its hold on the fundamental tension between the intentional and 
the unintentional, played out on the terrain of an increasingly 
anachronistic everyday life, whose image is still familiar enough to 
us to represent a powerful nostalgia. Cultivating this nostalgia cannot 
protect us against the increasingly simulated nature of contemporary 
existence and the disappearance of its historicity. But if we can learn 
to treat Ulysses neither as a unified text nor as a pluralistic one, but 
rather as a self-contradictory, overdetermined, and heterogeneous 
one, we may be able to turn our nostalgia into a resistance to the 
simulations of everyday life in our own world, simulations which 
cannot endlessly fend off the massive social dislocations on our 
horizon.10 
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NOTES 
1. On the debate concerning photography and "art ," see Benjamin (18-27). 
2. On ordinary and private language, see Wittgenstein (Philosophical Inves­
tigations, especially paragraphs 97-133, 242-75). 
3. Franco Moretti points to these two passages as evidence of the way in 
which Joyce conceives advertising as the new unconscious of the culture, "a form 
of persuasion based on unawareness" paralleling the "randomness, rapidity, discon­
tinuity, uncontrollability and depth of the stream of consciousness" (Signs Taken 
For Wonders 196-97). However, Moretti's emphasis is less on discontinuities and 
disjunctions than on the fluid, subliminal effects of advertising, and this risks 
missing the difference between a modernist culture of commodities and the 
postmodernist culture of simulacra (which I shall discuss below). In Joyce's and 
Bloom's conception, advertising must somehow "arrest" and "stop' the consumer, 
even as it fits more or less "casual[ly]" into the flow of experience. The advertising 
image has not yet blended entirely with the fabric of everyday life, nor collapsed 
into an identity with the commodity which it represents. 
4. Sec Jameson (Marxism and Form). In the early twentieth century, according 
to Jameson, 
Advertising, in the dimensions so familiar to us, is scarcely developed 
at all; indeed, the very ads themselves, whether affiche, the sandwich 
man of Ulysses, or that crude painting on a vacant wall which was 
Gertrude Stein's first introduction to the secret prestige of oil paints, 
can still be apprehended as objects of fascination in their own right. 
(104) 
5. Jameson ("Postmodernism") points to the erasure of use value in the 
simulacrum: "Appropriately enough, the culture of the simulacrum comes to life 
in a society where exchange-value has been generalized to the point at which the 
very memory of use-value is effaced" (66). 
6. Franco Moretti, like Adorno and Brecht in earlier debates with Lukacs, 
defends Joyce against the charge of mystifying social experience by fetishizing its 
"mythic" aspects. In Joyce's work, according to Moretti, 
myth and history are complementary: they presuppose and neutralize 
each other, and it is impossible to establish a formal or ideological 
hierarchy between the two. In Joyce, myth is not identified with the 
aesthetic form (as in Eliot), and therefore cannot be the starting point 
for a new cultural hegemony. (192) 
See also Lukacs ("Realism in the Balance"), Brecht and Adorno ("Reconciliation 
Under Duress"), all in Bloch et al., Aesthetics and Politics. 
7. Cf. Jameson (Marxism and Form): 
Think of the precariousness of the synthesis of Joyce, in which matter 
once again seems momentarily reconciled with spirit, all the objects and 
detritus of the city luminous and as though informed by subjectivity— 
except that the seams show [. . . ]  . 
8. Cf. Jameson ("Postmodernism"): 
Not only are Picasso and Joyce no longer ugly; they now strike us, on 
the whole, as rather "realistic"; and this is the result of a canonization 
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and an academic institutionalization of the modern movement generally, 
which can be traced to the late 1950s. (56) 
9- Cf. Jameson ("Reflections in Conclusion," in Aesthetics and Politics): 
To take an attitude of partisanship towards key struggles of the recent 
past does not mean either choosing sides, or seeking to harmonize 
irreconcilable differences. [. . . ] The fundamental contradiction is be­
tween history itself and the conceptual apparatus which, seeking to 
grasp its realities, only succeeds in reproducing their discord within 
itself in the form of an enigma for thought, an aporia. It is to this 
aporia that we must hold, which contains within its structure the crux 
of a history beyond which we have not yet passed. (213) 
10. On the Marxist notions of ideological contradiction and overdetermination, 
see especially Althusser ("Contradiction and Overdetermination" 87-128) and Jean-
Paul Sartre (Search for a Method 100-111, 140-66); on heterogeneity, see Derrida 
("White Mythology," especially 214-15, 253-54; Of Grammatology 19-21). 
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Joyce's Pedagogy

Ulysses and Finnegans Wake as Theory

PATRICK MCGEE 
Wyndham Lewis, to Joyce's somewhat irritated fascination, called 
Ulysses "an encyclopedia of english literary technique, as well as a 
general-knowledge paper. The schoolmaster in Joyce," he continued, 
"is in great evidence throughout its pages" (76). Although Lewis 
never appreciated what was most innovative in Joyce's teaching (in­
deed, he learned very little from Joyce), he was right to lay emphasis 
on the pedagogical effect of Joyce's work, on the way it sets out to 
inform and reshape the reading subject. Any work of literature or 
any writing can be said to produce this effect, but I want to argue 
that in Joyce's later work such an effect is primary. In relation to the 
issue of pedagogy, other questions about Joyce's work—whether Ulys­
ses is a novel or what Finnegans Wake is about—become secondary; 
they are seen as questions posed and subsumed by Joyce's style. 
In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the narrative events 
unfold in academic settings, often in the classroom, but more fre­
quently in those places where we see Stephen Dedalus struggle against 
biological, spiritual, and academic fathers in order to achieve personal 
autonomy—the autonomy he demonstrates in chapter 5 by conveying 
his aesthetic theory to Lynch and by taking his imaginative life into 
his own hands in deciding to leave Ireland. Pedagogy is seen from 
the point of view of the student who uses his teachers and their 
teaching as Wittgenstein argued we should use his philosophical 
propositions—as a ladder to be climbed and then discarded. The 
teacher, like the father in Joyce, seems doomed to failure, especially 
for Stephen who, like his author, must teach himself to fly beyond 
the nets of language, nationality, and religion. Ironically, though, in 
the scene with Lynch in chapter 5, Stephen's own approach to 
knowledge and his method of conveying it are purely conventional, 
expository, magisterial. In advancing his aesthetic theory, Stephen 
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takes into account neither himself as a desiring subject implicated in 
a web of words nor Lynch as a subject on whom the theory is intended 
to work and to produce an effect. The theory stands on its own as a 
cognition to which the teacher and the student, the voice and the 
ear, are only tangentially related. Ultimately, all that Stephen succeeds 
in proving is his quasi-mastery of the traditional thought associated 
with the names Aristotle, Aquinas, Ibsen, etc. He has a certain textual 
knowledge but no knowledge of the teaching process itself. Lynch 
would appear to have more understanding of that process in the way 
he carefully urges Stephen to speak by facetiously playing the part of 
the one who doesn't know and who has nothing better to do than 
to listen to the cogitations of genius. On the whole, the pedagogical 
effect in Joyce's book is not much more developed than in Stephen's 
demonstration. A Portrait of the Artist is only a novel; and, in spite 
of its complex ironies, it remains faithful to the convention of the 
novel and refuses to problematize the relation between the writer and 
the reader. It does not require the extensive restructuring of the reader 
through self-analysis and the overcoming in the reader of resistance 
to the act of reading. 
Although such a restructuring is the pedagogical effect of Joyce's 
later work, the beginning of Ulysses is not greatly different from A 
Portrait in focusing on scenes of teaching. However, these scenes, as 
I will show, provide a critical view of pedagogy that the performative 
dimension of the entire book illustrates. In the "Nestor" episode, 
for example, Stephen at first epitomizes the awkward, bungling 
pedagogue who can hardly sustain the interest of his pupils. Based 
on what we see, he clearly fails as a teacher, at least in any normative 
sense of the word, although he does bring about the possibility of 
learning. He does this by exploiting the linguistic accident resulting 
from his pupil's attempt to identify the name Pyrrhus in a lesson on 
ancient history. Out of ignorance and frustration, young Armstrong 
associates the name of the ancient general with the word "pier"; and 
when Stephen asks for a definition of the latter, the boy says, "A 
kind of bridge. Kingstown pier, sir." Stephen cannot resist making 
a verbal joke: "Kingstown pier. . .Yes, a disappointed bridge" (U­
GP 20-1). 
If, as Derrida has suggested, education in its traditional forms 
"has as its ideal. . .the effacement of language" ("Living On" 93­
94), then Stephen's teaching, in this instance, challenges such ide­
alization by drawing attention to a use of language that resists 
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effacement. This use does not negate language's signifying or refer­
ential functions but shows to what extent these functions depend on 
a rhetorical surface, to what extent the grammar and logic of reference 
bring about their own displacement by uncovering the metonymic 
links between apparently unrelated signifiers. Stephen's young pupils 
are confused by his joke because they cannot see through the phrase 
"a disappointed bridge" to the referent that would yield an objective 
meaning and, thus, stop the play of words. They don't know how 
to respond to the joke because they don't know how to repeat it. As 
Freud stressed, a joke is only understood when it can be repeated; 
even our initial response has less to do with grasping its meaning 
than with grasping the logic of its construction, the way it capitalizes 
on linguistic coincidence. The troubled gaze of Stephen's students 
after hearing the joke is a symptom of their traditional education, of 
their lack of knowledge about language as language, about its rhe­
torical dimension. Knowledge of such a dimension entails the ability 
not only to tell jokes but to make the figures of speech that are 
crucial to the construction of both literary texts and persuasive ar­
guments. Indeed, ignorance of rhetoric blocks the process of invention 
itself, prevents the subject from being able to take a position from 
within language and to assert its linguistic independence in the process 
of self-representation. 
Just in case his students did not grasp the point about language 
the first time, Stephen decides to give them a second chance. He 
tells them a riddle: "The cock crew, I The sky was blue: I The bells 
in heaven I Were striking eleven. I 'Tis time for this poor soul I To 
go to heaven. " When no one guesses the answer, Stephen reveals it 
himself: "The fox burying his grandmother under a hollybush" (U­
GP 22). Stephen lays a trap with this unanswerable riddle in order 
to teach his pupils a lesson. Precisely because the rhetorical force of 
language surpasses its power of signification, it can always be used to 
mystify, to create the illusion of a positive referent where there is 
none. The riddle creates the illusion of meaning, but the answer 
subverts that illusion (and hides the private meaning known only to 
Stephen, i.e., the reference to his dead mother) by insisting on the 
arbitrariness of its relation to the riddle. This forces us to see what 
we frequently do not see when we read formulations as different as 
an intelligence quotient or a political slogan: the gap between the 
raw signifier and the set of interpretive constraints that produce 
meaning and social value. However, Stephen can convey this knowl­
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edge only by risking failure as a teacher insofar as nothing guarantees 
that either we or his pupils will "get the message" or be able to 
repeat the performance. 
In other words, Stephen, whatever his intention, teaches his 
students that understanding involves more than effacing words in 
order to grasp a referent. In involves seeing or hearing words as 
iterative, as self-reflexive. If we are blind or deaf to this dimension 
of language, then we become susceptible to every kind of mystification 
and block our own capacity for creative self-transformation. We sur­
render our positions as subjects and become the objects of another s 
subjectivity, instead of subsuming subject and object, through the 
critical use of language, within the collective being of the social 
symbolic. Stephen's pupils are confused because they have heard 
language that refuses to be effaced and demands to be repeated—a 
language that must be repeated in order to be understood. But what 
purpose exactly does this confusion serve? Is it possible to learn from 
confusion? After Stephen's pupils have fled the classroom for the 
hockey field, Stephen remains behind to teach Cyril Sargent how to 
solve some math problems. Mr. Deasy has told Sargent to copy the 
problems off the board, but Stephen wants to know if the boy can 
do them himself. When he says no, Stephen sits down and works 
out a problem in front of him. Demystifying his own knowledge by 
refusing to give Cyril an overly complicated explanation, Stephen 
simply performs and then asks Cyril to repeat the performance on a 
different problem. Cyril copies the data and then, "Waiting always 
for a word of help his hand moved faithfully the unsteady symbols, 
a faint hue of shame flickering behind his dull skin" (U-GP 23). 
Cyril, however, awkwardly, manages to repeat Stephen's performance 
which is not the same thing as copying something off the board. 
Cyril succeeds, but he might have failed. By any measurable standard, 
Stephen's pedagogy does not succeed; he does not illuminate the 
boy's darkness or fill the void of his ignorance or dissolve his shame. 
If Cyril were asked, he would not know what Stephen had done to 
teach him. And yet Cyril learns something from Stephen in learning 
not to fear the problem—not to fear a certain language. Stephen's 
refusal to finalize knowledge on the blackboard forces Cyril to teach 
himself. It forces him to repeat Stephen's repetition since, contrary 
to what Cyril thinks, Stephen is not the one who knows but the one 
who repeats the steps of a formula that were already a repetition in 
the first place. 
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The "Scylla and Charybdis" episode dramatizes a related aspect 
of Joyce's pedagogy. Stephen presents a theory of Shakespeare's life 
and work that impresses the small collection of Dublin intellectuals 
in the library in the same way the "grandmother" riddle impresses 
the pupils in "Nestor." Stephen faces an audience that not only 
resists the knowledge he conveys but also questions the authority 
with which he speaks. Rather than working to legitimate himself 
before these archons of Irish letters, Stephen plays a game of 
intellectual brinksmanship, which collapses, at the end of his dis­
cussion, in the following dialogue: "You are a delusion, said roundly 
John Eglinton to Stephen. You have brought us all this way to show 
us a French triangle. Do you believe your own theory?—No, Stephen 
said promptly" (U-GP 175). Contrary to what Eglinton asserts, 
Stephen probably never intended to compel belief but to show a 
problem. In "Telemachus," Mulligan said that he "proves by algebra 
that Hamlet's grandson is Shakespeare's grandfather and that he 
himself is the ghost of his own father" (U-GP 15); but Eglinton 
comes closer to the truth in identifying Stephen's performance as a 
kind of geometrical demonstration. Stephen does not teach his 
audience the truth about Shakespeare; he shows them the shape of 
the desire for truth, a French triangle. This geometry underlies not 
only Stephen's story of Shakespeare's quest for an identity which is 
perpetually complicated by the triangular structure of desire in the 
relation between self and other, Shakespeare and Ann Hathaway. It 
also underlies Stephens own performance as a speaking subject in 
relation to the audience as other. This geometry of desire destabilizes 
the relation between self and other by insisting on the structural 
possibility of a third position (which may or may not take the form 
of a third party), the position of the other as subject or the subject 
as other. This third position is what Jacques Lacan calls the desire 
of the capital Other, which is a desire inherent in the use of 
language. Stephen's pedagogy makes him into a delusion or a ghost 
in that it destabilizes the position of authority from which he only 
pretends to speak; it foregrounds the rhetorical dimension to such 
an extent that it forecloses the possibility of any stable referent as 
the object of his thought. As a result, in speaking his thought, 
Stephen articulates speech as desire—a desire that appears to be 
collective in that it exceeds the intention of the autonomous subject. 
The French triangle Stephen constructs in front of the librarians and 
Mulligan, like the math problem he solves in front of Cyril Sargent, 
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is useless knowledge until it is repeated with a difference, until the 
audience draws it out of their own experience as linguistic beings. 
Nothing, of course, insures that they will. 
The whole of Ulysses, I would suggest, possesses the structure 
of a French triangle. It has this structure in the obvious way that it 
is a novel of adultery and in the more subtle way that it triangulates 
the desire of writer and reader by foregrounding language itself, by 
perpetually undoing the grammar of narrative and the logic of 
content through rhetorical displacement. The book's pedagogical 
effect derives from this stylistic emphasis, and thus it goes against 
the grain of Western education which privileges logic and grammar 
over rhetoric. As Derrida remarks in "Ulysses Gramophone," "Joyce 
laid stakes on the modern university, but he challenges it to 
reconstitute itself after him." The first step of that reconstitution 
involves a reading of Ulysses that would require as its condition the 
reeducation of the reader. Of course, in this first step, Joyce takes 
the resistance of the reader into account by providing a relatively 
coherent narrative structure and logical content in spite of the 
rhetorical forces that pull against them in the second half of the 
novel. In the actual marketing of the book, he initiated a seduction 
of the reader by encouraging and participating in the construction 
of a pedagogical apparatus, which includes criticism, source studies, 
notes, schemata, plot summaries, etc. The spectacular history of this 
apparatus in the formation of the "Joyce industry" testifies to the 
book's resistance both to reading and to teaching. In effect, the 
book must be taught in order to be read; reading must become self-
teaching. 
In this respect, Joyce's work anticipates and supports Paul de 
Man's speculation on the pedagogical implications of the resistance 
to theory. According to de Man, the resistance to theory is "a 
resistance to the use of language about language," that is to say, 
"a resistance to language itself or to the possibility that language 
contains factors or functions that cannot be reduced to intuition" 
(13). Traditional historical scholarship, for example, takes for granted 
that one is able to see through language to the truth, whether the 
truth is the referent, the historical context, the author's intention, 
etc. Such an intuitive view of reading foregrounds logic and grammar 
over rhetoric for the simple reason that logic and grammar are allied 
to the referential function of language, its truth function, while 
rhetoric studies figures of speech or tropes which "pertain primordially 
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to language." As de Man points out, in the medieval trivium, 
tropes, officially considered a part of grammatical study, actually 
occupied a disputed borderline between rhetoric and grammar, since 
they were and are "text-producing functions that are not necessarily 
patterned on a nonverbal entity." Grammar, on the other hand, is 
"by definition capable of extra-linguistic generalization" (15). The 
reading of any text precipitates the tension between rhetoric and 
grammar in such a way that grammar (along with its conceptual 
cohort, logic) finds the order of knowledge it postulates destabilized 
by the figurative power of language. "The resistance to theory," 
therefore, as de Man writes in yet another formulation, "is a resistance 
to the rhetorical or tropological dimension of language, a dimension 
which is perhaps more explicitly in the foreground in literature 
(broadly conceived) than in other verbal manifestations or—to be 
somewhat less vague—which can be revealed in any textual event 
when it is read textually" (17). It is no accident that Joyce's work 
has lent itself so frequently to theoretical formulations, most notably 
in the work of Lacan and Derrida. For to the extent that Joyce's 
work capitalizes on the tension between the referential function and 
the rhetorical dimension of language, it operates like a theory, that 
is, as language about language forcing us to recognize reference as 
one function of the rhetorical. In other words, the pedagogical effect 
of Joyce's writing constitutes it as a theoretical discourse. 
Ulysses is, as I am placing it, the first step in Joyce's reconsti­
tution of the university, and Finnegans Wake is the second. To an 
extent, Joyce merely continues the pedagogical experiment of Ulysses 
by radicalizing it; he challenges the reader's resistance by blurring 
plot and diffusing content to an unprecedented degree. But ultimately 
the extent of this radicalization produces a pedagogical effect of such 
magnitude that it becomes almost impossible to teach the book 
within the frame of the university—not only as presently constituted 
but as fundamentally conceived. In other words, Finnegans Wake 
tends to resist any institutional framework—no matter how radical-
founded on the principle of reason. I say that it resists, not that it 
opposes. Joyce's last work is not a celebration of the irrational— 
which, in any case, would only submit it to the principle of reason; 
it offers no alternative, no counterculture, no counter university. I 
don't believe that it is unreadable or unteachable, though its resistance 
to teaching and reading exceeds that of any other book in our 
culture, including Ulysses. Finally, this resistance to reading is what 
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we teach; the purpose of Wake pedagogy is to show our students 
how to recognize, manage, and write about this resistance. Every 
time Finnegans Wake breaks into the space of the university, it calls 
that space into question by drawing attention to what the university 
only assimilates as a problem it cannot solve, unlike Ulysses which 
creates the illusion that the university can solve any problem. It is 
no accident that the Wake usually appears in the margins of the 
university—that it has been so frequently taught in the living rooms 
of professors, during the evening hours, without university credit. 
I would like to think of Finnegans Wake as an extension course 
on the French triangle. It extends the lessons of Stephen in "Scylla 
and Charybdis" and of Joyce in Ulysses; but only with difficulty can 
it be appropriated to the official "core" curriculum. In Ulysses, 
Stephen explores the French triangle within the house of reason, the 
library, whose boundaries he more or less respects. In Finnegans 
Wake, the library is engulfed by the triangle, an opening to the 
abyss that the principle of reason desperately tries to fill. The triangle 
is the sigla of ALP, the mother, and the outline of her sexual organs, 
the hole into which the critic tries to insert the principle of reason. 
Of course, such a critic is at least figuratively male, like the Shaun 
figure, Professor Jones, modeled on Wyndham Lewis, in the chapter 
of riddles and answers that recall Stephens "grandmother" riddle. 
The professor, reasoning against brotherly love, reveals a form of 
domination inherent in magisterial pedagogy: "My unchanging Word 
is sacred," he says. "The word is my Wife, to exponse and expound, 
to vend and velnerate, and may the curlews crown our nuptias! Til 
Breath us depart! Wamen." The professor describes himself and his 
discourse as "The ring man in the rong shop but the rite words in 
the rote order!" (FW 167.28-33). Roughly translated: the man 
married to reason in the place of unreason with the sacred words of 
tradition memorized by rote. The patriarchal professor impresses with 
his knowledge and threatens with his authority; but, fortunately for 
us, his words, asserting their own autonomy, refuse the system he 
wants to instill in them. 
Shem's approach to the triangle, though more circular, is less 
indirect. In the pedagogical chapter of Finnegans Wake, "Night 
Lessons," Shem, in the guise of Dolph, teaches his brother Shaun, 
in the guise of Kev, to construct an equilateral triangle within 
intersecting circles, another chapter in the geometry of desire. In 
doing so, Dolph figuratively lifts his mother's "maidsapron" (FU" 
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297.11); and Kev, beginning to get a confused notion of what the 
triangle is all about, remarks: "Mother of us all! O, dear me, look 
at that now! I don't know is it your spictre or my omination but 
I'm glad you dimentioned it!" (FW 299.3-6). Dolph thinks Kev 
too stupid to follow his demonstration (at first, Kev is more interested 
in his mother's navel than in her genitals); but the problem is stated 
more accurately by saying that Kev doesn't know what his language 
knows—i.e., the triangle has to do with his mother or generation 
through sex. Kev's words, "mother of us all," answer the question 
he is afraid to ask about his own desire (for his mother or rather 
for her desire), while a rhetorical reading of the interjection undoes 
that answer in the same gesture. Kev doesn't know if he has followed 
the logic of Dolph's demonstration, if what he knows is the product 
of Dolph's "spectre," a Blakean word for the principle of reason. 
He doesn't know if his knowledge is rational or if it comes from his 
"omination," that is, his imagination or his prophetic sense and 
ability to recognize omens. He is glad Dolph "dimentioned" it, 
though he resists the knowledge of what those dimensions signify. 
Language defines its own dimensions in the pun "dimention." 
For in the "dimentioning" of language, in doubling it so that we 
read it grammatically and logically (however ungrammatical and 
illogical it may be) even as we undo its "grammatical cognition" 
through a rhetorical reading of its figurative play—in this double 
speech or double writing, we discover the dimensions of language, 
its materiality or spacing. To use the distinction from speech act 
theory that Derrida likes to play with, language oscillates between 
"use'^ and "mention." In the Wake, Shem-Dolph mentions and 
Shaun-Kev tries to put what he mentions to use; but in that very 
act Shaun stumbles or stammers like his father and everything he 
says doubles back or, in Derrida's terminology, "invaginates." "My 
Lourde! My Lourde!" Kev further remarks, "If that aint just the 
beatenest lay I ever see! And a superpbosition! Quoint a quincid­
ence!" (FW 299-6-8). Kev puns away without the slightest knowledge 
of what he is saying. My lord and master is also the miracle of 
Lourdes which had to do with a virgin mother; but Kev's mother, 
"the beatenest lay" he ever saw, is no virgin. And neither is his 
language with its superpositions, one word on top of another, one 
word inside of another, and everywhere coincidences, including the 
one revealed by the superposition of the early English word "queynt," 
which was a vulgar name for the vagina, on the phrase "Quite a 
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coincidence." "Quoint a quincidence!"—such coincidences are the 
invaginations of the rhetorical dimension. 
This dimension of Joyce's writing resonates with what Lacanian 
psychoanalysis calls "la betise." In the Encore seminar, Lacan notes 
that "le signifiant est bete," the signifier is stupid, beastly, ani­
malistic. Beyond those meanings inscribed within the imaginary 
register, language is en corps (a pun on the title of the seminar), 
"in or of the body"; and Lacan considers this relation to be "the 
foundation of the symbolic dimension that alone permits us to isolate 
analytic discourse as such" (24). La betise can also mean "nonsense"; 
and language at its most substantial is nonsense. Lacanian theory, 
like Joyce's art, depends for its content and its effect on linguistic 
play and coincidence—for example, when Lacan directs our attention 
to the substantial dimension of language by rewriting the French 
word "dimension as "dit-mension" (25). Whereas Joyce changes the 
s of the English "dimension" to t to signify the double-mentioning 
or iterative dimension of language, Lacan adds a / to the first syllable 
of the French "dimension" to signify the priority of the signifier 
over the signified in speech. Both Joyce and Lacan use the pun to 
collapse the distinction between "use" and "mention" into a single 
rhetorical act. Insofar as the pun can be said to signify, it has been 
used to produce a semantic effect; however, insofar as the puns of 
both Joyce and Lacan illustrate the very thing they signify, which is 
the always possible subversion of meaning through rhetorical dis­
placement, they are mentioned or cited as examples of the impos­
sibility of meaning in the absolute sense. Grammar and logic, or 
the order of signification, are subsumed by the rhetorical dimension; 
yet without the grasp of grammar and logic in the act of reading it 
is virtually impossible to grasp the rhetorical dimension in the full 
scope of its cognitive function. 
To carry the comparison between Lacan and Joyce a step further, 
the pedagogical effect of Lacan s writing is directly related to what 
many consider to be the eccentricity of his style. As Shoshana Felman 
eloquently argues, pedagogy is not a theme in psychoanalysis but a 
rhetoric, an utterance, an action, and finally a style. Lacan was "the 
first to understand that the psychoanalytic discipline is an unprece­
dented one in that its teaching does not just reflect upon itself, but 
turns back upon itself so as to subvert itself, and truly teaches only 
insofar as its subverts itself" (39). In support of this assertion, Felman 
cites a passage from Lacan from which she makes a curious omission: 
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"Any return to Freud founding a teaching worthy of the name will 
occur only on that pathway where truth. . . becomes manifest in the 
revolutions of culture. That pathway is the only training we can 
claim to transmit to those who follow us. It is called—a style" (39). 
Felman omits the superlative adjective modifying the word for 
"truth" in Lacan's text, which speaks of "la verite la plus cache," 
the most hidden truth becoming manifest in cultural revolutions 
(Ecrits 458). What is the most hidden truth that any teaching worthy 
of the name discloses? After Lacan's seminar on "The Purloined 
Letter," we should be able to guess that the most hidden truth of 
psychoanalysis is out in the open where everyone is free to misconstrue 
it. It is language itself, or rather the rhetorical dimension of language, 
the field of operation of what Lacan calls the Unconscious. Lacan, 
like Joyce, theorizes by giving play to the Unconscious in the 
disfigurations or dislocutions of style. 
In the "Night Lessons" episode of Finnegans Wake, Dolph 
disfigures language and thus illustrates Paul de Man's formula for 
pedagogy which says that "it is better to fail in teaching what should 
not be taught than to succeed in teaching what is not true" (de 
Man 4). Dolph tries to teach Kev the truth about his mother by 
problematizing the relation to truth, the distinction between the 
literal and the figurative. He teaches what should not be taught not 
only in exposing the private parts of his mother's anatomy but also 
in showing that even anatomy has its rhetorical dimension and 
ideological function. But this strange geometry lesson fails in teaching 
Kev the truth that language, like sex, is not a mystery—that language 
invaginates not because it is feminine but because it is rhetorical. It 
fails because the truth cannot be simply communicated; it can only 
be shown. Dolph shows Kev "figuratleavely the whome of your 
eternal geomater" (FW 296.30-297.1) It is not that Dolph, Kev, or 
the reader sees the womb/home of the eternal earth mother figu­
ratively as opposed to literally but rather that the figurative, or the 
rhetorical, and the ideological frames must limit any possible vision 
of home, womb, or mother. In "Night Lessons," the closer Dolph 
gets to describing the facts of sex the more abstract and mathematical 
his language becomes, reducing feminine sexuality to the "power of 
empthood," that is, a logarithmic value of nought. To these male-
centered rationalizations of sex balanced against the puritanical 
ignorance of Shaun-Kev, Issy retorts in the footnotes with a language 
whose rhetoric lies in its simplicity: "I enjoy as good as anyone" 
{FW 298.Fl). 
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Issy's enjoyment undoes the principle of reason Joyce caricatures 
in Dolph; she constitutes the third side of the triangle pointing 
toward an invisible fourth position, "beyond." In the summary of 
his demonstration, Dolph nearly says as much himself: "there are 
trist sigheds to everysing but ichs on the freed brings euchs to the 
feared" (FW 299-1-3). Stated simply, there are three sides to Shem-
Dolph's triangle: I, you, and s/he. When the Is are freed, including 
the " I " in Issy, you will move to the fourth position beyond the 
triangle. The word for "you" here, the German euch with an English 
i-ending, could be taken as a pun on the word "us" : euchs is us. 
As Professor Jones says parenthetically, ' 'I am speaking to us in the 
second person" (FW 161.5-6). In the liberation of the feminine 
subject through the assertion of feminine desire and pleasure, you, 
that is, all of us, will move to the fourth position, the position of 
the collective where there is no contradiction between the first and 
second persons, between the singular and the plural. As the diagram 
on page 293 of Finnegans Wake shows, the fourth position is 
generated out of the first three as the second triangle is generated 
out of the first. The triangle is the structure of desire that constantly 
repeats in displacing itself. It is the structure of desire in language 
or the rhetorical dimension. 
Clive Hart noted long ago that "The primary energy which 
maintains the highly charged polarities of Finnegans Wake is gen­
erated by cycles of constantly varied repetition—'The seim anew' as 
Joyce puts it [FW 215.23]" (31). Hart says explicitly what Joyce says 
implicitly in writing Finnegans Wake as a repetition, with a difference, 
of Ulysses. (To continue the parallel with Lacan, the title of Encore, 
meaning "still" and "once again," emphasizes the repetition with 
a difference characteristic of his teaching.) Of course, this function 
of repetition in Joyce could be taken as an impasse, perhaps even 
the poststructuralist impasse. As many have stressed, Joyce's work 
anticipates poststructuralism, anticipates the impasse of repetition 
that poststructuralism identifies as its first principle. But I think 
there is a way of reading Joyce that goes beyond the impasse, beyond 
poststructuralism—though I don't mean to say that poststructuralism 
itself is without knowledge of this "beyond." 
Derrida, in his meditation on the university, remarks that 
" 'Thought' requires both the principle of reason and what is beyond 
the principle of reason, the arkhe and an-archy. Between the two, 
the difference of a breath or an accent, only the enactment of this 
'thought' can decide. That decision is always risky, it always risks 
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the worst. To claim to eliminate that risk by an institutional program 
is quite simply to erect a barricade against the future" ("Principle 
of Reason" 18-19). The pedagogy that emerges out of Joyce's work, 
particularly Finnegans Wake, is the pedagogy of enactment. It is a 
pedagogy that constantly risks itself in undoing the so-called objective 
knowledge we inject into our students and in capitalizing on the 
function of desire in the language we derive our knowledge from. 
This pedagogy is rhetorical because it teaches knowledge not merely 
as content but as enactment. At its limit, in teaching Finnegans 
Wake for example, this pedagogy actually challenges the foundation 
of the university; it offers itself as a form of resistance to the 
university s totalizing functions, to the encyclopedic unity of its 
knowledge, to the social and intellectual hierarchies into which it is 
organized. This does not mean, however, that such a pedagogy is 
opposed to the university in principle since it has no principle beyond 
the university. It challenges the university by exploring the thought 
of what lies beyond the principle of reason, both in the future and 
in the present. It also insists that the university can never contain 
knowledge in its totality and that teaching is never simply a matter 
for the university. For Joyce, the only teaching worthy of the name 
is self-teaching in the radical way I have indicated. But, as every 
reader of Joyce knows, teaching oneself is a collective act. Such a 
pedagogy, as theory, points beyond its own institutional framework, 
even beyond poststructuralism as the still-emerging critical institution 
of our time. We should not be afraid to go beyond poststructuralism 
or to fail in teaching it. As Joyce urges, we should not be afraid to 
teach ourselves or, like Issy in Finnegans Wake, be ashamed to be 
"selfthought" (FW 147.9). 
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From Catechism to Catachresis: 
Aspects of Joycean Pedagogy in 
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake 
LORRAINE WEIR 
. . .there is nothing more wonderful than a list, instrument of 
wondrous hypotyposis, 
—Eco, The Name of the Rose 
Catachresis, catafalque, cataglottism: tropes of the Fall in Derrick s 
Glas, signs of the inevitability of the author, of authority, and of the 
interrogation of sign and signature which the text both provokes and 
inscribes. 
Catachresis. . .n. 1. Trope wherein a word is diverted from its 
proper sense and is taken up in common language to designate 
another thing with some analogy to the object initially ex­
pressed; for example, a tongue [langue], since the tongue is 
the chief organ of spoken language; a looking glass. . .a leaf 
of paper. . .It is also a catachresis to say: ironclad with gold; 
to ride a hobbyhorse. . .2. Musical term. Harsh and unfamiliar 
dissonance. 
E. Karax/CJOT?, abuse, from Kara, against, xpfiois, usage. (2) 
Cataglottism, the "use of abstruse words," becomes catafalque, bearer 
of the corpse of language and authorial imprimatur\ becomes cata­
chresis, the transformation of language through the trope of cata­
glottism enshrined through the agency of death upon a catafalque 
(author, book, reader, arche-text, writing) which is the Fall, tomb 
(tombe) and tome of the catachretic text. Thus Derrida encodes not 
only the cycle of Finnegans Wake from Tim Finnegans fall to Pi's 
rise but of the "phall" (FW 4.15) of language across the Joyce system 
from catachresis to catechism, from syllogism to epiphany, by way of 
the glassy medium of the medieval speculum, a dream with a death-
knell built into it. Glas. 
If Portrait, Ulysses, and Finnegans Wake—the major components 
of the Joyce system—constitute a specula/tive text (a text, in other 
words, which operates according to the textual program characteristic 
of the medieval speculum or "mirror" form), those glyphic devices 
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or sigla,1 which serve in the Wake as metonymic operators of marked 
data, may be found in varying forms elsewhere within the system, 
functioning in similar ways. Thus where a reader like S. L. Goldberg 
in The Classical Temper sees the Joyce system as an essentially Realist 
one moving toward glyphic disintegration, we may also see a predom­
inantly specula/tive pedagogy which teaches readerly modes of pro­
grammed iteration as a strategy of world-building in and for itself; a 
"Gothic pedagogy"2 with what Kenneth Burke refers to in The 
Rhetoric of Religion as the "god-term" disseminated among the 
semes and sigla of the work, from SD and LB to Fl and A, among 
others; a learning system which segments its materials sequentially 
into questions and answers, and simultaneously into epiphanies, puns, 
and riddles. Throughout, the diachronic serves as vehicle for the 
synchronic which is its goal: ironically, a Tune strategy, " then" and 
"now" always having the significance of macrocosmic statement, in 
the Book of Kells with its optical interlacing (to use Vinaver's term) 
as in the speculum and the liturgy with their topoi and rituals of 
declension and gesture. 
This paper takes three of Joyce's system's major technics— 
syllogism, catechism, and the kernel trope of catachresis—and provides 
a necessarily brief account of some of their interactions and functions.3 
My intention here is primarily to suggest some of these semiotic 
operations in terms of Ulysses as focal text rather than to demonstrate 
their workings across the whole system. Readers uncomfortable with 
the assumptions and lexicon of Eco-ian semiotics and information 
theory may find that Ulysses disappears in the process. My point, 
however, is precisely that Ulysses is programmed process—in other 
words, that the text encodes specific processual moves—, and that we 
encounter the " 'finished' text merging with its own development," 
as Michael Groden puts it (157-58), not only when we work with 
the Gabler edition of the text but whenever we take up Ulysses in 
whichever edition we use.4 
1. Syllogism 
In the midst of a catechetically structured recital of the ills to which 
life is subject, "Ithaca" 's narrator asks, Did Stephen participate in 
his dejection? 
He affirmed his significance as a conscious rational animal pro­
ceeding syllogistically from the known to the unknown and a 
conscious rational reagent between a micro and a macrocosm 
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ineluctably construed upon the incertitude of the void. (U-G 
1535) 
The unknown macrocosm, the void, is a place, a locus on a memory 
chain, a destination attainable through the exercise of the syllogism. 
A vehicle of parallax and of parallactic enactment of the text, SD's 
syllogism is grounded in the act of reading as root paradigm. "Sig­
natures of all things I am here to read" says SD (U-G 75). Like LB, 
he erodes any distinction between animate and inanimate in his quest 
for understanding of the substance, the mode of operation and being 
of all creation. "[SJeaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty 
boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs. . . " : like the Ballast 
office clock, already catalogued, significant, waiting to "be epiphan­
ized," followed by a "dog s bark" (U-G 93) and a dead dog, by 
SD's lips which "lipped and mouthed fleshless lips of air: mouth to 
her moomb. Oomb, allwombing tomb" (U-G 97). 
Death woven into the possibility of life creates the end-term: 
infinity, the end of the catalogue, no supplement possible; the 
defining term of the Joycean syllogism in Ulysses. "See now. There 
all the time without you: and ever shall be, world without end" (U 
75), the doxology with its end-term suppressed ("Amain" as Fin­
negans Wake gives it—FW 81.08). The end is the book itself, 
graphically represented in Ithaca by the transcoding of LB through 
the language of sleep and into punctuation: 
Going to dark bed there was a square round Sinbad the Sailor 
roc's awk's egg in the right of the bed of all the awks of the 
rocs of Darkinbad the Brightdayler'' 
Where? (U-G 1633) 
Thus the middle term is suppressed within the system, leaving the 
first and last terms, SD and MB, Telemachia and Nostos, in balance. 
In this transsignifying, syllogistic process, SD is the reagent, LB 
the field of enactment, and MB the occasion of transsignification. If, 
at the referential mimetic level, incertitude is what is being enacted 
throughout 16 June 1904, at the processual mimetic one it is the 
point of parallactic infinity, the naming of all the parts of this "world 
without end." At the end of "Circe," the ghostly Rudy is bound in 
speculary reading paradigmatic of the transience of performance as 
well as of text and reader, and of their illusory nature. Later, in the 
"Ithaca" chapter, LB arrives at a similar point from a different 
trajectory: 
Was this affirmation apprehended by Bloom? 
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Not verbally. Substantially. (U-G 1535) 
—not understanding, not cognition but apprehension and apprehen­
sion which moves a stage beyond LB's inaudible speaking of Rudy s 
name during the vision. Here there are no words: apprehension has 
reached its ulti-mate form as substance. The very stuff of being, the 
wholeness and particularity of SD's statement, is consumed in this 
Joussean eating of the book. So LB models the reception of the 
performance-text in his role as "conscious reactor against the void of 
incertitude" (U-G 1625). But, in contrast to SD's emphasis on the 
void, LB's on incertitude character-izes the reader's primary analytic 
task in the Joyce system: to submit to textual programming, thereby 
reducing the incertitude occasioned by the bias of referential mimesis 
toward kerygmatic reading. Beginning to move beyond the surfaces 
of plot and character (to the extent that these devices are used in 
Portrait, Ulysses, and the Wake) as a means of reader orientation, 
the apprentice reader approaches the different surfaces of the system's 
processual mimetic techne. In other words, the referential micro­
structure serves the primary purpose of situating the competent reader 
within the textual syllogism which requires the response demanded 
by all performative discourse: enactment of the weaving of the macro­
structure according to textual program. When our sense of readerly 
balance falters and what Kenneth Burke refers to in Language as 
Symbolic Action as the "terministic screen" (44) of the microstructure 
dominates our reading, the system contains us within a complexity 
of semiosis for which the referential cannot begin to account. 
Motivation, then, or the intratextual factoring of the text by such 
elements as parallax (in the Formalist sense of motiv: a recurrent unit 
acquiring meaning beyond its basic semantic value as a result of 
repetition across the text or any portion of it)—or "looking back, 
in a retrospective kind of arrangement" (U-G 1423)—mimes the 
semiotic operations of the system as a whole. Through the co/incidence 
of units comprising the motiv, the system finds one agent of synchrony 
or the achievement of, as it were, the strengthening of its paradigmatic 
axis. This operation is what "Oxen of the Sun" refers to as "retro­
gressive metamorphosis" (U-G 849) since such readerly cognitive 
processing must always be the consequence of rereading, reflection, 
analysis. "Da capo," as the instruction puts it in "Sirens" (U-G 
627). In this mnemonic exercise, "Ithaca" provides rhythmo-tatechetk 
training^, the response paradigms generated by its techne (that is, by 
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its encoded performative directives) hypostatizing what Michel Beau-
jour has referred to as "topo-logy," the logic and logospecificity of 
topos and place, troping the performative discourse of the text and 
modeling its most basic semiotic operations. 
2. Catechism 
In the course of his study of the Gospels as "a narrative semiotics," 
Louis Marin reflects on the meaning of locus, "place," in the context 
of the discovery of Christ's empty tomb: 
The fact that this place (locus) is a tomb and that the absence 
is that of a disappeared cadavre introduces into the semantic 
dimension of history the transformation of topography into topos, 
of locus of space into locus of speech (parole),'' 
Marcel Jousse's concept of the "rhythmo-catechizing" process encoded 
within the Gospels here intersects with Marin's theory at the point 
where catechism takes over from event for with the disappearance of 
the body comes the disappearance of authority. As the medieval 
cliche puts it, there can be no auctoritas without the divine auctor 
whose presence suffuses the text with meaning.7 Thus the necessarily 
parallactic enactment of the catechetical techne mimes not the recovery 
of the author but the recovery of the topoi in the process of readerly 
enactment of the performance-text. Like the holistic gestural enact­
ment of the Gospels in the liturgy, the processing of Joycean 
performative discourse requires a training process in the recognition 
of what "is epiphanised" (SH 211) within the text at the motivic 
level as well as at other levels of patterning across each component 
of the system. Thus the parallactic "topo-logy" of "Ithaca" with its 
catechetical response paradigms becomes a massive review exercise 
and we are put through our dramatistic paces. 
Central to that catechistic process is an accommodation of 
typography to topography epitomized in the rhetorical figure of 
topograpbia* a semantic correlative of what modern physics epito­
mizes as spacetime. Joycean topographia is, however, very different 
from Marin's understanding of the topographic transformation from 
"locus of space into locus of speech" since the Joyce system rejects 
the reification of "speech/parole" as powerfully as it does that of 
"space," and teaches us only itself. 
What we learn in "Ithaca"—as in the rest of Ulysses—is neither 
scientific nor encyclopedic but speculaluwt, which is to say modeled 
upon the medieval speculum with its hyperbole of systems and 
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elaboration of components bound not by referential or scientific 
codes of origination—as, say, the Britannica is—but only by the logic 
of their own composition and semiotic relation to other systems. 
Compare the status of the encyclopedia with its relentless struggle 
to "keep abreast of the latest knowledge," as the cliche has it; a 
struggle which evidences the drive toward the fullness of sequentiality, 
of "fact," in the face of the equally relentless incursion of mystery. 
As Vincent Descombes puts it: 
On the one hand, the name of Encyclopedia excludes the 
supplement, for this title announces that the book is meant to 
have a comprehensive coverage of its subject from A to Z. On 
the other hand, in order to be what it claims to be, the 
Encyclopedia must allow the possibility of a supplement, an 
exposition beyond Z. . . . " (56) 
"Beyond Z" is that condition which Gilles Deleuze refers to as the 
"rhizome" and Umberto Eco as the "inconceivable globality" (,5V­
miotics and the Philosophy of Language 83), a global plenitude of 
knowledge which is beyond the rational powers of the human brain. 
The encyclopedia, in other words, is grounded—in sheer vio­
lation of its apparent epistemology—in the possibility of finally 
writing Truth, of inscribing the Logos and thereby, for a moment, 
suppressing mystery. The medieval speculum, in contrast, is free of 
this burden precisely because what Barthes refers to in Sade/Fourier/ 
Loyola (3) as the logothetic ambition is denied to it. The perfection 
of the god-term is precisely what it may not inscribe except in the 
sense that catalogues grounded in the rhetorical strategy of elaboratio 
are ultimately acts of homage to the creator of such frequently 
enumerated groups as, to quote Michel Beaujour's list (32), "the 
nine heavenly spheres, the nine angelic orders, the four elements, 
the four humours of the body and the soul, the four ages of the 
world, the seven ages of man, the seven virtues and the seven deadly 
sins." If we allow for the performative nature of both liturgy and 
Joyce system, we are not far here from the world of Plumtree— 
"Peatmot. Trumplee. Moutpat. Plamtroo" (U-G 1501) or "Old 
Ollebo, M.P." (U-G 1487) or any of the response paradigms across 
the system. In performance, in enunciation, the text becomes what 
it is. As Eco puts it in The Aesthetics of Chaosmos (7), "If you 
take away the transcendent God from the symbolic world of the 
Middle Ages, you have the world of Joyce," a "world" or system 
to which Kenneth Burke's strategy of "logologizing" is applicable. 
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"If we defined 'theology' as 'words about God,' " Burke writes 
in The Rhetoric of Religion (1), "then, by 'logology' we should 
mean "words about words. " In contrast to Eco's procedure of 
subtraction, logology is a strategy of conservation and has the great 
advantage of enabling us to consider that theological statements 
"about the nature of 'God'. . -[may] be adapted mutatis mutandis 
for use as purely secular observations on the nature of words.'' This 
is a crucial maneuver since, for Burke, "men's thoughts on the 
Divine embody the principles of verbalization" (1). Logologically 
speaking, then, the speculum directs its inquiry toward the celebration 
of language in itself, a goal which can be achieved only through the 
"rhythmo-catechizing" of response paradigms whose ever-increasing 
complexity inscribes the polysemy of language itself. 
In the Joyce system, these response paradigms are mnemonic 
events in part because neither component of the catechetical paradigm 
is necessarily predictable within the sequence of which it is a part. 
Precisely because so much of what we learn through this mode will 
strike us as being—rather like the nine angelic orders—non/sense 
outside the system, the catechetical act is grounded in strict, para­
digmatic order and syntagmatic processing. Its sense, in other words, 
is defined by and within the system. Not referential value but 
mnemonic placing within the topography of the whole is the criterion 
for Joycean inscription of data. Consider LB's catechized conclusion 
about the nature of the heavens: 
That it was not a heaventree, not a heavengrot, not a heavenbeast, 
not a heavenman. That it was a Utopia, there being no known 
method from the known to the unknown. . . .(U-G 1545) 
—a statement which we know to be only part of the paradigm since, 
two pages later, LB adapts SD's syllogistic procedure in the sacra­
mental elucidation of MB as "invisible attractive person. . .denoted 
by a visible splendid sign" (U-G 1547). All of which leads us to 
the traditional, coincidentally oppositive conclusion that MB is either 
a Utopian being who enables the movement from known to unknown 
or that she is the missing term of an incomplete syllogism. More 
likely, she is— like A in the Wake—aligned with the celestial sphere, 
given "Ithaca" 's earlier assertion of "The heaventree of stars hung 
with humid nightblue fruit" (U-G 1537) as the "spectacle" which 
confronts SD and LB as they emerge into the garden to urinate in 
tandem. If the association of MB with urine seems unlikely, we have 
only to think of the various chamber pot references in Ulysses and 
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of the extension of this topos in Finnegans Wake, "Fanny Urinia" 
{FW 171.28), to confirm the outlines of this response paradigm 
within the Joycean speculum.9 
If tree, grot, beast, man, and water make neither a heaven nor 
a Utopia, it is clear that they are at least elements of a knowable, 
cataloguable system, a speculum mundi which inevitably includes 
both love and hate as well. They are terms on LB's memory wheel: 
'Hate. Love. Those are names. Rudy. Soon I am old" (U-G 615). 
Fulfilling Emile Benveniste's principle that "an utterance is perfor­
mative insofar as it names the act performed. . The utterance is 
the act; the utterer performs the act by naming it" (274), this 
present-tense naming performs the act it utters but the performance 
is a complex one for we can respond adequately to such dramatistic 
demands only to the extent that we have acquired performance-
competence.10 Catachresis serves to assist our achievement of that 
pedagogical goal. 
3. Catachresis 
However ekphrastic the moment, however recapitulative the motiv/ 
ation, the textual performance must end.'* And that end must be 
inscribed within the system as well, inscribed so fully that the 
moment of semantic infinity—the moment when parallax at last 
accepts the intersection of its lines—will also be part of the gestural 
repertoire. This is the function of the pun, a form of catachresis or 
"misuse" which epitomizes the Joyce system's defiance of the on­
tological primacy of sequentiality in the act of reading. Where 
catechism is structurally dialogical, catachresis in its punning form is 
syllogistic, its middle term dispersed from the immediate occasion 
across the system. A device of segregation and dissociation in Joyce, 
catachresis mimes the Babel of all language, temporarily hazarding 
a creative aphasia. But used within a system characterized by a high 
degree of redundancy and motivic patterning, and itself inscribed 
within the text's motiv /ation, catachresis has the effect of ictus, a 
term whose neurological meaning is as useful here as its poetic one. 
Ictus refers to that brief pause which comes before the beginning of 
certain kinds of epileptic seizure, a pause which stands in double 
relation to the ensuing event for it is both warning of a time of 
disruption to be suffered within the neurological system and last 
brief space of clear, sometimes heightened awareness before inter­
ruption of consciousness occurs. In the language of poetics, ictus 
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denotes the stress falling on the long syllable of a metrical foot but, 
as the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics reminds us, the 
term was also used by Horace and Quintilian "to describe the 
movement of the foot or the hand in keeping time with the rhythm 
of a verse," (362) a kinesic gesture associated with Joussean rhythmo­
catechizing. 
In a system characterized by processual mimesis, ictus mimes 
the moment of death or semantic infinity within the "double gesture" 
(to use Derrida s term from "The Double Session") of catachresis. 
Like epiphany, catachresis serves to clear an opening in language, to 
interrupt the relentlessness of inscription and enact the absence of 
name. As a single event, catachresis attempts to subvert the memory 
system built up through enactment of catechetical performative 
discourse while retaining the place of mnemonics within the semiosis 
of the system. Attempting to sustain the instant of transsignification 
by intensifying the polyvalence of that operation, catachresis refuses 
to accede to the semantic demands of conversion and remains 
grounded in the iterability of the word and in its status within the 
logothetic economy of performative utterance. Analogous to Freudian 
dreamwork, catachresis synthesizes question and response, past and 
future, manifest and latent, catalyzing dichotomies into polyvalent 
units within the memory system. But this analogy is a partial one 
at best for Joycean catachresis, as a strategy of the specu/altive mode, 
works in triumphant rejection of mystery—or, in terms of Freud's 
ontotheology, of the "unconscious" with its claims to encyclopedic 
rather than specu/altive operation.12 Like parody, catachresis functions 
in this context as a device of programmed enunciation and sometimes 
of homage, rather than of kerygmatic proclamation. And like epiph­
any, catachresis epitomizes the system's defiance of the ontological 
primacy of sequentiality in the act of reading, attempting through 
the dissemination and re/collection of its terms to test the memory 
system built up in the course of its own enactment in performance. 
While "Ithaca" provides an extended initiation into the cate­
chetical mode and a rigorous exercising of dialogical procedures 
present in elementary form since the beginning of the Portrait," 
Finnegans Wake develops catachresis by way of Vico's "Mental 
Dictionary" in The New Science (par. 482) and his concepts of poetic 
geography and poetic etymology (par. 527). To those concepts both 
geometry and hieroglyphics are essential in the Science Nuova and 
in the Wake where in II.ii the catechetical exercise of schoolboy 
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lessons is repeatedly fractured, first by ±'s interjections which mime 
the effect of catachresis, and later by the geomater diagram or 
catachresis in Euclidean glyphic form. Elsewhere I have argued that 
it is the Vichian principle of morphogenesis—that is, of textual 
decomposition, deconstruction and code-generation—which governs 
the performative discourse of the Wake. In the case of the geomater 
diagram, the "keys to" (FW 628.15) this process are not only given 
but displayed topographically through a double gesture conjoining 
catechism and catachresis across that anatomically discursive space 
which has been particularly involved in the production of what Vico 
refers to as "interpatratio" (par. 448), the fathers interpretation. 
In the Wake, then, catachresis is concerned with "scribings 
scrawled on eggs" (FW 615.10): the inscription of language through 
the body, in terms of it, and upon it, whether the flesh in question 
be A's, C's, or the "hides and hints and misses in prints" (FW 
20.11) of the "mamafesta." Logologically considered, sacramental 
transformation is syllogistic transsignification (in becoming word, 
flesh decays into process). The result: "silents selfloud" (FW 261.11), 
the Wake's resolution of catachresis into Vico's highest form of 
language: the silence of the gods before the first thunderword 
provoking human experience of fear, marriage, warfare, organized 
religion, and the modern state. Taking Vico's catalogue as one basis 
for its speculative history, the Wake inscribes the moment of ictus— 
of that instant of suspended comprehension which is the syllogistic 
moment of catachresis as trope—at the center of the system. In 
doing so, the system moves constantly toward its own closure in 
response, its own opening in surprise and silence. 
NOTES 
1. Cf. Roland McHugh's use of this term in The Stgla of Finnegans Wake 
to signify a mode of "personality condensation" (10 ff). I extend the use of the 
term here to the other components of the Joyce system, an application for which 
Joycean precedent may be found in, for example, Buffalo Notebook VI.C.7 in The 
James Joyce Archive, vol. 27. 
2. I owe this phrase to my colleague Patricia Merivale who uses it in a very 
different sense in her article, "Learning the Hard Way: Gothic Pedagogy in the 
Modern Romantic Quest." 
3. This paper is a portion of a book on the poetics of the Joyce system. I 
am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for 
funding in support of this project and for a grant in aid of my participation in the 
Tenth International James Joyce Symposium in Copenhagen, June 1986. 
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4. With the semiotic concept of process used here, compare John Paul 
Riquelme's phenomenological approach to the "oscillating perspective" of the reader, 
and Wolfgang Iser's of the shifting "pictures" presented by the narrative. 
5. On Marcel Jousse's concepts of rhythmo-catechizing and mnemonic gesture, 
see Weir, "The Choreography of Gesture: Marcel Jousse and Finnegans Wake." 
6. Louis Marin "Du corps au texte: propositions metaphysiques sur l'origine 
du recit" Esprit 423 (1973): 925, quoted in Beaujour, 308. 
7. See AJ . Minnis (10 ff.) on auctor and auctoritas. 
8. See Gerard Le Coat The Rhetoric of the Arts, 1350-1630, 49. 
9. Among the many studies of this element, see Solomon, 77-80. 
10. On the catechetical "method of narration," compare Shari Benstock and 
Bernard Benstock, "The Benstock Principle," 19. 
11. See Krieger, 105-28. 
12. For a development of this argument, see Weir, "Performing the Dream­
work: Vichian Morphogenesis in Finnegans Wake," forthcoming. 
13. A detailed discussion of this part of the system will be found in Weir, 
"Barthes' Loyola /Joyce's Portrait (Taxonomy and Paradigm)." 
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ALP's Final Monologue in Finnegans Wake: 
The Dialectical Logic of Joyce's Dream Text 
KIMBERLY DEVLIN 
The female in Finnegans Wake assumes a number of represen­
tational forms within the dream text: verbal object, the topic of the 
washerwomen's gossip (FW 1.8); visual object, the geometrical diagram 
studied during the math lesson (II.2); writing subject, a hypothetical 
author of the letter (1.5); and speaking subject, an imagined witness 
at the deposition (III.3). In their respective essays on Issy and ALP 
in Women in Joyce, Shari Benstock and Margot Norris both convinc­
ingly argue that the images of the female in the Wake are dialectically 
structured, a series of psychological reversals and oppositions, shaped 
by the male dreamer's fears and desires. The female emerges as an 
enigmatic "other," as a being whose nature is finally only speculative, 
as a perspectival abyss that the dreamer recurrently tries to plumb 
("First he was living to feel what the eldest daughter she was panseying 
and last he was dying to know what old Madre Patriack does be up 
to" [FW 408]). As an elusive element, she appropriately finds her 
correlative in nature in the mobile and protean river, whose essence 
can never quite be captured and contained, and whose imagined 
babbling voice cannot always be clearly understood ("With lipth she 
lithpeth to him all to time of thuch on thuch and thow on thow. 
She he she ho she ha to la. Hairfluke, if he could bad twig her! 
Impalpabunt, he abhears. The soundwaves are his buffeteers; they 
trompe him with their trompes" [FW 23]). The larger dialectical 
representation of the female as speaking or writing subject, on the 
one hand, and as viewed or discussed object, on the other, may reflect 
the dreamer's attempt to envision this "other" point of view, coun­
tered by a recognition of its inaccessibility, its remoteness. 
ALP's closing monologue seems to mitigate the uncompromising 
otherness of the female principle in the Wake: critics suggest that 
here we finally hear the actual voice of ALP, even those who elsewhere 
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in their analyses take into account the dream's unmistakably male 
subjectivity. Benstock, for example, suggests that ALP's monologue 
is divorced from the rest of the Wake, providing "an alternate vision 
against which Earwicker's dream vision can be measured" (177), and 
discusses the final pages of the dream as if they were not colored by 
male wishes and fears, as if their narrative status were comparable to 
that of Molly's soliloquy at the close of Ulysses: "It is left to Anna 
Livia, who has the final word' in the novel, to confirm the future 
for her daughter. . .ALP's hints seem to suggest that diverse and 
flighty Issy will grow into the calm and unified mother/wife that 
Anna Livia now is" (190-191). Give Hart describes the final pages 
of the book as "the closest thing to 'interior monologue' in Finnegans 
Wake, " as a "stream of almost unmodified Dublin speech" (55). In 
The Decentered Universe o/Finnegans Wake, Norris grants the speech 
a similar standing, implying that we actually hear "leafy speafing" 
(FW 619), the feminine voice unmediated by the dreamer's con­
sciousness (96-97). In her more recent essay in Women in Joyce, she 
emphasizes the interpretive obstacles raised by the book's ending, 
though without resolving them: 
We must understand the dreaming male figure in order to 
understand the female figure. Yet Joyce, paradoxically, sets up a 
hermeneutical spiral in Finnegans Wake through which the best 
insights into the condition of HCE (presumably the male dreamer) 
are given by Anna Livia in her final monologue. This interpretive 
doubling is a bit like Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass, 
where we are momentarily in doubt whether Alice dreams the 
Red Knight or the Red Knight dreams Alice [sic]. (199) 
This "hermeneutical spiral," I would argue, characterizes the 
structure of not simply the final monologue, but the entire dream 
text: although HCE does envision himself speaking at several points, 
most of the information (or misinformation) we are given about him 
is mediated, delivered via imagined others. Within this narrative 
constructed around the hypothetical viewpoints of other, HCE is 
logically identified as the dreamer not because he is the central 
"speaker," but rather because he is the central "spoken of"—all 
narrative roads seem to lead to him. The final speech, I think, is a 
continuation of this ex-centric dream text, the female voice imagined 
yet again, the fantasized voice of a fantasized other, discoursing 
primarily upon the dream's favorite subject—the dreamer himself. 
The Wake critics who imply the voice is "real" overlook the fact that 
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the closing monologue contains reversals and contraries which make 
little sense on the level of realistic or waking narrative, and that it 
generates multilayered images typical of condensed, overdetermined 
visions of dream. The verbal and visual ambiguities of the speech, 
moreover, work dialectically, following the logic seen elsewhere in the 
Wake, expressing connected anxieties and desires. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the dream text of the Wake betrays 
a male fear of the female "eye" (the literal visual organ and the 
alien perspective it represents) as an unwelcome critical vantage point, 
as an agency of potential exposure ("The Female Eye" passim). In 
the final monologue, though, ALP is imagined tactfully censoring her 
visual field, reassuring her spouse that she will not look at him in 
his fallen state, that she will think instead of how he looked when 
young: 
Maybe that's why you hold your hodd as if. And people thinks 
you missed the scaffold. Of fell design. I'll close me eyes. So not 
to see. Or see only a youth in his florizel, a boy in innocence, 
peeling a twig, a child beside a weenywhite steed. (FW 621) 
This image of the politely veiled female eye, blocking out unpleasant 
sights and replacing them with happier ones, provides an apt correl­
ative for the dominant discourse of the final monologue: the kindly, 
optimistic, and circumlocutory speech is the verbal equivalent of ALP's 
censored gaze. As constituted by her language here, ALP is endowed 
with many of the trappings of a fantasy woman, a male ideal of the 
perfect wife—adoring, soothing, forgiving, and redemptive (although 
this is only one extreme of a dialectical image). Her mellifluous voice 
becomes the agent of renewal in itself, bidding HCE to rise and 
giving him the encouragement to do so. The close of the dream, I 
would like to suggest, represents an invalid's vision of being revived 
from a coma by a caring mate, of suddenly waking up from a deathlike 
state—a sort of plausible version of the "Tim Finnegan's Wake" 
song. It is surely a wishful vision, but also a fearful one, the dreamer 
imagining not simply revival, but also how he might be treated and 
spoken to upon his return to the world of the waking—the pictured 
situation is not altogether heartening. 
During the first part of the monologue, ALP is represented 
performing a series of nurturing and redemptive activities for HCE: 
laying out clean laundry, boosting his ego, taking him on a rejuven­
atory outing, speaking to him with fondness and optimism. But her 
monologue generates a double discourse, the surface statement often 
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contrasting with the insinuation, the sanguine circumlocution with 
the sad implication. ALP's inventory of HCE's apparel, for instance 
("Here is your shirt, the day one, come back. The stock, your collar. 
Also your double brogues. A comforter as well" [FW 619]), may 
evoke a simple domestic image of a wife picking out her husband's 
clothes, or a sadder vision of her helping an invalid get dressed, 
perhaps even trying to reteach him the names of common objects. 
Indeed, the emphasis on identification, naming, and basic recall at 
many points in the speech may imply an assumption (on her part) 
of a derangement in the mental faculties that control such abilities: 
HCE envisions himself being addressed as a victim of senility, as a 
person well into his second childhood. Her offer to hold her spouse's 
"great bearspaw" (FW 621) when they go on their imagined walk is 
a gesture that can be construed as affectionate, romantic even, or 
utterly humiliating: it may reveal the dreamer's anticipated unstead­
iness and his need of guidance, for at points in this closing dream 
vision he does not seem to know where he is ("You know where I 
am bringing you? You remember?" [FW 622]). ALP's remarks on 
the locales that they pass sound, on one level, like idle and friendly 
conversation, but betray, on another, HCE's possible disorientation. 
He seems to envision himself in a situation identical to Rip van 
Winkle's, returning to a world suspiciously unfamiliar to him, awak­
ening from what he feels has been a single night's sleep only to find 
his environs have drastically changed. The dream woman is heard 
passing off this change as perfectly natural and plausible, pretending 
that cities can literally spring up over night, presumably in order to 
circumvent the truth of the dreamer's prolonged slumber: "Why, 
them's the muchrooms, come up during the night. Look, agres of 
roofs in parshes. Dom on dam, dim in dym. And a capital part for 
Olympics to ply at" (FW 625). When one inquires into the logical 
motives behind the imagined speech acts that comprise the final 
monologue disturbing possibilities frequently emerge, creating a sub­
text that bespeaks all too clearly the dreamer's dread of his own 
potential helplessness and subsequent infantilization. 
The proposed rejuvenatory outing is envisioned as a return to a 
romantic spot on Howth from ALP's and HCE's earlier days together 
("You'll know our way from there surely. Flura's way. Where once 
we led so many car couples have follied since" \FU" 623]), with the 
young courting couple represented as primordial lovers, succeeded 
by countless others, including no doubt Molly and Leopold Bloom 
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("All quiet on Howth now. The distant hills seem. Where we. The 
rhododendrons. .All that old hill has seen. Names change: that's 
all. Lovers: yum yum" [U 377]). At the end of the Wake, as at the 
end of Ulysses, sexual reminiscence provides a means of psychic 
rejuvenation, though ALP uses it to revive the other rather than the 
self, recalling for HCE his gentler moments as a lover as well as his 
fiercer ones ("One time you'd stand fornenst me, fairly laughing, in 
your bark and tan billows of branches for to fan me coolly. And I'd 
lie as quiet as a moss. And one time you'd rush upon me, darkly 
roaring, like a great black shadow with a sheeny stare to perce me 
rawly" [FW 626]). The ensuing fond recollection of their marriage 
vows, however, turns suddenly sad as ALP realizes that the death 
described then as the remote and hypothetical condition of separation 
has become a not-so-distant reality ("How you said how you'd give 
me the keys of me heart. And we'd be married till delth to uspart. 
And though dev do espart. O mine!. .And can it be it's nnow 
fforvell?" [FW 626]). The nostalgic return to the past in Finnegans 
Wake has a very different associative and affective end point than in 
Ulysses, the return evoking not simply memories of initial union but 
also the projected moment of parting. 
The most disturbing ambiguity of the outing lies in the way it 
is described, ALP referring to it as a "journee saintomichael" (FW 
621)—a journey sentimental or a journey to Saint Michael, whom 
Adaline Glasheen identifies as "the receiver of the souls of the 
dead" (193). The thought of being escorted to the spot of a romantic 
tryst becomes confused with the thought of being escorted to the 
grave, as in a funeral ritual, sexual "death" perhaps being associated 
with actual death, the first sexual fall with the final physical fall 
into mortality. The implied psychological linking of different types 
of "falls" here has clear precedent in "Circe": when the nannygoat 
present at the Blooms' lovemaking on Howth enters the parade of 
phantasms, a vision immediately ensues of Bloom falling "from the 
Lion's Head cliff into the purple waiting waters' (U 550). In 
Finnegans Wake the association is synchronic rather than diachronic, 
the envisioned journey emerging as a dual-layered image, like a 
picture produced from two negatives. The dreamer imagines his wife 
leading him to the tip of Howth Head or to the outermost bourne, 
the afterlife, to the house of the Earl of Howth or to the house of 
God: 
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We might call on the Old Lord, what do you say? There's 
something tells me. He is a fine sport. Like the score and a 
moighty went before him. And a proper old promnentory. His 
door always open. For a newera's day. Much as your own is. 
You invoiced him last Eatster so he ought to give us hockockles 
and everything. Remember to take off your white hat, ech? 
When we come in the presence. And say hoothoothoo, ithmu­
thisthy! His is house of laws. {FW 623) 
Previously in the dream, HCE has had explicit visions of his wife 
not only interring him, loaming him from head to foot, but also 
actually weaving his grim fate, like an implacable goddess of destiny: 
"Now she's borrid his head under Hatesbury's Hatch and loamed 
his fate to old Love Lane" (FW 578). In the final monologue the 
image of the woman burying the dead male is more strongly repressed, 
carefully hidden beneath an antithetical screen vision, an image of 
her trying to rejuvenate him. 
As the couple travel in the dreamer's mind from inland out 
towards the open sea, ALP eventually acknowledges her own fatigue 
("For I feel I could near to faint away. Into the deeps") and the 
increasing frailty of her own senses: "Illas! I wisht I had better 
glances to peer to you through this baylights growing. But you're 
changing, acoolsha, you're changing from me, I can feel. Or is it 
me is? I'm getting mixed" (FW 626). ALP's concessions of personal 
debility and her sudden confusion as to who is "changing" signal 
a major reversal, a key switching of roles, providing the first definite 
hints that it is the female—and not the male—who is ultimately 
envisioned as dying. Shortly afterwards, however, ALP insinuates that 
she is not actually dying, but rather is sneaking off, running away 
from the family she has become disgusted with, tired of their failure 
to take an interest in her concerns or to appreciate her sacrifices: 
A hundred cares, a tithe of troubles and is there one who 
understands me? One in a thousand of years of the nights? All 
me life 1 have been lived among them but now they are becoming 
lothed to me. And I am lothing their little warm tricks. And 
lothing their mean cosy turns. And all the greedy gushes out 
through their small souls. And all the lazy leaks down over their 
brash bodies. How small it's all!. . I'll slip away before they're 
up. They'll never see. Nor know. Nor miss me. (I'll" 627) 
The final vision of the ]Xrake reflect's the male's fear of being 
abandoned by his weary mate—a fear, according to Richard Ellmann, 
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that Joyce himself was only too familiar with.1 The dream woman's 
embittered lament sounds like it comes from an overworked and 
disillusioned housewife, leaving it ambiguous as to whether she 
departs through death or fatigued disloyalty. 
This final female confession of disillusionment and despair is 
not unanticipated. Throughout the monologue, disgruntled com­
plaints qualify the professions of tenderness and love, just as surely 
as the veiled allusions to a funeral ritual undermine the encouraging 
discussion of a rehabilatory walk, a critical female voice interrupting 
the dominant strand of the discourse with incremental recurrence. 
The speech contains yet another subversive subtext, related to HCE's 
sense of his spouse's estimation of him, a subtext that stands in 
dialectic opposition to the image of ALP as adoring wife. One of 
the first hints of dissatisfaction is heard when ALP concedes the 
vanity of her high hopes for her husband's future, her unfulfilled 
dreams of his attaining royal honors or at least a position of municipal 
power: "He might knight you an Armor elsor daub you the first 
cheap magyerstrape.. . .And I'll be your aural eyeness. But we vain. 
Plain fancies. It's in the castles air" {FW 623). The disappointment 
here is expressed in mild and even self-reproachful terms, but shortly 
afterwards ALP closes her remembrance of HCE's architectural am­
bitions to "scale the summit" with the more straightforward accu­
sation: "All your graundplotting and the little it brought!" {FW 
624). At the end of her speech she acknowledges even more frankly 
the discrepancy between her wishful estimation of her husband and 
the reality of his achievements: "I thought you were all glittering 
with the noblest of carriage. You're only a bumpkin. I thought you 
the great in all things, in guilt and in glory. You're but a puny" 
{FW 627). The female voice grows more and more overtly dissatisfied, 
ALP ending her speech with both a verbal and physical rejection of 
her spouse. As the fantasy of the adoring and forgiving helpmate 
gives way to the more mundane and disturbing vision of the 
malcontent housewife, the image of the male self that this female 
other creates and defines crumbles simultaneously. 
This subversive discourse can actually be traced to the mono­
logue's very outset, in what sounds on the surface like unequivocal 
flattery: "You make me think of a wonderdecker I once. Or somebalt 
thet sailder, the man megallant, with the bangled ears. Or an earl 
was he, at Lucan? Or, no, it's the Iren duke's I mean" {FW 620). 
This verbal image of ALP comparing HCE to various heroes and 
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adventurers, both mythic and real, appears to be a blatantly gratifying 
and egotistical fantasy, until one remembers that elsewhere in the 
dream HCE is Van der Decken, he is Sinbad, he is Magellan, he is 
Wellington, the Iron Duke. ALP's "compliment" reduces what was 
hitherto metaphorical to mere simile. The ultimately deflationary 
intent of the comparison is hinted at in the word "wonderdecker," 
which combines the captain of Wagner's The Flying Dutchman (Van 
der Decken) with wonderdoktor, the Dutch word for a quack 
(McHugh 620). This ironic conflation and the emphasis on mere 
similitude both make clear that HCE's prior heroic guises are simply 
wishful imagoes, quixotic masks. 
Prior to the close of the final monologue, the dreamer's 
preeminent concerns have been his own guilty desires and fears, his 
own human mortality. The unsettling image of the wife's departure 
or demise may seem to indicate a sudden male sensitivity to the 
frustrations felt by the female, a lapse in that egocentricity which 
Freud argued characterizes the dreamworld (301). But as Joyce shows 
through the figure of Simon Dedalus in Ulysses, the thought of a 
spouse's death can occasion a sadness that is in part selfish, rooted 
not only in sorrow for the absent mate but also maudlin self-pity. 
Simon laments not only his wife's death but also the more personal 
repercussions of it, the imagined effect it has had on his own familial 
position: "You're like the rest of them, are you?" Mr. Dedalus 
grumbles to Dilly. "An insolent pack of little bitches since your 
poor mother died.. Wouldn't care if I was stretched out stiff. He's 
dead. The man upstairs is dead" (U 238). The fallen patriarch of 
the Wake betrays very similar fears about how he will be treated by 
his female offspring, but protects himself from the fate of Simon 
Dedalus through a sanguine fantasy: he hears the departing ALP 
reassuring him that the daughter will be "sweet for you as I was 
when I came down out of my mother" (FW 627). The anxiety 
occasioned by the wife's possible flight is negated by wishful thoughts 
of union with her younger incarnation—a clear example of psycho­
logical compensation betraying the dreamer's concern with how 
marital disaffection and defection would personally affect him. 
In Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake Clive Hart has 
demonstrated that ALP's monologue contains a significant cluster of 
verbal echoes of phrases from the end of "Eveline" (53-55). Indeed, 
the close of the Wake and the disturbing story from Dubliners share 
not only specific resonances but also a larger situational similarity. 
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Just as the Wake suggests that ALP's flight is motivated by maternal 
fatigue, by "a hundred cares, a tithe of troubles," "Eveline" similarly 
hints that Mrs. Hill's death is precipitated by the day-to-day demands 
placed on her as mother and wife: she has led "that life of 
commonplace sacrifice closing in final craziness" (D 40), a final 
craziness that ALP shares, conceding that she has grown "loonely in 
me loneness"(FIF 627)—not only lonely but also loony. In both 
works the departing mother expects that the dutiful daughter will 
take her place. Young Eveline must raise "the two young children 
who had been left to her charge" (D 38), having given her ailing 
mother "her promise to keep the home together as long as she 
could" (D 40). ALP also expresses a hope that her family will stay 
together—"Try not to part! Be happy, dear ones!"—and leaves in 
her wake "a daughterwife from the hills again" (FW 627—note the 
allusion to Eveline's last name). The father's desire for the daughter, 
blatant in the dreamworld, finds a more devious and sinister outlet 
in the waking reality of Dubliners. Eveline lives in fear of her father's 
violence, afraid that he might "go for her," even though she is 
nineteen, well beyond the age when children are reprimanded through 
physical punishments: "she knew that it was that that had given 
her the palpitations" (D 38). The aggressive father in the Wake has 
a similar effect on the daughter, or so he imagines, Issy glossing 
"the backslapping gladhander" in her footnotes with the remark, 
"He gives me pulpititions. . .  " (FW 276). 
The palpitations of the young woman signify fear and loathing 
but also their opposite—unacknowledged desire. A repressed Electra 
complex lies at the heart of Eveline's story, a complex unwittingly 
encouraged by the defeated mother, reinforced by the bullying father, 
and unconsciously acceded to by the passive and paralyzed daughter, 
who implicitly opts for the stultifying bond to Mr. Hill over a union 
with someone her own age, a new life with Frank, however ambiguous 
and uncertain that new life may be. In Finnegans Wake, of course, 
this incestuous drama is played out not within a waking narrative of 
the daughter's thoughts, but rather in a dream narrative of the 
father's. In accordance with the perspectival shift from conscious to 
unconscious psychic life, Joyce foregrounds the taboo desire only 
hinted at in "Eveline," bringing it to the surface. Shifting from the 
daughters to the father's point of view, Joyce also represents a very 
different dialectic of anxiety and desire, significantly revising the 
outcome of the earlier short story. Although the dreaming father of 
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the Wake hopes that the daughter will dutifully replace his spouse, 
he suspects and fears simultaneously that she will not stay with him, 
that like the mother, she will abandon him. He imagines the fleeing 
ALP offering her pity, gently hinting that he will have to compete 
with a younger generation of men for the daughter's loyalties and 
affections: "I pity your oldself I was used to. Now a younger's 
there" {FW 627). Running counter to the father's incestuous desire 
for the daughter throughout the dream is the grim epiphany of 
normal generational cycles, children ineluctably replacing parents 
rather than bonding with them. 
The mother's disillusioned leavetaking at the end of the dream 
is foreshadowed much earlier, in the daughter's devious commentary 
on the grammar book in the homework lesson {FW II.2). Appended 
to the instruction that counsels Issy to "mind your genderous towards 
his reflexives such that I was to your grappa. . .when him was me 
hedon" is an exclamatory footnote that reads, "Freeh devil in red 
hairing! So that's why you ran away to sea, Mrs Lappy. Leap me, 
locklaun, for you have sensed!" {FW 268). The apparent incongruity 
between the text counseling female deference to the male and the 
marginal comment recording female disloyalty and abandonment can 
be resolved by stressing the latter's interpretive status. The daughter 
is imagined here reading between the lines of "gramma's grammar" 
{FW 268) and finding in the conventional wisdom of the maternal 
text—in its ostensible endorsement of stereotypical sex roles—an 
epiphanic explanation for ALP's flight. The subversive notation 
assumes that the older woman has in fact grown tired of acting 
"genderous" towards male "reflexives," weary of playing the wife 
who caters selflessly to her husband's whims. Although her ensuing 
departure may be a sin, it may also reflect her good sense ("Mrs 
Lappy. . .you have sensed!"). Issy is envisioned as understanding a 
silent discourse of the female text, detecting the dissatisfaction 
inherent in its advice, hearing in it not a complacent admission of 
male superiority but rather a veiled complaint against male egotism. 
This footnote is interesting to consider in the context of "Eve­
line," for Eveline too reads and understands an alternate discourse 
of the mother. Mrs. Hill's implied request to the daughter to assume 
her role and responsibilities is subverted by her final mad and 
incoherent exclamations, the specific plea qualified by the larger 
behavioral statement. The daughter perceives a sad logic behind the 
mother's retreat into lunacy and death, just as Issy intuits the logic 
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behind ALP's analogous departure in the Wake: Eveline's thought of 
her mother's "life of commonplace sacrifices closing in final craziness" 
puts selfless maternal duty and ultimate insanity into a disturbing 
cause-and-effect progression, an alarming sequence of inevitability. She 
decides to break the promise to the mother because she interprets her 
crazed demise as a counterstatement to the request, as an admonition 
of what that elicited promise may lead to. Her "sudden impulse of 
terror'' (D 40) can be best accounted for if one assumes that Eveline 
recognizes unconsciously in her mother's death a premonition of her 
own possible fate, the memory ultimately fortifying not her sense of 
duty but rather her resolve to leave. The daughter vows an active 
physical escape from her oppressed position—a contrast to the mother's 
passive psychological escape into madness—though she is pathetically 
unable to carry through her resolve, apparently forgetting the warning 
embedded in the earlier recollection. That closing scene of "Eveline" 
in which the young woman stands suspended between flight and duty 
reappears at the very end of the Wake, I would like to suggest, albeit 
in a much altered and complicated guise. 
The final vision of the dream is a highly ambiguous one, one 
that expresses both a desire and a fear through a rapid alternation 
of images. ALP's union with her "cold mad feary father" (FW 628) 
reduplicates the previously envisioned union of HCE and his "daugh­
terwife" Issy, providing an overdetermined expression of the desire 
for father-daughter incest and of the implicit attendant wish for 
recaptured youth, for eternal renewal through a bonding with the 
female child who is reminiscent of the wife when young. In this 
protean vision of human roles so typical to the dream, Issy is not 
only wishfully imagined as spouse, but ALP is also seen as daughter, 
and it is in this capacity that her final gestures—both physical and 
verbal—become most equivocal. One moment ALP is the obedient 
daughter dutifully returning to the father, but in the next she is 
the rebellious daughter, turning away from the father towards the 
younger lover, the lover whom she sees as a means of escape from 
patriarchal oppression: "it's sad and weary I go back to you, my 
cold father, my cold mad father, my cold mad feary father, till the 
near sight of mere size of him, the moyles and moyles of it, 
moananoaning, makes me seasilt saltsick and I rush, my only, into 
your arms. I see them rising! Save me from those therrble prongs!" 
(FW 627-628, my emphasis). The intensifying vision of the father's 
wrath ("my cold father, my cold mad father, my cold mad feary 
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father") and the interesting pronomial shift that follows can be 
logically connected. At first ALP addresses the father himself (as a 
"you"), but then after envisioning his increasingly threatening mien, 
she suddenly refers to him more distantly, in the third person ("the 
mere size of him"), so that she is now imagined talking about the 
father to someone else. This second addressee is the lover to whom 
she ultimately turns for a saving embrace ("I rush, my only, into 
your arms...Save me from those therrble prongs!"), like Eveline 
fantasizing about Frank before she leaves home ("Frank would take 
her in his arms, fold her in his arms. He would save her" [D 40]). 
At the end of the earlier short story, the lover is associated with the 
sea, envisioned as the element that will drown the self ("All the 
seas of the world tumbled about her heart. He was drawing her into 
them: he would drown her" [D 4l]); at the end of the Wake the 
father himself plays this annihilating role, cast as he is as "Old 
Father Ocean" (U 50), as both the Irish and Greek sea gods, 
Mananaan ("moananoaning") and Poseidon, the latters threatening 
trident providing a rough imagistic variant of Mr. Hill's threatening 
blackthorn stick. 
The frightening image of the violent father reverses itself in the 
subsequent image of the protective father gently carrying the daughter 
along as he did when she was a child ("Carry me along, taddy, like 
you done through the toy fair!" [FW 628]). The dialectical structure 
of this mediated self-image is anticipated when ALP is envisioned 
remembering her father ambivalently ("I'm sure he squirted juice 
in his eyes to make them flash for flightening me. Still and all he 
was awful fond to me" [FW 626]), like Eveline recalling both her 
father's violence and his kindness. The double resonance of the 
phrase "Far calls. Coming, far!" (FW 628) reintrojects into the 
dream text the uncertainty of ALP's imagined response to the 
patriarch, the ambiguity of her nature—either fond, submissive, and 
childlike, or fearful, mistrusting, and defiant: she may be responding 
dutifully to the voice of the "far," the distant unknown Eveline is 
tempted by but ultimately rejects. In his mapping of the verbal 
correspondence between the end of "Eveline" and that of the Wake, 
Hart juxtaposes one of Frank's last words to Eveline—"Come!" (D 
41)—with this "Coming, far!" spoken by ALP (54). The two cries 
make sense, though, not as verbal analogies or parallelisms but as 
an entreaty and a response, as a plea and an answer. What is heard 
here on the final page of the dream, in short, are the words Eveline 
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is unable to speak. In this ambiguous rerendering of the close of 
the earlier short story, the daughter is imagined acquiescing obediently 
to the demands of the father or responding fervently to the cry of 
the lover, depending upon what one chooses to hear in that final 
equivocal "far." 
The two visions of the daughter that emerge through the rapidly 
shifting images and various verbal ambiguities are incompatible within 
the framework of a realistic narrative—the daughter cannot return to 
the father and abandon him simultaneously—but they do make sense 
as a dialectical narrative of dream. In fact I would argue that the 
logic of the Wake's seemingly contradictory ending can be best 
understood if one imagines the dreamer at this point as Mr. Hill 
and then speculates about what he might have dreamed about after 
reading Eveline's letter on the night she attempts to leave her family." 
The possibility of the daughter's departure, made clear by the letter, 
would logically produce an intensified unconscious desire for her 
loyalty, that desire expressed in such clear and overdetermined form 
at the close of the dream. Mr. Hill's probable conscious response to 
the attempted escape is anger and violence, a response apparently 
recalled in the image of the "cold mad feary father" authoritatively 
brandishing his trident or blackthorn stick: the dream text here may 
provide us with a disquieting hint of what Eveline encountered upon 
her return to the home. But the very threat of the daughter's 
departure would probably awaken in the father not only feelings of 
outrage, but also ones of vulnerability and weakness, a sense of 
uncertain control over the daughter he needs: hence the opposite 
and fearful dream vision of her opting for the lover over the father, 
defiantly breaking the familial bond. Indeed, in that final vision of 
the daughter turning away from him—both verbally and physically— 
at the sight of his "therrble prongs," the father recognizes his 
violence not as the means of controlling the daughter, but as the 
very thing that frightens her away from him: she is not simply lured 
away by another but also driven away by his aggression. If earlier in 
the Wake the daughter is envisioned as understanding a silent and 
subversive discourse of the mother, here she is imagined (on one 
level of the dialectic) as acting upon that wisdom of the malcontent, 
seeing the sense and not the sin in running away to sea, realizing 
the danger inherent in staying with the father and the attraction of 
that mysterious "far." 
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At the end of her monologue ALP embraces the sexual, imag­
ining her own erotic surrender: "If I seen him bearing down on me 
now under whitespread wings like he'd come from Arkangels, I sink 
I'd die down over his feet, humbly, dumbly, only to washup" {FW 
628). The image stands in opposition to one of Eveline's closing 
visions at the station, her "glimpse of the black mass of the boat" 
(D 40), inverting color (black/white), religious association (Black 
Mass/Annunciation, demonic/angelic), and implicit emotional effect 
(fright/acceptance), while maintaining the linking impression of 
massiveness. The "black mass of the boat" may embody a vague 
sexual threat and contribute to Eveline's distress and hesitation (in 
Finnegans Wake boats often become explicitly phallic—"with his 
runagate bowmpriss he roade and borst her bar" [FW 197]); at the 
end of the dream, however, the daughter is represented overcoming 
all sexual fears, envisioning not only her sexual surrender but also 
her survival, seeing erotic "death" as leading inevitably to self-
renewal, resurrection ("I sink I'd die down over his feet, humbly, 
dumbly, only to washup"). The man ALP gives herself to remains 
characteristically equivocal, the resonances of the Annunciation sug­
gesting the father-lover, but the allusion to "Arkangels" suggesting 
the younger lover as well: as B.J. Tysdahl points out, the conclusion 
to the Wake enfolds a reference to Ibsen's Lady from the Sea (178, 
210), the lover "from Arkangels" being the Stranger in the play, 
the sailor-lover who (as in "Eveline") serves as the father-lover's 
rival. 
In "Eveline" the mother's death and the daughter's possible 
flight are separate narrative events; in the dreamworld they are 
conflated, intermingled, recognized as analogous departures with 
similar causalities—weariness over female roles within the patriarchial 
family. ALP's dual status as both dying mother and fleeing daughter 
leaves the ultimate vision of female journeying and bequeathal of 
keys ambiguously suspended. Although there is a logical critical 
tendency to interpret ALP's keys symbolically, their more literal and 
mundane significance should not be forgotten: they may simply be 
house keys, like those in anyone's pocket or purse. On one level 
these keys left behind at the final decision to depart ("Lps. The 
keys to. Given!" \FW 628]) are perhaps passed from ALP-as-mother 
to Issy-as-daughter, in a wishful vision of dutiful female succession; 
but in her capacity as daughter, ALP may be returning those keys 
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of the house back to the master himself—they are the keys which 
may have logically accompanied Eveline's farewell letter, keys perhaps 
associated with domestic responsibility. 
What happens after the female return in "Eveline" can be 
imagined and is indeed explored from a new perspective in the final 
dream vision of the Wake; what happens after the female departure 
projected within this dream vision on the other level of the dialectic 
cannot, in contrast, be so easily conjectured. In an ending that 
resonates of Ibsen's A Doll House, the leave-taking female relin­
quishes the keys of her safe but oppressive domestic position to 
embrace an unknown that defies conception, resists articulation, 
arrests the flow of the dream language in midstream. When Joyce 
revisits and revises "Eveline" from its inherent male point of view, 
he adumbrates its abyss, that region beyond envisioning: that region 
is surely death itself, but also the female other who eludes the 
dreamer both physically and psychically, perhaps coursing fatalistically 
towards "that other world," perhaps ecstatically towards freedom. 
NOTES 
1. For an account of Nora's threatened departures, see Ellmann's James Joyce, 
687-688. 
2. This is not to suggest that Mr. Hill is the dreamer, that I pretend to have 
solved the riddle of HCE's identity (which ultimately, of course, remains indeter­
minate). What I am suggesting in a larger study of Finnegans Wake (of which this 
essay forms a part) is roughly this: in consttucting the dream of a dying "anyman," 
who relives the successive phases of his life in the dream text, Joyce uses a lot of 
the content of his earlier works—content both psychical (states of mind) and concrete 
(material, situational details)—to express the desires and fears encountered in and 
attached to these successive phases. HCE is a composite figure, created from figures 
not only from history, myth, and earlier works of literature, but also from Joyce's 
own canon. 
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Shahrazade, Turko the Terrible, and Shem: 
The Reader as Voyeur in Finnegans Wake 
HENRIETTA LAZARIDIS POWER 
Finnegans Wake contains a number of references to The Thou­
sand and One Nights; and the number of those Arabian Nights 
provides a model both for the proliferation of accounts of HCE's fall, 
and for the structure of cycle and ricorso which Joyce has borrowed 
from Vico. Like the "one thousand and one stories, all told, of the 
same" (FW 5.28) in Joyce's text, The Thousand and One Nights 
suggest the completion of one cycle (or millenium) and the beginning 
of another. Certainly, the Arabian Nights is a text known for its 
numbers and for its sex—as is Finnegans Wake. Yet Joyce has taken 
another more obscure element from the Arabian Nights, and applied 
it to his own "nightynovel." Among other narrative structures, the 
tales and fables of the Arabian Nights involve a traditional feature 
of medieval Arabic literature known as the "witnessing system"—a 
convention which validates a particular saying (often by Mohammed) 
by locating it in a chain of witnesses who testify to the authority of 
the text (Gerhardt 378). Joyce, too, uses a witnessing system. Yet, as 
the third chapter of the Wake indicates (with the conflicting and 
confusing accounts of passersby and pub customers), Joyce's intent is 
not to validate but to devalue authority. The chain of witnesses 
provides not an accurate testimony, but what Colin McCabe has 
described in Joyce's work as an "infinite regress of meta-languages"— 
these meta-languages being, more simply, the discourses which at­
tempt to certify and specify the meaning of a given prior text, yet 
which become themselves discourses to be specified—or questioned— 
by another witness (14). 
The key here to the unraveling of the chain of witnesses and to 
the devaluation of authority is Joyce's treatment of voyeurism as he 
relates it to the narration and the reading of the Wake. And it is 
here—with regard to the positions of watcher and actor, reader and 
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narrator—that the Arabian Nights provides perhaps its most significant 
contribution to Joyce's redefinition of narrative in the Wake. For, 
like Joyce's narrative tactics in the Wake, Shahrazade s strategy in the 
narration of the Arabian Nights uses forms of voyeurism to subvert 
the balance of authority between teller and listener (or reader), and 
to redefine traditional concepts of textual and sexual mastery. 
Though there are several scenes of voyeurism to consider in the 
Wake, and though there are references to the Arabian Nights through­
out Joyce's text, I will concentrate my discussion here on the tale of 
Willingdone, the Lipoleum(s), and the two jinnies (FW 8.9-10.23)— 
a tale which contains no overt allusions to the Arabian Nights, yet 
which provides an example of the kinds of narrative subversion that 
both Shahrazade and Joyce are engaged in. For my conclusion, I will 
turn to "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies" (FW^II.i) where 
we can watch the aesthetic subversion taking place in the "Magnificent 
Transformation Scene" (FW 222. XI) of a pantomime. Before I discuss 
these texts from the Wake, however, I would like to look at the 
overall structure of the Arabian Nights; and, particularly, I'd like to 
look at the uses of looking in the text. 
Shahrazade's use of narrative as an act of survival and liberation 
is a familiar literary topos. Later on, I will comment on the remarks 
Michel Foucault has made on this subject. But, for the moment, I 
would like to consider certain other elements of narrative structure 
which emerge in the Arabian Nights before Shahrazade arrives at her 
lifesaving narration. The frame narrative which establishes Shahra­
zade's position as the teller of the tales to King Shahryar, as well as 
the tales she tells, involves a complex series of betrayals, assertions of 
authority, and, significantly, episodes of voyeurism. Margot Norris's 
suggestion of a primal scene or primal sin as the source of the various 
episodes of voyeurism in the Wake is appropriate here. In the Wake, 
the primal scene involves the exposure or betrayal which results from 
the children's viewing of their parents' sexual activity (Norris 44-45). 
The primal scene of the Arabian Nights, however, involves the wit­
nessing of one's own sexual betrayal—a scene which is repeatedly 
revised in the rivalry between King Shahryar and his younger brother. 
While sibling rivalry is prominent in both the Arabian Nights 
and the Wake, a more significant rivalry which emerges in the former 
text is that between men and women. Shahryar asserts his own superior 
position in this relationship by enacting a vicarious and sexual revenge 
on his unfaithful wife: he violates a different virgin each night, and 
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orders her to be beheaded the next morning. It is Shahrazade who 
volunteers to be the next—and, she hopes, the last—virgin, and who 
manages to halt this series of violations by telling the King part of 
a tale each night after sex. Significantly, Shahrazade invites her sister 
Donyahzade to become the ostensible audience of her tales; the two 
sisters share both female imprisonment and female narration. In the 
rivalry between male master and female subject, Shahrazade has 
challenged the male-centered hierarchy of elder and younger kings 
with a perhaps female concept of balance and cooperation.1 
The frame of the Arabian Nights, then, provides us with certain 
distinct narrative elements: the notion of witnessing associated with 
betrayal; a rivalry in which witnessing figures as an element in the 
exchange of power; and a configuration of the female pair. These 
elements emerge from a fairly traditional narrative politics. At the 
outset of the Arabian Nights, the male is the master of the female 
subject; he commands the woman to entertain him—as domestic 
servant, and/or as sexual object. (One of the many titles of The 
Thousand and One Nights is, appropriately, The Arabian Nights' 
Entertainments.} To put this situation in textual terms, as the reader 
of the woman s performance, the man reserves the right to judge, 
interpret, and determine her text. He provides the meta-language for 
her discourse. However, the master is subject to two betrayals here— 
both engineered by women. Initially, with the King's betrayal by his 
wife, his power as a reader is subverted; he is forced to read his own 
vulnerability in the Queen's assertion of her own sexual freedom. His 
meta-language, then, becomes implicated in the infinite regression of 
languages which Joyce later turns into Finnegans Wake. As a reader, 
the King has become not so much a reader, a judge, but a passive 
witness to a female rebel's text. However, though the Queen's sub­
version of her master has exposed the fallibility of the master's power, 
the subversion continues to sustain a traditional concept of authority; 
the Queen has simply now put the male, not the female, in the 
position of passivity. 
Significantly, both Shahrazade and Joyce take the Queen s sub­
version one step further as they subject the master to a second betrayal. 
If the Queen has turned the authoritative reader into a passive witness, 
Shahrazade turns the witness into a voyeur—a figure whose position 
involves both passivity and activity, both detachment or concealment 
and participation. This is clear in the King's position regarding 
Shahrazade's narrative. With the presence of Donyahzade in what 
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becomes a narrative menage a trois, the King loses direct control over 
the text. His reading of Shahrazade's performance is mediated by the 
other woman who shares and undermines his position as the sole 
reader/critic. The reader, then, is no longer a detached judge who 
can determine the content of a text with his own interpretive text; 
nor is he a passive witness who is determined by another text (as he 
is while he witnesses his sexual betrayal). If we were to ascribe a 
single position to this reader in the narrative dynamics of Shahrazade's 
revisionary text, we would place him on the margin—not outside, 
but on the edge—of the circle in which the women's narrative is 
enacted. Yet the reader/King's position is not a static one. Rather, 
like a voyeur, the reader is in a compromised position—in two senses 
of the word: not only is he caught in his vicarious enjoyment of the 
sexuality of Shahrazade's tales, but he is also caught between the two 
postures of the supposedly authoritative audience of the tales, and 
the performer in them. (The King's performance consists of the nightly 
sex with Shahrazade which serves as a physical counterpart to the sex 
of her narrative.) 
Shahrazade's revision of the traditional dynamics of reading and 
writing depends largely on the fusion of these two functions. In 
reference to Joyce's work, Helene Cixous has suggested that an un­
derstanding of the text demands a "lecture-ecriture" (419-32)—a 
simultaneous reading and writing. I would add, then, that the text 
is the product, to begin with, of a "lecteur-£crivain"—a reader-writer. 
The same is true of the Arabian Nights, and of the formulation of 
the voyeur. For if the King, as reader, has no stable or static position 
with regard to the text, this is so because the writer of the text is 
also unstable. The King shifts from master to victim because Shah­
razade, too, moves from subject of a dictator to dictator of a tale. 
Like the King, Shahrazade is a voyeur who produces her narrative in 
a compromised position. 
Shahrazade's compromised position is, however, to her advan­
tage. She shares her stance with Turko the Terrible of Ulysses and of 
the Gaiety Theatre's first Christmas pantomime (McHugh 132)—a 
voyeuristic figure who, as the song goes, is "the boy / that can enjoy / 
invisibility" (U 10) precisely because he can proclaim that invisibility 
in the text of his song while he himself remains safely hidden. 
Shahrazade's mobility and invisibility engage her reader in a kind of 
shell game; each time the reader attempts to reveal her under a 
particular cover, he finds that she is elsewhere. It is this ability to be 
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always elsewhere which is essential to the role of the voyeur and to 
Shahrazade's survival as a storyteller. Foucault's remarks on narrative 
and survival are relevant here. 
In "What is an Author?" Foucault asserts that the writer 
"must assume the role of the dead man in the game of writing": 
in order to assert himself in his text, the writer must efface himself 
as well. Foucault excludes Shahrazade from this category of writers, 
saying that, rather than enact death, her text avoids it (by seducing 
the King away from murder into marriage) (102-3). Yet I would 
argue here that Shahrazade avoids death precisely because she does 
play dead in her text; in fact, her seduction is part of her strategic 
self-effacement. She prevents the division of her speaking head from 
her subjected body by presenting herself as an already divided woman. 
While, on the other hand, Donyahzade may divide the King's share 
of power over the tales, she also appeases the King by helping to 
create the illusion of a divided and dependent woman. Shahrazade's 
use of Donyahzade, then, creates a visible mask of invisibility and 
vulnerability for the elusive and manipulative speaker. 
In a sense, Shahrazade's narrative strategy allows her to conduct 
her own Wake. For the Irish, a wake involves a raucous ceremony 
of game-playing, story-telling, singing, and drinking intended to 
protect the mourning household from the spirits of death. Shahrazade 
fends off similar spirits which take the form of the King and his 
violent power. Significantly, she does so not by emphasizing her own 
activity (as do the celebrants described by the ballad of "Finnegan's 
Wake," for instance), but by presenting herself as a passive victim, 
figured in the fragmented image of the two sisters. 
Through her treatment of doubles and halves, and her redirec­
tion of the lines of narrative vision, Shahrazade has subverted the 
traditional formulation of authority, with its suggestion of usurpation 
and rivalry. Yet, as we move from Shahrazade's to Finnegans Wake, 
we see that Joyce's text is full of rivalries—between Willingdone and 
the Lipoleum(s), Buckley and the Russian General, the Cad and 
HCE, Mutt and Jute, and Shaun and Shem, to name a few. And 
while the Arabian Nights moves eventually towards reconciliation, 
the Wake moves along a series of antagonisms whose constant 
realignment propels the text. Nevertheless, the nature of these 
realignments suggests that, like Shahrazade, Joyce locates (or dislo­
cates) the authority of the reader in the figure of the voyeur who is 
both victor and victim, usurper and usurped. In fact, we can see 
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these realignments as part of what Norris has called the "maternal 
salvage" of ALP—like Shahrazade, another revisionary female. 
Though Norris opposes ALP's redistribution and exchange to the 
"unlawful appropriations" of the rival males, I would like to suggest 
that this male rivalry, and its constant /^-balancing of power, is 
subject to transformation by the redistributive aesthetic of ALP 
(64, 67-68). 
As with the initial configurations of power in the Arabian 
Nights, the tale of Willingdone and the Lipoleum(s) seems to indicate 
that authority is determined by one's position as viewer or performer. 
"[F]einting to read in their handmade's book of stralegy," the jinnies 
create a performance, "a cooin her hand" and "a ravin her hair" 
(FW 8.31-34). Like the King who watches the narration dramatized 
as the performance of two women, Willingdone is the reader of the 
two jinnies' calculated self-exposure. But the jinnies are not the only 
performers here. For, as he "git the band up" (FW 8.34), Willing-
done becomes a voyeur who participates vicariously in the sexuality 
of the scene before him. His erection here parallels the King's 
nightly sex with Shahrazade; it represents an enactment of the 
narrative, preventing the reader from determining the text from a 
position of detachment—or from any single position at all. Willing-
done is forced into a simultaneous observation and involvement. 
It might appear that Willingdone maintains a position of mastery 
over the two jinnies. After all, his sexual and martial authority is 
affirmed as "sexcaliber hrosspower" (FW 8.36) just as the power of 
the King's sword is concentrated in, and replaced by, his phallus. 
Yet the potential authority of Willingdone's erection is undermined 
by an emblem of perception: the "tallowscoop" (FW 8.35, 9-34) 
which falls "on the flanks of the jinnies" (FW 8.35-36). Both phallic 
and optic, the tallowscoop implicates the role of the reader with that 
of the voyeur. Even its optic qualities alone suggest the dual role of 
the reader/voyeur as the tallowscoop fuses immediacy and distance, 
detachment and participation. As with the regression of meta­
languages and of witnesses throughout the Wake, here in particular, 
the voyeur joins a chain of viewers and exposers which dislocates 
rather than defines authority. 
As becomes evident when the three rival Lipoleum(s) condense 
into the "hindoo seeboy" (or the "cursigan Shimar Shin") (FW 
10.14, 10.18), the voyeur himself is exposed, seen by another voyeur 
who, unlike Willingdone, appears to remain "hindoo" or hidden. 
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Instead of a chain of witnesses who authorize their own and each 
preceding text, Joyce produces a chain of voyeurs who keep the text 
suspended in indeterminacy. One critic of the Arabian Nights has 
pointed out that Shahrazade's survival and narrative success depends 
on her replacement of the signified with the signifier, a strategy 
which allows for the development of an unlimited number of 
discourses or of witnesses (Ghazoul 43). The same occurs in the 
Wake—a text which remains "lapse but not leashed" (FW 62.24), 
falling, with neither origin nor anchor, from one signifier to the 
next, from one act of voyeurism to another. 
Joyce's narrative strategy here makes possible both a plurality 
of discourses and a plurality of readings or of positions for the 
reader I voyeur to adopt. Perhaps because of this plurality, neither 
and each side emerges as a single victor from the battle for power 
between Willingdone and the Lipoleum(s). Willingdone wins the 
division of his three rivals who are represented by the "triplewon 
hat" (FW 8.15); and the Lipoleum(s), realigned three-in-one as 
Shimar Shin, win their own survival and partial retaliation by blowing 
up both Willingdone's "harse" and the triplewon hat that Willing-
done has hung on the "harse"'s tail (FW 10.2). Since the positions 
of power are determined by the dynamics of both combat and 
voyeurism, the victory here must be a pyrrhic one—in two ways—as 
each master is necessarily made subject to vision and division. 
The pyrrhic or peer-ic victory is essentially the creation of the 
Lipoleum(s) who unsettle the apparently monumental power of 
"Stonewall Willingdone" (FW 10.2) with their fractious and fractured 
presence, "grouching down in the living detch" (FW 8.22). While 
the jinnies read their strategy against Willingdone from a "hand­
made's book" (FW 8.32), so, in a sense, do the Lipoleum(s): they 
take their strategy from Shahrazade's book of tales. As Shahrazade 
has done, the Lipoleum(s) present themselves to their supposed 
master as already divided; in this way, they survive their division 
into "half of the threefoiled hat" (FW 10.8). The Lipoleum(s) center 
their threesome on one soldier—Shimar Shin—whose name suggests 
the antagonistic twins of the Wake, and whose identity appears to 
be constituted in two opposing halves. Joyce has, in a way, prepared 
us for this reading of the Lipoleum(s) through his allusion to 
Giambattista della Porta (as "Gambariste della porca"—FW 935­
36), the author of "I Due Fratelli Rivali." Through Shimar Shin, 
the Lipoleum(s) preserve Shahrazade's illusion of a binary and 
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hierarchical structure while they subvert the mastery of the nominal 
authority—an authority which remains, like its putative subject, always 
elsewhere. After all, with their shifting between a double and a 
triple configuration, the Lipoleum(s) elude both defeat and victory; 
neither Willingdone s sexcaliber, nor the reader's interpretive pene­
tration will succeed in articulating (that is, in both dividing and 
determining) their position. Male rivalry has been feminized, in a 
sense, transformed into the redistributive tactics of the Prankquean 
who turns Tristopher and Hilary (FW 21.12) into Larryhill and 
Toughertrees (FW 22.19, 22.24), and who turns a binary opposition 
like this one (sad/glad) into a triple configuration with her fairy-tale 
pattern of three returns. 
Appropriately, Joyce derives the names of the two "jiminies" 
in the Prankquean episode from Bruno's motto, itself a compromise 
of contraries: "In tristitia hilaris hilaritate tristis" (McHugh 21). It 
would appear that Bruno and Shahrazade have the same function in 
Joyce's text. Both figures represent a breakdown of oppositions into 
reunion or compromise. Nevertheless, there is a difference here, 
suggested in part by the difference in gender. For instance, Shah­
razade's function relates more specifically to oppositions in the 
dynamics of reading and writing. And her manipulation of these 
oppositions suggests the figure of the voyeur as reader-writer—a 
figure, after all, who takes a prominent part in this text about sexual 
exposure and sexually motivated observation. Finally, Shahrazade's 
strategy is a subversive one which involves the concealment inherent 
to the voyeur. Shahrazade's subversion prompts a reconsideration of 
Julia Kristeva's distinction between the rhetorician and the stylist 
with regard to the issue of gender in the Wake. In Desire and 
Language, Kristeva argues cogently that symbolic language is distinct 
from (and, perhaps, in opposition to) semiotic language. The one 
involves a repressive attribution of meaning and fixity, while the 
other operates in the area—or the chora—of the unnameable, of the 
unstable, and of desire; symbolic language belongs to the father, 
while semiotic language is the mother's or the woman's discourse. 
Yet Kristeva goes on to ascribe semiotic (or poetic) language to the 
"stylist" who challenges that father's discourse with a new one of 
his or her own. The "rhetorician," meanwhile, remains fascinated 
with paternal discourse, "miming a father" in his or her symbolic 
language (133-39, 138). I would argue that, in certain respects, the 
stylist simply continues the possessive and repressive behavior of 
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fathers and sons, and of male discourse. It is the rhetorician, on the 
other hand, who adopts Shahrazade's distinctly female strategies of 
subversion and transformation. As Shahrazade has done, the rheto­
rician mimes the father, at the same time, "seducing" him away 
from paternal discourse towards the hybrid and elusive language of 
the chora (or body) he has intended to master (138). 
Shem, too, is a rhetorician, functioning in the Wake like the 
hidden seeboy Shimar Shin. Shahrazade, Shimar Shin, and Shem 
are all voyeurs who announce their power from a position of disguise 
or concealment, and whose discourse both mimes and defies their 
opponents. Joyce makes Shem's dual function clear in his revision 
of the Biblical family which gives Shem his name. Shem's Biblical 
antecedent is known for covering his drunken father Noah without 
taking a glance at Noah's exposed body. His brother Ham, on the 
other hand, is known for both watching and proclaiming his father's 
physical vulnerability. Yet, in Joyce's condensation of Ham, Shem, 
and Japhet into Shem and Shaun, Shem adopts the roles of both 
brothers at once. For, when he writes, Shem's text both covers and 
reveals—proclaims his identity and obscures it. As Shem puts it 
himself, his writing is a "squirtscreen" to detail and disguise a 
"squidself" (FW 186.6-7). As becomes clear in Shem's self-inscrip­
tion with his own excrement, Joyce suggests here that writing involves 
disguise and self-compromise; narrative is a form of de-scription— 
the unwriting of any particular subject of any particular text. And 
it is this de-scription as a transformation of both self and master, 
and as an act of survival, which makes the writer a voyeur, a hidden 
seeboy. 
As I have pointed out, the gaze of the voyeur sets in operation 
a continuing exchange between the positions of reader and writer, 
master and subject. The exchange continues until the two positions 
combine, and until subjection becomes an element of mastery. This 
fusion of opposites is apparent, certainly, in Joyce's frequent allusions 
to Bruno and his theories, and in his use of the Prankquean and 
her threes. In "The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies," as 
well, where pantomimic transformation and combination is the rule, 
we see HCE, "cap-a-pipe" (FIT 220.26), turning into his Shem-like 
rival the Cad; a fallen Shem/Glugg turning into HCE, caught in 
the complex of "Herzog van Vellentam," "Bohnaparts," and "jen­
nyjos" {FW 238.24-26, 238.33); and the Lipoleum(s) or Bohnaparts 
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turning from male to female as they become "la pau'Leonie" to 
"Josephinus and Mario-Louis" {FW 246.16-17). Of course, these 
transformations have been taking place from the very beginning of 
a text which forces us to redefine reading. Margot Norris has pointed 
out Heidegger's observation that reading and gathering are etymo­
logically related. The German lesen, which denotes both activities, 
recasts reading as "not the rapid, automatic decoding to which we 
are accustomed, but a slow, patient, bringing together, putting one 
thing with another" (69). In other words, reading Finnegans Wake 
is a participation in the semiotic, not the symbolic, discourse of a 
voyeur as we confront a language that cannot be decoded or named. 
Moreover, the fixed meta-language of a master has given way to the 
work of a female rhetorician, and to ALP's gathering and redistri­
bution. We can see this transformation of narrative dynamics in the 
"Mime," where the Prankquean and her numbers appear, and where 
"tempt-in-two will stroll at venture and hunt-by-threes strut muske­
teering" {FW 245.19-20) in yet another version of the "baffle of 
Whatalose" {FW 246.27). 
In the gestural language of the "Mime," Joyce offers us a 
dramatization of Shem/Glugg's change from authoritative writer and 
reader to reader-writer (to use Cixous's terms again) or voyeur. 
Somewhere in this pantomime scenario lurks the invisible Turko the 
Terrible of Ulysses and of the Gaiety.3 Here it is Izod, with her 
"grateful sister reflection in a mirror" {FW 220.9) who takes the 
role(s) of Shahrazade and Donyahzade, and who becomes an agent 
of Shem/Glugg's transformation.4 Joyce's diction leads us to associate 
Shem's search for the answer to the flower-girls' riddle with Wil­
lingdone's observation of the jinnies; both men are engaged in some 
sort of visual prying. Shem's "gazework" recalls Willingdone's 
"Wounderworker" tallowscoop {FW 224.26, 8.35); and the slang 
"bander" occurs again in reference to both Shem who must "fand 
for himself," and Shaun who "bandished it with his hand the hold 
time" {FW 224.26, 224.34). Even without linguistic parallels, the 
episode is the same: the male figure looks at the female temptresses 
who resist him as they expose themselves to his gaze. Significantly, 
the context for this resistance has shifted now from warfare to 
interpretation as Shem tries literally to read Izod and her flower-
girls. Yet, as the King has done in his intended reading of Shah­
razade, Shem fails in his attempt. Before we consider the cause for 
Shem's failure, it will be helpful to look at his response to it. 
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Shem answers his failure to provide an answer to the riddle of 
color with an act of revenge: he writes. In his anger, "He do big 
squeal" and he will "set it up all writhefully rate in blotch and 
void" (FW 228.6, 229.27). Like his attempt at interpretation, Shem's 
self-expression participates in the male discourse of "unlawful ap­
propriation." His reading has been an unsuccessful exercise in 
determination—in fixing the elusive text of the flower-girls with his 
authoritative meta-language. To Shem's one-track questions,5 the 
flower-girls and/or Izod respond with only negatives and movement— 
forms of verbal and physical evasion. Shem's written corrective for 
the girls' indeterminacy involves another attempted declaration of 
authority: his "squeal" is a meta-language of aggressive retaliation. 
Nevertheless, though he may intend to state the case against the 
vagueness of heliotrope in the apparent clarity of black and white, 
Shem ends up writing in "blotch and void," "reading off his 
fleshskin and writing with his quillbone" (FW 229.30). In other 
words, whether he likes it or not, Shem resorts to the voyeuristic 
reading-writing of a hidden seeboy. As I.vii has suggested, writing 
involves the de-scription of both the writing subject and the subject 
of the writing. 
I have pointed out that transformations are the rule in Finnegans 
Wake. The conventions of pantomime theatre shed some light on 
the particular type of transformation at work in Joyce's "Mime." 
The "Harley Quinn" {FW 221.25) of traditional pantomime is 
endowed with a slapstick or bat which has the ability to transform 
his surroundings and to convert his enemies. The slapstick has the 
magic power we see in Shems "lifewand" (FW 195.5), and perhaps, 
in Stephen's ashplant (U 432).6 Yet, for all its phallic power, 
Harlequin's wand fails him, and he must be rescued by a "benevolent 
agent" who is traditionally female. What has taken place here is an 
assertion of female power and of a female aesthetic—one which 
replaces combat with reconciliation and reunion. In Shems case, it 
is the combined figures of Izod, the flower-girls, the Prankquean, 
and ALP who transform the phallic mastery of both sex and text. 
As a voyeur, Shem must both read and write with an "eye­
trompit" (FW 247.32-33), and so must accept the error inherent in 
every attempt to see or describe the truth. After all, throughout the 
riddling of the "Mime," Shem can presumably see the colors of the 
rainbow girls ("eye seize heaven!"—FIT 247.31), but he cannot 
articulate those colors in a text. Even his eventual solution of the 
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riddle remains unverbalized. The text tells us simply "Wink's the 
winning word!" and "Luck!"; later on, we are told "There lies her 
word, you reder!" and the letters appear as architectural and ana­
tomical pieces (FW 249.4-5, 249.13-14, 249.16-17). Again, a fixed 
text is impossible; even Izod's word (of honor) will lie to us. As 
with the signs of window, hedge, prong, hand, and so on, the letters 
of Izod's text remain scattered throughout the equally scattered text 
of the Wake. In order for Shem, or any reader, to discover either 
text, he or she cannot simply decode the signs into a meta-language. 
Instead, the reader must gather the letters together, redistribute 
them, and rearrange them. Writing in a voyeuristic mode, Izod has 
concealed the answer to her riddle in her question (FW 248.11-14); 
in order to see it, we must read in the same way. 
For all that it is a pantomime, Joyce's "Mime of Mick, Nick, 
and the Maggies" has its share of sound and words.8 Nevertheless, 
silence has the last word: "Mummum" (FW 259-10). Yet this is not 
a literal, but a figurative silence. Unlike the "Mum's" and the 
"Silanse" (FW 228.15, 228.17) which precede Shem's verbal revenge 
on the flower-girls, this silence suggests the ability of this voyeuristic 
text to remain outside the limiting and determining framework of a 
meta-language. Both the "Mime" and the Wake leave their reader 
able to see the scattered signs of the text, able to gather them 
together in some way, but unable to articulate and master them in 
a language of his or her own. 
In my discussion, I have suggested the possibility that Shahrazade 
offers Joyce a model for the reader redefined as a voyeur who 
simultaneously holds the reader s power of judgment and the writer's 
power of expression, who both discriminates and generates. Like a 
witness in the infinitely regressing chain of Joycean and voyeuristic 
testifiers, Joyce's model has created a model of her own as a 
counterpart to the King. Among her tales in the Arabian Nights are 
some which concern Haroun al Raschid, the Caliph of Baghdad 
during the ninth or tenth century, and the supposedly beloved 
"Commander of the Faithful." The Caliph is also a voyeur who 
masks himself to maintain his form of mastery; disguised as a 
commoner, the Caliph investigates the welfare of his kingdom. He 
becomes, then, a "commander" or dictator who both watches and 
prescribes, who is both passive witness and active teller. In his 
wanderings around Baghdad, the Caliph suggests the Wake's HCE— 
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a suggestion which Joyce hints at through the image of HCE 
"stambuling haround Dumbaling" (FIT 33.36-34.1). Together, HCE 
and Haroun al Raschid suggest a new position for interpretive and/ 
or narrative authority in the configuration of reader, writer, and text. 
The position is, in fact, a lack of position, a lack of any fixed site 
from which a fixed claim to power can be made. In the Wake, the 
identification of place must coincide with disinformation; for instance, 
when we ask where ALP is, the answer must be "we nowhere she 
lives" (FW 10.26). After all, we are forced to look for her through 
an "eyetrompit." 
As the stories about HCE, Willingdone, and others multiply in 
the Wake, the text warns us that we will be unable to distinguish 
an origin or an individual at all: "since in this scherzarade of one's 
thousand one nightinesses that sword of certainty which would 
identifide the body never falls" (FW 51.4-6). If it were to fall, that 
sword would divide head from body, teller from text, or teller from 
listener. And such a divisive and decisive falling would put a stop 
to the somewhat different falling—the linguistic lapsing—which is 
the substance of the Wake. In a sense, the text's principle is to 
conduct a wake for itself—to keep at bay the evil spirits of a 
traditional hermeneutics which determines an origin and an ending 
for its subject, and which produces the final utterance of a meta­
language. One way in which Joyce has kept the traditionalists at bay 
is to transform the sword of certainty—not into the proverbial 
ploughshare, but, as a voyeur would, into a tallowscoop. 
NOTES 
1. Though neither the sisters nor the brothers are twins, the mirroring 
configuration of the women as they share in the presentation of the tales suggests 
a form of equality that the two brothers lack. 
2. As McHugh points out, "bander" is French slang for "to have an 
erection'' (8). 
3. He lurks elsewhere in the Wake as well, as "Turk of the Theater," 
"Thorker the Tourable," and "turgoes the tumble" (FIT 98.10, 132.18, 205.29). 
4. Henceforward, Shem/Glugg will be, simply, Shem. 
5. The first series of questions concerns only gems, and the second, only 
yellow (FW 225, 223). 
6. Appropriately, Stephen uses his ashplant dramatically, "shattering light 
over the world," in the pantomime-influenced play of "Circe" where he ponders 
gesture as a "universal language" (U 432). 
7. With her more powerful wand, the benevolent agent might be a version 
of what Suzette Henke has called the "phallic mother" in Joyce (117-18). 
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8. This is only fitting since, after the Regency, pantomimes ceased to be 
completely silent (Mayer 19). 
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The Wake's Confounded Language 
DEREK ATTRIDGE 
Not far from the venue of the Tenth International James Joyce 
Symposium is a church, Vor Frelsers Kirke, with a superb eighteenth-
century spire, so constructed that around the outside of it a stair 
spirals disconcertingly to the top. There is no truth, my guidebook 
reassures me while inviting me to make the ascent ("in good weather 
only"), in the legend that the builder fell to an untimely death from 
his newly completed but not entirely stable tower. But if the story is 
untrue, how has it gained sufficient currency to merit an official 
denial in a guidebook? And why, in any case, should a guidebook, 
whose function is to enhance my pleasure by giving me facts about 
the objects I see, waste its space with a legend I am told to dismiss 
as false? 
Evidently, the story of the hapless builder, irrespective of its 
historical accuracy, has a vivid appeal which strongly colors the sight­
seer's experience of the fantastic spire—an appeal that springs no 
doubt from its connection with the wide-ranging family of mythic 
and literary texts that work and rework the motif of the building of 
the tower and the consequent fall. (Leaving James Joyce out of it for 
the moment, two texts we might think of are the eleventh chapter 
of Genesis and the ballad of Tim Finnegan.) One way of representing 
the force of this motif is to see it as a parable which teaches the 
virtue of humility: to build a tower, or to climb a ladder, is to 
attempt to rise above one's proper station, and the dizziness that 
seizes the mortal who ascends to such heights is the voice of a god— 
a jealous god, no doubt—who feels his mastery threatened; or, in 
more modern terms, it is the inner voice that whispers to us, just at 
the fatal moment, that our technology can never be adequate to our 
desires. 
But we must remind ourselves of the alternative construction 
which could be placed upon the myth. The tower from which the 
262

The Wake's Confounded Language 263 
builder falls is one which has reached the very limits of human 
capacity; one from which the builder did not fall would, by virtue 
of that fact, be less lofty than it might be. Part of the attractiveness 
of these stories about builders—the sons of Noah, Tim Finnegan, the 
builder of the spire of Vor Frelsers Kirke—is that they invite us to 
take pleasure in humanity's capacity to arouse the envy of the gods, 
in the fact that our desires can always outstrip our technology. From 
this perspective, the Fall is necessarily fortunate, not, as the Christian 
tradition would have it, because it brings forth otherwise unattested 
Divine mercy but because by its own daring it makes manifest the 
prohibition it transgresses against, and in doing so exposes the hidden 
power structure—whether we call it the force of God or the force of 
Nature—within which humanity is obliged to operate. 
One of the significant differences between the myth of the first 
Fall and that of Babel is that the latter is the story of a collective 
struggle with Divine power, not an individual one. And what the 
myth identifies as the source of strength of the collective is language; 
it is this that makes possible the development of the technology of 
brickmaking, described in some detail in Genesis Chapter 11, which 
leads in turn to the plan to "build a city and a tower, whose top 
may reach unto heaven" (Authorized Version, 11.4). But this, inter­
estingly, is not the ultimate aim; we seem to circle back to the power 
of language, since the purpose of the magnificent city (Hebrew 
"Babel" is, of course, Greek "Babylon") is to "make us a name, 
lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth" (11.4). 
Their fears are, it turns out, quite justified: the Lord reflects on the 
power that a shared language gives to a community, and is not happy 
with the prospect. "Behold, the people is one, and they have all one 
language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be 
restrained from them, which they have imagined to do" (11.6). He 
therefore confounds the language of the people, and thus fragments 
the collective and takes away its power. They do indeed make a name 
for themselves, but the name is "Babel," which the Yahwist associates 
punningly with Hebrew "balal," or confusion.1 
The myth of Babel expresses a yearning for a condition of perfect 
mutual intelligibility, for a language of total communication shared 
by all humanity; a Utopian community in which no misunderstanding 
could occur and therefore no strife. Humankind is prevented from 
attaining such a state not by its own weakness but by a law imposed 
from outside; to be thus would be to be as gods. Language is therefore 
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our bane when it could be our salvation. Babel signifies both the 
imaginable possibilities and the actual limitations of collective exis­
tence; the word "Babel" in English has come to mean both "a 
visionary scheme" and "a confused medley of sounds." 
It's a commonplace that our post-Babelian condition is more 
fully evinced in Finnegans Wake than in any other linguistic artifact; 
one of its most notorious features is the cacophony of various lan­
guages, sometimes miraculously chiming but more often multiplying 
dissonant meanings in a confusion of noises. The tireless work of 
explicators has reduced that dissonance by showing that what at first 
sight seems an array of discordant meanings is often an elaborate 
harmony, and one might say that the vision that (consciously or 
unconsciously) has encouraged Wake explication over the years has 
been the same one that underlies the Babel myth: the dream of 
achieving a reading in which all the languages of the Wake will speak 
to one another lucidly and comprehensibly, and thus become one 
language, a new super-language that will unite divided humanity 
once more, at least in the aesthetic realm. This vision, the explicatory 
enterprise assumes, was Joyce's vision: Finnegans Wake is his tower 
of anti-Babel, designed and built to counter the destructive act of 
the jealous god who drove the nations apart, and to bequeath to the 
world an artifact which, by making out of the kaleidoscope of lan­
guages a new tongue and a new name to hold humanity together, 
will succeed where the sons of Noah failed. If much of the Wake 
sounds to us as Babelian confusion, this must be—so it is assumed— 
because we are still locked in our monoglot cultural prisons, lacking 
the energy and enterprise to follow Joyce in his multilingual archi­
tectural feat of total unification. 
We are not, of course, talking only about the interpretation of 
Finnegans Wake; what is at issue is the hermeneutic drive itself, the 
urge to translate what is apparently "confused" into a language 
which will be entirely transparent, to unweave the polyglot textual 
fabric into the monoglot thread. The hermeneutic hope is that the 
Lord will be more lenient this time, and allow the city of mutual 
intelligibility to be built by means of the new technologies of 
interpretation and translation (which are, of course, closely related 
activities). The Babelian texture of the Wake offers the greatest 
possible challenge to the interpreter and translator, one fundamental 
problem being, as Jacques Derrida has pointed out in discussing 
Joyce's use of the Babel myth ("Two Words" 155, "Des Tours de 
The Wake's Confounded Language 265 
Babel" 170-71, and "Table Ronde" 132-33), that the most successful 
translation/interpretation of Wakean words will, by definition, be 
the least successful at relaying a fundamental property of the text: 
its being in more than one language at once. But as long as Joyces 
book is seen, like every other book, as intended for, and amenable 
to, complete explication, the hermeneutic faith will doubtless survive. 
We find, then, that there are two competing uses to which the 
myth of the fall from the tower might be put; it could be taken as 
an encouragement to accept the imperfections that surround us 
(including the impossibility of perfect communication) as the justly 
imposed and unavoidable condition of our existence, or a call to 
regard them as something unjustly willed upon us (or culpably 
allowed by us to come into being) which it is our prime duty as a 
human collective to overcome. I could respond to my guidebook 
entry by lamenting the sad tale of architectural ambition outstripping 
technical capability or by admiring the sacrifice that taught others 
the way forward to more solidly constructed towers. (Among the 
larger systems of belief that would tend, respectively, in these 
directions would be some kinds of Christianity and some kinds of 
Marxism.) From the first perspective, the language of Finnegans Wake 
produces an ironic comedy inviting laughter at our shared ridicu­
lousness and mutual incomprehension (if not an unreadable tragedy 
reflecting despair at our hopeless condition); from the second, it 
constitutes a celebratory comedy demonstrating our potential for 
imaginative fertility and mutual understanding. 
Faced with these two opposing views, we might—following the 
spirit if not the exact method of Fredric Jameson in The Political 
Unconscious—look for a more comprehensive perspective which will 
at once explain the contradicting positions and, without rejecting 
them, move beyond them. They both, it seems to me, arise from 
the same conception of language, a conception that cannot be made 
to cohere with the way language works in practice. Language is 
widely seen, in both popular and scientific understanding, as fun­
damentally and constitutively a matter of intersubjective communi­
cation: a procedure of coding and decoding preexisting mental 
contents, which, if the linguistic machine is working properly, remain 
unchanged by the passage from one mind to another. The efficiency 
of the procedure depends on the arbitrariness of the relation between 
signifier and signified: what matters is that the code is sufficiently 
complex and subtle to encapsulate all the details of the mental 
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contents, and iconic or symbolic relationships would only interfere 
with this. It is arbitrariness that makes possible the existence of more 
than one language (since there is no signifier more or less appropriate 
for any given signified), but it is also arbitrariness that makes possible 
all types of translation (including interpretation, which translates one 
text into another more readable text), since the mental contents are 
assumed to remain constant, and only the way they are encoded 
varies. 
To hold this view of the nature of language is, of course, to 
be puzzled and disappointed by the empirical evidence, which 
suggests that the communicative procedure fails more often than it 
succeeds; there always seems to be some contingent reason why a 
given utterance is unable to yield wholly and truly its burden of 
meaning. ( I leave aside the vexed problem of how one would 
ascertain that anything that could be called a completely successful 
act of communication had in fact occurred.) Particularly unsatisfactory 
in its failure to communicate a stable preexisting meaning is the 
written utterance, and most of all what is called the "literary text" — 
with Finnegans Wake as the worst offender of all. Hence the two 
attitudes I've sketched: resignation at the necessary imperfections of 
a nonideal world, or hope that technological improvements (better 
languages, more efficient channels of communication) or sociopolitical 
advances (increased human solidarity, perhaps) might eventually reveal 
to us language in its true form, as it should always have been. 
A different view of language, however, would not produce this 
disparity between the idea and the experience, a view that I won't 
expatiate on now since it's become familiar, in various versions, in 
the writing of a number of philosophers and literary theorists, but 
could be broadly described in terms of its rejection of the commu­
nication model and its emphasis instead on language's constituting 
and conditioning force. Not just an instrument neutrally serving 
objects and intentions, language operates in and upon the world in 
a host of different ways, and is already implied in any possible 
mental content. The literary text, far from being the most aberrant 
instance of language, is the instance that reveals its nature most 
clearly, as an endlessly retranslatable complex of signifiers, existing 
as part of a set of public, and political, institutions, themselves 
caught in a process of constant transformation. And, in this respect, 
Finnegans Wake is the most typical and the most revealing of all 
literary texts. 
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The myth of Babel, from this wider perspective, is a story 
western culture tells itself to account for the failure of its own model 
of language to match up to the reality it experiences; language has 
to be judged as fallen from its true self, whether necessarily or 
unnecessarily, if the belief in this model is to be sustained. (The 
difference between intralingual and interlingual failure of compre­
hension is not a significant one; we can take the story of Babel as 
referring to the institution of several languages or to the making 
imperfect of the communicative processes within any single language.) 
But Finnegans Wake retells the myth, a number of times, from a 
different perspective: neither lamenting language's fall nor trying to 
secure its recovery, it finds its pleasures in the knowledge that 
language, by its very nature, is unstable and ambiguous. (The 
irreverent treatment of artificial world languages like Esperanto and 
Volapiik in the Wake functions in a similar way.) Once the belief 
in a pure communicative language has been abandoned, the sharp 
difference between monoglot and polyglot discourse disappears; any 
language is many languages—a Babel of registers, dialects, older and 
newer forms, slang and borrowed items, accents and idiosyncracies— 
and all that the Wake does is to extend this logic to its comic 
extreme. True, no single reader could assimiliate all the Wake's 
languages; but no single hearer could assimilate all the languages— 
no doubt confused and contradictory languages—that I give utterance 
to, knowingly or unknowingly, each time I produce an everyday 
statement. 
As Laurent Milesi points out in an informative article entitled 
"The Babelian Idiom of Finnegans Wake, " there is a reference early 
in the Wake to the traditional number of nations—and hence 
languages—on earth, a reference which reminds us that a linguistic 
item will have as many meanings as there exist codes in which to 
place it: 
So you need hardly spell me how every word will be bound 
over to carry three score and ten toptypsical readings throughout 
the book of Doublends Jined. (20.13-18) 
But this, of course, is true of every word of every book, not just of 
our circular story of Dublin's giant. Babel is a condition of all 
language, not just that of the Wake, and it is this that provides 
language with its power to give pleasure and to change the world 
(by no means incompatible functions). In Joyce's text, the myth of 
the fall from the shaky tower of Babel may be read, like all the 
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many falls in the book, not as a moral lesson in humility, not as a 
symbol of defeated human aspiration, but as an instance—comically 
transformed—of the way we represent to ourselves, in language, 
language's refusal to be a mere instrument of transcendent intentions 
or desires. 
Milesi reminds us of an anecdote of Budgens which is worth 
quoting in full: 
Joyce once told me (it was during the composition of Vinnegans 
Wake) that he thought he had found the meaning of the Tower 
of Babel story. If I had done my bounden duty I should have 
been ready with "what?" and "how?" and "tell," but, slow 
of wit and more apt to ruminate than to ask, I let the occasion 
slide, so that what Joyce thought was the true inwardness of the 
Biblical story is anybody's guess. ("Resurrection" 12) 
It is perhaps just as well that Budgens inquisitiveness failed him at 
this point, since Vinnegans Wake itself stands as a much richer 
exegesis of the story of Babel than could have been communicated 
by even the most meticulous biographer. 
NOTE 
1. Tim Finnegan's upward mobility is also related to both language and 
bricks: the ballad informs us that "He had a tongue both rich and sweet, / An' 
to rise in the world he carried a hod." 
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Also of Interest 
Stephen and Bloom at Life's Feast

Alimentary Symbolism and the Creative Process

in James Joyce's Ulysses

by Lindsey Tucker 
"The relationship between the alimentary process and the creative process in James Joyce's 
Ulysses is examined here for the first time in sufficient detail. More than just a study of the 
way Joyce uses the ingestion transformation and elimination of food as a metaphor or symbol 
for the creative process (although it is that too), Tucker's study explores the mythic and ritual 
significance and origins of the alimentary symbolism in Ulysses and shows how the alimentary, 
reproductive, and religious symbolism interconnect to create the complexity of character and 
language in the work... .Well worth the attention of serious students, scholars, and critics of 
James Joyce's Ulysses.'1 
—Choice 
ISBN D-S142-D3hl-a 
Joyce's Moraculous Sindbook

A Study of Ulysses

by Suzette A. Henke

"Suzette Henke uses existential phenomenology to read Ulysses as a book about the sinful 
miracle of being. She shows Stephen and Bloom departing from defined virtue, transcending a 
world of dead categories, by understanding themselves in relation to the immediacy of 
experience and to each other. Her approach, often expressed with lively sensitivity, yields 
refreshing and important insights about self-creation in Ulysses." 
—James Joyce Quarterly 
ISBN 0-filM2-02?S-b 
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